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Abstract
Humanitarian interventions to stop mass atrocities are among America’s most
controversial uses of military force overseas since the end of the Cold War. While
there is much research analysing the justifications for and conduct of humanitarian
interventions, there is very little scholarly investigation of how and why interventions
end. Indeed, successive US presidents have struggled to implement exit strategies
from humanitarian interventions with the outcome often dismissed as ‘mission creep’.
In this thesis, I use US presidential rhetoric as a way to understand exit strategy
dynamics in humanitarian interventions. In particular, I explore how American
presidents publicly justified their exit strategies in four interventions from 1991-
2011—northern Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo and Libya. My normative concepts analysis of
more than 700 texts shows how presidents craft exit strategies through practices of
public justification and legitimation to their domestic audience. I argue a president’s
discursive engagement is constrained by three groups of normative expectations
shaping the realm of imagined possibilities for how America should use force when
responding to humanitarian crises; specifically the US should: (1) fulfil its moral
responsibility to stop atrocities, fight evil and promote political transformation; (2)
win its military engagements; and (3) avoid quagmires. These expectations frame
justifiable uses of military force, but also exist in tension with one another, and are
in turn affected by changing battlefield conditions, past intervention experiences,
domestic and international pressures, and personal preferences. How presidents
navigate these tensions affects their troop withdrawal decisions, including failures to
7
Anna Samson
implement exit strategies.
My thesis is the first comparative analysis of America’s exit strategies in four of
the most significant humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era. By using
public justification analysis to illuminate decision-making dynamics, I overcome the
shortcomings of applying extant victory, war termination and end state planning
theories to humanitarian interventions. By identifying the normative constraints on
exit strategy decision-making, I demonstrate how and why mission creep occurs. My
thesis provides evidence for military planners and policy advisers who are considering
using force to stop a mass atrocity, to take normative expectations seriously in
considering when and how troops will withdraw.
Finishing the job 8
Contents
Contents 11
1 Introduction 17
1.1 Chapter outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2 Humanitarian Intervention, Victory, Exit Strategies and Mission
Creep 33
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 What is ‘humanitarian intervention’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Success in humanitarian interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 Victory and its limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Theories of war termination and mission creep . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3 Discourse, Justification and Normative Expectations 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 A word on normative expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Discourse and foreign policy action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.1 Discourse and culture in foreign policy analysis . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.2 Political discourse theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.3 Public justification theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.4 The rhetorical presidency during wartime . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.5 Narrative framework and national role conception . . . . . . . 78
3.4 A discursive understanding of exit strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4.1 Political myths in the narrative framework of intervention . . 82
9
Contents Anna Samson
3.4.2 US exceptionalism and manifest destiny . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.3 ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4.4 Victory still matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.5.1 Domestic institutional framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5.2 International context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.5.3 Presidential agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4 Method, Data and Research Findings 109
4.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.2 Data overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3 Analytical framework for research findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5 Providing Comfort in Northern Iraq (1991–1996) 133
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2 The rhetorical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.2.1 The end of the Cold War and the new world order . . . . . . . 136
5.2.2 The Gulf War, moral duty and the Vietnam Syndrome . . . . 138
5.3 Talking about exit before intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.4 Justifying exit in Provide Comfort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.5 Justifying exit with ground troops deployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.6 UN transition exit strategy not an exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.7 Justifying exit in Provide Comfort II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6 Providing Relief in Somalia (1992–1995) 183
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.2 The rhetorical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.2.1 Humanitarian crisis in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.2.2 Expanding the ‘humanitarian exception’ to nonintervention . . 187
Finishing the job 10
Contents Anna Samson
6.2.3 The new world order’s transformative potential . . . . . . . . 189
6.3 Justifying exit in Provide Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.4 Justifying exit in Restore Hope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.5 UN transition exit not an exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
6.6 Justifying exit in Continue Hope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
6.7 Justifying exit after the Battle of Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
6.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
7 Striking the Noble Anvil in Kosovo (1999–) 231
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
7.2 The rhetorical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
7.3 Talking about exit before intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
7.4 Justifying exit in Noble Anvil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
7.5 Problems exiting from Noble Anvil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
7.6 Justifying exit in Joint Guardian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
7.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
8 Dawning Odyssey in Libya (2011) 277
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
8.2 The rhetorical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
8.2.1 Obama’s promise to end America’s wars and prevent genocide 281
8.2.2 Emerging responsibility to protect (R2P) ideas and practice . 284
8.2.3 The Arab Spring reaches Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
8.3 Talking about exit before intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
8.4 Justifying exit in Odyssey Dawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
8.5 Exit from Odyssey Dawn not an exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
8.6 Justifying exit in Unified Protector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
8.7 Problems exiting from Unified Protector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
8.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
9 Conclusion 323
Finishing the job 11
Contents Anna Samson
Bibliography
Finishing the job 12
Contents Anna Samson
Acronyms
AU African Union
CAQDAS computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DHA discourse-historical approach
DMZ demilitarised zone
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FPA foreign policy analysis
ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IED improvised explosive device
IFOR Implementation Force
IR international relations
ISIS the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
LAS League of Arab States
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Finishing the job 13
Contents Anna Samson
MARO Mass Atrocity Response Operations
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFZ no-fly zone
NGO non-government organisation
NoCA normative concepts analysis
NSC National Security Council
NTC National Transitional Council–Libya
OAS Organisation of American States
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PDD-25 Presidential Decision Directive 25
PDT political discourse theory
PJT public justification theory
PKK Partiya Karkereˆn Kurdistaneˆ (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
QRF Quick Reaction Force
R2P responsibility to protect
SFOR Stabilisation Force
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Finishing the job 14
Contents Anna Samson
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNITAF Unified Task Force
UNOSOM United Nations Mission in Somalia
UNOSOM II United Nations Mission in Somalia II
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commision on Iraq
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United Somali Congress
WMD weapon of mass destruction
WWII World War II
Finishing the job 15
Contents Anna Samson
Finishing the job 16
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
How do American presidents justify their decisions to end military interventions
attempting to stop atrocities overseas? Or, as is sometimes the case, how do presidents
explain why exit strategies have changed and soldiers will not be coming home as
originally planned? The conventional wisdom is presidents choose to withdraw
soldiers once their objectives are achieved. Indeed American presidents often talk
about their exit strategies in terms of ‘finishing the job’ at which point they can
declare ‘mission accomplished’.
Perhaps the most famous ‘mission accomplished’ announcement occurred, not during
a humanitarian intervention, but on 1 May 2003 with those very words emblazoned
on a banner on USS Abraham Lincoln. The banner was the literal and metaphorical
backdrop for a harness-wearing President George W. Bush, arriving in spectacular
fashion, having co-piloted an arrested landing on the aircraft carrier. The Commander-
in-Chief was there to laud America’s achievements in the Iraq War less than two
months after it began. Bush’s banner was memorable because public declarations
about mission completion carry practical and political consequences. Bush was
talking about a military operation, which, at least at the time, was an inter-state
war. In this context, ‘mission accomplished’ meant military victory. Bush referred
to winning on the battlefield in his 1 May speech saying US troops had “prevailed in
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Iraq”, congratulating them on a “job well done”.1
The American public, domestic media outlets and international commentators in-
terpreted Bush’s banner as declaring American victory in Iraq, and with the war
almost over, US soldiers would soon return home. These initial interpretations were
based on a discursive link between victory and troop withdrawal;2 if Bush said troops
had achieved their mission, there was little reason to keep American soldiers in and
around Iraq. Stage-managing an event to foreground this discursive link also helped
vindicate Bush’s initial decision to deploy troops while simultaneously reassuring
audiences exit was imminent. The interpretations were inaccurate, however, as the
Iraq War was far from over in May 2003.
As the Iraq war continued, the Bush Administration tried recasting the memory of
the ‘mission accomplished’ banner as a press “mischaracterisation”.3 At the same
time, the White House publicly reinforced the idea of winning in Iraq as a precursor
for exiting. Bush’s National Security Council framed its 2005 strategy for victory
in Iraq as a strategy for exit, while also reminding observers “no war has ever been
won on a timetable”.4
Despite the promise of this strategy and its many subsequent iterations, US military
involvement in Iraq continued for a further ten years. American troops deposed
Saddam Hussein and assumed control of the vestiges of his regime; troops conducted
1. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, May 1, 2003.
2. Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” Foreign Affairs, 1998, no. 1, 56–67.
3. Deputy Assistant for Communications in the Bush White House, Scott Sforza quoted in
Tahman Bradley, “Press Missed ‘Mission Accomplished’ Meaning, Says Bush Staffer,” ABC News,
September 19, 2001,
4. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq sets out “8 Pillars of Victory”: Defeat the Terrorists
and Neutralise the Insurgency; Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance; Help Iraqis Form a National
Compact for Democratic Government; Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential
Services; Help Iraq Strengthen its Economy; Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law and Promote
Civil Rights; Increase International Support for Iraq; and Strengthen Public Understanding of
Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of the Insurgents. The Strategy acknowledges the obvious
breadth of these goals noting that the US government is organised for “long-term success” and
in Iraq, the US is “organised for victory to an extent not seen since the end of the Cold War.”
George W. Bush, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” 2005, accessed October 25, 2017; See
also Gareth Porter, “The Third Option in Iraq: A Responsible Exit Strategy,” Middle East Policy
12, no. 3 (2005): 29–45; Kurt Shillinger, “The ‘Victory’ Code: Bush’s Exit Strategy and Prospects
for Iraq,” South African Journal of International Affairs 12, no. 2 (2005): 105.
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counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations, disbanding, reforming and
training the Iraqi military. Billions of dollars in United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) programs and related state-building, democracy and human
rights initiatives, including overseeing national elections, buttressed the work of US
soldiers and military contractors.5 A decade after his infamous speech and well after
he left office without an end to the Iraq war in sight, Bush acknowledged the banner
had misled observers into thinking the war was over.6
Bush and his successor Barack Obama tried to convince Americans they had won
(or were at least on track to winning) the war in Iraq, despite the rising US casualty
numbers, persistent instability and unrelenting insurgent attacks. The war invited
comparisons with the earlier Vietnam War, a now-pathologised example of US defeat
and failure to make a timely exit.7 While the differences between the Iraq and
Vietnam Wars far outnumber their similarities, the quagmire frame associated with
Vietnam was applied to Iraq in domestic American popular discourse and scholarly
analysis.8 Even when Obama officially ended the Iraq War in 2014,9 his decision to
redeploy US soldiers to Iraq the following year to fight a new war against the global
terrorist organisation ISIS took the shine off victory declarations and undermined
his exit strategy implementation. A number of analysts argued ISIS emerged and
5. Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, Adelphi, 434-435 (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012); Toby Dodge, “Intervention and Dreams of
Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq,”
Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (2013): 1189–212; Gregory M. Morgan, “History of Iraq,
1990–Present,” in The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf,
Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, ed. Spencer Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts (Santa Barbara:
ABC-CLIO, 2010), 590–97; James Dobbins, Coalition Provisional Authority, and International
Security and Defense Policy Center, Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2009).
6. David Sanger, “President Says Military Phase in Iraq Has Ended,” The New York Times, May 2,
2003, James Wright, “10 Years After ‘Mission Accomplished,’ the Risks of Another Intervention,”
The Atlantic, May 1, 2013, Cheryl Gay Stolberg, “Mistakes, I’ve Made a Few, Bush Tells Reporters,”
The New York Times, January 12, 2009,
7. The connections between the two wars has been the subject of scholarly inquiry, see for
example: John Dumbrell and David Ryan, eds., Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, Lessons, Legacies and
Ghosts, Contemporary Security Studies (London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2007).
8. Herbert W. Simons, “From Post-9/11 Melodrama to Quagmire in Iraq: A Rhetorical History,”
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10, no. 2 (2007): 188; Discussion of the errors of the war, including the
failed exit strategy, spawned a number of works including Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American
Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).
9. For more on the strategic, logistic and other challenges of ending the Iraq War see Rick
Brennan Jr et al., Ending the US War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and
Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013).
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grew in prominence in part because of America’s 2003 war.10
So strong is the connection in the public imagination between winning and exiting
that Bush’s ‘mission accomplished’ banner has become a symbol of hubris in wartime,
of mission creep and the difficulties of successfully ending a war, of a president
misunderstanding the nature of a military engagement and executing a poor public
relations strategy. Satirical references to the mission accomplished banner in Ameri-
can television shows and elsewhere in domestic media all point to the prematurity of
Bush’s success claims precisely because US troops remained in Iraq and the goals of
dramatic political transformation were not achieved.11
In strategic studies and international relations literature, the connection between
ideas of victory and exit in military operations is axiomatic. Victory means exit and
having a good exit strategy is part of winning. If troops don’t leave after they fulfil
their objectives, they have fallen prey to ‘mission creep’, a problem best avoided
through more careful operation planning. The relationship between victory, exit and
mission creep is problematic in humanitarian interventions, however, because the
normative impetus for these military operations and expectations for their conduct
are different to other military operations where defending foreign citizens from falling
victim to mass atrocities is not central to commencing or continuing an operation,
especially when compared to defeating the enemy. The ‘humanitarian’ character
of humanitarian intervention demands a mission motivated by and conducted with
moral integrity. This requires more than simply following just war principles but
includes adhering to taken-for-granted, normative expectations of how to use military
force appropriately. These include expectations about how far America’s moral
10. Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Robert K.
Brigham, “The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq,” in Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, ed. Beth L Bailey and Richard H Immerman (New York, 2015); John Cassidy,
“ISIS and the Curse of the Iraq War,” The New Yorker, August 28, 2015.
11. For example, in the 2004 HBO series The Wire included an episode entitled “Mission Accom-
plished” that writer David Simon explained was his homage to the war in Iraq, in particular the
problems of continuing and ending a war commenced on false pretences. In 2009 Fox television’s
long-running cartoon The Simpsons included an episode in which the ‘mission accomplished’ banner
unfurled on the shores of England prior to the historic battle where the English Navy defeated
the Spanish Armada. Fox television’s Arrested Development, which more broadly parodied the US
relationship with the Iraqi government prior to its 2003 war, also featured a ‘mission accomplished’
banner over one of the Bluth family’s poorly-constructed homes.
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responsibilities extend and in which directions, what it means to succeed or ‘win’,
and the conditions under which US troops can withdraw with their honour intact. The
practical challenges of matching the instrument of military force with the objectives
of solving a human rights problem extends to decisions about how and when to end
these operations.
The term ‘exit strategy’, only entered US public discourse in 1993 with America’s
humanitarian intervention in Somalia.12 In Somalia, the US encountered difficulties
deploying soldiers into hostile territory to prevent a humanitarian disaster. Protecting
civilians proved difficult in the absence of functioning state institutions, famine and
civil conflict. In Somalia US policy-makers tried to frame the question of troop
withdrawal separately from the question of victory. While America’s wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have come to epitomise the challenge of exit strategies, humanitarian
interventions are what have given exit strategies their shape as military planning
and rhetorical concepts.
My thesis focuses on presidential exit strategy justifications in humanitarian inter-
ventions for four reasons. First, exit decisions are under-theorised and -examined,
especially when compared with decisions to launch humanitarian interventions and
prescriptions for conducting interventions. Second, despite the role public justifi-
cation plays in framing and constraining foreign policy action, it has not attracted
a commensurate level of scholarly attention. Third, conventional explanations of
why successive US presidents struggled to conclude humanitarian interventions often
rely on the assumption presidents do not plan for exit making them susceptible to
‘mission creep’. This explanation is unconvincing in its generality and, given the
resources devoted to operational planning, does not adequately explore the dynamics
of how and why mission creep occurs. Fourth, my emphasis on public justifications
demonstrates the value of discourse analysis to foreign policy analysis, international
relations and strategic studies.
12. Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion.”
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American presidents do not speak in a vacuum and the audiences for their remarks
exist far beyond US borders. At the same time, however, in my examination of
presidents’ verbal statements regarding humanitarian intervention, their primary
audience was domestic constituents. Even when a president talks overseas, the
overwhelming majority of the comments about US foreign policy are framed in
ways that resonate with American audiences and are explicitly targeted at this
domestic audience. Even in press conferences, almost all answers presidents provide
are to questions posed by American journalists writing for domestic press outlets.
Together with other rhetorical presidency and public justification scholars, therefore,
I focused on analysing presidential speech acts, contextualising them with the help
of Congressional debates, media coverage and opinion poll data.
While I acknowledge presidential rhetoric may at times be insincere or calculated to
manipulate, this does not diminish the value of a president’s public justifications.
A president’s public statements demonstrate, at the very least, they believe their
audience will find such statements persuasive and consequently influence future
discourse and action. The primary interest for my thesis is not to uncover the
subconscious core of presidential intent or motivation or to reveal the truth or
otherwise of particular statements about intervention. Rather, it is to make apparent
the discursive strategies adopted in the service of a specific political objective: ending
a humanitarian intervention. My aim is also to reveal the effects these strategies
have on subsequent discursive strategies presidents adopt; even when they actively
seek to later relax or change these standards they are constrained by their earlier
rhetorical choices.
Because humanitarian interventions are a response to a human rights crisis overseas
affecting foreigners, rather than a direct domestic threat, presidents cannot rely on
‘self-evident’ justifications like protecting the homeland from an existential threat.
Humanitarian interventions are therefore among the most politically controversial
military operations and more likely to require presidents to consciously, publicly
justify their actions. I chose to focus on humanitarian interventions because they
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arise in circumstances where protecting others, rather than ‘national interest’ or
existential threat is the dominant, publicly-stated motivation. Consequently the
tensions and contradictions between normative expectations about the role of military
force in achieving foreign policy objectives, setting boundaries for mission success,
and the limitations of military force to achieve sustainable human rights outcomes
are more easily observable. My thesis thus explores how these tensions manifest in
practice when presidents are faced with decisions about troop withdrawal. Although
the emergence of the responsibility to protect movement in 2001 has affected public
discourse on collective international responsibility to protect civilians from gross
human rights violations wherever they occur, humanitarian intervention remains an
act worthy of investigation because it is still an option under R2P principles when it
is too late to pursue other atrocity prevention solutions or those actions have failed.
R2P has also opened space for humanitarian intervention to be used preventatively
as well as in response to an atrocity already underway.
In my thesis I follow the work of Uriel Abulof and Markus Kornprobst to identify the
normative expectations framing presidential justifications for exit strategy decisions
in humanitarian interventions.13 In particular, I show how normative expectations
shape US presidents’ imagined possibilities for justifiably withdrawing troops; how
these expectations foreclose some exit options for decision-makers and make others
practically and politically unavoidable. I also demonstrate these normative expec-
tations remain salient across time and persist whether the president is Republican
or Democrat; whether, like Bush or Clinton, a president conducts more than one
humanitarian intervention during his term of office; whether an intervention, like
northern Iraq or Somalia, begins with one president and ends with another; and
whether, as with Obama, the humanitarian intervention follows a major strategic
shock such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. What does change, however, is the
way presidents attempt to navigate these expectations, crafting strategic narratives
13. Uriel Abulof and Markus Kornprobst, “Introduction: The Politics of Public Justification,”
Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1 (2017): 1–18; Uriel Abulof and Markus Kornprobst, “Unpacking
Public Justification,” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1 (2017): 126–33; Uriel Abulof, “Normative
Concepts Analysis: Unpacking the Language of Legitimation,” International Journal of Social
Research Methodology 18, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 73–89.
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based on past humanitarian intervention experiences, battlefield realities and personal
preferences. My case studies were selected because they enabled me to make these
comparisons, augmenting case study analysis with a story of continuity and change.
I look into the black box of mission creep to uncover some of the dynamics that keep
America from successfully ending its humanitarian interventions.
My research shows that far from failing to consider exit in humanitarian interventions,
American presidents are preoccupied with exit strategies, devoting much of their
time to discussing the conditions for exit and how they are going to create those
conditions. In some cases, presidents refused to commence operations until they were
convinced a viable exit strategy was in place; at other times they chose operational
approaches based predominantly on their preferred exit strategy.
After line-by-line analysis of all public verbal texts on the humanitarian interventions
under review, the argument I develop in this thesis is that presidential justifications for
exit strategies consistently draw upon a cluster of domestic normative ideas regarding
the best use of American military power. Three groups of normative expectations
emerged from the data: (1) America must fulfil its moral responsibilities to stop
atrocities, fight evil and promote political transformation; (2) America must achieve
victory preferably decisively; and (3) US troops must be assured of an exit to
guarantee troops will not get stuck in a quagmire, costs will be minimal, and America
will not be an occupying power. These normative expectations are grounded in ideas
regarding America’s national identity as a moral actor in international relations,
a national obsession with winning and, based on ‘lessons’ from World War II and
Vietnam, ideas about what it means to fight and win good wars. As embodied
representatives of the American nation and leading foreign policy actors, presidential
rhetoric reproduces and reinforces these normative expectations, referencing the
expectations in public justifications for exit.
It is hard, however, for presidents to satisfy all three groups of normative expecta-
tions simultaneously over the course of a humanitarian intervention. This means
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US presidents can be observed making strategic narrative choices about which
normative expectations to emphasise in their public narratives about each humani-
tarian intervention. These choices were, of course, affected by changing battlefield
conditions, domestic and international pressures and personal preferences but I
demonstrate how these choices were persistently constrained by the three sets of
normative expectations about the justifiable use of force. Presidents’ constrained
narrative choices affect their exit options and contribute to less-than-ideal or not
implemented exit strategies.
My investigation is situated within the study of discourse in foreign policy analysis,
specifically public justification analysis.14 I examined more than 700 texts comprising
verbal statements delivered by American presidents in the form of public addresses
and answers to questions over the course of four humanitarian interventions between
1991 and 2011: northern Iraq (1991–1996), Somalia (1992–1994), Kosovo (1999–)
and Libya (2011). My thesis is the first comparative study of US humanitarian
intervention exit strategies in the post-Cold War period. It provides a unique insight
into how exit strategies and their justifications are similar over time and space and
how they change, thereby contributing to the literature on humanitarian intervention,
exit strategies in military operations, and US foreign policy analysis. My research
also augments the literature exploring presidential rhetoric, demonstrating the role
presidential discourse plays in shaping exit strategies for humanitarian interventions.
I show how presidents exercise agency in crafting strategic narratives as well as
how these narratives are shaped and constrained by normative expectations about
American foreign policy behaviour.
The research method I adopt in this thesis contributes to the growing field of public
justification analysis. It is one of the few studies of foreign policy and military
strategy combining the discourse-historical approach with normative concept analysis
to look at public justifications for decisions. Discursive analysis is not a tools that is
14. Liah Greenfeld, “Caveat: Addressing Public Justification as an Empirical Phenomenon,”
Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1 (2017): 120–25; Markus Kornprobst, “From Political Judgements
to Public Justifications (and Vice Versa): How Communities Generate Reasons upon Which to Act,”
European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 1 (2014): 192–216.
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often applied in the field of military strategy. My research provides an example of
how discourse analysis can help decision-makers better understand the constraints
and opportunities they have to shape strategic narratives about military operations
and exit strategies.
1.1 Chapter outline
In the following chapter I explore the contours of theoretical debates about humani-
tarian intervention as they intersect with war termination and victory theories. I
highlight a gap in the literature where all three fields overlap and show the ways
existing analyses have not sufficiently considered the domestic normative expecta-
tions inherent in conducting humanitarian interventions. In particular, I identify
the ways existing literature often fails to distinguish between the different types
of exit strategies contemplated by decision-makers in humanitarian interventions
that are not always a feature of other military operations, including operational
disengagement, and transitions to the United Nations (UN), regional organisations
or local authorities.
In Chapter 3 I present the conceptual framework for my analysis, focusing on discourse
analysis, public justifications and political myths. I examine the ‘discourse of foreign
policy’ and explain how this conceptual framework provides a way to move beyond
the presently inadequate explanations of exit strategy formation and implementation
in humanitarian interventions. I note the ways that discourse provides the ‘context
of action’ for decision-makers. Following the work of rhetorical presidency scholars, I
explain why presidential discourse is an important locus for understanding decision-
making in military operations. As the Commander-in-Chief, the US president has
singular authority to deploy US soldiers overseas. Congressional efforts to constrain
this authority have been weak to the point some scholars have argued an “imperial”
presidency has emerged and continued to develop over the subsequent presidential
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terms.15 As the head of the executive branch of the federal government, the president
also represents and discursively re-presents the American people to themselves and
the world beyond. US presidential rhetoric can therefore reveal how the context of
action is constructed and constrains presidents’ imagined possibilities for action.
In Chapter 4 I set out my method and analytical framework for the four case studies
that follow. I outline the steps in my analysis showing how I integrated a discourse-
historical approach with discourse tracing and normative concepts analysis. The
methodological approach I selected builds on the investigation methods pioneered
by public justification scholars. My granular analysis of a large number of texts
allowed me to identify and compare thematic framing patterns within and between
cases. It also allowed me to observe connections within and between texts that might
otherwise be obscured by a purely semantic analysis.
In Chapter 5 I apply my analytical framework to the first US humanitarian inter-
vention of the post-Cold War era: the intervention in northern Iraq (1991–1996).
This was an intervention from which US troops did not completely withdrew despite
there being two exit strategies of operational disengagement and UN transition. I
show how both president Bush’s and president Clinton’s focus on America’s moral
responsibilities to the Kurds constrained their exit strategy choices, especially as
both presidents were committed to not ending the intervention until US troops had
‘succeeded’. In this case study I show how success is important for implementing
exit but also how ideas of victory and success are defined by normative ideas of
moral responsibility, which in turn affect the possibilities for exit. Northern Iraq was
an intervention shared between two presidents of different political persuasions but
the narrative choices Bush made about how to frame the conditions for American
troop withdrawal also constrained Clinton’s decisions about how to implement an
exit strategy. Both Bush and Clinton’s imagined possibilities for withdrawing troops
were shaped by persistent normative expectations of how to use military force in
humanitarian crises. Both chose to emphasise America’s moral responsibility to
15. William C. Banks and Jeffrey D. Straussman, “A New Imperial Presidency? Insights from US
Involvement in Bosnia,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 2 (1999): 195–218.
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promote political transformation in Iraq over other considerations. Without effec-
tively removing the threat President Hussein posed to the Kurds, both presidents
found it difficult to withdraw American forces lest their ‘success’ be undermined by
a return to violence. Despite the failing to result in a complete removal of troops,
Bush and Clinton’s narrative choices in northern Iraq shaped exit strategy discourse
in subsequent US humanitarian interventions.
In Chapter 6 I discuss how Bush’s absorption of the northern Iraq intervention
into the wider narrative of the Gulf War’s ‘success’ contributed to him framing an
intervention in Somalia as similarly ‘doable’. Somalia, however, became notorious
for the difficulties American presidents face when crafting and implementing exit
strategies in humanitarian interventions. Despite the conventional wisdom that
neither Bush nor Clinton had an exit strategy in Somalia, it is more correct to say
there was no consistent exit strategy. There were in fact three exit plans: operational
disengagement, UN transition and a combined local transition/withdrawal. Problems
implementing these strategies occurred as both Presidents Bush and Clinton changed
how they framed moral responsibilities over the course of the intervention, which in
turn affected their decisions to change exit strategies. Again, Clinton continued an
intervention begun by his predecessor, and while he was constrained by Bush’s exit
justifications for Somalia, he also shaped his own strategic narrative about exit. In
Somalia Clinton’s exit strategy justifications changed to immediate withdrawal when
success seemed unachievable but failure could not be admitted. In this instance,
Clinton’s narrative was still affected by normative expectations regarding American
moral purpose and success to make a noble exit possible.
Somalia affected the way the US responded to future humanitarian crises. Somalia’s
‘lesson’ created the so-called Somalia Syndrome and contributed to Clinton’s reticence
to use military force to stop the 1993 genocide in Burundi and the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda, but also limited his response to mass atrocities in Bosnia in 1992–1995.
When a new round of mass atrocities threatened the Kosovar Albanians in the
former Yugoslavia, Clinton supported another humanitarian intervention, a case
Finishing the job 28
Chapter 1. Introduction Anna Samson
I examine in Chapter 7. Despite (or perhaps because of) his discursive focus on
exit, Clinton pursued three different exit strategies over the course of the Kosovo
intervention. Taking a different approach to that he followed in Somalia, Clinton’s
strategic narrative emphasised the normative expectation his intervention must have
an implementable exit strategy for American forces over the expectation America had
a moral obligation to protect civilians from mass atrocities. Clinton’s justifications
for his exit strategies revealed how difficult it was to maintain this emphasis and
ultimately, how prioritising exit opened the Kosovo intervention to criticism that US
moral responsibilities were unmet and therefore the intervention was unsuccessful.
Thus, when Clinton decided to embrace the full extent of America’s moral duties with
a view to achieving sustainable success, troop withdrawal became very difficult to
the point US troops remain in Kosovo today, fulfilling essentially the same mandate
under which they were deployed in 1999.
More than a decade passed between Clinton commencing the Kosovo intervention
and the next time a US president used military force to stop a mass atrocity.16
In the meantime, America experienced the 9-11 terrorist attacks and in response,
President George W. Bush launched wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.
These two wars were controversial for many reasons including concerns about exit
strategies. The debate the Somalia intervention prompted about the wisdom of
overseas nation-building resurfaced with respect to the US wars in the Middle East,
and with it debates about obligations America has to countries to which it deploys
its troops.
In Chapter 8 I look at the US humanitarian intervention in Libya, conducted in
2011 while president Obama was attempting to fulfil his election promise to end
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Obama, a Democrat like Clinton, was personally
committed to the idea of using military force to defend human rights as ‘just
wars’. Having decided to intervene in Libya, Obama followed Clinton’s example by
16. Note, however, that President George W. Bush did station US troops off the coast of Liberia
to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia
in May 2003 and both Bush and Obama considered intervention in Darfur from 2003–2010.
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prioritising an implementable exit strategy over expansive framings of America’s
moral responsibility to the Libyan people. Unlike Clinton, however, Obama opted
for a (partial) transition to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), followed
by an exit strategy combining operational disengagement with transition to local
authorities. Obama was clear about limiting US moral responsibility, diffusing it
through NATO and restricting US duty to preventing an imminent mass atrocity
event. However, Obama did not demonstrate the discursive discipline required
to maintain this limited moral obligation, allowing normative expectations of how
American should respond in this humanitarian crisis to expand to addressing the ‘root
cause’ of the atrocities with regime change. In Libya I show how, despite the domestic
debate about nation building in a post-9/11 world, the normative expectations for
how America should best respond to humanitarian crises were just as salient and
largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War. Obama struggled to justifiably
limit the scope of American moral responsibilities to the Libyan people, particularly
after US troops were deployed to the region, no matter if they were ‘leading from
behind’. In Libya, Obama found America was held responsible rhetorically and
reputationally, if not practically, for the wider consequences of its humanitarian
intervention.
I conclude my thesis in Chapter 9 with an overview of the similarities and differences
between each of the cases. I argue that the difficulties America faced in withdrawing
troops from humanitarian interventions were about more than just mission creep.
Exploring the discourse of exit strategies shows us how normative expectations
about justifiable uses of military force shape the imagined possibilities of action
for decision-makers in humanitarian interventions. So long as military responses
remain part of the US government’s approach to dealing with mass atrocities—as
occurred in Mt Sinjar, Iraq (2014) and Syria (2017, 2018)—we must accept it is
almost impossible to achieve a humanitarian intervention that fulfils America’s moral
responsibility, is victorious, and delivers on a quick timetable for exit. Armed with
this knowledge, analysts and policy-makers can make more informed decisions about
which expectations will go unmet and better understand the consequences of these
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choices.
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CHAPTER 2
Humanitarian Intervention, Victory, Exit
Strategies and Mission Creep
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I uncover a gap in the current literature on exit strategies in hu-
manitarian interventions. I begin with an overview of the concept of humanitarian
intervention, I note that humanitarian interventions are unique applications of
military force because, unlike other operations, they are primarily motivated by
defending and protecting the human rights of others. Moral considerations thus bear
particularly heavily on decisions in humanitarian interventions, including decisions
to exit. Much of the literature on humanitarian intervention focuses on justifications
for commencing an intervention and how best to conduct it. With a handful of
exceptions, comparatively little work has been done exploring exit strategies in
humanitarian interventions.
Without their own well-developed analyses and theories of exit strategies, human-
itarian intervention scholars have adopted war termination theories developed for
other military operations. In sections 2.2 and 2.3 I outline these orthodox war
termination theories and show how they consider victory a prerequisite for troop
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withdrawal. Prevailing ideas about victory and exit — even those developed for
operations like counter-insurgency or cyber-warfare — focus on comprehensively
neutralising the enemy and withdrawing forces once victory is achieved. I agree with
scholars studying war termination that decisive or unambiguous victory is not always
possible in most military operations, but I suggest applying the concept of victory
to humanitarian intervention is especially complicated because of the centrality of
moral responsibilities to the raison d’eˆtre of humanitarian intervention and, relatedly,
because ideas of what it means to succeed in a humanitarian intervention are different
from other types of military operations.
I consider two of the most common ways to view success in humanitarian intervention:
(1) saving more lives through intervention than would have otherwise been lost; and
(2) creating sustainable human rights outcomes. The problem is these ideas of success
are all based on securing battlefield victory and do not explain how, when or why
troops should withdraw, or the ways exit strategies are implemented in practice.
There are a handful of works looking explicitly at exit in humanitarian interventions
but they too use victory as the trigger for exit, without accounting for situations
where victory may be neither possible nor morally desirable.
Beyond the humanitarian intervention and war termination literature, just war
scholars have problematised the connection between victory and exit in war planning
with their theory of jus ex bello, or ‘just exit’ (section 2.5). Jus ex bello is a useful
theoretical development but it does not address the practicalities of pursuing an exit
strategy, the role of normative considerations in constraining exit strategy options, or
how exit norms are reproduced in public discourse for wars generally or humanitarian
interventions in particular. This is the gap my thesis bridges.
Finishing the job 34
Chapter 2. Intervention, Victory, Exit and Mission Creep Anna Samson
2.2 What is ‘humanitarian intervention’?
‘Humanitarian intervention’ is the term I and other writers including Brendan Simms,
D.J.B. Trim, Sean Murphy, Nicholas Wheeler, Thomas Weiss and Fernando Teso´n con-
sider the most accurate and historically consistent way to describe military operations
to stop or prevent mass atrocities or widespread human rights abuses.1 Humanitarian
interventions comprise a discrete subset of US military operations, distinct from
wars, peacekeeping operations, stabilisation operations, military occupations and aid
missions. In this thesis, I define ’humanitarian intervention’ as:
• a government deploying its troops
• into a foreign territory
• without permission of that foreign territory’s government, and if there is no
legitimate government, then the territory is hostile to the foreign troops
• to achieve objectives primarily (but not necessarily exclusively) centred on
human rights protection for foreign citizens (that is, the intervenor is not
protecting its own citizens)
• with or without authorisation from an intergovernmental organisation such as
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
It is this paradoxical aspect—the uninvited use of the instruments of war and lethal
force to protect civilians—that prompts extensive debates about humanitarian inter-
1. For more on the definition of humanitarian intervention, see Alex J. Bellamy, “Motives, Out-
comes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions,” Journal of Military Ethics 3, no.
3 (2004): 216–32; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illus-
trations (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 2006); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian
Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Sean D. Murphy, Hu-
manitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Fernando R. Teso´n and Bas Van der Vossen, Debating Humanitarian
Intervention: Should We Try to Save Strangers? (New York, 2017); Brendan Simms and D. J. B.
Trim, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011);
Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, Third edition (Cambridge: Polity,
2016).
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vention2 as does the question of whether or not specific humanitarian interventions
are ’lawful’ or otherwise ’permitted’. With its substantial military resources the US
has led or played a pivotal role in four humanitarian interventions from 1991–2011
that meet the above criteria and are the focus of this thesis: northern Iraq, Somalia,
Kosovo and Libya.
Humanitarian intervention is not a universal term, however, because what constitutes
‘intervention’ is often a matter of contention; for instance, should economic sanctions
be classified as intervention because they can cripple a country as much as any
military assault? The meaning of the word ‘humanitarian’ has also changed over
time from a focus on the “humanity or divinity of Christ” to a focus on human rights
and crimes against humanity.3 In addition, even when humanitarian interventions are
supported by international law and the opinion of the international community, they
are still considered exceptional state action taken in extraordinary circumstances as
a last resort.4
Starting with Liberia in 1990, the UNSC began considering intra-state conflict
its remit of preventing threats to international peace and security. In Liberia, the
UNSC supported ECOWAS efforts to implement a ceasefire. Representatives of the
Liberian government noted in their statements to the UNSC, that this case was an
instance where the Council should reconsider its reluctance to involve itself in internal
state matters.5 Although the UNSC did not call these operations humanitarian
interventions, it authorised military interventions in Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992),
Bosnia (1995), Sierra Leone (1997), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) that met the
2. For more on the ethical challenges posed by the issue of causing deaths with humanitarian
interventions see: Lars Christie, “Distributing Death in Humantiarian Interventions,” in Who
Should Die? Liability, Rights, and the Moral Context of Killing in War, ed. Ryan C. Jenkins,
Michael Robillard, and Bradley Jay Strawser (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 186–201;
For a broader discursive critique of killing in war see: Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life
Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009).
3. Simms and Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History , 3.
4. Ibid., 5–6.
5. Decision of 22 January 1991 (2974th meeting), UN Security Council. For a good overview of
the development of the UN’s construction of international peace and security since its formation
in 1945 see Trudy Fraser, Maintaining Peace and Security? The United Nations in a Changing
World (Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan Education, 2015); Hikaru Yamashita, “Reading “Threats
to International Peace and Security,” 1946–2005,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 18, no. 3 (2007): 551–72.
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definition of humanitarian intervention outlined in Section 2.2 above. The US led
all these interventions except Sierra Leone and was at the forefront of promoting
these military interventions in UNSC debates.6 Alex Bellamy argues these UNSC
authorisations established a “humanitarian exception” to the principle of state
sovereignty and non-intervention.7 UNSC support for humanitarian intervention was
not always easily won, however, and there were notable instances where the UNSC
failed to act in a timely fashion to prevent genocide in Burundi (1993), Rwanda (1994)
and Bosnia (1995). In Burundi and Rwanda in particular international inaction was
largely on account of US resistance to intervention.
In 2000 the Canadian government formed an ad hoc International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).8 The Commission’s 2001 report reframed
the dominant discourse on sovereignty away from the rights of states, and onto the
responsibilities of statehood, in particular, the responsibility of states to protect their
citizens from “avoidable catastrophe”.9 According to the Commission, such avoidable
catastrophes include not only war crimes, genocide and gross human rights violations,
but also mass starvation and state failure. Where a state is unable to discharge
this “responsibility to protect” (R2P), the responsibility automatically falls to the
wider international community that can then use it as grounds for intervention. The
Commission’s grounds for the military intervention aspect of R2P are heavily based
on just war principles of right intention, right authority, last resort, proportional
means and reasonable prospects.10
6. In addition to this small group of humanitarian interventions, there are a number of operations
that are occasionally referred to as humanitarian operations—for example, East Timor (1999), Mali
(2013), Iraq (2015)—but as they do not satisfy all of the criteria for humanitarian operations I
adopt, the label is not strictly accurate in this group of cases.
7. Bellamy, “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions,” 218.
8. The Commission identifies its remit as flowing from a question posed by the then United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “. . . if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systemic
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” Gareth Evans
and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre,
2001), vii.
9. Ibid., viii.
10. This responsibility to intervene is articulated as follows: “Where a population is suffering
serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in
question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect”. Ibid., xi–xii.
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The ICISS and subsequent UN contributions on R2P stress armed foreign inter-
vention is only one end of the spectrum of permissible actions for responding to
“situations of compelling human need”,11 but it is the military intervention aspect of
R2P that draws the most critical attention. In 2005 the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) recognised R2P with respect to four areas much narrower than
those envisaged by the ICISS but aligning more closely with the Rome Statute prohi-
bitions of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In
2009, United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon released his report,
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The document provides a framework
for the 2005 General Assembly resolution and downplays the prominence usually
accorded to the armed intervention element of R2P.12
The boundaries between humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, aid delivery
and state-building are increasingly blurred, especially as operations beginning as
humanitarian interventions may later include elements of peacekeeping, aid delivery,
and state-building. Efforts to ‘mainstream’ humanitarian responsiveness and human
rights protection into operational approaches of Western military forces has further
contributed to dissolving categories of military/humanitarian action. Indeed, a num-
ber of the more recent publications on humanitarian intervention, civilian protection,
atrocity prevention, peacekeeping and aid focus on understanding the relationship
between these concepts and how they intertwine in practise.13
11. W. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton, eds., The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to
Protect (New York: Routledge, 2012), 143.
12. For more on the impact of R2P see Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten,”
Ethics and International Affairs 29, no. 2 (2015): 161–85; Rosa Brooks, “Humanitarian Intervention:
Evolving Norms, Fragmenting Consensus (Remarks),” Maryland Journal of International Law,
2014, Thomas G. Weiss, “RtoP Alive and Well after Libya,” Ethics and International Affairs 25,
no. 3 (2011): 287–92.
13. Cecilia Jacob, Alistair D. B. Cook, and University of Queensland, eds., Civilian Protection in
the Twenty-First Century: Governance and Responsibility in a Fragmented World, First edition
(New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2016); Paul D. Williams, “Protection, Resilience and
Empowerment: United Nations Peacekeeping and Violence against Civilians in Contemporary War
Zones,” Politics 33, no. 4 (2013): 287–98; Angus Francis, Vesselin Popovski, and C. J. G. Sampford,
eds., Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012); Sreeram Chaulia, International Organizations
and Civilian Protection: Power, Ideas and Humanitarian Aid in Conflict Zones, The Library of
International Relations 54 (London: I. B.Tauris, 2011); Michael N. Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss,
Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011).
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In the next section I turn to ways in which scholars and policy-makers judge if a
humanitarian intervention is going to be, or has been, successful. Understanding
success is critical for knowing when it is best to end an intervention as success is
frequently proffered by decision-makers as a pre-requisite for troop withdrawal. I
show that definitions of success are elusive, leading to reliance by scholars, analysts
and strategists on traditional ideas of military victory ill-suited to humanitarian
interventions.
2.3 Success in humanitarian interventions
All discussions about humanitarian interventions, be they popular or scholarly, begin
with the idea these operations are fundamentally about using military force to protect
vulnerable people from death or serious harm. While there may be disagreements
about how, when, and under what circumstances military force is employed, it is the
civilian protection or rescue aspect that gives interventions their ‘humanitarian’ char-
acter. There are high normative stakes for any government pursuing a humanitarian
intervention primarily because of the inherent contradiction of using lethal force
to save lives. Intervention also challenges the principle of state sovereignty as the
cornerstone of inter-state relations, serving as an exception to the general prohibitions
against using military force to resolve conflict. Questions regarding intervention
success are thus of major importance to humanitarian intervention scholars.
Because protection claims are central to humanitarian intervention, it seems obvious
we should judge the success of an intervention by measuring the number of people
saved against the deaths and injuries that may have occurred in the absence of
intervention. This is precisely Taylor Seybolt’s approach in his 2007 review of six
humanitarian interventions since 1990.14 Seybolt’s work is the most comprehensive
attempt to systematically and comparatively evaluate humanitarian interventions
14. Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and
Failure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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using the ‘lives saved’ criteria. Seybolt’s method can be criticised for not includ-
ing other impacts of intervention/non-intervention in addition to lives potentially
saved/lost, for example, the effects of intervention on infrastructure, state legitimacy
or self-determination. His study is useful, however, because public debates about in-
tervention in cases of mass atrocity, genocide or war crimes often feature calculations
about numbers to be saved and sacrificed.15
The normative stakes of humanitarian intervention are high, however, making it
difficult for governments and scholars to limit evaluations solely to equating hy-
pothetical lives saved versus lives lost. Instead, I suggest at the heart of debates
about how we should judge humanitarian interventions and when it is appropriate to
exit, are varying expectations of what an intervention should deliver. If intervention
is expected to stop a mass atrocity from occurring or worsening, then Seybolt’s
calculation is relevant: foreign forces standing between perpetrators and victims,
deterring or preventing violence, will make this intervention successful. This type of
action also helps create an international norm against states committing acts of mass
violence because it signals the international community is willing to use military
force to protect those who may be the targets of violence.
It may be possible to successfully curtail an atrocity currently being committed but
such success may be short-lived. Research on genocide and mass atrocities shows
incidents of mass violence, while sometimes unpredictable, are not spontaneous but
rooted in social, political and economic structures.16 If humanitarian intervention is
expected to do more than prompt a temporary pause in violence and instead promote
15. In support of the continuing relevance of Seybolt’s approach see Ned Dobos, “Idealism, Realism,
and Success in Armed Humanitarian Intervention,” Philosophia 44, no. 2 (2016): 497–507; See also
recent debates about the utility of military intervention in Syria versus other options captured in
Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., The Syria Dilemma (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2013).
16. For analysis of the causes and dynamics of mass atrocities, see Benjamin Valentino, Final
Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2004); Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2008); See also Ben Kieman, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and
Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); For frameworks
on the precipitating factors for genocide and other atrocities see United Nations Office on Genocide
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool
for Prevention,” 2014, This framework was preceded by another framework focusing exclusively on
genocide prevention Office of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, “Genocide
Prevention Analysis Framework,” 2013,
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the longer-term protection of vulnerable populations, then the sustainability of an
intervention’s positive effects must be part of measuring success. If not, violence may
recur, requiring repeated interventions. Achieving sustainable protection outcomes,
however, means a range of wider conflict management activities may become tied to
humanitarian intervention and assessing its success.
If intervention is expected to address the grievances that precipitated violence,
then post-conflict peace-building becomes a potentially necessary component of
successful humanitarian intervention. Kristin Kosek and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis
measure the success of humanitarian interventions according to their ability to
contain conflict.17 As with most other studies of humanitarian interventions and post-
conflict peace-building, Kosek and Gizelis separate the military phase of intervention
from post-conflict reconstruction, arguing interventions only succeed when the local
population contributes to the development of the “intervention strategy” after foreign
combat troops have withdrawn. Michael Walzer, for instance, argues wars should end
with the protagonist fostering self-determination, reconstruction, democratic rule
and civil rights,18 while Doug McCready argues there is an obligation to “reestablish
political, economic and social stability. . . to prevent domestic consequences of the
war from becoming the seed of future conflict”.19 These obligations may require the
ongoing presence of peacekeepers to help safeguard the process of broader societal
transformation. Such transformation could take the form of (liberal) state- and
institution-building, including promoting democracy, market reforms and gender
equality. If a government was responsible for causing the violence or allowing it to
continue, then regime change may be the scale of societal transformation required
to prevent atrocities recurring.20 As pointed out in the previous sections, however,
there are problems with state-building, not least the fact US efforts in this regard
17. Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Kristin E. Kosek, “Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or
Fail: The Role of Local Participation,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International
Studies Association 40, no. 4 (2005): 363–83.
18. Michael Walzer, “Just and Unjust Occupations,” Dissent, 2004, no. 1, 61–63.
19. Doug McCready, “Ending the War Right: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War Tradition,”
Journal of Military Ethics 8, no. 1 (2009): 66–78.
20. Michael Walzer argues policies of regime change can be compatible with just war theory:
Michael Walzer, “Regime Change and Just War,” Dissent 53, no. 3 (2006): 103–8.
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have led to increased authoritarianism and coercive institutions.21
Just war scholars, whose work is often used in the context of analysing humanitarian
intervention, argue a justifiable humanitarian intervention is one where: (1) there is
just cause to defend foreign citizens from their own government or other groups in
their territory; (2) the intervening state intends its protection to be the outcome of
its military action even if protection is a means to another end; (3) the intervener
complies with jus in bello principles and has a reasonable chance of succeeding; and
(4) the intervention is necessary, proportionate and does not undermine prospects
for just peace.22 Within just war theory, Luke Campbell offers one of the few
contributions exploring the ‘reasonable prospect of success’ requirement for just
war. Campbell argues there is a disconnect between the putatively objective idea of
success in war as a matter of rationality, and the reality that judgments are based on
“emotional memories, metaphors and cultural symbols”, or rather, the “affectively
familiar”.23 In my thesis, I take Campbell’s work further, arguing in the case of
American humanitarian interventions, the idea of success is also framed by normative
expectations about what it means to win a war. Victory, even in humanitarian
interventions, is an integral component of the US public discourse of exit strategies.
Governments can thus use a range of criteria to assess the utility of deploying
military force for civilian protection purposes, to measure an intervention’s success.
A government’s standards will depend on the outcomes it claims an intervention will
21. Dodge, “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 1211.
22. For more detail on just war criteria see: Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations; Michael Walzer, “The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers
of Success),” Social Research 69, no. 4 (2002): 925–44; David Boucher, “The Just War Tradition and
Its Modern Legacy: Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello,” European Journal of Political Theory, 2011,
1–20; Bellamy, “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions”;
Brian Orend, “Justice after War,” Ethics and International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002): 43–56; John
J. Davenport, “Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention and the Need for a Democratic
Federation,” Journal of Religious Ethics 39, no. 3 (2011): 493–555; John W. Lango, “Preventative
Wars, Just War Principles, and the United Nations,” The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 247–68;
Francis V. Harbour, “Reasonable Probability of Success as a Moral Criterion in the Western
Just War Tradition,” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 3 (2011): 230–41; Larry May, After War
Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Teso´n and
Van der Vossen, Debating Humanitarian Intervention; C. A. J. Coady, The Ethics of Humanitarian
Intervention, Peaceworks 45 (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2002), 47.
23. Luke B. Campbell, “The ’Importance of Winning’: Affect, Just War and the ’Familiarization’
of Success” (PhD thesis, University of Kansas, 2015).
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deliver, and the length of time considered reasonable for the positive effects of an
intervention to last (or at least to outweigh any negative consequences). Consequently,
a humanitarian intervention’s success may rest as much on the effectiveness of non-
military programs supporting and following the intervention. And yet, humanitarian
intervention is ultimately about the use of military force. As noted above, calls
for humanitarian intervention only arise because the circumstances are considered
so extraordinary they require military action to protect civilians, not just aid and
development programs. At the same time, humanitarian interventions are supposed
to be short and generally distinct from wars resulting in occupation.24 Success is thus
linked to the protection outcomes achieved as much as to the smooth withdrawal of
foreign forces and transition to civilian authorities. So how then do we understand
if the military operation aspect of a humanitarian intervention was successful and
under what circumstances foreign soldiers should leave?
It is at this point much of the existing scholarly literature on humanitarian in-
terventions encounters difficulties because, for the most part, contributors leave
exit strategy decisions to the realm of strategic and operational theory. Failure to
explicitly discuss exit strategies in humanitarian interventions results in an analytical
gap regarding the relationship (if any) between intervention success and the timing
of exit.
For example, in their edited volume covering the various dilemmas of intervention,
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane do not include detailed discussions of issues
regarding exit.25 Michael Bhatia’s book on the issues of war and intervention also
does not cover exit strategies with only a single reference to how goals of intervention
might require reinterpretation of exit strategies.26 Robert Pape’s analysis of the
future of humanitarian intervention following the NATO operation in Libya similarly
does not discuss the role of exit strategies in shaping “pragmatic” approaches to
24. Bellamy, “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions,” 225.
25. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
26. Michael V. Bhatia, War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations (Bloom-
field: Kumarian Press, Inc, 2003).
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intervention.27 In his extensive list of “tough choices” in humanitarian interventions,
Dayton Maxwell only considers whether stipulating an exit date for foreign forces
may affect the prospects for stable peace.28
Neither the seminal text on humanitarian intervention, Nicholas Wheeler’s Saving
Strangers,29 nor more recent contributions on historical antecedents and contemporary
challenges of humanitarian intervention, such as Fabian Klose’s edited collection,30
provide more than passing reference to exit strategies. With the exception of a handful
of works on exit strategies in the US intervention in Somalia,31 even analyses of
specific humanitarian interventions only issue general calls for “better exit strategies”
without explaining what these might entail.32 Admittedly it is not the intention of
the scholars I idenfity to engage in detailed discussion of exit strategies and decision-
making about troop withdrawals in humanitarian interventions. But this is precisely
my point: humanitarian intervention analyses have been traditionally preoccupied
with the when, why and how questions of commencing military operations. Apart
from nods to Clausewitz’s axiom regarding the foolishness of starting a war without
appreciating what one intends to achieve,33 humanitarian intervention scholars have
generally been much less interested in questions of why, when and how interventions
should and do end. Instead humanitarian intervention scholars rely on theories of
victory and exit developed for war and other types of armed conflict, which are
not suited to humanitarian intervention. In the following sections 2.4 and 2.5 I
explain the shortcomings of prevailing theories of victory and war termination for
humanitarian interventions.
27. Robert A. Pape, “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard for Humanitarian Intervention,”
International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 41–80.
28. Dayton L. Maxwell, “Facing the Choice among Bad Options in Complex Humanitarian
Emergencies,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 9, no. 1 (March 1998): 179–91.
29. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society .
30. Fabian Klose, ed., The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the
Nineteenth Century to the Present, Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2016).
31. For example: Douglas Delaney, “Cutting, Running, or Otherwise? The US Decision to
Withdraw from Somalia,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 15, no. 3 (2004): 28–46.
32. Michael G. Smith, “Military Intervention and Humanitarian Assistance,” Global Change,
Peace & Security 20, no. 3 (October 2008): 243–54.
33. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008), 88–89.
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2.4 Victory and its limitations
In traditional Clausewitzian framing, victory is war’s ultimate aim, its primary
motivation, and the universal metric for determining success.34 At the same time
‘victory’ is a political state, often shifting, and frequently not readily identifiable
before, during or at war’s conclusion.35 While it is often difficult to secure strate-
gic goals without achieving battlefield objectives, practically speaking there is no
necessary connection let alone an inevitable causal link between battlefield success
and strategic victory.36 Take, for example, the US battlefield victories during the
Vietnam War or Israel’s military defeat of neighbouring Arab nations. Grappling
with this disconnect is fundamental to much recent literature on theories of strategic
victory, although it is not a new insight. The idiom of a ‘Pyrrhic victory’—victory
achieved at such a price as to amount to a defeat—is, after all, drawn from Ancient
Roman historiography.
Strategic studies scholars acknowledge a linear relationship between military and
political victory does not exist. William Martel finds most war outcomes contain
elements of both victory and defeat.37 Colin Gray similarly notes victory’s deci-
siveness lies on a continuum; while achievable, decisive battlefield victory needs to
be supplemented by elements of strategic success and strategic advantage.38 With
its longer time horizon and broader political goals, strategic victory is a contested
concept. In his treatise on victory, Robert Mandel moves beyond Colin Gray’s
34. Clausewitz, On War , 75; Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (Carlisle
Barracks.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002), 10.
35. On the idea of the three levels of victory, the relationship between them and how they can be
best achieved see Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory ; Robert Mandel, The Meaning of
Military Victory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); J Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of
Victory,” Parameters, 2008, 25–36; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat
in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Stephen Biddle, “Military Power: A
Reply,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 3 (2005): 453–69; Ryan Grauer and Michael C Horowitz,
“What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System,” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (2012):
83–112.
36. Bernard Fook Weng Loo, “Decisive Battle, Victory and the Revolution in Military Affairs,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (2009): 189–211.
37. William Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
38. Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory .
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equation of strategic victory with decisive battle. Mandel argues securing strategic
victory in modern conflicts is far more difficult than in earlier times because states
no longer equate wartime success with abjectly crushing the enemy. Strategic victory
today is more variegated with overlapping and sometimes contradictory components
of which Mandel identifies six: information control, military deterrence, political
self-determination, economic reconstruction, social justice and diplomatic respect.
For Mandel, strategic victory also has a moral dimension requiring the vanquished
be treated fairly.39 Not all writers accept Mandel’s definition of strategic victory, but
others such as J. Boone Bartholomees and Bernard Fook Weng Loo agree with his
fundamental Clausewitzian principle: victory requires breaking the will of the enemy
to continue fighting.40 For all these writers, war termination is equated with one
side successfully imposing its will on its adversary through battlefield (military) and
political (strategic) victories sustained over the longer term.
Victory is not always objectively discernible and scholars note perceptions of military
outcomes matter.41 Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney have devised a theory
of victory applied to case studies including the Cuban Missile Crisis and the US
intervention in Somalia. Their theory highlights the importance of perceptions, biases
and discursive framing of military outcomes.42 Framing conditions for victory—such
as US President Roosevelt’s call in 1943 for “unconditional surrender” of Axis forces
as a condition for ending World War II—also affect the timing of exit, the prospect
for negotiated settlement and the costs to be borne by the victor and vanquished.43
Perceptions aside, the majority of contributions to the literature on victory take as
their starting point the idea that victory through battle is ultimately achievable. If
not annihilation of the enemy, at least neutralisation of the threat the enemy poses,
is a precondition for orthodox understandings of victory in war. Even renowned just
39. Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory .
40. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory”; Loo, “Decisive Battle, Victory and the Revolution
in Military Affairs.”
41. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” 26.
42. Dominic D P Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and
Defeat in International Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Dominic Johnson
and Dominic Tierney, “Essence of Victory,” Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2003): 350–81.
43. Michael Balfour, “Unconditional Surrender,” International Affairs 46, no. 4 (1970): 719–36.
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war scholar Michael Walzer argues that in a just war there is “nothing like winning.
There are alternative outcomes, of course, but these are accepted only at some cost
to basic human values”.44
The construction of victory as comprehensive defeat of the enemy persists even in
so-called ‘unconventional’ military operations such a counterinsurgency or cyber-
war. For example, in their in-depth analysis of 41 counterinsurgency operations
Christopher Paul and his colleagues still see the objective as “defeating insurgencies”
and creating “durable peace intervals”, even if the “crush them” approach tends to
be unsuccessful.45
Most of the literature on victory in war does not countenance the notion that victory
may be less than total or decisive by design. The idea it may be necessary to
forgo decisive battlefield victory in order to achieve more desirable, longer-term
political outcomes is also not often considered. This is despite the fact strategists
and policy-makers, particularly those theorising about the employment of nuclear
weapons during the Cold War, were reluctant to talk about strategic/political
victory in Clausewitz’s absolutist vein.46 Even in post-Cold War non-nuclear military
engagements, US decision-makers were faced with the prospect that something less
than decisive victory might be the most desirable outcome. Analysing this reality,
however, remains at the margins of orthodox scholarship on victory, making it difficult
to see how the moral expectations inherent in humanitarian intervention can be
accommodated.
The major exception to this position is that of Dominic Tierney who argues that “we
44. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 122.
45. Christopher Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, Report for the
Office of the US Secretary of Defense (Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2013), 188; For a
compelling, if lone, voice calling for a reconceptulaisation of victory in the context of cyber-war, in
particular the problem of seeing victories as defeats see: Jason Healey, “Winning and Losing in
Cyberspace,” in Cyber Power (Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,
2016).
46. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 31;
For notable exceptions, however, see Colin S. Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of
Victory,” International Security 4, no. 9 (1979): 54–87; Edward N. Luttwak, On the Meaning of
Victory: Essays on Strategy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
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live in an age of unwinnable wars, where decisive triumph has proved to be a pipe
dream”.47 Tierney argues that US military history was dominated by victories until
the mid-21st century, which, as I note in Chapter 2 helped establish a normative
expectation that if the US entered a war, it would win. Today, however, Tierney
suggests that the cost of pursuing victory can be so catastrophic that it is unwinnable;
in this case, “losing the right way is a kind of victory”. For Tierney, losing the
right way involves having an exit strategy, which he states should ultimately be
based on a “cost-benefit analysis”. Despite his focus on examining failure in war,
therefore, Tierney’s analysis is very similar to the approach adopted by other war
termination scholars who also adopt a cost-benefit approach, which, as I point on in
the following section, is not the best framework for thinking about decision-making
in humanitarian interventions.
2.5 Theories of war termination and mission creep
War termination analysis—looking at when and how wars end—can be divided into
quantitative and qualitative studies. Empirical studies suggest a (non-exhaustive)
combination of variables significantly affect how and when armed conflicts end.
Comparative qualitative studies of war termination are not widespread and dominated
by US case studies.48 Possibly the most famous contribution is Every War must End
by Fred Ikle´, which he wrote following America’s difficult experience successfully
ending the Vietnam War, updated 30 years later after the US began experiencing
similar difficulties ending its 2003 war in Iraq. Ikle´ argues the decisions to commence
military operations are often made without considering how those military operations
will end. Even when decision-makers are cognisant of the need for an exit strategy,
47. Dominic Tierney, The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts
(New York: Little, Brown & Co, 2015).
48. There is a related body of work on exit from post-conflict, liberal state-building or peacekeeping
operations. See, for instance Dominik Zaum, “The Norms and Politics of Exit: Ending Postconflict
Transitional Administrations,” Ethics and International Affairs 23, no. 2 (2009): 189–208; Richard
Caplan, ed., Exit Strategies and State Building (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Richard
Caplan, “After Exit: Successor Missions and Peace Consolidation,” Civil Wars 8, nos. 3-4 (2006):
253–67.
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they frequently misinterpret enemy behaviour, misjudge the effect specific operational
decisions will have on the eventual war outcome, are adversely affected by domestic
political constraints, or otherwise have their plans thwarted through the unpredictable
nature of war itself.49
Other contributions also echo Ikle´’s findings even while they are restricted to analysing
only the US experience.50 Two key contemporary publications are Between War and
Peace: How America Ends its Wars edited by Matthew Moten, and Gideon Rose’s
How Wars End: Why we Always Fight the Last Battle. Both books use the US
experience ending wars to draw more general conclusions about conflict termination.
After looking at six wars beginning with World War I and ending with the 2003
Iraq War, Rose concludes the explanation for termination rests in power politics,
even though both domestic and battlefield factors can influence the outcome of
wars. For Rose, the neoclassical realist construction of international relations and
strategic theory is most useful for understanding both the conduct and conclusion of
armed conflicts. Moten’s volume covers a wider historical arc beginning with the
American War of Independence, ending with the Iraq War, and covering another
eleven wars in between. Despite the disparate nature of the conflicts, Moten proffers
six war termination principles gleaned from this history, including: war aims change
constantly but “gradually converge” toward an agreement to end hostilities; war
fighting cannot be sequestered from “the influence of the world beyond”; and the
limited usefulness of decisive campaign/victory in understanding war termination.
There are three over-arching shortcomings with the existing literature on war termi-
nation making them appropriate only in the most general terms for understanding
49. Fred Ikle´, Every War Must End, Revised (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Ikle´
reaches similar conclusions to those in other comparative works including Paul Seabury and Angelo
Codevilla, War: Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989); George H. Quester, “Wars
Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 392 (How Wars End 1970): 30–39; A J P Taylor, How Wars End (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1985); Robert Rothstein, “Domestic Politics and Peacemaking: Reconciling Incompatible
Imperatives,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392 (How Wars
End 1970): 62–75; James L. Foster and Garry D. Brewer, “And the Clocks Were Striking Thirteen:
The Termination of War,” Policy Sciences 7 (1976): 225–43.
50. Ashley Tellis J., “Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S. Involvement
in Intrastate Conflicts,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no. 2 (1996): 117–51; David M.
Edelstein, “Exit Lessons,” Wilson Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2009): 34–39.
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how and why decision-makers end humanitarian interventions. First, most studies
adopt the Clausewitzian cost-benefit calculation as the criterion for planning and
judging exit strategies.51 Clausewitz famously wrote that war is an extension of
politics. Consequently, a war must end if the effort expended to achieve war ob-
jectives exceeds the value of the war’s political goal. Following Clausewitz further,
planning for war termination is central to war initiation. Any other approach is
politically short-sighted and undermines victory.52 Considerations outside this cost-
benefit calculation—which is itself assessed exclusively in terms of resources expended
versus political goal to be achieved—and how they might shape decisions about war
termination, are usually not explored. To the extent authors accept other issues affect
exit strategies, these are considered symptomatic of Cluasewitzian wartime friction
or problems implementing an exit strategy that should have been accommodated at
the outset.53 For humanitarian interventions, however, moral imperatives complicate
both the costs and benefits side of the strategic decision-making equation because
human rights objectives are the ends but externally-imposed violence is the means.
Moral considerations affect cost/benefit calculations but also operate independently
in decisions about ending humanitarian interventions short of victory.
Second, in orthodox war termination analyses, little attention is paid to contemplating
when a war should stop before political objectives are reached or before costs to any
party become too great to bear. The ideal exit thus occurs after victory is achieved.
There is also little discussion of instances a war should not be terminated but rather
continue despite its burden of costs outweighing its political gain.
Third, the stochastic nature of violent conflict further complicates the question of
war termination, what Roy Licklider refers to as “war [taking] on a dynamic of its
own” such that we cannot “assume that the causes or the issues of the war influence
51. James C. Walker, “War Termination: Why, When, Who What, Where and How” (Naval
War College, Newport R.I., 1996); Michael C Griffith, “War Termination: Theory, Doctrine and
Practice” ( US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992); Tellis, “Terminating Intervention:
Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S. Involvement in Intrastate Conflicts.”
52. Clausewitz, On War .
53. Dominic J. Caraccilo, Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy (Santa Barbara:
Praeger Security International, 2011).
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its conclusion”. Instead,
the important variables may have more to do with things that occur during
the war rather than its ostensible causes or at least wars with similar causes
may have very different patterns of termination. This may also explain why
many such wars end with the ostensible causes not really addressed.54
Some writers including David Baum, Jon Western and Joshua Goldstein, have
recognised the challenges of planning and adhering to a precise exit strategy leading
them to focus on ‘end state planning’ instead.55 Although not fixated with a specific
moment in time and often concerned more with processes than outcomes, these
studies and their incorporation within US military doctrine, share the same theoretical
premises as the orthodox literature on war termination. This interest in end state
planning has contributed to growing interest among policymakers and military
operations planners in the idea of transition as exit, which often involves the continued
presence of foreign troops. It is questionable, however, whether this type of ‘exit’ is
really an exit at all or simply a type of military occupation.
These challenges persist in three contributions looking explicitly at exit strategies
in humanitarian interventions. The first is a 1996 article Terminating Intervention
by Ashley Tellis, part of a larger RAND Corporation project on US intervention in
interstate conflict. The timing of the article leads Tellis to rely on Cold War case
studies of Greece, Congo, Lebanon, Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama, a
limitation when considering how his conclusions could be applied to post-Cold War
humanitarian interventions. Nevertheless, Tellis’ definition of exit as part of strategy
has general applicability. He argues exit strategies should have three components: (1)
“limited, stable and worthwhile political objectives to be achieved”; (2) achievable
operational goals derived from those political objectives; and (3) “fallback options
that must be anticipated” if (1) and (2) cannot be secured “for any conceivable
reason”.56 Tellis views exit strategies as a means for preventing “entrapment” in a
54. Roy Licklider, “Early Returns: Results of the First Wave of Statistical Studies of Civil War
Termination,” Civil Wars 1, no. 3 (1998): 127.
55. David Baum, “The Exit Strategy Myth and the End State Reality,” (Washington DC), 2001,
Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, “Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons From
Somalia to Libya,” Foreign Affairs, 2011, no. 6, 48–59.
56. Tellis, “Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S. Involvement in
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war by requiring decision-makers to set objective “victory criteria”.57
As with other contributions on exit strategies, Tellis’ conception of exit is inextricably
linked to victory. Winning is the ultimate objective and when winning by one standard
cannot be achieved then the solution is to set a new standard. The main problem
with this idea, however, is that definitions of victory are not infinitely elastic. There
are discursive and practical limits to how far ‘fallback options’ can deviate from
initial political objectives and from the overall expectations of what accounts for a
successful intervention.
The second contribution is an edited collection by Richard Caplan, Exit Strategies
and State-Building,58 examining the conclusion of cases where state-building was
the primary purpose of foreign intervention. Although the focus of the volume is on
peace and stability in state-building operations, a number of the case studies—Sierra
Leone and Kosovo in particular—began as humanitarian interventions. Thus some
of the wider policy observations regarding exit are of relevance to humanitarian
interventions. In his chapter in Caplan’s book, Robert Wilde argues decision-makers
are faced with competing normative requirements about their responsibilities when
considering when and how to exit from state-building interventions: on the one hand,
they are to act as “trustees” with a civilising mission (similar to that expected of
colonial authorities); on the other hand, they should allow for local self-determination
and exit as soon as possible, regardless of whether the country is “ready”.59 Wilde’s
focus on normative constraints resonates with my findings regarding US experiences of
intervention and the normative requirements incumbent on American exit strategies.
In his concluding chapter, Caplan defines an exit strategy as:
a transitional plan for the disengagement and ultimate withdrawal of external
parties from a state or territory, the parties ideally having attained their princi-
pal state-building objectives. If the objectives have been attained, a successful
Intrastate Conflicts,” 122.
57. Tellis, “Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S. Involvement in
Intrastate Conflicts,” 123.
58. Caplan, Exit Strategies and State Building .
59. Ralph Wilde, “Competing Normative Visions of Exit,” in Exit Strategies and States Building,
ed. Richard Caplan (ebook: Oxford University Press, 2012), 261–75.
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exit strategy will contribute to the consolidation of these achievements. If
the objectives have not been attained, a successful exit strategy will entail
measures to preserve the partial gains or minimise the losses, including any
reputational costs to the state-building actors.60
In the context of state-building operations, Caplan says a successful exit strategy
means leaving behind a “consolidated peace”, which he explains is a “self-sustaining
peace”,61 although he acknowledges this is not always possible. In his list of factors
contributing to successful exit—accomplished mission mandate, interests converging
among conflicting parties, and a pre-existing functioning state existing—Caplan notes
a continuing presence of foreign troops might also be required. It is questionable,
however, whether an exit without complete foreign troop withdrawal is an exit at all.
The third contribution is a 2001 UNSG report entitled No Exit without Strategy
regarding the considerations for determining how and when UN peacekeeping opera-
tions should end.62 The report sets out some “guidelines for an exit strategy” which
differ depending on the extent to which the peacekeeping mandate of establishing
“sustainable domestic peace” has been achieved.63 Where the mandate has been only
partially achieved, the report argues troop withdrawal decisions should be based on
whether more harm than good is to be achieved by ending the mission, mindful of
governments’ willingness to maintain the necessary troop commitment.64 The report
acknowledges that although sustainable peace is the goal, it is “not always possible in
the short run”.65 Beyond this UN report, there is a debate within the peacekeeping
literature about the conditions required for success. Within this literature there is a
consensus that peacekeeping operations can succeed when there is a clear mandate
for operation and a great power is involved in delivering on that mandate. The time
horizon for achieving ‘success’ can be lengthy and sustained financial, resources and
60. Richard Caplan, “Policy Implications,” in Exit Strategies and States Building, ed. Richard
Caplan (ebook: Oxford University Press, 2012), 313.
61. Ibid., 314.
62. United Nations Secretary-General, No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making
and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-
General S/2001/394 (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 20, 2001).
63. Ibid., para 10.
64. Ibid., paras 29-34, 55–58.
65. Ibid., para 24.
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political commitment is required over this time to deliver intended outcomes.66 Much
like the Caplan volume, these contributions on peacekeeping are not specifically
about humanitarian interventions but there is overlap in the missions often used
as illustrations, for example Kosovo and Somalia. A number of Caplan’s policy
recommendations also mirror those recommendations and findings found in these
works.
While these three works are instructive, they are ultimately about state-building
and peacekeeping operations that, as I noted in Section 2.2 are sometimes related
but otherwise distinct from humanitarian interventions. The goals of state-building
and peacekeeping are fostering liberal democratic institutions and resolving armed
conflict, and these goals shape success metrics and contemplated exit strategies. It
is not apparent how applying these standards to humanitarian interventions are
illuminating or effective.
A circular prescription has filled the gap in understanding the relationship between
success and exit in humanitarian interventions: successful intervention requires
foreign forces to exit, and in order to exit smoothly, foreign forces must succeed at
their mission.67 To borrow David Edelstein’s framing, the belief is “there is no such
thing as a failed intervention capped by a good exit strategy”.68 This assumption
is also exhibited in attempts to engage concretely with issues such as what tasks
soldiers should carry out in humanitarian intervention and to establish criteria for
military success. For example, in their appraisal of humanitarian interventions from
Somalia in 1992 to Libya in 2011, Jon Western and Joshua Goldstein argue that on
balance, interventions have demonstrated potential to protect civilians and truncate
civil wars.69 They point to the need for quick action, strong UN mandates and
sufficient troop commitments as requirements for a successful intervention. However
66. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brule´, Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions : A Typology of Success and
Failure in International Interventions (New York: Routledge, 2017).
67. C. A. J. Coady, “The Dilemmas of Militant Humanitarianism,” Global Change, Peace and
Security 20, no. 3 (2008): 257.
68. Edelstein, “Exit Lessons.”
69. Western and Goldstein, “Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons From Somalia to
Libya.”
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in arguing for a “transition strategy” rather than an exit strategy for foreign troops,
Western and Goldstein end up creating a division between victory in the military
aspect of humanitarian intervention and longer-term, post-conflict state-building
activities.70
Another example can be found in the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)
Handbook,71 a ground-breaking effort by Sarah Sewall and her colleagues to establish
mass atrocity prevention and response as a distinct category of military operation.
The handbook represents a unique attempt to think through the practical considera-
tions of using US soldiers in humanitarian interventions. The conceptual framework
of MARO is an operational environment in which there are multiple actors, an
“illusion of impartiality”, and the “escalation dynamic of mass atrocities”.72 It pro-
vides guidance for US military planners on how to craft mission objectives and
understand tactical considerations specific to situations where widespread threats
to civilians are occurring or imminent. The authors note one of the main political
considerations for interveners is determining how much responsibility they have for
civilian protection as this will affect troop actions and withdrawal strategy.73 Such
political considerations, however are largely separated from the work of operational
planners. In the process of fitting within existing frameworks governing military
action, the handbook accepts the principles of victory and exit strategies associated
with conventional military operational planning. As a result, the MARO Handbook
makes explicit what is presumed or otherwise taken for granted in other analyses of
humanitarian interventions: the unique character of humanitarian interventions does
not extend to our conceptualisation of victory and exit in these military operations.
A small group of just war scholars has begun to question the extent to which
conventional frameworks for understanding victory and exit strategies can adequately
address some of the difficulties decision-makers have ending a war. This group has
70. Ibid., 59.
71. Sarah Sewall, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin, MARO - Mass Atrocity Response Operations:
A Military Planning Handbook (Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2007).
72. Ibid., 9.
73. Ibid., 18.
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developed an additional branch of just war theory, termed “jus ex bello” or “jus
terminatio”.74 To date, most just war scholarship proceeded on the basis that a war
satisfying jus ad bellum (just reasons for commencing war) and jus in bello (justifiable
actions during war) criteria is morally justified in being fought until it concludes.
Jus ex bello proponents argue, however, that in some instances wars commenced
and fought justly may need to be ended short of victory because this is the most
morally defensible course of action.75 In addition, jus ex bello permits certain wars
commenced unjustly to continue because to end them prematurely would result in a
graver injustice.76 A war can also justifiably be continued past the initial point of
victory because armed force is needed to stop or prevent an injustice manifesting
only after the war began. Consequently, a war’s legitimacy should be iteratively
assessed throughout its prosecution and terminated or continued as appropriate.
Exit decisions should also be separated from decisions about starting a war and how
it should be fought.77
Jus ex bello thus provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the
practical and moral considerations at play in exit strategies in humanitarian in-
terventions. David Rodin, one of its leading proponents has explicitly noted its
relevance in these cases.78 Jus ex bello is currently the only framework grappling
with how to justify exit strategies when war’s circumstances, or reasonable beliefs
held about those circumstances, change. It also explicitly tackles the phenomenon of
war aims that prioritise avoiding defeat rather than winning, ‘sunk costs’,79 and risk
calculations.80 Ex bello allows for the possibility that by increasing costs beyond those
74. Darrel Mollendorf, “Jus Ex Bello,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2008): 123–36;
Darrel Mollendorf, “Two Doctrines of Jus Ex Bello,” Ethics 125 (2015): 653–753; David Rodin,
“The War Trap: Dilemmas of Jus Terminatio,” Ethics 125 (2015): 674–95; Daniel Statman, “Ending
War Short of Victory? A Contractarian View of Jus Ex Bello,” Ethics 125 (2015): 720–50; Cecile
Fabre, “War Exit,” Ethics 125 (2015): 631–52; Gabriella Blum and David Luban, “Unsatisfying
Wars: Degrees of Risk and the Jus Ex Bello,” Ethics 125 (2015): 751–80; Janina Dill, “Ending Wars:
The Jus Ad Bellum Principles Suspended, Repeated, or Adjusted?,” Ethics 125 (2015): 627–30.
75. Mollendorf, “Two Doctrines of Jus Ex Bello,” 124; Statman, “Ending War Short of Victory?
A Contractarian View of Jus Ex Bello.”
76. Mollendorf, “Two Doctrines of Jus Ex Bello,” 124.
77. David Rodin, “Ending War: A Response to Richard Miller,” Ethics and International Affairs
25, no. 3 (2011): 360.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Blum and Luban, “Unsatisfying Wars: Degrees of Risk and the Jus Ex Bello.”
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considered proportionate prior to war commencing, moral outcomes can be secured.
Protagonists may therefore have a moral responsibility to continue a war they know
might be unjust overall.81 Wars could be also justifiably escalated, ratcheting costs
in the hope of ultimate moral vindication.
Ex bello theory does not, however, help determine if the ends being sought are
themselves justifiable, regardless of whether they have shifted during the course
of the war. While ex bello provides a means for reconceptualising the relationship
between military victory and exit it can only offer a partial explanation, if any,
for the decisions US presidents confront when justifying their exit strategies to the
American people in humanitarian interventions. If jus ex bello-type justifications
have traction with the American public, especially when the US president is trying to
explain why he has decided to postpone a planned troop withdrawal, expand troop
objectives or withdraw soldiers prior to achieving decisive victory, it is important to
understand why this is, as well as how it might be complicated by other normative
considerations. These are among the questions I seek to answer in my thesis.
Like ‘exit strategy’, the term ‘mission creep’ has also entered public discourse, in this
instance as a pejorative way to describe and explain military operations extending
beyond planned activities or end dates. Despite its taken-for-granted meaning, there
is almost no scholarly work on the conditions creating mission creep or how the idea
relates to unimplemented exit strategies. The term emerged in the 1990s when the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe expressed his desire to avoid mission creep in
the Implementation Force (IFOR) operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.82 Adam
Siegel was arguably the first to define the term. He identified four types of “mission
change”: task accretion (progressively adding tasks viewed as necessary to achieve
initial mission goals); mission shift (when additional tasks disconnected from political
decision-making about objectives cause the mission to expand); mission transition
(where a mission “undergoes an unclear or unstated shift in objectives”, often through
81. Rodin, “Ending War: A Response to Richard Miller,” 361.
82. Adam B. Siegel, “Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 2000,
112–15.
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“gradual” modification); and mission leap (where a mission is “radically changed”).83
The 2010 US Army Field Manual, The Army in Multinational Operations,84 defined
the term as “tangential efforts to assist in areas of concern unrelated to assigned
duties that cripple efficient mission accomplishment”. The term also appears in the
2016 edition of the manual, without definition, its meaning presumed in statements
about commanders needing to “avoid” it.
In terms of analysing mission creep dynamics or causes, Michael Robinson attempted
to identify the factors causing NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) expansion. His focus
was on regional and local Kosovo dynamics and does not explain how events in
the US contributed, if at all, to this change.85 Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray
provide the most extensive explanation of how mission creep occurred within the US
military and defence establishment since the 9-11 terrorist attacks, but theirs is a
meta-analysis of changing institutional mandates and expectations and the effect
on American foreign policy.86 Although humanitarian interventions like Somalia
and Kosovo have been criticised for mission creep, there is an absence of detailed
comparative work on how and why the missions shifted over time, and how these
changes affected exit strategies or vice versa.
83. Siegel, “Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?”
84. The United States Army, US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-16, The Army in Multinational
Operations (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), 2–4.
85. Michael A. Robinson, “Military Operations in Kosovo and the Danger of ‘Mission Creep’,”
Military Review, May 28, 2014, 1–5.
86. Gordon Adams and Shoon Kathleen Murray, eds., Mission Creep: The Militarization of US
Foreign Policy? (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014).
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CHAPTER 3
Discourse, Justification and Normative
Expectations
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I noted existing scholarly and policy literature largely
overlooks the issue of humanitarian intervention exit strategies. Instead, analysts
tend to presume exit strategies are implemented as transition points between the
combat phase of interventions and post-conflict peace-building, even if foreign soldiers
frequently remain throughout. Where exit strategies are considered, they are treated
parenthetically and rely on orthodox conceptions of victory and war termination.
I argued the problem with these prevailing approaches is they do not adequately
account for the deep moral impetus motivating humanitarian interventions and
constraining expectations of success. To more accurately appreciate the dynamics of
exit strategies in US humanitarian interventions, I suggest it is helpful to look at
exit strategy discourse, including how it is embedded within culturally constructed
justifications for withdrawing troops from military interventions.
To develop a better understanding of this discourse and how it might affect justifica-
tions and decision-making about exit, in this chapter I turn to discourse theory for
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my conceptual starting point. Discourse theory has numerous entry points and in
the first section I chart a course through the various discourse frameworks to show
where my thesis fits. I begin by explaining how discourse and culture are understood
within international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). Explanations
of political discourse theory (PDT), rhetorical presidency public justification theory
studies follows.
Next I consider narrative framework theory as a new approach for unpacking American
public discourses about US military operations. This narrative framework does not
simply exist; it is shaped by citizens’ national role conception, including normative
expectations for America’s international behaviour. My own research supports
other scholars in finding America’s national role conception centres on three sets of
normative expectations for using military force: (1) American exceptionalism and
manifest destiny; (2) World War II as an archetype of a ‘good’ war and the Vietnam
War as its antithesis; and (3) winning as morally vindicating the decision to use force.
In my thesis I show how commonly-held ideas and perceptions about exit strategies
and military force shape ideas about the reasonableness of some political actions and
foreclose other options for US presidents1 as foreign policy decision-makers and affects
how they craft and justify exit strategies from humanitarian interventions. While
discourse is central to understanding presidential justifications for exit strategies,
it does not provide a complete explanation for all exit strategy justifications in
every case. To conclude this chapter I consider the wider domestic and international
context affecting presidential action, as well as the scope for strategic narrative.
Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of how I see the theories I discuss in this
chapter contributing to a discursive framework for presidential justifications for
humanitarian intervention exit strategies. The arrow connecting each component of
the framework represents a feedback loop; components are not static or immutable
but are themselves sites of discursive struggle in which the president participates
during an intervention. One outcome of this discursive struggle is that the way this
1. Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 137.
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framework operates in one intervention also shapes how components are constructed
in subsequent interventions.
Figure 3.1: Discursive framework of presidential justifications for exit strategies
3.2 A word on normative expectations
The idea that individuals hold certain ideas or beliefs about the world around them
and use these ideas to guide their own behaviour as well as judge the behaviour of
others, is a well-established tenet of psychology, law, sociology, and political science.
These ideas are ‘expectations’ because they are prospective in nature; they anticipate
the behaviour of others. An individual’s own actions are also based on presumptions
about what other actors’ expect and on others’ reactions. These expectations are
’normative’ insofar as they contain a moral or values-based judgement; that is,
expectations are judgments about behaviour that are ’good’ or ’bad’, behaviour that
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’ought’ or ’ought not’ to occur.2 Normative expectations can be evidenced through
behaviour including speech.
It is not the purpose of my research to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise
of the normative expectations held in the context of developing, justifying or im-
plementing exit strategies from humanitarian interventions.3 Nor is it my purpose
to measure these normative expectations. I treat normative expectations in the
functionalist sense, wherein expectations imbue social action with meaning, with the
behaviours they give rise to creating a shared values and identities.
My research focuses on demonstrating the existence of these normative expectations,
to identify how the source of these expectations are grounded in pervasive (but not
unchanging) ideas in popular American discourse about the role of military force.
I explore how these expectations constrain presidential decision-making through
a series of case studies demonstrate interplay of normative expectations and their
relative influence in the presidential decision-making. In essence, I adopt Cristina
Bicchieri’s idea that normative expectations constrain presidential discourse and
other behaviour because presidents believe that their constituents expect them to
fulfil these expectations, even when other choices may be open to them.4
Bicchieri’s and my work are thus closely aligned with Frank Schimmelfennig’s work
on rhetorical action and entrapment. However, while Schimmelfennig tends to focus
on ’naming and shaming’ and reputational risk as a means for coercing compliance
with international norms, my work argues that discursive constraints need not
be actively invoked by those who judge presidential action. Rather normative
expectations and the discursive constraints within them form a part of the pre-
existing framework within which contemporary presidents have had to craft their
2. Nicholas Onuf, International Legal Theory, Essays and Engagements, 1966-2006 (New York:
Routledge, 2008), 446.
3. For an example of a work that attempts to do this see Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdepen-
dence and War (online: Princeton University Press, 2015), who looks at whether or not expectations
about economic decline in times of war are ’factual’.
4. Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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exit strategy justifications in humanitarian interventions.5 For more on my use of
normative expectations in this thesis see subsection 3.3.5.
3.3 Discourse and foreign policy action
3.3.1 Discourse and culture in foreign policy analysis
Discourse studies explores the ways humans use modes of expression—frequently
language but also visual, auditory and other communications—to create, transmit
and reproduce knowledge. Discourse scholars argue discourse is neither neutral nor
natural; instead discourse shapes and is shaped by relationships of power, domination,
resistance and hierarchy.6 As founding discourse scholar Michel Foucault argues,
communication is not rational but regulated by ritual:
We know perfectly well that we do not have the right to say everything, that
we cannot speak of anything at all in any circumstance whatsoever; not just
anyone, finally, may speak of just anything.7
Like Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu argues language is a social-historical phenomenon.
Bourdieu notes some expressions of language or utterances are performative; not
strictly true or false but “ways of acting or participating in a ritual. . . inseparable
from the institution that defines the conditions (such as the place, the time, the
agent) that must be fulfilled for the utterance to be effective”.8 Bourdieu argues
social institutions underpin the power, authority and believability of justifications
rather than any claim to rationality.9
Bourdieu’s theory of practice10 counters rationalist decision-making models that
presume actions are outcomes of conscious calculation. Instead, “by virtue of the
5. Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 47–80.
6. Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2002).
7. Michel Foucault, Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, ed. Meaghan Morris and Paul
Patton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), 11.
8. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power, Reprint, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino
Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 8.
9. Ibid., 8–10.
10. Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989):
14–25.
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habitus, individuals are already predisposed to act in certain ways”, and because
individuals are the product of social histories that “endure in the habitus, their
actions can never be analysed adequately as the outcome of conscious calculation”.11
Bourdieu also notes all discourse takes place within certain contexts—‘markets’—such
that all actors within those contexts must take into account the ‘market conditions’
in which their words will be received and valued by others. Consequently a process
of ‘censorship’ occurs in discourse as actors preemptively attempt to ensure that
their speech is compatible with market expectations.12
I agree with discourse theorists that social actors construct their reality. The
ontological assumptions underpinning discourse theory can be categorised as idealist.13
My epistemological approach is social constructionist.14 I position myself alongside
social scientists in arguing knowledge construction occurs “against a background
of shared interpretations, practices and language; they occur within our historical,
cultural and gendered ways of being”.15 The source of ideas derives from humans
“making sense” of the physical world and their relationships with others through
inter-subjective, meaning-making activities.16
The discourse theories of Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu and others have influenced
inquiry across the humanities.17 Within political science and IR, post-structuralists
were the first discourse scholars, arguing language should be taken seriously and
explaining states and other foreign policy actors are constituted in discourse. Dis-
cursive deconstruction in IR allows analysts to look behind unquestioned axioms of
identity, power and rationality shaping our understanding of foreign policy action.18
11. Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power , 16–17.
12. Ibid., 19.
13. Norman Blaikie, Approaches to Social Enquiry, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 16.
14. Ibid., 22.
15. Ibid., 23.
16. Ibid., 22–23.
17. Ove K. Pedersen, Discourse Analysis, Working Paper 65 (Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business
School, 2009); Michael Karlberg, “Discourse Theory and Peace,” in The Encyclopedia of Peace
Psychology, ed. Daniel J. Christie (Malden: Wiley Blackwell Publishing, 2012).
18. Lene Hansen, “Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen
School and Directions for How to Apply It,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 3 (2012): 99.
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Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is an agent-oriented branch of IR theory focusing
on decisions made by individuals or groups about issues beyond the borders of the
nation-state.19 FPA provides a framework within which comparatively recent efforts
to understand how culture and social constructions affect state behaviour can be
integrated into IR analysis.20 FPA’s theoretical antecedents lie mainly in the work
of social constructivists, acknowledging ideas construct preferences, interests and the
material world. FPA goes further than most social constructivist thinking, placing
human decision-makers as the purveyors of ideas, rather than the disembodied ideas
themselves, at the crux of inquiry.21 For example, Richard Jackson explains how the
US ‘war on terror’ and ‘9/11’ have become cultural ideographs22 and Fre´de´rik Me´rand
uses Bourdieu’s sociological framework rather than ‘strategic culture’ to explain
challenges to maintaining common European identity.23 FPA also provides an avenue
for acknowledging domestic constraints and context in shaping state behaviour.
In her comprehensive guide to FPA, Valerie Hudson provides a typology of its main
levels of analysis, each with different foci and investigative approaches. These levels
are: cognitive processes; leader personality and orientation; small group dynamics; or-
ganisational process; bureaucratic politics; domestic political considerations; national
attributes; regional and international systems, and culture and identity.24 Hudson
contends this final category—culture and identity—is one of the least developed in
FPA and it is where I have situated my investigation.25
A key aspect of the relationship between discourse theory and the study of culture
in FPA is that discourse provides an insight into the way culture is understood,
processed, recreated and challenged. Discourse is what gives culture meaning because
19. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory , 4, 7.
20. Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture & Foreign Policy (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1997).
21. Margaret Sprout and Harold Sprout, An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Centre of International Studies, 1968).
22. Richard Jackson, “Culture, Identity and Hegemony: Continuity and (the Lack of) Change
in US Counterterrorism Policy from Bush to Obama,” International Politics 48, nos. 2-3 (2011):
390–411.
23. Fre´de´ric Me´rand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense,” Security Studies 19,
no. 2 (2010): 342–74.
24. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory , 34.
25. Ibid., 118.
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it is how meaning is constructed.26 In conducting discourse analysis, foreign policy
analysts generally focus on public texts. Discourse analysis in FPA is less concerned
with the ‘inner workings’ of decision-makers (unlike, for example, those studying
political psychology) and instead focuses on how discourses are invoked to achieve
particular purposes. I agree with Kenneth Wilkening that it is useful to look at
questions of culture in foreign policy analysis, not because of any resulting claims
about causality in decision-making, but because of the relationship culture has to the
broader issue of power in politics; that is, as an endeavour to explore which cultural
ideas are harnessed by whom to achieve what purposes.27
While culture is an important field of inquiry in FPA, social context has been part
of strategic studies literature, albeit at the margins. In 1977 Russell Weigley wrote
about an “American way of war”.28 That same year Jack Snyder introduced the
concept of ‘strategic culture’ to understand the USSR’s nuclear doctrine.29 In the
subsequent decades there was also some peripheral scholarly interest in using culture
to explain different approaches by the US and other countries to assessing their
national security interests, threat perceptions and war fighting approaches. Examples
include Colin Gray’s discussion of an American ‘national style’,30 and K.P. O’Reilly’s
analysis of America’s ‘rogue states’ doctrine.31 Some scholars have also explored
links between strategic culture and presidential discourse, including studies of the
role US presidents can play in shaping strategic culture. For example, in analysing
26. Alan Cienki and Dvora Yanow, “Why Metaphor and Other Tropes? Linguistic Approaches to
Analysing Policies and the Political,” Journal of International Relations and Development 16, no. 2
(2013): 168, accessed October 30, 2017; David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign
Policy and the Politics of Identity, Rev. ed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
27. Kenneth E. Wilkening, “Culture and Japanese Citizen Influence on the Transboundary Air
Pollution Issue in Northeast Asia,” Political Psychology 20, no. 4 (1999): 701–23.
28. Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy
and Policy, Indiana University Press paperback ed, The Wars of the United States (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1977).
29. Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations R-
2154-AF (Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, September 1977).
30. Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” International Security 6,
no. 2 (1981): 21–47.
31. K. P. O’Reilly, “A Rogue Doctrine?: The Role of Strategic Culture on US Foreign Policy
Behavior: A Rogue Doctrine?,” Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 1 (2013): 57–77; See also: Carnes
Lord, “American Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy 5, no. 3 (1985): 269–93; Adrian R. Lewis,
The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation
Iraqi Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2007).
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Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson’s influence on US foreign policy, Stephen
Walker and Mark Schafer conclude these presidents’ beliefs about the nature of the
“political universe” in which they operated affected their political decisions.32
Nevertheless, prevailing approaches to studying American strategic culture suffer
some limitations. First, these works commonly privilege the US historical experience
without always acknowledging collective memories of these experiences or the lessons
learned are themselves socially embedded. Recent illustrative but not unique examples
are found in a 2014 volume of Contemporary Security Policy dedicated to US strategic
culture, including Brice Harris’ contribution in which he takes as axiomatic US
strategic culture causing Americans to “substitute technology for strategy in war”.33
Such contributions do not explain where US strategic culture comes from or why
certain experiences yield cultural legacies and others do not. Instead, ‘culture’ is used
as an explanation of last resort; to cover causative elements resistant to shoehorning
into realist explanations.34 Looking directly at presidential justifications allows us to
get behind these assumed tenets of strategic culture, unpacking ideas that might not
necessarily be wholly truthful or accurately applied but are nevertheless salient in
providing the moral basis for strategic action.
Second, other approaches to strategic culture delve into the realm of political
psychology, to uncover the origins of individual belief systems, travelling down the
difficult path of discerning intention, motivation and individual agency in strategic
decision-making. Such micro-level analysis may prove interesting but it is difficult to
grasp the overall trajectory of culture, or discern patterns in strategic culture-making
or -reinforcement. The social context in which the individual is situated may be
downplayed such that influences on an individual’s reasoning—what is within the
realm of imagined possibilities—are only addressed parenthetically. While I do not
explore political psychology in this thesis, I acknowledge the context of presidential
32. Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural
Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Psychology 28, no. 6 (2007): 747–76.
33. Brice F. Harris, “United States Strategic Culture and Asia-Pacific Security,” Contemporary
Security Policy 35, no. 2 (2014): 290–309.
34. Me´rand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense.”
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discourse in what I refer to as “room for rhetorical manouevure”, which I discuss in
section 3.5 below.
Despite its potential to yield new insights, research on culture and discourse remains
at the margins of IR, FPA and strategic studies.35 On the specific topic of human-
itarian intervention, there are three contributions worth mentioning, although all
focus on the decisions to commence rather than end intervention. In her discourse
anlaysis of UNSC debates about intervention, Carrie Booth Walling shows UNSC
members are more likely to support intervention when they agree to construct human
rights as compatible with ideas of sovereignty.36 Booth Walling’s study influenced
decision-making quantitative analysis in other humanitarian crises, including Juraj
Medzihorsky and colleagues’ look at how human rights discourse featured in UNSC
debates about intervention in Syria.37 Martha Finnemore takes a broad view of the
phenomenon of intervention, tracing how the idea and its use have changed over 400
years. She argues state intervention persists while the reasons for and meaning of in-
tervention shifted. Finnemore notes the types of interventions rejected in earlier times
have now been normalised. Changes in perspectives arose as the normative value of
armed force declined, equality norms expanded and the importance of international
law increased.38 In his analysis of humanitarian intervention discourse, Gustavo
Gozzi traces the discursive shift from humanitarian intervention to responsibility
to protect arguing both discourses fundamentally challenge sovereignty ideas and
represent “hegemonic discourse”.39
My approach extends Booth Walling’s, Finnemore’s and Gozzi’s work on the initial
stages of humanitarian interventions, using discourse analysis to develop explanations
35. Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research
and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999): 225–54.
36. Carrie Booth Walling, All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Inter-
vention, Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2013).
37. Juraj Medzihorsky, Milos Popovic, and Erin K. Jenne, “Rhetoric of Civil Conflict Management:
United Nations Security Council Debates over the Syrian Civil War,” Research & Politics 4, no. 2
(2017): 1–10.
38. Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
39. Gustavo Gozzi, “The “Discourse” of International Law and Humanitarian Intervention: The
“Discourse” of International Law,” Ratio Juris 30, no. 2 (2017): 186–204.
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for ending interventions. In aligning my work with the cultural and discourse school
of thought in FPA my thesis provides a new avenue for considering the dynamics
of humanitarian intervention exit strategy decision-making and justifications. My
theoretical approach draws on FPA but is also informed by political discourse theory,
public justification theory and rhetorical presidency analysis. All these approaches
consider how elite decision-makers use ideas, myths and narratives that resonate
with their audiences to create compelling justifications for political action.
3.3.2 Political discourse theory
Political discourse comprises actions and interactions occurring predominantly in
the public sphere between participants in political processes, including politicians,
bureaucrats, citizens, organisations and institutions. Political discourse reflects and is
constrained by schematic forms of political action.40 Before political discourse theory
(PDT) was established in the 1960s as a distinct field of research, similar inquiries
occurred in rhetoric and argumentation studies. There are four main approaches to
PDT, each of which are associated with their principle proponents: Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe,41 Paul Chilton,42 Isabel and Norman Fairclough,43 and Ruth
Wodak and Martin Riesgl.44 My work in this thesis draws most heavily on Wodak
40. Teun A. van Dijk, “What Is Political Discourse Analysis?,” in Political Linguistics, ed. Jan
Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1995), 28.
41. Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, “Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory,” in Discourse
Analysis as Theory and Method (London: SAGE, 2002); Claire Sutherland, “Nation-Building through
Discourse Theory,” ASEAN 11, no. 2 (2005): 191; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985).
42. Paul Chilton and Christina Scha¨ffner, “Introduction: Themes and Principles in the Analysis
of Political Discourse,” in Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse, ed.
Paul A. Chilton and Christina Scha¨affner (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2002), 1–44; Paul A Chilton,
Analysing Political Discourse Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2004).
43. Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis. a Method for Advanced
Students (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical
Study of Language. (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013); Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, “Critical
Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology,” in Methods of Critical Discourse
Analysis, 2nd (London: SAGE, 2009), 1–33; Ruth Wodak et al., Methods of Text and Discourse
Analysis: In Search of Meaning (London: SAGE, 2000); Meriel Bloor and Thomas Bloor, The
Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis: An Introduction (London: Hodder Arnold, 2007).
44. Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA),” in Methods of
Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd (London: SAGE, 2009), 87–121; Gilbert Weiss and Ruth Wodak,
eds., Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003).
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and Riesgl’s discourse-historical approach (DHA).
Although my thesis is situated within DHA, it is important to emphasise some
common themes across all PDTs informing my investigative approach. First, all
political discourse theorists agree language is socially constituted and affected by
institutional and historical constraints, as well as structures of power, domination
and hierarchy. I argue humanitarian interventions, as political endeavours, are
constrained by collective historical understandings and dominant, ‘common sense’
views of how intervention should be conducted and ended. Second, political discourse
is more than explanation; it is a process of argumentation in which social actors
attempt to persuade others of the normative superiority of their world views. I argue
that during interventions, one major purpose US presidents have is to convince their
domestic constituents that troop withdrawal choices are morally justified and satisfy
normative expectations of appropriate action. Third, although interesting, it is not
important whether the US president “believes” his exit strategy justifications. What
matters is his or her decision to frame justifications in particular ways believing
they convince Americans of the rightness of his or her actions because these frames
are sufficiently internalised as ‘truthful’ representations of reality. Finally, political
discourse is not fixed but subject to processes of contested reproduction changing
over time. For humanitarian interventions, I argue debates in the US and the wider
international community about using military force to defend human rights affect the
imagined possibilities available for presidents justifying decisions about withdrawing
troops from humanitarian interventions.
Ruth Wodak, Martin Reisigl and their colleagues developed the discourse-historical
approach (DHA) in the late 1980s.45 Much DHA work occurred outside the English-
speaking academic world with most publications in German. DHA focuses on
the “validity claim of normative rightness” occurring through argumentation.46
45. Wodak and Meyer, “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology”;
Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).”
46. Martin Reisigl, “Argumentation Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach: A Method-
ological Framework,” in Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies, ed. Christopher Hart and Piotr
Cap (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 69.
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DHA scholars integrate normative dimensions into their analysis, primarily by
distinguishing between reasonable and fallacious argumentation. DHA provides ten
“pragma-dialectical rules of critical discussion” to help distinguish between ‘sound’ and
‘fallacious’ argumentation, although Martin Reisigl argues these ten principles are
not rigid rules but rather function as guidelines.47 Argumentation soundness is one
area explored by DHA scholars and Reisigl identifies another three: (a) functional,
formal and content-related analysis of argumentation; (b) analysis of the macro-,
meso- or micro-structure of argumentation; and (c) argument representation versus
argument performance.48
Public justification fits within the DHA approach. For DHA scholars, argumentation
is ultimately a strategic issue. Topoi are a way of strategically organising speech
acts to indicate how social actors can most convincingly engage in argumentation.49
Like other DHA scholars, my work is content-related; I identify the main ideas
underpinning the ways US presidents justify decisions to withdraw troops from
humanitarian interventions. My approach uses the rhetorical concept of topoi as
a means for identifying the dynamic premises of arguments, which Reisigl says
reveals the “specific character of discourses (subject positions, controversial claims,
justification strategies, ideologies, etc.)”.50 The way I use topoi in my thesis is as
“normative concepts”, which are part of normative concepts analysis (NoCA) and
discourse tracing methods of studying public justification. I discuss these methods
in Chapter 4.
3.3.3 Public justification theory
DHA scholars influenced public justification theory (PJT) when it emerged in 2015.
PJT focuses on argumentation in public political communication. Studies of public
justification acknowledge inter-subjective reasoning as central to the public, political
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 76.
49. Ibid., 90.
50. Ibid., 77.
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answers given to the ‘why?’ question asked of social actors.51 PJT scholars trace the
way language reflects and shapes justifications, examining the “communicative process
of legitimacy-making (and unmaking) in the public sphere”.52 Public justification
is grounded in social context. Social context underpins an actor’s legitimacy and
authority to speak as well as furnishes her with reasons likely to resonate with an
audience and have the most persuasive value. In order to craft justifications that
“make sense”, an actor will invariably rely on reasons with a “taken-for-granted”
quality.53 To understand public justifications, researchers must therefore identify and
deconstruct these unquestioned/unquestionable ideas and reflect on how they are
(re)produced, internalised or subverted, examining the process of ‘creating reality’.
Contemporary public justification theory draws much from the work of leading
DHA scholar Theo van Leeuwen who set out a framework for analysing legitimation
in human communication.54 van Leeuwen proposes four categories of legitimation:
“authorisation” (based on reference to authority of tradition, custom, law and insti-
tutional authority); “moral evaluation” (based on values); “rationalisation” (based
on goals and uses of institutionalised social action); and “mythopoesis” (conveyed
through narratives rewarding legitimate action).55 vanLeeuwen suggests legitimation
is not restricted to speech acts but can be performed through visual or musical
representations.56
Building on van Leeuwen’s work, Anthony Reyes examines how “political leaders
justify their political agendas”. He sees political legitimisation, or public justifica-
tion, as behaviour “enacted by argumentation”, seeking audience approval.57 Reyes’
categories of legitimisation are:
51. Abulof and Kornprobst, “Unpacking Public Justification.”
52. Abulof and Kornprobst, “Introduction,” 9.
53. Ibid., 6.
54. Theo van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,” Discourse & Communi-
cation 1, no. 1 (2007): 91–112.
55. Ibid., 92.
56. Ibid., 107.
57. Antonio Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions,”
Discourse and Society 22, no. 6 (2011): 782–84.
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1. Legitimisation through emotions. Speakers create two sides to a given event
resulting in a positively-portrayed ‘us’ group and a negatively depicted ‘them’
group.58
2. Legitimisation through a hypothetical future. Speakers identify a future threat
requiring immediate present action.
3. Legitimisation through rationality. Speakers refer to socially-acceptable decision-
making processes to present actions as thoughtful and considered judgments.59
4. Legitimisation through voices of expertise. Speakers identify experts in a specific
field as supporting a specific course of action.
5. Altruism. Speakers present a course of action as serving the ‘common good’
including the audience and/or a remote society in need of ‘our’ help.60
I use both van Leeuwen and Reyes’ categorisations of justification practices as
a starting point for analysing presidential public justifications for humanitarian
intervention exit strategies. The US president occupies a unique social position as a
person with the power to define political reality as viewed from the vantage point
of the United States. Portraying this reality also sets the standards for how others
outside the US judge its actions. Again, it is not about whether those outside the
US believe the justifications themselves are ‘true’ but that they form the frame of
legitimate and legitimisable American foreign policy action. At the same time, for a
president’s definition to be believed, to be considered legitimate and to ‘resonate’
with his audience, the president’s approach must fit within the American people’s
‘taken-for-granted’, normative expectations. It is valuable, therefore, to understand
how the president reflects and shapes the reality of humanitarian interventions
through his exit strategy justifications. I discuss this view in greater detail in section
58. See also Wodak et al., Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis; Edward J. Lordan, Case for
Combat: How Presidents Persuade Americans to Go to War (ebook: EBSCO Publishing, 2010), 12.
59. David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2004): 607–20.
60. Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions,” 785–87.
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3.3.4 drawing on the work of scholars who study the ‘rhetorical presidency’.
3.3.4 The rhetorical presidency during wartime
The rhetorical presidency—the study of US presidential discourse61—was pioneered
in the 1980s, first in the work of J.W. Ceaser and colleagues,62 and then Jeffrey
Tulis in The Rhetorical Presidency.63 The central motivation for this research is
that presidential rhetoric matters, even if its impact cannot always be guaranteed.64
Despite political, social and technological changes the power of the institution of
the presidency is such that it defines national realities and constitutes the American
nation.65 Notwithstanding its significance, the literature on presidential discourse in
wartime remains relatively small and focuses almost exclusively on how US presidents
frame decisions to start wars or continue fighting them.66 My work extends this
literature into exit strategies and decisions to end humanitarian interventions.
At no time is the president’s ability to define reality for the American people more
marked than when the US is fighting wars overseas. The majority of US citizens
have no direct experience of military action and must therefore look to people like
their president who hold themselves out as authorities on the realities of war. Even
with the prevalence of news media, the information journalists can access is partial
61. Mary E. Stuckey, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Presidency and Presidential Rhetoric,” Review
of Communication 10, no. 1 (2010): 38–52; Terri Bimes, “Understanding the Rhetorical Presidency,”
in The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency, ed. George C. Edwards and William G. Howell,
The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
62. J. W. Ceaser et al., “The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency,” in Rethinking the Presidency, ed.
Thomas E. Cronin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 233–52.
63. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr, 1987).
64. Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” 611.
65. Stuckey, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Presidency and Presidential Rhetoric,” 41; Martin J.
Medhurst, ed., Before the Rhetorical Presidency, 1st edition, Presidential Rhetoric Series 19 (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 133.
66. Eran Ben-Porath, “Rhetoric of Atrocities: The Place of Horrific Human Rights Abuses in
Presidential Persuasion Efforts,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2007): 181–202; Francis A.
Beer and Robert Hariman, “Post-Realism, Just War and the Gulf War Debate,” in Politically
Speaking: A Worldwide Examination of Language Used in the Public Sphere, ed. Ofer Feldman and
Christ’l De Landtsheer (Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 184–93; Andrew J. Brown, “The Righteous
Use of Violence: Rhetoric and Mythmaking before the First Gulf War (1990–91),” PoLAR 27, no. 2
(2004): 20–44; Alfred Fusman, “U.S. Presidential Discourse, September 11-20, 2001: The Birth of
the War on Terror,” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 12, no. 34 (2013): 126–51.
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and must frequently rely on government sources; fuller analysis is also often not
timely. Therefore how US presidents frame wars—motivations, conduct, objectives,
evaluations—affects how those wars are understood and remembered by the American
people.67
Looking at a president’s public justifications for military decisions reveals which
options are considered ‘legitimate’ and enables us to identify which choices are
open or foreclosed.68 Presidential justifications therefore reflect, reinforce and shape
a language of practicality within which the wider security and foreign relations
community discusses and advocates particular policy positions.69 As Consuelo Cruz
argues, the pervasiveness of particular ideas central to identity formation can constrain
the “collective field of imaginable possibilities” of action.70 What US discourse permits
as legitimate or legitimisable is all the more important given America’s great power
status, its ability to support its normative predispositions with military force, and
the extent to which its normative frameworks have historically been assimilated
into global institutional structures.71 This is particularly true of the international
framework for using military force for humanitarian purposes.
The classic objection to this discursive approach, extended to discourse analysis
more generally in strategic studies and IR, is that regardless of his motivations,
presidential justifications do not matter. After all, civilian control of the military is
well-established in the US and the president has authority—within the bounds of the
Constitution—to deploy troops and withdraw them as he sees fit. Presidents taking
the trouble to communicate decisions to the American people, let alone convince
67. Lordan, Case for Combat: How Presidents Persuade Americans to Go to War , This prevailing
power of the president can be seen, for example, in the narrative about weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq that became the dominant narrative for that war, despite its inaccuracy.
68. Vanessa B. Beasley, “Identity, Democracy and Presidential Rhetoric,” in Politics, Discourse,
and American Society: New Agendas, ed. Roderick P. Hart and Bartholomew H. Sparrow (Rowman /
Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 20.
69. G. Thomas Goodnight, “The Metapolitics of the 2002 Iraq Debate: Public Policy and the
Network Imaginary,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 13, no. 1 (2010): 67; D. Scott Bennett, “Democracy,
Regime Change and Rivalry Termination,” International Interactions 22, no. 4 (1997): 172–73, 178.
70. Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make
Their Futures,” World Politics 52, no. 3 (2000): 277.
71. Chris Brown, “Do Great Powers Have Great Responsibilities? Great Powers and Moral Agency,”
Global Society 18, no. 1 (2004): 5–19.
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them the decisions are legitimate, is arguably a mere courtesy rather than a demand
of the office, as the long history of covert military operations under every president
since George Washington attests.72 Further, even if one accepts the president’s role
involves justifying foreign policy decisions, justifications are arguably just the window
dressing of military action and do not have substantive bearing on the actual killing,
dying and political transformation in war. This is Stephen Walt’s view. A major
critic of the poststructuralist/discursive IR approaches Walt argues “issues of war
and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent
discourse that is divorced from the real world”.73 My position is public discourse
is far from removed from reality; it is the way in which we create, represent and
understand reality. It is precisely the seriousness of war and peace issues that behove
us to move discourse from the margins to the centre of our analysis of foreign policy
decision-making.
There are a number of political and practical reasons why presidential justifications
are important during wartime and why analytic frameworks acknowledging their
normative foundations are useful. The importance of presidential justifications relates
partly to questions of political legitimacy74 and partly to the role of political discourse
discussed in Section 3.3.2 above. First, employing military force involves making
inherently moral choices about life and death. Citizens have a stake in constructing
their nation’s character and thus have an interest in how, when and under what
circumstances wars are fought, including acceptable levels of American and foreign
casualties. Pressure to justify and legitimise war-making and -ending decisions is
amplified in humanitarian interventions because these operations are grounded in
moral rightness claims and willingness to sacrifice a nation’s own citizens to save the
72. Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
73. Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35,
no. 2 (1991): 223.
74. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968); Maurizio
Passerin d’Entre´ves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London: Routledge, 1994); A. John
Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott
Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964); Beasley, “Politics, Discourse, and American Society.”
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lives of foreigners.75
Second, even when decisions about war are constructed in ways assumed to be morally
clear—for example, responding to an existential threat, or fulfilling ‘national security’
objectives—they are ultimately normative judgments.76 The ethical issues involved
make it incumbent upon democratically-elected leaders to justify these decisions to
their populations. Analysing presidential strategies of legitimation thus has potential
to reveal “cause-consequence effects about shared beliefs within a cultural group”
and explain how they affect war and national security decisions.77
Third, in democratic societies, leaders need to justify their political actions to maintain
legitimacy and be re-elected. Appearing morally consistent bolsters credibility and
supports a government defending its legitimacy. Fourth, believable justifications
ensure public support for military action; an essential component of a war’s success.78
Finally, as pointed out in section 3.3.2, the primary goal of political discourse is
convincing other members of the social group a particular course of action is the
most correct.79
As I noted in section 3.3.2, while it is important to acknowledge presidential rhetoric
may at times be insincere or calculated to manipulate, this does not diminish the
value of studying public justification. Public statements demonstrate, at the very
least, the speaker believes her audience will find such statements persuasive and
consequently “even insincere speech may shape future sincere discourse”.80 The
75. Nathanial Berman, “Intervention in a ’Divided World’: Axes of Legitimacy,” in Human Rights,
Intervention and the Use of Force, ed. Philip Alston and Euan MacDonald (London: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 215–42; Denise M. Bostdorff, The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign
Crisis, Studies in Rhetoric/Communication (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994);
Cheyney Ryan, “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitan Soldiering,” in Heroism and the Changing Character
of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014),
120–41; Roberta L. Coles, “Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and
Destiny Intertwined,” Sociology of Religion 63, no. 4 (2002): 404.
76. Campbell, Writing Security ; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Soceity
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
77. Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions,” 783.
78. A point Carl von Clausewitz acknowledges in one of his ‘trinities’ required for victory. Clause-
witz, On War .
79. Piotr Cap, “Towards the Proximization Model of the Analysis of Legitimization in Political
Discourse,” Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008): 17–41.
80. Abulof and Kornprobst, “Introduction,” 10.
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primary interest for public justification researchers and for this thesis, therefore, is
not to uncover the subconscious core of presidential intent or motivation or reveal the
truthfulness of particular statements; rather, it is to make apparent the discursive
strategies adopted in service of a specific political objective.
There are other good reasons for excluding motivations and intentions from my
examination of humanitarian interventions, not least because there is a surfeit of
popular and scholarly discussion of the motivations of military action, including
interrogations of the genuineness of professed humanitarian intentions and assertions
of mixed or ulterior motives for intervention. This interest is understandable and
the veracity of a government’s claims to be acting with a humanitarian purpose may
indeed play a role in influencing the way an armed intervention is conducted and
ended. At the same time, trying to discern ‘real’ or ‘true’ intention is not possible
with any degree of certainty. Individual decision-makers rarely behave with a single
purpose; there could (and most likely are) a range of motivations for a particular
president deciding to deploy US armed forces in a foreign territory. The existence of
other, non-humanitarian motives also does not prevent an intervention from being
classified as humanitarian.81
Rhetorical presidency studies show the president cannot craft their war rhetoric in a
vacuum. Presidents must fit their rhetoric into a narrative framework that resonates
with the American people to be believed and for their decisions to be considered
legitimate. In section 3.3.5 I look at this idea of narrative frameworks and how they
manifest in the humanitarian intervention context.
3.3.5 Narrative framework and national role conception
Elements comprising the context of presidential public justifications constitute a nar-
rative framework. This idea is drawn from Walter R. Fisher who argues humans judge
81. Fernando R. Teso´n, “Humanitarian Intervention: Loose Ends,” Journal of Military Ethics 10,
no. 3 (2011): 192–212.
Finishing the job 78
Chapter 3. Discourse, Justification, Expectations Anna Samson
rationality based on—and are thus more convinced by—communications resonating
with stories believed to be true about their lives.82 Fisher’s narrative paradigm
theory has much in common with the schema theory of political communication,
which examines how people process new information they receive about particular
events. Schema theorists such as Doris Graber argue individuals assimilate new
information based on existing knowledge they have about a situation.83 Narrative
framework also maps onto Nathan Leites’ ‘operational code’,84 a set of “general
beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics” affecting
elite decision-making.85 Leites identified a Bolshevik operational code underpinning
Soviet action but Alexander George suggests the concept can be used to understand
actors’ assumptions about the nature of political conflict.86
There is a reflexive, dynamic relationship between the dominant narrative framework,
justification and strategic action. US presidents will, by-and-large, take actions
considered justifiable, but justifiable actions are those consistent with the dominant
narrative framework. To maintain legitimacy, US Presidents are required to draw on
the American narrative to craft convincing justifications for decisions to withdraw
troops from humanitarian interventions. Martha Finnemore locates this type of
reasoning in the ‘logic of appropriateness’ where norms drive action. In these instances
“actors may ask themselves, ‘what kind of situation is this?’ and ‘what am I supposed
to do now?’ rather than, ‘how do I get what I want’?”87
Narrative frameworks are central to forming what K.J. Holsti calls “national role
82. Walter R. Fisher, “Clarifying the Narrative Paradigm,” Communication Monographs 56, no. 1
(1989): 55.
83. Doris A. Graber, ed., Media Power in Politics, 4th ed (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2000);
Robert Axelrod, “Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition,”
American Political Science Review 67, no. 4 (1973): 1248–66; Richard K. Herrmann et al., “Images
in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata,” International Studies
Quarterly 41 (1997): 403–33.
84. Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, 1st edition (New York: RAND Corpo-
ration, 1951).
85. Alexander L. George, “The ”Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision Making,” in American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed.
G. John Ikenberry (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 483.
86. Ibid.
87. Finnemore, National Interests in International Soceity , 29; See also Vincent Pouliot, “The
Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” International Organization
62, no. 2 (2008): 257–88.
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conception”. Holsti argues a nation’s view of itself and its role in international
affairs is formed through discursive socialisation affecting behaviour. Role conception
includes what policymakers define as “suitable” actions and imagine as “appropri-
ate orientations and functions”.88 At times of “acute international conflict”, the
self-defined national role conception takes precedence over externally determined
behavioural expectations, such as those prescribed by international law.89
Holsti identifies 17 national roles, concluding the US self-identifies with eight different
“active” role types, which Holsti notes coincide with America’s active role in interna-
tional affairs. US role types are: regional protector, anti-imperialist agent, defender
of the faith, developer, bastion of revolution-liberator, mediator/integrator, regional
collaborator, and faithful ally.90 Using national role conception as a shorthand for
understanding state behaviour can create its own pitfalls: expectations states will
behave in a particular way because of their perceived role conception may affect how
that role is constructed.91 Holsti acknowledges role conceptions and perceptions are
not determinative and inconsistencies between role conception and actions can occur.
Role conception may also vary depending on the relationship or issues involved.92
Holsti’s idea of national role conception continues to influence contemporary schol-
arship about US foreign policy.93 For example Hanns Maull notes the US has had
a “remarkable degree of continuity” in its role conception since the end of the Cold
War revolving around five themes: (1) exclusive international leadership and re-
pudiation of imperialism; (2) devoting substantial national resources to pursuing
global power; (3) promoting the “American ideology” of democracy, human rights
and market economics as a morally and practically beneficial social order; (4) a
88. K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies
Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 246.
89. Ibid., 243.
90. Ibid., Table 2.
91. Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, “Rethinking Roles: Reflexive Role Ascription and Performativity
in International Relations,” International Studies Review 18, no. 3 (2016): 487–507.
92. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 298.
93. For the theory’s application to other countries see: Nele Noesselt, “China’s Contradictory
Role(s) in World Politics: Decrypting China’s North Korea Strategy,” Third World Quarterly 35,
no. 7 (2014): 1307–25; Cameron G. Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin
America,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014, 662–81.
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practical rather than principled approach to multilateralism; and (5) a propensity for
military intervention, including unilateral action.94 Maull further suggests differences
between US presidents in their foreign policy actions are more closely related to how
to interpret and pursue roles rather than the role conception itself. He also notes
American exceptionalism is the “most pervasive element” in US political culture,
deeply influencing US foreign policy.95
I agree with Holsit and Maull’s constructions of US national role conception. I
build on their analysis, exploring where the normative expectations underpinning the
national role conception come from and how they operate in presidential decisions
about humanitarian interventions. To do that I turn to the ideas of political myths;
what public justification theorists incorporate within the notion of ‘taken-for-granted’
ideas.
3.4 A discursive understanding of exit strategies
In this section I consider theoretical approaches for determining which elements of
the narrative framework should be explored in a discursive study of intervention exit
strategies. In the following chapter I explain how I combined these elements with
my research findings to develop a discursive framework for presidential justifications
for humanitarian intervention exit strategies.
94. Hanns W. Maull, “Hegemony Reconstructed? America’s Role Conception and Its “Leadership”
within Its Core Alliances,” in Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses,
ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull, Routledge Advances in International
Relations and Global Politics (New York: Routledge, 2011), 170–71.
95. Ibid., 168.
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3.4.1 Political myths in the narrative framework of interven-
tion
Political myths are neither objects nor the same as political symbols; they do not
describe the world but rather ‘create’ their own world and are thus self-fulfilling.96
Myths do not make empirical claims to truth. Their function is to insert events
within a narrative framework to “ground” it.97 Political myths thus make moral
claims about reality, expressing a “paradigmatic truth”.98 While political myths
are enduring they are not immutable or static. Nor do myths possess agency in
themselves; they are tools social actors use when engaging in argumentation in
political discourse. As their potency ebbs and flows and political myths undergo
processes of (d)evolution, they continue to provide reference points for exercising,
experiencing and understanding US military power. Presidential justifications about
humanitarian interventions contribute to the ‘mythic history’ of US military action
against which all past, current and future experiences of humanitarian intervention
are understood.
I argue three of the most salient political myths in American decision-making about
using military force are: (a) US exceptionalism and manifest destiny; (b) World
War II and the Vietnam War archetypes of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ wars respectively;
and (c) winning military operations as proving moral vindication. In singling out
these three myths for analysis, I am not suggesting that they are the only political
myths that operate in Presidential foreign policy discourse (others include the myths
of the American Civil War, the ‘discovery’ of America by Christopher Columbus,
Thanksgiving and the idea that America’s founding fathers were all Christians). I
96. Chiara Bottici, “Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth,” Iris 3, no. 5 (2011): 34; Chiara
Bottici and Benoˆıt Challand, “Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-
Fulfilling Prophecy,” European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 3 (2006): 315–36; Chiara Bottici,
“Philosophies of Political Myth, a Comparative Look Backwards: Cassirer, Sorel and Spinoza,”
European Journal of Political Theory 8, no. 3 (2009): 365–82; Joanne Esch, “Legitimizing the
”War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric,” Political Psychology 31, no. 3 (2010):
257–391; Robert S. Leib, “Political Myth: An Archeology of Magical Language” (PhD thesis, 2016);
John Flowerdew, “The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal: A Case Study in the Creation of Mythic
Discourse,” Discourse and Society 8, no. 4 (1997): 453–77.
97. Bottici, “Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth,” 38.
98. Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth,
Ritual, and Classification, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 24.
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am arguing, however, that they are among the most significant and pervasive, giving
rise to normative expectations about justifiable uses of military force.99
3.4.2 US exceptionalism and manifest destiny
The political myth of exceptionalism and manifest destiny derives from the collective
story of America’s founding, the character of its people, and its role in the world.
The myth is the US, from its puritan beginnings, is a divinely chosen nation with a
righteous responsibility to lead by example and transform the world in accordance
with its values of freedom, democracy and economic prosperity.100 This political myth
is so entrenched it is sometimes known as American civil religion.101 The myth’s
impact is significant enough it has been used axiomatically when constructing US
strategic interests, strategic objectives and military operations.102 Unlike Joanne
Esch who has examined political myths evident in presidential discourse on the war
on terror, I consider the idea the US is a chosen nation with a duty to civilise less
enlightened peoples to be part of, rather than separate to, the US exceptionalism
myth.103
There are two influential aspects of the exceptionalism/manifest destiny myth ob-
servable in American humanitarian interventions. The first is the idea America’s
99. Coles, “Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined”;
Lane Crothers, “The Cultural Roots of Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign
Policy,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, no. 1 (2011): 21–34; Stephen W. Silliman, “The “Old
West” in the Middle East: U.S. Military Metaphors in Real and Imagined Indian Country,” American
Anthropologist 110, no. 2 (2008): 237–47; Catherine Sneberg, “The Purpose of American Strategic
Culture: A Study of American Exceptionalism and Its Implications for U.S. Grand Strategy and
America’s Global Role” (Masters thesis, University of Oslo, 2015); Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “The
Emperor Wore Cowboy Boots,” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 3 (August 2008): 319–30;
David P. Forsythe and Patrice C. McMahon, American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: US Foreign
Policy, Human Rights, and World Order, Internatioinal Studies Intensives (New York: Routledge,
2017).
100. Robert Booth Fowler et al., Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture and Strategic
Choices, 5th (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013); Raymond Haberski, “‘A Theology of American
Exceptionalism’? Iraq, Civil Religion and American Public Morality,” in Moral Values, Cultural
Change, and Post-Materialism in Europe and North America (Lisbon, April 14, 2009); Coles,
“Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined.”
101. Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96, no. 1 (1967): 1–21.
102. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example”; Glenn P. Hastedt, American
Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future, Tenth edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).
103. Esch, “Legitimizing the ”War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric.”
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God-given gift of wealth and power is accompanied by a moral responsibility to
propagate the values and institutions believed to underpin this privileged position.104
The second is US military operations are liberating for target populations because it
is a non-imperial actor.105
Walter McDougall and Walter Russell Mead link the exceptionalism/manifest des-
tiny myth to the moral and moralist drivers of US foreign policy and the role of
religion in American public life.106 Alan Wolfe argues liberals, conservatives and
neo-conservatives in America adhere to US exceptionalism, although they have differ-
ent ideas about how to pursue its tenets.107 Although exceptionalism and manifest
destiny are sometimes analysed separately, they are closely related, representing two
facets of the same myth and often used interchangeably in popular discourse.108 Even
scholars who set out to debunk the exceptionalism myth recognise it is discursively
pervasive and powerful.109 In their four-volume treatise on the history of American
exceptionalism, Timothy Roberts and Lindsay DiCuici note even in the early days of
the Republic, “anti-exceptionalism contained within it an entrenched belief in Amer-
ican distinctiveness”.110 The myth has power to bound decision-making, creating
and constraining the slate of strategic options US Administrations believe can be
reasonably pursued in military operations.111
104. Coles, “Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined.”
105. Sterling-Folker, “The Emperor Wore Cowboy Boots.”
106. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the
World Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Miﬄin, 1997); Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence:
American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World, Reprinted, A Century Foundation Book
(New York: Routledge, 2009).
107. Alan Wolfe, “Back to Crackpot Moralism,” World Policy Journal 25, no. 3 (2008): 218–20.
108. Coles, “Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined,”
415–16.
109. William Blum, America’s Deadliest Export: Democracy: The Truth about US Foreign Policy
and Everything Else (Halifax: Fernwood Publications; Zed Books, 2013); Forsythe and McMahon,
American Exceptionalism Reconsidered , 27.
110. Timothy Roberts and Lindsay DiCuirci, eds., American Exceptionalism, vol. 4 (London:
Pickering & Chatto, 2013), vii.
111. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State; Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An
Anatomy of American Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Andrew Rojecki,
“Rhetorical Alchemy: American Exceptionalism and the War on Terror,” Political Communication
25, no. 1 (2008): 67–88; Eugene Secunda and Terence P. Moran, Selling War to America: From the
Spanish American War to the Global War on Terror (Westport: Praeger Security International,
2007); William B. Allen, “The Moral Foundations of Political Choices: George Washington, Foreign
Policy and National Character,” The Review of Faith and International Affairs 9, no. 4 (2011):
3–12.
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Exceptionalism/manifest destiny myths rarely operate in isolation as factors in
presidents’ decisions about military action. Other motivations include expanding
US sphere of influence, self-defence, acquiring territory, and promoting favourable
trade conditions. Nevertheless I suggest even when realpolitik considerations catalyse
decisions, they do so with the accompanying moral weight of the exceptionalism myth
providing additional support for and at times constraining action. Derek Chollet and
Tod Lindberg argue it would be impossible to talk about US foreign policy without
talking about its moral expectations because they are woven so tightly into the fabric
of the collective national narrative.112 Sarah Maxey similarly finds that humanitarian
justifications are central to motivating public support for all military operations, not
just humanitarian interventions.113 To help demonstrate this point, the following is a
brief historical overview of the myth’s place in US foreign policy decision-making.114
In providing this account my approach diverges from the most common explanations
for the contours of US foreign policy.115 These accounts tend to divide American
foreign policy behaviour into the categories of isolationism, internationalism, realism,
idealism, unilateralism and multilateralism.116 The categories presuppose a tension
between, for example, the foreign policy approach of Presidents George Washington,
Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe who advocated isolationism, versus Presidents
such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson who supported greater US in-
volvement in world affairs and global institutions. Instead of adopting a similar
approach, I take my lead from scholars such as Lane Crothers who focuses on cul-
112. Derek Chollet and Tod Lindberg, “A Moral Core for US Foreign Policy,” Policy Review, no.
146 (2007): 3–23.
113. Sarah Maxey, “The Power of Humanitarian Narratives: A Domestic Coalition Theory of
Justifications for Military Action,” Political Research Quarterly, 2019, 1–16.
114. For readers interested in more detailed historical accounts of US foreign policy see the works
of: Bryan Mabee, Understanding American Power: The Changing World of US Foreign Policy
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S.
Foreign Relations since 1776, The Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008).
115. For a good example of this see Mabee, Understanding American Power , 14–53; On the
challenges of conducting an historical inquiry into US foreign policy see: Michael J. Hogan and
Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
116. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy ; Michael Lind, The American Way of Strategy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006); Tudor A. Onea, US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era:
Restraint versus Assertiveness from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013).
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tural explanations for certain tropes persisting in the American political debate
about foreign policy. Crothers argues it is overly simplistic to view US foreign
policy as ‘isolationist turned interventionist’, as all debates are largely rooted in
the US exceptionalism myth. Crothers’ view provides a convincing explanation for
neo-conservative enthusiasm for US military interventions despite their otherwise
isolationist tendencies.117
During the early days of the republic, President George Washington attempted to
distinguish the US from other European nations, particularly imperial powers Britain
and France. Washington argued America should pursue global economic expansion
while avoiding political alliances. Washington’s principles are an early expression of
a politically independent (rather than isolationist) US foreign policy tied to moral
action.118 Keeping with this moral drive, President Thomas Jefferson (elected in
1800) focused on developing the US as a light on the hill and an ‘empire of liberty’
at home.119 Continental expansion continued with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.
In 1819, President James Monroe further expanded US territory by negotiating
with Spain to annex Florida. Despite increasing America’s own footprint in the
region, Monroe’s official policy supported newly independent states in the Western
hemisphere against influence from European and other imperial powers. Monroe
justified his 1823 Monroe Doctrine as morally incumbent on the US republic.120
President Andrew Jackson continued the US expansion project, annexing Texas in
1845, declaring war with Mexico (1846-49) and negotiating with Britain for Oregon
(1848). Jackson used manifest destiny to justify these actions arguing it was America’s
God-given right to control this territory and civilise the Western frontier.121 The
Civil War that followed (1861-1865) became a touchstone in American collective
117. Crothers, “The Cultural Roots of Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign
Policy.”
118. Mabee, Understanding American Power , 17–18.
119. Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right, 1st,
A Critical Issue (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 22.
120. Christopher R. Rossi and Elihu Root, eds., “The Monroe Doctrine and International Law in
the Americas,” in Whiggish International Law (Online: Brill Nijhoff, 2019), 123–53.
121. Zoe¨ Hess Carney and Mary E. Stuckey, “The World as the American Frontier: Racialized
Presidential War Rhetoric,” Southern Communication Journal 80, no. 3 (2015): 163–88.
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identity. Almost half of all wartime deaths in US history occurred during the Civil
War (620,000 of a total of 1,264,000). Animosities underpinning the war still resonate
in domestic discourse on race relations, states rights, economic production, patriotism
and heroic sacrifice.
The explosion of the USS Maine during the Cuban rebellion against Spain in 1898
prompted President William McKinley to declare war against Spain. Domestic
discourse about the war focused on US moral responsibility to protect oppressed
people under Spanish colonial rule. American victory resulted in its acquisition of
overseas territories (Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines) and the accompanying
accoutrements of an imperialist state, ushering in a new era of American intervention-
ism overseas. President Woodrow Wilson extended the list of American protectorates
with military occupations of Haiti in 1915 and Nicaragua in 1916.
Pre-occupied with ensuring stability in the Americas, Wilson initially kept the US
out of World War I, seeing “Providence” creating an opportunity for the US to
lead a new world order out of the ashes of the war.122 During his 1916 election
campaign for a second presidential term, Wilson spoke of the US responsibility to
“serve the wrold” in preventing another global war.123 His program for peace was
built on “American principles, American policies” that were also the principles “of
every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of
mankind and must prevail.”124 Wilson would later consolidate his peace plan into his
Fourteen Points address on 8 January 1918, however he failed to win either domestic
or international support for it.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, elected in 1932 during the Great Depression,
re-calibrated US interventionism as a ‘Good Neighbour’ policy. However, in 1940, as
World War II raged in Europe and Asia, Roosevelt spoke of turning US industrial
capacity into “the great arsenal of democracy” whose weapons would be targeted
122. Herring, From Colony to Superpower , 399.
123. Ibid., 407–8.
124. Woodrow Wilson, “Address to the Senate of the United States: ”A World League for Peace”,”
American Presidency Project, January 22, 1917,
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against the “gang of outlaws” and “evil forces” of the Axis powers.125 Japan’s 1941
bombing of Pearl Harbour spurred US retaliation, sending troops to join the Allies’
fight. America’s late entry into the war shielded it from much of the devastation that
shattered the European powers when the war ended. America emerged as a great
power in the second half of the 20th century with the exceptionalism/manifest destiny
myth featuring heavily in public justifications for America leading multilateral devel-
opments including Bretton-Woods, the UN and NATO. The exceptionalism/manifest
destiny myth helped legitimse policies promoting world peace through democracy,,126
as well as spreading human rights and ‘American values’ as a national security
interest.127
Fulfilling American destiny and leading the world in pursuing freedom and democracy
prompted military interventions to eliminate the Cold War communist threat. In
1947 President Harry Truman argued the US had “great responsibilities” to lead
the free peoples of the world. Presidents Truman, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B.
Johnson and George H. W. Bush used the rhetoric of exceptionalism and moral
purpose to help justify the Korean and Vietnam Wars, as well as interventions in
Dominican Republic (1965-1966), Cambodia (1969-75), Laos (1971-73), Chile (1973),
El Salvador (1981-1992), Beirut (1982-1984), Grenada (1983-84), Libya (1986) and
Panama (1989).128 Rather than framing these wars exclusively in terms of existential
threat, Cold War presidents felt compelled to incorporate moral responsibility in
their justifications.
The second, anti-imperialist part of the exceptionalism myth is as much about
distinguishing US foreign policy from that of the empires that dominated the pre-
20th century international order, as it is about justifying America’s significant global
military footprint. Despite claims of anti-imperialism, a number of scholars interpret
US foreign policy and its military interventions as consistent with the behaviour of
125. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat,” American Presidency Project, December 29, 1940,
126. Beate Jahn, “The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding
(Part II),” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 2 (2007): 211–29.
127. Matthew Levinger, “A Core National Security Interest: Framing Atrocities Prevention,” Politics
and Governance 3, no. 4 (2015): 26; Herring, From Colony to Superpower , 537.
128. Herring, From Colony to Superpower .
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an empire.129 The discursive power of a non-imperialist US was particularly apparent
after the end of the Cold War, when the idea of non-imperialist intervention and
America’s moral responsibility to catalyse democratic transformation allowed the
manifest destiny/exceptionalism myth to assume a meliorist hue, what Dan Cox
refers to as ‘liberal imperialism’.130 Successive US administrations constructed the
Cold War as more than an existential battle between the US and the Soviet Union;
it was a quest for supremacy between opposing world views.131 US leaders could
thus construe America’s Cold War victory as vindicating its world view, validating
exceptionalist perceptions and supporting claims the US has a responsibility to lead
global transformation.132 Crafting legitimate foreign policy in the post-Cold War
world thus requires the US to rhetorically and militarily defend principles considered
to have ‘won’ the Cold War and created America’s exceptionalism.133
At the same time, however, constructing the US as a global defender of the moral
good and promoter of democratic institutions also constrains US foreign policy,
especially in the post-Cold War era. US military operations are particularly sensitive
to charges of neo-imperialism.134 By contrast Jennifer Sterling-Folker notes there is
no similar rejection of using the terms ‘hegemon’ or ‘great power’ to describe the
US.135 Behaviour that might be associated with empires—for example, occupying
foreign countries, military operations facilitating resource extraction, the interests of
American capital defended through military force—are denied, re-framed or eschewed.
To underscore the anti-imperialist nature of its interventions, the US also often seeks
129. The US actions in invading Iraq in 2003 prompted much of the recent scholarly literature
on this question: Tony Smith, “From Woodrow Wilson in 1902 to the Bush Doctrine in 2002:
Democracy Promotion as Imperialism,” International Politics 48, nos. 2-3 (2011): 229–50.
130. Dan G. Cox, “The Age of Liberal Imperialism: Twenty-Five Years of a Flawed U.S. Foreign
Policy,” Orbis 57, no. 4 (2013): 643–52.
131. Paul A. Chilton, Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common
House, Conflict and Consciousness, vol. 2 (New York: P. Lang, 1996).
132. Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The
Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 35–68.
133. It is also possible to link this idea of exceptionalism and the moral responsibilities that come
with post-Cold War hegemony to the work of those scholars who argue that global powers like
the US, UK and France have ‘special responsibilities’. See: Mlada Bukovansky et al., Special
Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012).
134. G. John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age,”
Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004).
135. Sterling-Folker, “The Emperor Wore Cowboy Boots,” 321.
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approval from legitimising institutions like the UNSC and ‘coalition partners’. At
other times, the US is willing to bypass collective decision-making bodies, justifying
unilateral action on the basis it is acting for the common good.
Not only is there a collective belief among American citizens that a moral responsibil-
ity to ‘do the right thing’ motivates US foreign policy, but this ‘right thing’ requires
helping others develop political and economic institutions like America’s.136 At the
same time, anti-imperialism requires America not keep troops in place for longer
than absolutely necessary to secure these objectives; US military power should enable
a target country to realise its potential and spearhead its own social transformation.
Emancipation, not occupation, is key.
While American Presidents may not always explicitly state their nation is ‘excep-
tional’, they frequently reference the myth by employing frames referencing the
founding fathers, defending freedom, democracy, promoting human rights, the desir-
ability of the American model and the uniqueness of American institutions. Refusing
to talk about America as exceptional also draws criticism, as President Obama
experienced when he dared suggest that nations other than the US also consider
themselves special.137 The manifest destiny/exceptionalism myth is especially robust
in domestic discourse about war and peace. The exceptionalism myth requires the
US President act morally when conducting wars.138 The myth has significant bearing
on the believable justifications US Presidents can craft about American participation
in humanitarian interventions.
136. Beasley, “Politics, Discourse, and American Society,” 26.
137. Greg Jaffe, “Obama’s New Patriotism: How Obama has used his Presidency to Redfine
‘American Exceptionalism’,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2015,
138. Haberski, “‘A Theology of American Exceptionalism’? Iraq, Civil Religion and American
Public Morality.”
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3.4.3 ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ wars
The US manifest destiny/exceptionalism myth informs another political myth in US
foreign policy discourse: how America’s ‘good’ wars are fought and won. Dominant
narratives of World War II (WWII) and the Vietnam War shape ideas about an
ideal American approach to war. The ‘mythic history’ of these two wars contain
tropes about American military power139 and frame domestic debates about the
legitimate use of force. In singling out these two wars I do not intend to argue
other military experiences did not also affect American narrative frameworks and
ideas about war-fighting. Others have written on the role the frontier wars, War of
Independence, American Civil War and Cold War, have had in shaping US strategic
culture and collective identity.140 My argument, however, is WWII and the Vietnam
War occupy an especially relevant position when looking at public discourse about
ending humanitarian interventions. This is because when US presidents conjure
the dominant collective memories of WWII and Vietnam, they reference moral
claims about these wars as well as the victory and exit strategy ‘lessons’ the wars
are thought to yield.
WWII is framed in contemporary US public imagination as the archetypal ‘good’
war, despite evidence a more nuanced judgement of US actions is required. Peter
Schrijvers, for example, identifies a number of incidents undermining unequivocal
statements about WWII’s inherent ‘goodness’ or ‘righteousness’, including US and
allied forces air strikes causing civilian casualties and the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Schrijvers suggests it is more accurate to consider WWII a good cause
rather than a good war. He also notes scholarship questioning the legitimacy of the
good war characterisation has failed to temper the dominant narrative of a war in
which the US fought against a manifest evil and won decisively.141
139. Geoffrey M. White, “Mythic History and National Memory: The Pearl Harbor Anniversary,”
Culture & Psychology 3, no. 1 (1997): 63–88.
140. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example”; Carney and Stuckey, “The World
as the American Frontier”; Secunda and Moran, Selling War to America.
141. Peter Schrijvers, “War against Evil: The Second World War,” in Heroism and the Changing
Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014), 76–92.
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According to this dominant narrative of WWII, US actions materially contributed to
dismantling fascism in Europe, quashing German expansionism and ending the war
with the ultimate weapon. It provided ‘proof’ overwhelming force and commitment
to decisive victory is required to neutralise evil dictators. The deaths of thousands
of American soldiers in the Pacific and on battlefields in Europe also represents the
pinnacle of heroic death uniquely achievable in war time: these lives were worthily
sacrificed to end the great evil of the Holocaust, defend against attacks on American
soil, and preserve ‘the American way of life’.142
The Marshall Plan, a massive financial injection to rebuild Western Europe, followed
WWII. The plan was part of America’s Cold War strategy of Soviet containment and
promoting US economic growth. This strategy underpinned other foreign policies
such as building and expanding NATO to keep Western Europe within the American
rather than Soviet sphere of influence. The dominant narrative of WWII dovetailed
with the manifest destiny myth because it framed American triumph as part of the
wider justification for a US-led transformation of the international order. Two world
wars had decimated Europe’s economic base and signalled the end of a world order
characterised by empires. The horrors of the concentration camps on the UK’s and
France’s doorstep also undermined these old empires’ moral authority. The US could
thus step in and fill the global moral vacuum, taking its place as the rightful world
leader.
Increasing public awareness of avoidable civilian deaths, the debatable need to
have deployed atomic weapons to end the war, and the ongoing effects of soldiers
suffering trauma, undermined the moral clarity presupposed by the WWII good
war narrative. But the appeal of transforming WWII into a morally uncomplicated
story is understandable when juxtaposed against the moral ambiguities of Vietnam
War where US actions proved less amenable to exoneration. In fact, the resurgence
of the WWII ‘good war’ narrative in popular American discourse coincides with
sober assessments of the Vietnam War in the 1980s. Studs Terkel published The
142. Edward W. Wood, Worshipping the Myths of World War II: Reflections on America’s
Dedication to War, 1st ed (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2006).
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Good War about WWII in 1984. The following decade Stephen Ambrose’s Citizen
Soldiers discussed the virtues of America’s “band of brothers” and was adapted
into a television mini-series. Popular NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw described the
soldiers as America’s “greatest generation”, and Steven Spielberg released his visceral
Saving Private Ryan.143 Just as WWII tropes came to represent what it means to
fight and win a good war, Vietnam War tropes encapsulated a war Americans were
best to avoid.
The Vietnam War raised questions in bureaucratic, scholarly and public discourse
about difficulties translating battlefield gains into strategic victory. Five Ameri-
can presidents oversaw the war: Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B.
Johnson and Richard Nixon. All wrestled with using military force to support a
superficially democratic but otherwise weak and brutal South Vietnamese administra-
tion, while simultaneously preventing Chinese/Soviet communist influence growing
in Asia, dealing with an insurgency, and addressing domestic American opposition
to the war. Ultimately the US struggled to win the war and withdraw its forces.
Vietnam birthed the metaphor of the ‘quagmire’ to describe troops ‘bogged down’,
fighting with indefinite goals and no end in sight.144
The War also spawned the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ trope, referring to the American
public’s growing wariness to risk soldiers in wars considered unwinnable and not
essential to US interests. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) first coined the term in 1978 and
President Ronald Reagan also famously used the term in a speech two years later.145
Turning the memory of Vietnam into a ‘syndrome’ rendered it into a nation-wide
psychological malaise president George H. W. Bush would declare ‘cured’ only after
143. Ibid., 3–4.
144. The description of the Vietnam War as a quagmire was first popularised by the 1965 publication
of David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era,
Revised (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), Interestingly, Halberstam argues that even though
Vietnam should be a lesson for military planners about starting and waging war, there are good
reasons for not withdrawing troops as soon as the war becomes unwinnable.
145. George C. Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War,
ed. David L. Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 409–30; Ronald Reagan,
“Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety” (August 18, 1980); Kenneth J. Campbell, “Once Burned,
Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine,” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3
(1998): 357–74.
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US victory in the Gulf War in 1991.146
Efforts by cultural theorists, historians and policy-makers to extract ‘lessons’ from
the Vietnam War also helped cement the events into American political myth. The
issue of dealing with defeat was central to the power the Vietnam War holds in public
political discourse, but its power also rests in the uncomfortable moral questions the
war raised. Vietnam challenged the prevailing mythology that America is a moral
military actor; it fights wars for the ‘right’ reasons against enemies that deserve to be
vanquished. Contributions include James Blight and Janet Lang’s Fog of War, the
companion book of the acclaimed Errol Morris documentary of the same name;147
Nixon’s National Security Adivser and later Secretary-of-State Henry Kissinger’s
Ending the Vietnam War ;148 and John Dumbrell and David Lyon’s Vietnam in
Iraq.149 Among the lessons learned was criticism of Kennedy’s early resistance to
deploying ground forces, opting instead for ‘limited war’. Kennedy’s approach shifted
away from the kind of total war considered necessary in WWII reinforcing the
military establishment’s scepticism about limited war’s strategic shortcomings.150
It was the lessons Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger learned from the
Vietnam War, coupled with 241 US soldiers dying in a 1983 operation in Lebanon,
that prompted him to set out six ‘tests’ to be met before US forces are committed
to combat operations. These tests became known as ‘The Weinberger Doctrine’ and
146. G. L. Simons, Vietnam Syndrome: Impact on US Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998), 3; Walter L. Hixson, “Viet Nam and ‘Vietnam’ in American History and Memory,” in
Four Decades on: Vietnam, the United States, and the Legacies of the Second Indochina War, ed.
Scott Laderman and Edwin A. Martini (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Alexander Bloom,
“”The Mainspring in This Country Has Been Broken”: America’s Battered Sense of Self and the
Emergence of the Vietnam Syndrome,” in Four Decades on: Vietnam, the United States, and the
Legacies of the Second Indochina War, ed. Scott Laderman and Edwin A. Martini (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2013), 58–83.
147. James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life of Robert S.
McNamara (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
148. Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and
Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
149. Dumbrell and Ryan, Vietnam in Iraq .
150. Although popularised under Kennedy, his predecessors Truman and Eisenhower had also
pursued a limited war approach in Korea. Limited war is also associated with the development
of nuclear weapons. The strategy has much longer history dating to pre-Napoleon times and
was prompted by the cost of replacing relatively expensive weapons and soldiers. R. R. Palmer,
“Frederick the Great, Guilbert, Bu¨low: From Dynastic to National War,” in Makers of Modern
Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and
Felix Gilbert, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 91–122.
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include willingness to dedicate sufficient resources for decisive victory, committing to
unlimited war if necessary. Combat operations should also be continually assessed to
ensure they are in service of a vital national interest and will succeed; if not, troops
should be withdrawn.151 General Colin Powell, assistant to Secretary Weinberger
and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President George H.W. Bush,
continued to expound these six tests, using them to guide the 1991 Gulf War.152 Powell
created his own ‘Powell Doctrine’ by adding his own test to the formulation: America
should not commit to combat unless it has an exit strategy to be implemented in a
defined time frame.
The Vietnam War arguably directly challenges the American exceptionalism/manifest
destiny myth because it illustrates the risks of hubris and the limits of military power.
And yet, in the dominant American collective narrative, Vietnam is framed in a way
that chimes with rather than contradicts the myth of exceptionalism. Instead of
suggesting the US abandon its global transformation goals, Vietnam is employed by
political leaders to urge caution about underestimating the political and military
commitment required to spread American ideals in overseas operations. American
lives lost in the pursuit of the nation’s ideals are only considered wasted insofar as
the goals of military operations are not achieved, making it incumbent on leaders to
have a plan to win wars convincingly or not bother fighting at all. These Vietnam
War lessons continue to be applied in assessments of US military intervention in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.153 According to Bernd Greiner, the Vietnam
Syndrome “does not stand for dignified reserve, but rather indicates a refusal to
accept defeat. . . a perpetuation of the traditional ‘victory culture”’.154
151. Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power” (November 28, 1984), The other tests for
the engagement are: it must be vital to US national interest or that of its allies, it must have clearly
defined military and political objectives, it has domestic support, and war is only waged as a last
resort.
152. Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine,” Political Science
Quarterly 124, no. 1 (2009): 71–93.
153. Eric Schmitt, “The Powell Doctrine Is Looking Pretty Good Again,” The New York Times,
April 4, 1999, Stephen M. Walt, “Applying the 8 Questions of the Powell Doctrine to Syria,” Foreign
Policy, September 3, 2013, David Rothkopf, “Barack Obama and the Powell Doctrine, Reconsidered,”
Foreign Policy: Voice, October 15, 2015, Dumbrell and Ryan, Vietnam in Iraq .
154. Bernd Greiner, “Heroism and Self-Sacrifice: The Vietnam War as a Case in Point,” in Heroism
and the Changing Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 118.
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The Vietnam War occupies political myth status in the collective American conscious-
ness. Contemporary discursive references suggest the makings of an unsuccessful war
effort, worsened by an indefinite end point, waged at significant cost to US lives.155
Despite efforts to rehabilitate the American people from effects of the Vietnam War
on the collective psyche, its discursive power remains,156 with some scholars arguing
the term has been “assimilated rather than transcended” in the dominant American
collective narrative.157
The political myths of WWII and Vietnam have become so assimilated into dominant
American foreign policy discourse they provide ripe analogies for presidents. In his
book on US elite decision-making during the Vietnam War, Yuen Foong Khong
argues analogies are not just policy justification tools in war time, but are cognitive
and information-processing tools for decision-making.158 Much military training and
planning is based on drawing comparisons with past operations, identifying lessons
and applying them. Analogies have their drawbacks, however, potentially providing
fallacious reasoning, encouraging decision-makers to look for similarities where none
exist and repeating inappropriate behaviour.159
Regardless of how accurately they represent reality, dominant American representa-
tions of and tropes associated with Vietnam and WWII make claims about wartime
victory that place battlefield successes and failures within the context of the political
myths about America’s existential purpose and moral duty. The WWII and Vietnam
tropes suggest criteria for what constitutes good endings for military operations
predicated on decisive victory, defeating evil, force protection and rapid withdrawal.
155. Campbell, “Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine”;
Michael T. Klare, Beyond the ”Vietnam Syndrome”: U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s (Washington,
D.C: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981).
156. Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome”; Andrew Priest, “From Saigon to Baghdad: The Vietnam
Syndrome, the Iraq War and American Foreign Policy,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no.
1 (2009): 139–71; Trevor David McCrisken, “The Vietnam Syndrome, American Exceptionalism,
and the Use of United States Military Force” (PhD thesis, American University, 1994); Flowerdew,
“The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal: A Case Study in the Creation of Mythic Discourse,” 461–62.
157. Derek Neal Buckaloo, “Fighting the Last War: The ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ as a Constraint on
United States Foreign Policy, 1975–1991” (PhD thesis, Emory University, 2002).
158. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam
Decisions of 1965, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
159. Andrew Mumford, “Parallels, Prescience and the Past: Analogical Reasoning and Contemporary
International Politics,” International Politics 52, no. 1 (2015): 7.
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It is only by interrogating these myths and the way that they operate in American
foreign policy decision-making that we can better understand the contours of exit
strategies in American humanitarian interventions.
3.4.4 Victory still matters
Scholars disagree about whether the end of the Cold War ushered the US into a
‘post-heroic’ age. In the age of post-heroic warfare, technological advances remove US
soldiers from the battlefield, there is a declining proportion of Americans choosing
military service, the American public is apparently increasingly ‘casualty averse’,
and soldiers are now perceived as victims rather than heroes. Christopher Coker
associates these changes with Western countries becoming increasingly risk averse,
using technology to displace humans on the battlefield, or, as he sees it, technicians
displacing warriors.160
Rather than seeing an inevitable decline in the American war hero myth, I agree with
Sibylle Scheipers there remains enormous discursive power in the idea of heroism
in American warfare.161 Heroism is a process shaping and shaped by the social
construction and interpretation of soldiers’ behaviour. In America, heroism in war
remains intimately tied to the idea of God-given destiny and to the types of war
the US is called to fight. The ‘noble cause’—which is as much linked to ‘universal’
concepts of freedom and democracy as it is to the existential survival of the American
nation—is necessary to make sense of suffering and justify soldiers’ deaths even in the
face of a lost or unwininnable battle; a point echoing the political myths of WWII
and Vietnam.162
160. Christopher Coker, Waging War without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict,
IISS Studies in International Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
161. Sibylle Scheipers, “Introduction: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?,” in Heroism and the Changing
Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014), 14.
162. Adam I. P. Smith, “‘On the Altar of the Nation’: Narratives of Heroic Sacrifice in the American
Civil War,” in Heroism and the Changing Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, ed.
Sibylle Scheipers (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 34.
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Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver and Jason Reifler argue it is too simplistic to take
current debates about controversial military engagements as evidence the American
public is becoming increasingly casualty sensitive. Their research demonstrates
Americans are willing to tolerate soldiers dying if they believe the US is fighting war
for the ‘right’ reasons and is likely to win.163 Although predominantly quantitative
studies focusing on opinion poll data, Gelpi and his colleagues’ research provides
evidence for a strong connection in American public discourse between ideas of
victory and claims of moral purpose in war.
The fact perceptions of military success feature so strongly in the American public’s
willingness to support war helps explain why claims to victory have such persuasive
force in presidential discourse. It also points to a bigger ideational commitment
to winning in the American political community. In his sociological inquiry into
the unique place winning has in American public and private life, Francesco Duina
attempts to explain why Americans consistently and significantly out-poll citizens of
other countries in their positive view of competition and individuals seen as ‘winners’.
Duina argues the attraction of winning is as much (and in some case more) about
what winning represents rather than the act of winning itself.164
There are three benefits accruing to winners in competitive environments relevant
for humanitarian interventions and war more generally: first, winning allows social
actors to differentiate themselves from their peers; in the case of military action, it
demonstrates the US is rightfully the most powerful country in the world. Second,
winning vindicates or proves one’s view of the world is ‘right’; in the case of hu-
163. Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and
the War in Iraq,” International Security 30, no. 3 (2006): 7–46; Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver,
and Jason Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in
Military Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
164. A more contemporary example of Duina’s argument can be seen in the populist rhetoric of
President Donald Trump whose 2015 Presidential campaign focused on “making America great
again”, including by winning more. One of his statements on the subject at a campaign rally in
2015 is worth quoting in full: “That’s right, we don’t win anymore. We wanna win. We don’t
win anymore. We’re gonna win a lot. If I get elected, we’re gonna win a lot. We’re gonna win so
much...it’s true. We’re gonna win a lot. We’re gonna win a lot. We’re gonna win so much you’re
all gonna get sick and tired of winning and you’re gonna say, ”oh no, not again!” Only kidding,
you never get tired of winning.” Donald Trump Campaign Rally, C-Span (User Uploaded) (Hilton
Head, South Carolina, December 30, 2015), accessed December 21, 2017.
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manitarian intervention, it justifies using military force to address the humanitarian
problem. Third, winning injects ‘value’ into ideas of victory and loss; if we can’t talk
about winning in war, this undermines the very idea of victory and the social import
attached to intervention as an heroic and honourable pursuit.165
The connection between winning and manifest destiny is victory provides proof God
has enabled US success, divinely anointing the choices made by US leaders.166 As
vindication, therefore, winning also contributes to the idea of a war fought for the
‘right reasons’,167 bringing the endeavour into line with the WWII ideal. Indeed, part
of the reason US defeat in Vietnam had such profound existential consequences is
that just as victory proves moral justification, failure indicates beliefs were misplaced.
In his survey of six wars from ancient to modern times in which decisive victory was
achieved, John David Lewis begins his analysis recognising war is ultimately a “clash
of moral purposes”.168 Victory, therefore, is the triumph of one moral purpose over
another. Lewis shows victory is critical for boosting the legitimacy of a moral cause
and thus provides motivation for combatants to continue pursuing their cause with
violence.169 Just as victory demonstrates general US moral superiority, the angst of
defeat spreads wider than the individual military operation. Winning also brings
honour to the victor and can help inure against criticism US soldiers are being put
at risk in order to achieve foreign policy objectives.
3.5 Context
My argument about US national role conception as a normative constraint on exit
strategies suggests the greatest impact on presidential justifications derives from
largely endogenous or domestically-generated impulses. I have focused on discourse
165. Francesco G. Duina, Winning: Reflections on an American Obsession (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2011).
166. Ibid., 45, 131.
167. Ibid., 40.
168. John Lewis, Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2013), 3.
169. Ibid., 294.
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in my analysis of decision-making because its significant influence has not been
matched by a commensurate level of analysis of how it works during humanitarian
interventions. While I view discourse as a dominant constitutive force for social
action, I also argue discourse represents reality; language is not powerful on its
own but as a means for social actors to obtain and use power.170 As Ruth Wodak
and Martin Reisigl note, discourse affects the scope of imagined possibilities for
action but there is a broader ‘context’ of action. This context comprises intertextual
and interdiscursive relationships between the presidential discourse of humanitarian
intervention and other fields of discourse, as well as extralinguistic institutional
frames, and wider sociopolitical and historical issues.171
In my thesis, I acknowledge these constraints but note how the US president discur-
sively engages with and negotiates them. Although my analysis does not consider
in great detail the institutional dynamics of discourse (or the discursive operation
of institutions),172 I acknowledge presidents have power to shape institutional ap-
proaches to humanitarian intervention through discourse. It is not my intention in
this section to provide a comprehensive account of all these relationships, discourse
sites or institutional frames here. Instead, I highlight some contextual elements
affecting presidential discourse. In my case studies I explain relevant aspects in
greater detail.
3.5.1 Domestic institutional framework
A major institutional constraint is the US Constitution’s separation of powers.
Despite being the Commander-in-Chief, it is theoretically difficult for the president
to unilaterally commit US soldiers to war indefinitely. Until 1950 all major wars in
which the US participated were either declared or authorised by Congress.173 Congress
170. Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).”
171. Ibid., 89–90, 93.
172. For more on discursive institutionalism see: Vivien A. Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism:
The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse,” Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (June
2008): 303–26.
173. Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 3rd (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 189.
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has power over the defence budget and can hamstring presidential military action
by simply refusing to fund it. Congressional budgetary power does not completely
limit the president’s ability to fund military operations, however, as activities can be
financed through appropriations from other budgets.174
Amid the Vietnam War controversy, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in
1973. The Resolution requires the president to seek Congressional authority within
48 hours of deploying US forces to an armed conflict. It also prohibits the president
from conducting military operations without Congressional approval for longer than
60 days, with an additional 30-day withdrawal period. Robert Turner, among others,
argues that the Resolution is unconstitutional because it intrudes on the president’s
powers as Commander-in-Chief.175 Others such as Peter Haas argue the Resolution
is largely redundant because it has failed to restrict presidential power to unilaterally
start military operations.176
US presidents have pushed against checks and balances on their power since 1950 and
especially since the end of the Cold War and Congress has been hesitant in pushing
back. In part this is because since the middle of the 19th century American presidents
have also been members of the dominant political parties - Republican and Democrat.
Consequently the willingness of Congress to challenge the exercise of executive power
has also been affected by partisan politics in Congress and which party has had
effective control of each House. Louis Fisher suggests ‘presidential war powers’ have
emerged, directly counter to the intentions of America’s Constitution drafters.177
Arguments about constitutional action aside, US presidents have exercised a great
deal of autonomy and unilateral decision-making power with respect to humanitarian
interventions because they are military operations about which there is no settled
174. Banks and Straussman, “A New Imperial Presidency? Insights from US Involvement in
Bosnia.”
175. Robert F. Turner, “The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional, Unnecessary
and Fraud That Contributed Directly to the 9/11 Attacks,” Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 45, no. 1 (2012): 109–43.
176. Peter Haas, “Does It Even Work? A Theoretical and Practical Evaluation of the War Powers
Resolution,” Congress & the Presidency 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 235–58.
177. Louis Fisher, “Presidents Who Initiate Wars,” in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign
Policy: Insights and Evidence, Sixth edition, ed. James M. McCormick (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2012), 189–208; Fisher, Presidential War Power .
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construction under the War Powers Resolution.
In addition to Congress, other notable constraints on the US president’s ability to
start and end humanitarian interventions are domestic media in both its traditional
and new/social forms, which reflect and shape public opinion on foreign policy issues.
The main body of scholarly literature examining the power of news media is ‘agenda-
setting theory’.178 This power was particularly acute over the period covered by my
study (1990s-2000s) with the so-called ‘CNN-effect’, that is, the impact of 24-hour
television cable news broadcasting and media coverage of military operations.179
Eytan Gilboa argues the evidence of a causal effect between media coverage of foreign
affairs and public opinion is not conclusive180 Michael Baum, however, notes despite
declining cable news viewership, Americans continue to use ‘soft news’ formats
such as talk shows to inform their opinions on foreign affairs.181 Similarly Robert
Entman shows how the US president and members of his administration compete
with mass media and other public discourse actors to shape the frames that ultimately
affect public opinion.182 The interest Americans take in their government’s foreign
policy and overseas military operations matters because ultimately the president and
Congress are subject to the electoral cycle. The challenges of crafting electorally
palatable foreign policy responses have become more marked as partisanship both
within Congress and the general community has grown.183
178. David Weiss, “Agenda-Setting Theory,” in The Encyclopedia of Communication Theory
(Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2009), 32–34; Agenda-Setting, in International Encyclopedia of Political
Science (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2014), 49–53, by Thomas Konig and Dirk Junge.
179. Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (London:
Psychology Press, 2002).
180. Eytan Gilboa, “Global Television News and Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect,”
International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 325–41.
181. Matthew A Baum, Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in
the New Media Age. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
182. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign
Policy, Studies in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2004); See also Teena Gabrielson, “Obstacles and Opportunities: Factors That Constrain
Elected Officials’ Ability to Frame Political Issues,” in Framing American Politics, ed. Karen
Callaghan and Frauke Schnell (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 76–102.
183. Sarah A. Binder and Thomas E. Mann, Constraints on Leadership in Washington, Issues in
Governance Studies 41 (Washington DC: Brookings, July 2011), 6–8.
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3.5.2 International context
Much has been written about the changing character of war and the impact on how
military commanders and their civilian leaders choose to fight wars. Themes in this
literature highlight material and normative constraints developed during the time
period of my thesis. First, there are technological changes in warfare, including
enhanced conventional weapons’ targeting capabilities and increasing use of remotely
controlled weapons systems.184 Successive US Administrations have argued these
changes make contemporary Western warfare inherently more ethical than earlier
wars. Modern warfare is said to better satisfy just war criteria of discrimination and
proportionality because weapons are more ‘precise’ and better able to limit civilian
casualties by mitigating human error and ‘friction’.185 These changes make soldiers
less likely to be killed on the battlefield but also much more expensive investments
(in terms of training and equipment costs).
Despite ongoing improvements to the targeting and killing abilities of weapons
technology, there are limitations beyond ethical considerations on the usability of
such weapons.186 David Koplow identifies a current revolution in military affairs with
the US military developing weapons that do not necessarily prioritise lethalness but
instead support “more restrained and partial versions of international combat”.187
Koplow provides eight reasons for this shift in approach to military operations: loss
of faith in deterrence, civilian/non-combatant casualty aversion, mission expansion to
include unconventional operations or operations other than war, asymmetric warfare
(particularly counterinsurgency), effects-based operations, limited budgets, the law
184. Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War since 1945 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010).
185. Harold Hongju Koh, “The Obama Administration and International Law,” in Speech (Wash-
ington D.C.: US Department of State, March 25, 2010); Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s
Drone War on Al Qaeda (ebook: Potomac Books, July 1, 2013), 169–204.
186. For an overview of some of these considerations with respect to precision-guided munitions
and unmanned aerial vehicles see: Sarah Kreps and John Kaag, “The Use of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles in Contemporary Conflict: A Legal and Ethical Analysis,” Polity 44, no. 2 (2012): 260–85;
James E. Hickey, Precision-Guided Munitions and Human Suffering in War, Military and Defence
Ethics (Burlington: Ashgate Pub. Co, 2012).
187. David A. Koplow, Death by Moderation: The U.S. Military’s Quest for Useable Weapons
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 219.
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of armed conflict requirement of proportionality, and ongoing faith in the power of
technology to deliver clean, casualty-free warfare.188 In humanitarian interventions,
the moral and emancipatory impetus for intervention arguably requires paying
attention to balancing battlefield effectiveness against minimising civilian casualties
when choosing weapons and tactics. Related to this is the influence of international
humanitarian law as providing a moral standard against which wars are expected to
be conducted, especially by countries like the US that are expected to be standard
bearers of the international liberal world order.
At the same time, as I noted in section 2.2, the UN has encouraged states to pay
greater attention to humanitarian issues in peacekeeping and combat operations.
Despite its challenges and critics, the UNSC continues to occupy a unique place
in providing international legitimacy for military operations. America’s European
allies also place pressure on the US to fulfil NATO alliance obligations, witnessed
in manoeuvring at the UNSC where France and the United Kingdom hold veto
power alongside the US. NATO members that are also members of the European
Union (EU), for example, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, need to
consider how to fulfil their EU human rights law obligations when conducting NATO
military operations. Such concerns about ‘legal interoperability’ affect how the US
conducts its humanitarian interventions when acting with NATO allies.189 It is also
worth noting other regional organisations such as the Organisation of American
States (OAS), ECOWAS can also influence humanitarian interventions, in some
instances making representations directly to the US or to the UNSC regarding
military operations.
188. Koplow, Death by Moderation, 220–29.
189. Kirby Abbott, “A Brief Overview of Legal Interoperability Challenges for NATO Arising
from the Interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in Light of the European Convention on Human
Rights,” International Review of the Red Cross 96, no. 893 (March 2014): 107–37.
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3.5.3 Presidential agency
The relationship between US presidents, discourse and the domestic and interna-
tional institutional context raises the question of individual agency.190 In my earlier
discussion of discourse theory I noted the office of the president is discursively con-
stituted. At the same time, one reason presidential discourse merits investigation is
the continuity and divergences within and between discourses individual presidents
employ. I explore these differences and similarities across my four case studies. As
I noted previously, the president can, through the discursive power of their office,
shape experiences and articulations of ‘reality’. Exactly how presidents articulate and
shape reality is affected by their particular backgrounds, perceptions and leadership
styles as well the historical context within which they govern.
In her work on American presidents’ decisions to intervene in foreign military
conflicts Elizabeth Saunders looks at leaders holding substantively different beliefs
about the origin of threats. Saunders creates a typology of leaders distinguishing
between those who are “internally”- and “externally”-focused, noting differences
in the “policy investments” leaders are willing to make in responding to perceived
threats. She notes leaders “do not necessarily have the luxury of choosing their
intervention opportunities”, observing domestic and international audiences often
provide “political imperatives to intervene somewhere”.191 Of the three presidents she
studies in detail—Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson—Saunders finds leaders’ threat
perceptions remain relatively consistent before they take office and through their
presidential terms. Saunders notes her conclusions are more useful for judging initial
decisions to intervene rather than assessing decisions during interventions because
these may be shaped by battlefield conditions and other considerations. I agree it
is difficult to judge motivations during military intervention. I suggest, however, it
is possible to look to discourse as a signal of changes (if any) in perceptions and
190. Soumitra Chatterjee, “Presidential Beliefs, Advisors’ Capacities and the Forumulation of
Intervention Policy” (PhD thesis, University of California, 2019).
191. Elizabeth N Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2016), 7, emphasis in original.
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judgments about intervention as it progresses and to map these against external
changes and other factors that may affect decision-making.
Although presidential predilections are themselves discursively constituted, I agree
with Robert Jervis that leadership does matter but so too does the environment within
which those leaders are created and govern, which includes normative expectations
as constraints on action.192 By mapping presidential discourse against normative
expectations, I argue researchers can assess the extent to which individual presidents
can push the boundaries of dominant discursive frames and in which directions; what
I refer to as “room for rhetorical manoeuvre”.
What I call rhetorical manoeuvre, Alistar Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura
Roselle incorporate in their definition of ‘strategic narrative’. Theirs is a much wider
approach to narrative than Fisher’s narrative framework theory and focuses on the
active steps taken by political actors “to construct a shared meaning of the past,
present, and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and
international actors”.193 O’Loughlin supports the approach of discourse studies for
revealing narrative frameworks in public justifications for political action and how
these frameworks serve to constrain behaviour. However he argues whenever there is
a “moment when [a social actor] must decide”, this is where we “find intention and
strategy”, for “craft and creativity” in constructing discourse.194
192. Robert Jervis, “Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?,” Security Studies 22, no. 2
(2013): 153–79.
193. Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, eds., Forging the World: Strategic
Narratives and International Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017), 6; See
also: Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Papers 379 (London:
Routledge, 2006), 22–27, 73–95; George Dimitriu, Beatrice De Graaf, and Jens Ringsmose, Strategic
Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War (London:
Routledge, 2015); George Dimitriu and Beatrice De Graaf, “Fighting the War at Home: Strategic
Narratives, Elite Responsiveness, and the Dutch Mission in Afghanistan, 2006–2010,” Foreign Policy
Analysis, 2014, 1–22; Thomas Elkjer Nissen, “Narrative Led Operations,” Militaert Tidsskrift 141,
no. 4 (2013): 67–77; Pamment looks at the way in which the US government employs strategic
narratives as part of its public diplomacy: James Pamment, “Strategic Narratives in US Public
Diplomacy: A Critical Geopolitics,” Popular Communication 12, no. 1 (2014): 48–64.
194. Ben O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narratives: Methods and Ethics,” in Forging the World: Strategic
Narratives and International Relations, ed. Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017), 37.
Finishing the job 106
Chapter 3. Discourse, Justification, Expectations Anna Samson
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I demonstrated the benefits of using foreign policy discourse theory,
particularly public justification theory, to move beyond inadequate existing explana-
tions of exit strategy formation and implementation in humanitarian interventions. I
argued there is a collective narrative framing public discussions of foreign policy in
the US that sets normative standards of behaviour for foreign policy action including
using military force. These normative expectations are based on a dominant national
role conception informed by political myths about US exceptionalism, good war/bad
war archetypes, and the importance of winning. These taken-for-granted ideas shape
normative expectations about US behaviour in humanitarian interventions, includ-
ing options for exit. To that end, humanitarian interventions should be consistent
with expectations they will fulfil America’s moral responsibilities to defend human
rights, defeat evil and promote political transformation. Humanitarian interventions
should also have a clear exit strategy to ensure troops are not stuck in a quagmire.
As military operations humanitarian interventions should also be won; US troops
must succeed in their endeavour or risk undermining the wider collective narrative
framework about how and why America uses military force overseas. In the following
chapter I provide more detail about how I arrived at this analytical framework for
my thesis by explaining my research method in greater detail.
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CHAPTER 4
Method, Data and Research Findings
4.1 Method
My investigation method is grounded in the discourse-historical approach (DHA)
outlined by prominent DHA scholars Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak,1 combined
with normative concepts analysis (NoCA) and discourse tracing. I used an eight-
step method to analyse presidents’ public justifications for decisions about their exit
strategies across four humanitarian interventions over a twenty year period from
1991-2011.
DHA’s critical orientation coupled with its scholars’ interest in political justifica-
tion, argumentation strategies, and changes in discourse over time, makes DHA a
sound choice for examining presidents’ exit strategies over time. Content-related
argumentation analysis in DHA centres on identifying and analysing topoi. Within
DHA I use normative concepts analysis (NoCA) principles and discourse tracing
promoted by Uriel Abulof specifically for studying public political thought and public
justification.2 I also adopt Marianne LeGreco and Sarah J. Tracy’s discourse tracing
1. Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).”
2. Abulof and Kornprobst, “Introduction”; Abulof and Kornprobst, “Unpacking Public Justifica-
tion”; Abulof, “Normative Concepts Analysis.”
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principles.3 Critical discourse scholars acknowledge DHA, NoCA and discourse
tracing methods are complementary approaches for analysing argumentation.4
Although I explain some of my findings with deductive reasoning, my approach is
predominantly abductive and iterative.5 It is a process of identifying the key ideas,
concepts and tropes imbued with moral meaning shaping the imagined possibilities
and language of exit strategy justification in humanitarian interventions. Having
identified these concepts I also identify how their meaning and employment changes
over time.
Table 4.1 summarises the research method I adopted. The table shows how I
integrated the steps involved in DHA, NoCA and discourse tracing to arrive at my
approach to analysing exit strategies in US humanitarian interventions.
Table 4.1: Method
Research
steps
Discourse-
historical
approacha
Normative concepts
analysisb
Discourse tracingc
1. Conduct
literature
review
Activate and
consult preceding
theoretical
knowledge.
Review literature to
outline potential
research directions.
2. Collect
data
Include context
information.
3. Prepare
data
Downsize data
according to
relevant criteria.
Selecting texts, giving
prominence to
ideationally/materially
powerful agents.
Order data
chronologically.
3. Marianne LeGreco and Sarah J. Tracy, “Discourse Tracing as Qualitative Practice,” Qualitative
Inquiry 15, no. 9 (2009): 1516–43.
4. Abulof, “Normative Concepts Analysis”; Wodak and Meyer, “Critical Discourse Analysis:
History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology.”
5. Igor Douven, “Abduction,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta
(online: Stanford University, 2017); Karen Locke, “Abduction,” in Encyclopedia of Case Study
Research, ed. Albert Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2010).
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Table 4.1: Method
Research
steps
Discourse-
historical
approacha
Normative concepts
analysisb
Discourse tracingc
4.
Formulate
research
questions
Specify research
question and
formulate
assumptions.
Based on
literature review
and first
skimming of data.
Identify normative
concepts based on
literature and skimming
of data. Core question:
“what do social actors
believe legitimates
politics?”
Define case using
rupture/turning points.
Read data for emergent
themes and issues.
Detect main strategies
of legitimation. Create
structured questions
based on literature and
emergent themes.
5. Conduct
qualitative
pilot
analysis
Test categories of
analysis and
identify topoi.
Test and refine
normative concepts.
Apply structured
questions to the data.
6. Conduct
detailed
case studies
Analysis is
primarily
qualitative but
also quantitative.
Conduct data analysis
along three axes: (a)
Sort (types of
legitimation); (b) Scale
(topoi of normative
concepts); (c) Scope
(how often normative
concepts are used and in
what way to determine
salience and resonance).
Identify how arguments
relate to one another
and change over time as
well as socio-political
context. Explore matrix
of justificatory beliefs,
establishing links
between strategies, their
evolution and context.
Discover normative
concepts and how they
relate to each other as
justificatory beliefs.
7.
Formulate
critique
Interpret results
taking into
account relevant
context.
Write case study based
on answers to structured
questions with focus on
formation, interpretation
and appropriation of
discursive practices.
8. Apply
results
Identify prospects
for future
research.
Address theoretical
conclusions of the case/s.
Develop practical
implications and
recommendations.
aReisigl & Wodak 2009
bAbulof 2015
cLeGreco & Tracy 2009; Abulof 2015
Having decided to focus on US presidential discourse I collected all US presidential
statements on every humanitarian intervention conducted between 1991 and 2011:
verbal and written, prepared and unprepared, public and (initially) private. I
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drew primary texts from the American Presidency Project, a digitised collection of
all publicly available documents of every US President since 1789.6 The Project’s
integrity as a reference source is widely acknowledged.7 Where required, I also used
presidential documents held at the US Library of Congress and presidential libraries.
For contextual information, I used secondary sources as well as collected reports,
opinion pieces and editorials from leading US print media sources—The Washington
Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal—covering the same time
period and cases.8 I entered and catalogued my data using using the computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) program Dedoose,9 which
gave me an initial overview of my data.
I took the following steps to refine my data to arrive at a final corpus of 713 texts:
(a) I chose to focus on US experiences in four humanitarian interventions that
scholars agree meet the definition of humanitarian intervention outlined in
Section 2.2: northern Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo and Libya. These are all interven-
tions in which the US played a leading role. In each case the US deployed its
troops into hostile foreign territory, without the request of the host government
(to the extent that there was a government available for negotiations), with
6. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “The American Presidency Project,” 1999–2017.
7. Shari Laster, “The American Presidency Project,” Reference Reviews 27, no. 7 (September 16,
2013): 23–24; A. I. Fritz, “The American Presidency Project,” Choice 52, no. 12 (2015): 2000;
Komalsingh Rambaree and Elisabeth Faxelid, “Considering Abductive Thematic Network Analysis
with ATLAS-Ti 6.2,” in Advancing Research Methods with New Technologies, ed. Natalie Sappleton,
Premier Reference Source (Hershey: Information Science Reference, 2013).
8. Pew Research Centre, Newspapers Fact Sheet: Analysis based on Alliance for Audited Media
data, research report (Pew Research Centre, 2018), I appreciate that particularly for more recent
humanitarian interventions, online media has played an increasingly important role in shaping
the public discourse on intervention. I chose not to incorporate online publications or casting
services such as Twitter because to do so would require an exponentially greater degree of time
and resources, and this was ultimately not the focus of my investigation. That said, even while
these forms of new media surged in popularity, the print and television sources identified above
remained pillars of mainstream media and continued to be read by large sections of the US public.
During the time period covered by my case studies, American newspaper circulation reached its
peak and then proceeded to decline. A Newspaper Association of America survey conducted in
2013 showed that 69 per cent of Americans read a newspaper at least once a week or accessed a
newspaper website at least once a month. “Across Platforms, 7 in 10 Adults Access Content from
Newspaper Media Each Week,” March 25, 2013, In 2013, The Wall Street Journal and The New
York Times were the two most popular newspapers in the United States with a weekday circulation
of 2.4 million and 1.9 million respectively. While The Washington Post had a circulation of almost
half a million during that same period, it is still considered an “agenda-setting paper”. These three
newspapers also have online editions that mirror their print editions. Accessed September 22, 2014.
9. http://www.dedoose.com
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the primary (but not exclusive) aim of protecting civilians from actual or
anticipated human rights atrocities. It was not material to my case selection
that each of these interventions be recognised or authorised by the UNSC as
humanitarian interventions, only that they met the criteria for humanitarian
interventions I set out in Section 2.2.
(b) I only include texts comprising US presidential public discourse, that is verbal
statements made to the American people via scripted speeches, responses to
interview questions and off-the-cuff remarks.10
(c) I limited texts to presidential public speech directed at the American people
allowing me to focus more directly on the the phenomenon of exit strategies in
humanitarian interventions as it is the domestic audience to whom such policy
justifications are most frequently directed.11
(d) I selected all recorded public statements by each US president beginning from
the time that the humanitarian crisis emerged and intervention was mooted
through to a short period after the withdrawal of troops, or, where troops were
not withdrawn, to the point where the president no longer publicly discussed
the intervention.
(e) In each of my cases I divided the corpus of presidential communications
into five categories (or ‘genres’):12 statements; press conferences/interviews;
letters/memos; executive orders/proclamations; and speeches/remarks (with
no questions).
Next I formulated the primary research question for this thesis:
How do US presidents justify to the American people decisions to withdraw
troops and end humanitarian interventions?
10. Consistent with work on the rhetorical presidency and public justification: Tulis, The Rhetorical
Presidency , See also my discussion in Chapter 3; Abulof, “Normative Concepts Analysis”; Abulof
and Kornprobst, “Introduction”; Abulof and Kornprobst, “Unpacking Public Justification.”
11. Consistent with the approach in: Reisigl and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach
(DHA),” 90.
12. Ibid.
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I then developed the following subsidiary research questions:
(a) How do US presidents frame normative considerations relating to exit strategies
and withdrawing troops from humanitarian interventions? Do these considera-
tions change over time?
(b) What is the relationship between normative expectations regarding exit and
how do they connect with normative grounds for initiating intervention?
(c) Are normative expectations for exit strategies ever in conflict? If so, how do
presidents balance between or prioritise competing normative considerations?
(d) Do normative expectations constrain imagined possibilities for exit strategies?
(e) Is it possible to develop a typology of presidential justification strategies?
(f) Can presidential discourse provide insights into why exit strategies in humani-
tarian interventions have traditionally not been successfully implemented?
(g) How do contextual differences between interventions feature in presidential
justifications for exit strategies? For example do external shocks like 9-11 or
major intervening wars affect their justifications? Are there differences based
on a president’s political affiliation (Democrat versus Republican) or whether
it is an intervention early or later in a political career (for example, Bush in
northern Iraq and Somalia, or Clinton in Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo)?
(h) To what extent can and do presidents shape a strategic narrative for exit
strategies?
Next I established a series of normative concepts and justification practices observable
in presidential speech. These normative concepts contribute to the “scale” and “scope”
requirements for NoCA. These following concepts derive from the dominant narrative
framework underpinning US military action and setting expectations for justifiable
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behaviour:
(a) The political myth of US exceptionalism/manifest destiny imposes particular
responsibilities and requirements on US foreign policy action to stop atrocities,
champion human rights and create societies in the US image, or at least
acquiescent to the US-led international order.
(b) Winning wars vindicates the moral purpose of military action.
(c) Humanitarian interventions should be just wars supporting human rights and
creating societal transformation.
(d) US troops should not be occupiers but only stay as long as necessary to prevent
atrocities, protect victims and help communities take charge of their own
transformation.
(e) Humanitarian interventions should be conducted at limited cost to the American
people.
(f) Humanitarian interventions should be ‘good’ wars, fought nobly for the ‘right’
reasons, won decisively, and with viable exit strategies.
I developed typologies of justification practices that I could potentially observe
in presidential speech for the “sort” category of analysis in the NoCA approach.
I adapted and extended the categories in rhetoric analysis13 as well as Theo van
Leeuwen’s14 and Anthony Reyes’15 typologies of legitimation strategies creating the
following categories:
13. Lordan, Case for Combat: How Presidents Persuade Americans to Go to War .
14. Theo van Leeuwen, “Three Models of Interdisciplinarity,” in New Agenda in (Critical) Dis-
course Analysis : Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity, ed. Ruth Wodak and Paul A. Chilton,
Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture ; v. 13 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub-
lishing Company, 2005), 3–19; van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication”; See
also: Roderick P. Hart, ed., Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
15. Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions.”
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(a) Legitimacy through emotions—referred to in rhetoric analysis as ‘pathos ’. The
strategy is used to justify US action to right a wrong based on innate notions
of moral/motivational superiority and rightness of purpose and being, which is
contrasted by the absence of these characteristics on the part of the ‘other’.16
(b) Legitimacy through moral evaluation and altruism—ethos in rhetoric analy-
sis. This strategy resonates with the American exceptionalism myth and the
normative basis of humanitarian interventions.
(c) Legitimacy through rationality and voices of expertise17—logos in rhetoric
analysis. Until very recently the US president has been considered, by virtue
of the office, to be an expert on matters of war policy and national security.
His or her authority and legitimacy is enhanced by reference to advice received
from other experts to support his or her decisions. Presidential statements are
accorded additional legitimacy if they are perceived as rational in the particular
social context; in political discourse the decision is “presented as neither rushed,
nor taken lightly, and therefore the right way to proceed”.18
(d) Legitimacy through a hypothetical future and analogical bridging is evident in
conditional statements about the future demanding immediate action. The
feared hypothetical future, which may or may not be real or as dangerous as
perceived, becomes more acute through repetition. These hypothetical futures
are also believable because they are based on the collective memory of past
events and efforts to draw parallels between the presumed similarities of past
event and the present circumstance.19 This practice is known as ‘analogical
bridging’, a term used most notably by Jeffrey Alexander to explain how
the memory of the Holocaust in World War II has been transformed into a
16. Wodak et al., Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis; Lordan, Case for Combat: How
Presidents Persuade Americans to Go to War , 12.
17. Reyes treats these as separate strategies but in my view they are better understood as being
closely related with each strategy being used to reinforce the other.
18. Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions,” 800;
Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition.”
19. This is not a legitimisation strategy identified by Reyes or van Leeuwen but my research shows
it is observable in presidential discourse on intervention conduct and exit strategies.
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universal, global symbol of evil and atrocity.20 In humanitarian interventions,
the president may construct hypothetical futures around the political and
humanitarian disaster that would ensue if US troops withdraw. Analogical
bridging may also occur when the president refers to collective memories of past
military operations. Analogies are used to justify policies in war but are also
cognitive and information-processing tools for decision-making.21 By referring
to past intervention experiences as blueprints for future action, the president
contributes to institutionalising particular memories of intervention, enhancing
their power for future analogical bridging justifications.22
I conducted a close reading of all the texts for this case. Rather than adopting a
rigid line-by-line or word-by-word approach, I followed Ronald Chenail’s suggestion
of dividing each text into “meaningful undivided units”, depending on the text.23 In
the main, these units were sentences, although at times individual words, sub-clauses
or short paragraphs were units. The size of my units was determined by what was
sufficient to indicate the president referring to a normative concept. I used the
Dedoose software to apply codes based on the normative concepts outlined above. I
reflexively switched back and forth between my data and the theoretical frameworks
I outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.
Although DHA scholars use topoi to triangulate their findings, I share Igor Zˆagar’s
criticism of the predominant DHA focus on literary topoi as failing to reveal any-
thing about connections between arguments and conclusions.24 Instead, I use the
Aristotelian concept of topoi as adapted by Cicero into loci and Stephen Toulmin
20. Jeffrey C. Alexander, “On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The ‘Holocaust’ from
War Crime to Trauma Drama,” European Journal of Social Theory 5, no. 1 (February 1, 2002):
46–49; Other writers have also noted the role of analogical thinking on political decision-making, for
example: Davis B. Bobrow, “Stories Remembered and Forgotten,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
33, no. 2 (1989): Davis Bobrow argues that lessons learned from certain experiences are transformed
into ‘maxims’ that are to be applied in future supposedly similar situations.
21. Khong, Analogies at War .
22. Thomas Olesen, “Global Injustice Memories: The 1994 Rwanda Genocide,” International
Political Sociology 6 (2012): 373–89.
23. R. J. Chenail, “Conducting Qualitative Data Analysis: Reading Line-by-Line, but Analyzing
by Meaningful Qualitative Units,” The Qualitative Report 17, no. 1 (2012): 266.
24. Igor Zˇagar, “Topoi in Critical Discourse Analysis,” Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6, no. 1 (2010).
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into warrants.25 Instead of using ‘pre-determined’ topoi, I looked to how the president
discursively relates conclusions, evidence and justifications regarding exit strategy.
Toulmin defines a warrant as the general, unstated proposition allowing a speaker
and her audience to move from data to a claim. Sometimes the warrant is a shared
assumption between speaker and audience and is thus not apparent from a superficial
reading of the text, but it can be revealed through looking at backing (support for
the warrant), qualifiers (words that limit the statement), and conditions of rebuttal
(exceptions).26 In Toulmin’s words:
[Warrants] may normally be written very briefly (in the form If D [data], then
C [claim]); but, for candour’s sake, they can profitably be expanded, and made
more explicit: ‘Data such as D entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims,
such as C,’ or alternatively ‘Given data D, one may take it that C’.27
My detailed case analysis can be found in the following case study chapters. Based
on my pilot analysis, I refined my coding of normative concepts for my full data
set. Table 4.2 details these normative concepts and the lexical identifiers with which
they were most commonly associated; a task that satisfied the “scope” aspect of
NoCA. Because of the way these concepts were represented in the texts as either
grounded in or giving rise to specific expectations about how an intervention should
be conducted, I re-framed the normative concepts in this table and my subsequent
analysis as ‘normative expectations’. I also provided example excerpts for each code
from my Iraq pilot study, noting that in a number of cases I applied multiple codes
to these units of text.
The reader will note that in each group of lexical triggers I include individual words
and specific phrases as well as broader, referential sub-concepts that do not require
specific words in a precise order. Presidents are orators and thus it is not always
possible, or necessarily useful, to use a single word or phrase as the basis for analysing
humanitarian interventions. To focus exclusively on the use of terms like ‘exit’ or
‘exit strategy’ or even ‘humanitarian intervention’ would be an interesting project
but distinct from my investigation. In my thesis, such an approach would give a
25. Stephen Edelston Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003); Zˇagar, “Topoi in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 23.
26. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument ; James E. Warren, “Taming the Warrant in Toulmin’s Model
of Argument,” The English Journal 99, no. 6 (2010): 41–46.
27. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument , 91.
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misleading impression about the extent to which intervention exit issues are broached
by the US President and the manner in which this occurs. It would also make it
more difficult to identify connections observable through informed judgments about
sentence constructions, turns of phrase, metaphors and image construction.
The reader will also observe some lexical identifiers are included in more than one
category. This does not amount to ‘double-counting’ but rather reflects the fact that
individual words or phrases can have more than one meaning/connotation depending
on the context.
Table 4.2: Lexical identifiers for normative expectations for
humanitarian interventions
Normative
expectation
for
intervention
Lexical identifiers Example
Consistent
with
American ex-
ceptionalism
and manifest
density
(manifest) destiny; Founding Fathers;
responsibility; (defending/promoting)
freedom; (defending/promoting)
democracy; institution-building; blessed
(by God); American values; reliance (of
other countries on the US); American
example; American leadership; countries
looking to America; success; prosperity;
responsibility; duty; (intervention is)
right/just/moral; other countries relying
on the US; consistency with international
law;UN Security Council Resolutions;
NATO allies (supporting); Marshall Plan;
legitimacy; international community
sanctioning
We learned that the United
States alone – it’s only the
United States that can
mobilise the international
community and then lead it
through such efforts. (Bush
speech 9 July 1991)
Fighting evil war crime; atrocity; mass violence; murder;
massacre; killing; repression; persecution;
oppression; aggression; dictator;
uncaring/indifferent leaders; (WWII)
Holocaust; torture; militia; genocide;
(comparing perpetrators to) Hitler;
malicious; undemocratic; torture; (lack of)
freedom; authoritarian (leader); human
rights abuses; suffering; appeasement;
sacrifice; brave men and women
And the United States is in
lockstep with Europe in
terms of our approach to
helping these unfortunate
people that are being
victimised by this brutal
dictator in Baghdad. (Bush
press conf. 11 April 1991)
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Atrocities
stopped with
aid/disaster
relief or
providing
protection
war crime; atrocity; mass violence; murder;
massacre; killing; repression; persecution;
oppression; aggression; dictator;
uncaring/indifferent leaders; Holocaust;
torture; genocide; chemical weapons;
weapons of mass destruction; victims,
especially women and children, protesters,
unarmed civilians; suffering; disaster;
catastrophe; humanitarian emergency;
responsibility to protect (R2P); protection;
saving
Now do we hurt when
Kurdish people are hurt and
killed and brutalised? (Bush
press conf. 4 April 1991)
Failed state
redeemed
ethnic tensions; authoritarian (leadership);
dictatorship; (indiscriminate) violence;
refugees; poverty; unresolved historical
grievances; economic problems; crime; loss
of legitimacy (of country that is the target
of intervention)
But what we don’t care about
is helping protect a regime
that has lost all credibility
and lost all chance of
running the country because
of the brutality. (Bush press
conf. 3 April 1991)
Just war
prosecuted
(situation is a) threat to international
peace and security; (stopping) aggression;
humanitarian intervention; save; protect;
moral duty; responsibility; evil (being
fought/contained); seeking
peace/diplomatic solution failed; UNSC
resolutions (supporting intervention);
international law (supporting
intervention); legitimacy; international
community supporting action; stopping
atrocities; just war; (stopping) genocide;
(innocent) victims; (presence of) civilian
targets of violence; women and children
(targeted/affected by violence);
indiscriminate violence; war crime; (target
country is a) failed state; government
violence (perpetrated in target country);
imminent attacks (on civilians in target
country); (intervention complies with)
Geneva Conventions; (intervention to
stop) massacres; (situation in target
country causing) refugees; Holocaust;
Rwanda; Bosnia; World War II; chemical
weapons (used in the conflict)
Such an undertaking was
made necessary by the
terrible human tragedy
unfolding in and around
Iraq as a result of Saddam
Hussein’s brutal treatment
of Iraqi citizens. (Bush
press conf. 16 April 1991)
Victory
secured
(continue until) job is done; stay the
course; defeat (aggressor, evil, enemy);
achieve objectives; victory; Gulf War; (not
a) quagmire: World War II; defeating
Hitler; defeating Saddam Hussein; winning
And the determination of
the United States in dealing
with the problem of Iraq
should not be
underestimated. (Clinton
speech 11 September 1996)
Costs limited no (American) ground troops; (fighting in)
coalition; peacekeeping; (participating in)
international force; (predominantly/only)
airstrikes; few deaths; reference to
(American) casualties
I just want to say, again,
that we are going to do
everything we can to make
sure our own pilots are safe,
that they can fly their
missions in safety. (Clinton
speech 11 September 1996)
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Exit
embedded in
operational
approach
(troop) withdrawal; bring troops home;
come home; return home; exit strategy;
timetable; benchmarks; achievable
objectives; mission creep; (avoiding)
Somalia; (avoiding) quagmire; (not being)
bogged down; (avoiding) Vietnam
Syndrome; (avoiding) Black Hawk Down;
(avoiding) Battle of Mogadishu; (contrast
with) Afghanistan (2001- ); (contrast
with) Iraq (2003-2014); restriction to
aerial operation
And we are committed to
seeing every American
soldier and every allied
POW home soon. . . (Bush
speech 2 March 1991)
Exit assured
through UN
handover
handover to UN; responsibility of
international community; timetable;
benchmarks; achievable objectives
We intend to turn over the
administration of and
security for these sites as
soon as possible to the
United Nations,. . . (Bush
press conf. 16 April 1991)
Exit assured
through
transition to
local
authorities
after transfor-
mation
handover to locals; autonomy;
self-determination; timetable; benchmarks;
achievable objectives; elections; institution
building
And we must work to
reintegrate Iraq and its
people into the region once
the Iraqi people choose new
leadership. (Bush press conf.
2 August 1991)
I tried to improve the reliability of my findings in three ways: first, I was the
only researcher involved in this study so risk of inter-coder inconsistencies was
eliminated; second, I used a comparatively large number of texts to help guard
against selection bias; and finally, my causation explanations are consistent with the
logic of abduction.28
4.2 Data overview
I examined a total of 713 transcripts of verbal texts across four humanitarian
interventions. Table 4.3 sets out all these texts divided according to each phase of
intervention, which I based on the changing nature of US involvement over the course
28. Jo Reichertz, “Abduction: The Logic of Discovery of Grounded Theory,” in The SAGE
Handbook of Grounded Theory, ed. Antony Bryant and Kathy Charmaz (London: SAGE, 2007),
214–29; Megan Woods, Rob Macklin, and Gemma K. Lewis, “Researcher Reflexivity: Exploring
the Impacts of CAQDAS Use,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 19, no. 4
(2016): 396; Benjamin Banta, “Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism,” European Journal of
International Relations 19, no. 2 (2013): 379–402.
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of the intervention. I provide more detail on each phase in the subsequent chapters.
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Table 4.3: Texts analysed
Intervention Phase Date Nature of US intervention President Total texts
Northern Iraq
3 April 1991–31
December 1996
296 texts
Pre-intervention 1 March 1991–2
April 1991
US withdrawing from Gulf War George H.W. Bush 18
Provide Comfort
no-fly zone
3 April 1991–15
April 1991
Enforcement of no-fly zone and aerial aid
delivery; support for UN and existing aid
agency missions
George H.W. Bush 8
Provide Comfort
ground troops
16 April 1991–24
July 1991
US ground troops deliver aid directly,
repatriate refugees and establish ‘safe
havens’ for the Kurds
George H.W. Bush 53
Provide Comfort II 25 July 1991–31
December 1996
US responsible for preventing future Iraqi
government attacks on Kurds as well as
providing ongoing protection and
guaranteeing safety. UN responsible for
safe zones
George H.W. Bush
Bill Clinton
91
124
Post-intervention 1 January 1997–28
February 1997
US begins Operation Northern Watch to
enforce no-fly zone, transitioned into
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003
Bill Clinton 2
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Table 4.3: Texts analysed
Intervention Phase Date Nature of US intervention President Total texts
Somalia
15 August
1992–25 March
1995
120 texts
Pre-intervention/
Provide Relief
15 August–3
December 1992
Airlifting relief supplies, transporting UN
peacekeepers into Somalia
George H.W. Bush 6
Restore Hope 4 December 1992–3
May 1993
Contribution to UNITAF; establishing
security to facilitate aid delivery
George H.W. Bush
Bill Clinton
21
6
Continue Hope
before the Battle of
Mogadishu
4 May 1993–2
October 1993
Contribution of Quick Reaction Force to
UNOSOM II to support state-building,
policing, searching for General Aidid
Bill Clinton 23
Continue Hope
after the Battle of
Mogadishu
3 October 1993–25
March 1995
Troop surge and preparing for troop
withdrawal
Bill Clinton 51
Post-intervention 26 March 1995–31
December 1996
All troops withdrawn from Somalia Bill Clinton 13
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Table 4.3: Texts analysed
Intervention Phase Date Nature of US intervention President Total texts
Kosovo
24 March 1999–
242 texts
Pre-intervention 4 February–23
March 1999
US troops stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina
& Macedonia
Bill Clinton 25
Noble Anvil 24 March–9 June
1999
Contribution to NATO’s Allied Force
mission; airstrikes initially against Serbian
military installations followed by civilian
infrastructure
Bill Clinton 87
Joint Guardian 10 June 1999– Establishing security; preventing
recurrence of atrocities; contributing to
nation-building activities
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
81
37
12
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Table 4.3: Texts analysed
Intervention Phase Date Nature of US intervention President Total texts
Libya
19 March
2011–31 October
2011
57 texts
Pre-intervention 5 February 2011-18
March 2011
US rhetorical support for Arab Spring Barack Obama 8
Odyssey Dawn 19 March 2011–31
March 2011
Airstrikes on Libyan military installations Barack Obama 15
Unified Protector 1 April 2011–31
October 2011
Contribution to NATO operation;
airstrikes on Libyan military installations;
regime change
Barack Obama 19
Post-intervention 1 November
2011–31 December
2011
US troops withdrawn Barack Obama 15
aRestore Hope did not officially start until 9 December 1992 but Bush’s major announcements about the operation began on 4 December. For analytical consistency I
have included the 4 December texts in this phase.
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4.3 Analytical framework for research findings
For the purposes of explaining how I used my method, in this section I foreshadow the
three main findings comprising my analytical framework. First I linked the normative
expectations of intervention found in presidential discourse with the implications
they have for presidential decision-making about exit strategies. In this way, I could
show how the normative expectations functioned as Toulmin’s “data”, and the exit
strategy frames as “conclusions”. Table 4.4 details these connections.
Table 4.4: Normative concepts and exit strategy implications
Normative
expectation
for
intervention
Normative expectation
explained
Expectations for framing
exit strategies
Consistent
with American
exceptionalism
and manifest
destiny; Failed
state redeemed
America is a successful nation
because it has been chosen by God
and it has a duty to help other
countries follow the US example;
Consistent with national role
conception of US as a moral foreign
policy actor and US vision for a
‘good war’; Country subject to
intervention is a failed state and the
US has a responsibility to help build
a better state
US troops will leave when
country has been transformed
in a manner consistent with
American ideals, values and
interests but US will not be
an occupying power;
handover to local authorities
or UN; US troops will leave if
heroism questioned
Fighting evil America is fighting to defeat an
identifiable evil
US troops will leave when
evil enemy forces have been
defeated
Stopping/
preventing
atrocities
Parties to conflict are committing (or
will commit) extreme acts of violence
and human rights abuses that require
US intervention
US troops will leave when
atrocities have stopped and
will not resume
Just war
prosecuted
America is fighting a just war
sanctioned by the international
community and its exit strategy is
consistent with international
obligations
Exit strategy should accord
with the requirements of
necessity, proportionality,
right intention, jus ex bello
possibilities for exit without
victory or keeping troops to
prevent greater injustice
Victory American victory will vindicate
President’s decision to use military
force
US troops will leave when all
objectives are achieved and
enemy is neutralised
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Costs limited Limit the risk to American troops
and reduce potential American
casualty numbers
US troops will leave when the
risk to American lives
becomes unacceptably high
Exit assured Every sensible military operation
should have an exit strategy; US
government has an exit strategy and
it is being implemented; this
intervention is not like other
operations where a successful exit
strategy was not implemented
Timetable for US troop
withdrawal demonstrating US
soldiers will not be occupiers
and costs will be limited
Continuing with Toulmin’s approach, I found those conclusions revealed a series
of warrants about an American audience’s normative expectations for an exit in
humanitarian interventions. These three warrants are:
(a) Victory achieved.
(b) Moral duty fulfilled.
(c) Troop withdrawal assured.
I re-framed the three warrants as exit strategy expectations. The warrants/exit strat-
egy expectations highlight the assumptions and taken-for-granted ideas underpinning
presidential exit strategy justifications. Through the course of my analysis it became
clear that these exit strategy expectations are difficult to fulfil simultaneously. At
the same time, not meeting these expectations is beyond the realm of imagined pos-
sibilities for foreign policy action. To not meet these expectations has consequences
for the narrative about the humanitarian intervention and the collective narrative
about how the US uses military force. It can potentially undermine the legitimacy,
and assessment of the wisdom of a humanitarian intervention. It also challenges
the collective belief systems of the American body politic, threatening a collective
cognitive dissonance. Figure 4.3 represents these connections. It shows that if any
one of these groups of normative expectations are not met, questions about the moral
rightness and legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention arise.
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Figure 4.1: Expectations for a publicly justifiable exit strategy
When it comes to implementing an exit strategy in humanitarian interventions,
presidential rhetoric about exit is self-reinforcing and constraining but not always
determinative. In each case there are examples of presidents engaging in rhetorical
manoeuvring; presidents craft strategic narratives, attempting to reshape the meaning
of normative expectations. Table 4.5 shows the space presidents have for rhetorical
manoeuvre; to make strategic narrative choices. In the case study chapters that
follow I demonstrate the relationships between normative concepts, exit strategy
requirements and strategic narratives in presidential justifications for withdrawing
troops.
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Table 4.5: Presidential justifications for exit strategies
Exit strategy
expectations
Normative
expectations for
intervention
Strategic narrative choices to meet exit
strategy expectations
Fulfil moral
duty
American
exceptionalism;
manifest destiny;
redeeming failed
state
How far and for how long does the US
responsibility last? What counts as
transformation in intervention country?
Democratic elections? Removal of dictator?
Liberal institutions? Security of civilian
populations?
Fight evil What does it mean to defeat the enemy? Is
deterrence sufficient? Is regime change required?
Is a peace settlement required or is transition to
civilian, peaceable, democratic government
needed?
Stop/ prevent
atrocities
How long should the period of peace last before
US will be held responsible for any resurgence in
violence? How many people should be saved?
How many people are intervention forces
permitted to kill in order to justify saving other
lives? Should US troops only stop currently
occurring or impending atrocities or should the
threat of atrocities be eliminated?
Prosecute a just
war
How many people should be saved? How many
people are intervention forces permitted to kill in
order to justify saving other lives? What kinds of
operational approaches and tactics are
permissible? What risks should US soldiers be
asked to bear? Is regime change permissible?
Achieve victory
Win What does it mean to win a humanitarian
operation? How many civilians can be justifiably
killed? How much damage to infrastructure is
justifiable? Is regime change required?
Limit cost How much risk is reasonable to expect US soldiers
and the American public to bear? How can
American lives be balanced against lives of those
to be saved?
Troop withdrawal
assured
Exit in operational
approach, assured
through handover
or transition
How specific should the timetable be? Should
there be dates or benchmarks? Can transition to
the UN or NATO be classified as an exit if US
forces remain engaged?
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4.4 Conclusion
In my thesis I examine how US presidents have justified their decisions to terminate
humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War, noting in the majority of
instances, the president must justify decisions not to terminate an intervention in
the manner proposed at the outset of the troop deployment. My research approach
follows discourse-historical approach (DHA) and the related methods of normative
concepts analysis (NoCA) and discourse tracing.
My thesis is the first comparative discourse study of public justifications for exit
strategies in humanitarian interventions. I demonstrate that although not a complete
explanation for the process of exiting intervention, discourse is a necessary component
in understanding the challenges of exit strategy development, articulation and
implementation. Consequently it adds a new perspective on intervention exit strategy
development and implementation that should be incorporated into future research
on humanitarian intervention and the dynamics of end state planning.
My research contributes to the development of normative concepts analysis for
exploring public justification and strategic narrative practices of US presidents
including during military operations. My research also expands the study of the
rhetorical presidency using these methods beyond justifications for starting wars
to include the conduct and conclusion of military operations. More specifically,
my study is the first comparative discursive analysis of exit strategies in armed
humanitarian interventions, further demonstrating the utility of discourse analysis
for understanding questions of decision-making in war time.
In the following chapter I apply the methodology I outlined in this chapter to the first
US humanitarian intervention following the end of the Cold War: the intervention to
assist the Kurds in northern Iraq following the 1991 US Gulf War.
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CHAPTER 5
Providing Comfort in Northern Iraq
(1991–1996)
Q. You said before that you didn’t like the idea of a
protected enclave within Iraq itself. But doesn’t this, in
effect, establish for months and the foreseeable future the
United States military protecting Kurdish refugees in that
area? And do you want to continue to leave it ambiguous
what the US would do in case there is any effort by the
Iraqis against the Kurdish refugees?
President Bush. I hope we’re not talking about a
long-term effort.
White House press conference
16 April 1991
5.1 Introduction
Scholars generally do not consider America’s 41st president George Herbert Walker
Bush to be a particularly coherent orator, let alone an inspiring one.1 The former
congressman, ambassador, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
vice-president eschewed advisors’ efforts to tailor messaging or craft public relations
1. Wynton C. Hall, ““Reflections of Yesterday”: George H. W. Bush’s Instrumental Use of
Research in Presidential Discourse,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2002): 540.
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strategies.2 Bush was suspicious of scripted speech-making as disingenuous. While
he did not avoid the press, he preferred ‘plain-speaking’ to making visionary pro-
nouncements.3 And yet as America’s first post-Cold War president, Bush had to
explain how America should navigate the post-Cold War world. It was up to Bush
to demonstrate how the US, as the world’s only superpower in the final decade of
the 20th century, would continue meeting the normative expectations for its foreign
policy behaviour.4
As is often the case for American presidents, a war defined Bush’s presidency and his
foreign policy legacy.5 No sooner was the Cold War over when Bush launched the
Gulf War on 2 August 1990. The US led 35 countries in a UN-authorised mission to
force Iraq to withdraw its military forces from neighbouring Kuwait. The spectacular
military victory delivered predominantly by US forces was followed by humanitarian
crises across Iraq, spreading into neighbouring Iran and Turkey.
Bush initially resisted sending troops to Iraq. His arguments ran counter to the
foreign policy expectations of fulfilling moral responsibility I outlined in Chapter 3
as well as Bush’s own commitment to defeat evil and fulfil the demands of American
exceptionalism. Bush then reluctantly commenced what would become the first
humanitarian intervention of the post-Cold War era: Operation Provide Comfort
to assist the Kurds in northern Iraq. The intervention began in April 1991 as an
exclusively air operation enforcing a no-fly zone (NFZ) and dropping aid parcels
to stranded refugees. A few weeks later, Bush deployed ground troops to build and
protect a safe haven for the Kurds inside Iraq. Four months later responsibility for
the intervention was formally handed over to the UN but rather than ending the
intervention, Bush moved US troops across the border to Turkey. He maintained
2. James Addison Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War,
and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995).
3. Bush’s press secretary Marlin Fitzwater and deputy chief-of-staff Andy Corin quoted in Hall,
““Reflections of Yesterday”: George H. W. Bush’s Instrumental Use of Research in Presidential
Discourse,” 531–33.
4. Jeffrey A. Engel, “When George Bush Believed the Cold War Ended and Why That Mattered,”
in Inside the Presidency of George H. W. Bush, ed. Michael Nelson and Barbara A. Perry (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2014), 100–122.
5. Tucker Spencer, US Leadership in Wartime: Clashes, Controversy and Compromise (New
York: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 905.
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patrols of Iraqi airspace and committed US soldiers to responding militarily if the
Iraqi government resumed attacking the Kurds.
The story of Provide Comfort is often recounted as a humanitarian intervention that
helped save the lives of millions of Kurds;6 the first UNSC-authorised foreign military
operation to successfully halt a mass atrocity within the borders of a sovereign state.
These narratives often ignore the reality that Provide Comfort ended in name only.7
Despite ostensibly ‘handing over’ the operation to the UN and Bush’s hope the
mission would not be “a long-term effort”, US intervention in northern Iraq lasted
five-and-a-half years and was gradually subsumed into wider US military operations
in Iraq conducted for almost a quarter of a century. Conventional narratives also
focus on the legality and practicalities of conducting the intervention. By contrast,
in this chapter I draw attention to the discursive framework affecting how the
Commanders-in-Chief imagined intervention possibilities and expectations and how
this in turn constrained strategic narrative choices for exit strategies.8
I tell a story about how Bush and his successor Bill Clinton justified their exit
strategies for Provide Comfort to the American people. Mine is an attempt to
understand how Bush, despite his fears of a Vietnam War-style quagmire, deployed
US soldiers in an open-ended operation to protect the Kurdish people in northern Iraq.
I explain how Bush set aside his commitment to only begin operations involving US
troops when victory and rapid withdrawal was assured; how he ended up justifying
an exit strategy that was ultimately not an exit strategy at all, but a series of
undertakings progressively deepening and widening US obligations to the Kurdish
people. Even though the presidency changed hands and parties from Republican
Bush to Democrat Clinton, I show how Bush’s rhetorical parameters constrained
6. Gordon W. Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide
Comfort, 1991 (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2004); James L. Jones, “Operation
Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq,” Marine Corps Gazette
75, no. 11 (1991): 98–107; Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success
and Failure; Philip A. Meek, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Case Study in Humanitarian Relief
and Foreign Assistance,” Air Force Law Review 37 (1994): 225–39.
7. Michael E. Harrington, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in International Law,”
Connecticut Journal of International Law 8 (1992–1993): 188.
8. Ibid., 636.
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Clinton’s imagined exit strategy options.
I begin with an overview of the rhetorical context and the humanitarian crisis in
northern Iraq. I divide the rest of the chapter into each of the three phases of
the intervention: Provide Comfort as a no-fly zone (NFZ) with aid drops; Provide
Comfort involving ground troops; and Provide Comfort II. This case study is impor-
tant because as the first post-Cold War humanitarian intervention, Iraq became the
template for future interventions. Bush also introduced the idea of a UN transition
as an exit strategy; an option adopted in subsequent interventions. In addition, the
Iraq case demonstrates the power of moral responsibilities to constrain intervention
exit strategies. Bush and Clinton emphasised America’s moral duty to the Kurds
throughout the intervention and this defined victory. Paradoxically, both presidents
expanded the scope of America’s moral duty to achieve victory, but in so doing,
made it more difficult for the intervention to be ‘won’ or to place a time limit on US
troop deployment.
5.2 The rhetorical context
5.2.1 The end of the Cold War and the new world order
For the US the end of the Cold War was an historical moment readily assimilated
into the national collective narrative about American exceptionalism and manifest
destiny. In mainstream public discourse the Cold War did not ‘end’ so much as the
US ‘triumphed’ over its Soviet adversaries. In the year following fall of the Berlin
Wall, leading elite press outlets The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and
The Washington Post collectively published more than 30 editorials and opinion
pieces about America’s Cold War ‘victory’.9
9. Factiva database search (November 5, 2018).
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When talking about American foreign policy motivations Bush was forced to address
the demise of America’s main enemy of the previous 50 years. Following in the
footsteps of Presidents Roosevelt, Nixon, Carter and Reagan, Bush used the concept
of a ‘new world order’ in February 1990 to describe the post-Cold War landscape
and America’s role within it.10 Bush used the phrase more frequently than his
predecessors, mentioning it 92 times in public statements over the course of his
four-year presidency. Although Bush provided greater detail each time he used the
term, he maintained its core tenet elucidated in his 11 September 1990 address to a
joint session of Congress:
Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can
emerge: a new era—free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of
justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations
of the world. . . can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have
searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the
span of human endeavour. Today that new world is struggling to be born. . . A
world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which
nations recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world
where the strong respect the rights of the weak.11
Conjuring an image of a new world “struggling to be born” Bush argued the new
global order would not arise organically; the US had to fight for and build it. Bush
appealed to his domestic audience’s association of the US with the virtuous elements
of this new world; his definition positioned America on the side of freedom, peace
and justice, protecting the oppressed and vanquishing evil, using frames reflecting
10. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address for Navy and Total Defense Day, ed. Address for Navy and
Total Defense Day, October 27, 1941, In 1941 Franklin D. Roosevelt described Adolf Hitler’s “plans
for conquest” during the Second World War as an attempt to create a new world order: Richard
Nixon, Toasts of the President and Premier Chou En-lai of China at a Banquet Honoring the
Premier in Peking, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 25, 1972, Richard Nixon
used it to refer to the emerging rapprochement between the US and the then-communist China in
1972–1973: Richard Nixon, Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 3, 1973; Jimmy Carter, Visit of Lieutenant General
Obasanjo of Nigeria Toasts of the President and Lieutenant General Obasanjo at a Dinner Honoring
the Nigerian Head of State, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 11, 1977, Jimmy
Carter used it in 1977 to describe a “more just world economic system”: Jimmy Carter, Visit of
President Perez of Venezuela Toasts of the President and President Perez at a Dinner Honoring
the Venezuelan President, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 28, 1977; Ronald Reagan,
Toasts of President Reagan and President Soeharto of Indonesia at the State Dinner, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, October 12, 1982, Ronald Reagan adopted the term in 1982 to refer
to the work incumbent on the US to “achieve an overall improvement in the inequalities in the
world. . . which guarantees political justice, economic justice and social justice”:
11. George H. W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf
Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 11, 1990.
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normative ideas of American exceptionalism/manifest destiny and fighting evil. As
Jeffrey Engel points out, Bush knew the end of the Cold War removed the most
stabilising part of the post-World War II international system and this rhetorical
vacuum needed filling. As the Cold War was brought to a dramatic end, Bush
reminded his US allies they required a new enemy on which to base their alliances
and “this new enemy was instability”.12
In his speech on 11 September 1990, Bush framed the Gulf War, then in its pre-
combat phase as Operation Desert Shield as a response to the “first assault on the
new world that we seek.”13 Winning the Gulf War would thus vindicate the power
and necessity of American global leadership, reinforcing the normative ideas central
to American foreign policy narratives. Bush thus tied American actions in Iraq to
America’s moral responsibilities to shape the post-Cold War order.
5.2.2 The Gulf War, moral duty and the Vietnam Syndrome
The Gulf War—Operation Desert Storm—launched on 16 January 1991 and was
the first widely-publicised, inter-state war of the post-Cold War era.14 Bush ended
the Gulf War on 27 February 1991 following a swift and powerful air and ground
campaign targeting Iraqi positions in Kuwait.15 Proponents considered the war a
tactical and strategic victory. Iraqi forces were pushed out of Kuwait with many
soldiers surrendering to coalition troops. In a war mobilising over 950,000 coalition
troops—including 500,000 from the US—only 147 of a total 382 coalition soldiers
who died during the war were killed by hostile fire. Coalition ground forces did
not pursue Iraqi troops deep into Iraqi territory but its aerial campaign resulted in
widespread destruction of Iraq’s military and civilian infrastructure and an estimated
12. Engel, “When George Bush Believed the Cold War Ended and Why That Mattered,” 118.
13. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the
Federal Budget Deficit .
14. For more on Bush’s decision-making process in the lead-up to war see H. W. Brands, “George
Bush and the Gulf War of 1991,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2004): 113–32.
15. Spencer, US Leadership in Wartime: Clashes, Controversy and Compromise, 779–888.
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death toll of 205,500.16
The US ultimately enjoyed military victory but the idea of defending Kuwait and
safeguarding American oil supplies was inadequate for mobilising domestic American
enthusiasm for the war.17 Without a motivating Cold War narrative, Bush framed the
Gulf War in equally stark terms: Iraqi forces were committing atrocities in Kuwait
and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was as evil as Hitler. Bush talked of the “rape”
of Kuwait and recounted the (false) story of Iraqi soldiers killing staff and premature
babies in incubators at a Kuwaiti hospital.18 Bush frequently referred to Hussein as
“brutal”19 and “evil”,20 describing Iraqi forces as Hussein’s “henchmen” committing
“horrible crimes and tortures” that were “an affront to mankind and a challenge to
freedom of all”.21
These images recalled normative expectations of US moral responsibility to prevent
atrocities and fight evil. Bush presented the Gulf War as more than a just cause;
it was analogous to WWII, the archetypal ‘good’ war. Bush’s framing choices
transformed the Gulf War from a strategic encounter into a “moral imperative”22 in
which victory demonstrated America’s military strength, commitment to vanquishing
evil and realising its divinely ordained post-Cold War vision: “the kind of blessing
that enables good people to accomplish great deeds”.23 Bush proclaimed a ‘National
16. Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties during the Air
Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War (Human Rights Watch, June 1, 1991), accessed
July 27, 2014; Beth Osborne Daponte, “A Case Study in Estimating Casualties from War and Its
Aftermath: The 1991 Persian Gulf War,” The PSR Quarterly Review 3, no. 2 (1993): 65.
17. Steven Hurst, “The Rhetorical Strategy of George H. W. Bush during the Persian Gulf Crisis
1990–91: How to Help Lose a War You Won,” Political Studies 52 (2004): 384.
18. Ben-Porath, “Rhetoric of Atrocities: The Place of Horrific Human Rights Abuses in Presidential
Persuasion Efforts,” 189.
19. George H. W. Bush, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 1, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Interview With Middle
Eastern Journalists, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 8, 1991; George H. W. Bush,
Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Bethesda, Maryland, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, March 27, 1991.
20. Bush, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict ; George H. W. Bush,
Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 2, 1991.
21. George H. W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian
Gulf, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, January 16, 1991.
22. Bush, Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region.
23. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Community Welcome for Returning Troops in Sumter,
South Carolina, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 17, 1991.
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Day of Prayer’ during the Gulf War24 and on 7 March 1991 he decreed 4, 5, and 7
April ‘National Days of Thanksgiving’ to celebrate the God-given victory.25 Kjell
Lejon has commented on the religious and moral overtones of Bush’s communications
during the Gulf War arguing Bush saw the normative idea of a ‘just war’, “as a
powerful instrument of legitimation in US policy”.26 For Bush, defeating evil in the
Gulf War was both a “moral and ontological battle”.27
With repeated references to the Vietnam War throughout February and March 199128
Bush addressed lurking domestic fears America’s military deployments inevitably
become longer, costly and more fraught. Bush argued the Gulf War exorcised
America’s Vietnam Syndrome demons,29 “bur[ying] the spectre of Vietnam. . . forever
in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula”.30 Without ever admitting US failures
in Vietnam, Bush framed the Gulf War as the better example for understanding US
military activity as a redemptive force at home and abroad, with victory achieved at
low cost to US soldiers. Speaking before US troops returning from the Gulf Bush
told them:
You helped this country liberate itself from old ghosts and doubts. And when
you left, it was still fashionable to question America’s decency, America’s
courage, America’s resolve. No one, no one in the whole world doubts us any
more. What you did, you helped us revive the America of our old hopes and
dreams.31
The Gulf War became a critical plot point in Bush’s post-Cold War narrative of a new
world order where America defeated evildoers without being haunted by the ghosts of
Vietnam. The extent to which Bush could convincingly claim Americans had “kicked”
the Vietnam Syndrome,32 however, relied on more than trouncing a weaker foe on
24. George H. W. Bush, Proclamation 6243—For a National Day of Prayer, February 3, 1991, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 1, 1991.
25. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Commemorating the National Days of Thanksgiving in Houston,
Texas, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 7, 1991, This proclamation was called for by
a joint resolution of Congress on 28 Mar 1991.
26. Kjell Lejon, George H.W. Bush : Faith, Presidency, and Public Theology (Frankfurt: Interna-
tionaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2014), 189.
27. Ibid., 180.
28. Ibid., 169.
29. Simons, Vietnam Syndrome.
30. Bush, Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region.
31. Bush, Remarks at the Community Welcome for Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina.
32. George H. W. Bush, Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council, ed. Gerhard
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the battlefield, it required a demonstrated exit strategy; the war should be clearly
‘over’ with US soldiers seen returning home. But instead of withdrawing troops in
March 1991, Bush found himself confronting a humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq
and pressured to respond with a humanitarian intervention. This situation raised
uncomfortable questions about the decisiveness of America’s Gulf War victory, the
scope of America’s moral responsibilities to the Iraqi people, and the viability of the
US exit strategy.
5.3 Talking about exit before intervention
During Gulf War ceasefire negotiations in the first week of March 1991 and with
US troops withdrawing after Operation Desert Strike, Iraqis staged protests against
their national government. Localised protests developed into larger uprisings across
thirteen cities. The unrest began in southern Iraq led by the Shiite population. Not
long after, the Peshmerga led their Kurdish compatriots in northern Iraq in armed
rebellion.33 The Peshmerga have waged an ongoing struggle for an independent
Kurdistan since the 1920s and used Bush’s call for Iraqis to rise up against Saddam
Hussein as motivation for their latest rebellion. Iraq’s military deployed helicopter
gunships to suppress the rebels and attack civilian populations in rebel strongholds.34
Western media outlets reported Iraqi troops using chemical weapons35 and conducting
mass, summary executions.36
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 1, 1991.
33. For more on the history of the Kurdish struggle and the role of this particular uprising see:
Howard Adelman, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds,” International Journal
of Refugee Law 4, no. 1 (1992): 5–9; Harrington, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in
International Law,” 638–39; Peter Malanczuk, “The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the
Aftermath of the Second Gulf War,” European Journal of International Law 2 (1991): 114–35;
Robert Olson, “Five stages of Kurdish nationalism:1880–1980,” Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs.
Journal 12, no. 2 (1991): 391–409.
34. Dan Balz and John M. Goshko, “Situation in Iraq ’Murky’; Rebels Claim Progress in North;
Army Seen Gaining South,” The Washington Post (Washington DC), March 20, 1991, a01.
35. Patrick E. Tyler, “After the War: US Juggling Iraq Policy,” The New York Times, April 13,
1991,
36. Nora Boustany, “A Trail of Death in Iraq; Shiite Refugees Tell of Atrocities by Republican
Guard,” The Washington Post (Washington DC), March 26, 1991, a01.
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The violence of the uprisings and the brutal government response led 40,000–100,000
Shiite refugees to flee across the border into Iran with a further 37,000 arriving in
Saudi Arabia. More than 1.4 million Kurds entered Iran with a further 450,000
travelling towards the mountainous regions between Iraq and Turkey.37 By 18 March
1991, Iraqi state media carried reports the uprising in the south were crushed,38
however Western media continued featuring reports of massacres by the Iraqi military
in the north and south of the country.39
In this section I outline how Bush’s Gulf War rhetoric, because it was based on
constructing a particular relationship between moral responsibility, victory and exit
strategy justifications, affected exit strategy options in the subsequent humanitarian
intervention. In particular, the deteriorating human rights situation in Iraq under-
mined Bush’s framing of the Gulf War as a combined battlefield and moral triumph.
The Iraqi government committing atrocities against the Kurds created domestic
pressure on Bush to gird his Gulf War victory by keeping troops in Iraq to deal with
the humanitarian crisis rather than withdrawing them as initially promised.
Despite the worsening humanitarian crisis in March 1991, Bush’s public statements
about American foreign policy in Iraq were preoccupied with Gulf War victory
justifying American troop withdrawal. America’s Gulf War victory was a boon
for Bush’s domestic popularity. On the day Bush declared the war officially over,
his Gallup presidential job approval rating was 86 percent,40 up from 58 percent
immediately prior to the war.41 Almost a third (30 percent) of Bush’s comments
about Iraq in March 1991 were about the US winning the Gulf War and he used
the word ‘victory’ 14 times in 18 verbal texts during this time. Bush declared
37. Peter W. Galbraith, Refugees from War in Iraq: What Happened in 1991 and What May
Happen in 2003, MPI Policy Brief 2 (Migration Policy Institute, February 2003).
38. Jonathan C Randal, “Kurds Report Uprising in Northern Iraq; Arab Leaders Meet in Damas-
cus,” The Washington Post, March 6, 1991, Jonathan C Randal, “Iraq Says Rebellion Toll High;
Papers Print Photos of Bodies, Damage in Southern Cities,” The Washington Post, March 18, 1991,
Dan Balz, “Bush Criticizes Iraq’s Use of Helicopters on Rebels; President, Mitterrand Confer in
Martinique,” The Washington Post (Washington DC), March 15, 1991, a37.
39. Nora Boustany, “Refugees Tell of Turmoil in Iraq; Troops Recount Allied Onslaught,” The
Washington Post (Washington DC), March 4, 1991, a01.
40. Gallup News Poll, “Presidential Job Approval Rating Interactive Chart,” August 9, 2018.
41. Ibid.
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unequivocally America “won the war”,42 and “crush[ed] Saddam’s war machine”.43
Bush gained political capital from the perceived success of the Gulf War creating
opportunities to pursue other aspects of his foreign policy agenda, such as the Middle
East peace process. Preserving the integrity of Gulf War victory was also important
for Bush’s reputation as he headed into the 1992 presidential election campaigning
season.
Bush framed US victory as important for its own sake but also because it was
consistent with other US foreign policy expectations of exceptionalism and fighting
evil. Bush focused on Saddam Hussein’s abject evilness,44 contrasting it with
American righteousness evident in Bush’s willingness to defend innocents from
tyranny. Hussein was a “villain”,45 “the village bully”46 who had committed “war
crimes”,47 “tortures and insidious crimes”48 in Kuwait that were “just sickening”49
and “threatened the future of our children and the entire world”.50 By contrast the
US was a “humble nation”,51 a “beacon for democracy”52 and a “lamp of liberty”.53
Americans had “selflessly confront[ed] evil for the sake of good in a land so far
away”,54 “lift[ing] the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that
many Americans had never even heard of, and we ask nothing in return”,55 acting
42. George H. W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the
Persian Gulf Conflict, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 6, 1991.
43. Bush, Remarks at the Community Welcome for Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina.
44. Lordan, Case for Combat: How Presidents Persuade Americans to Go to War , 240; Hurst,
“The Rhetorical Strategy of George H. W. Bush during the Persian Gulf Crisis 1990–91: How to
Help Lose a War You Won,” 381–82.
45. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf
Conflict .
46. Bush, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict ; Bush, Interview With
Middle Eastern Journalists, See also.
47. Bush, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict .
48. Bush, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict ; Bush, Question-and-
Answer Session With Reporters in Bethesda, Maryland , See also.
49. Bush, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict .
50. Bush, Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region.
51. George H. W. Bush, Remarks to Veterans Service Organizations, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, March 4, 1991.
52. Bush, Interview With Middle Eastern Journalists.
53. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Bethesda, Maryland .
54. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf
Conflict .
55. Ibid.
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“without arrogance”56 and “not gloating”.57 Bush unambiguously framed the Gulf
War as a case of ‘us versus him’:
It’s right and wrong. It’s good and evil. He’s evil; our cause is right.58
Having argued America’s actions in the Gulf ensured Winston Churchill’s vision
had come to pass, a new world order where “the principles of justice and fair
play. . . protect the weak against the strong”,59 it was difficult for Bush to justify
America not having a responsibility to the Iraqi people suffering under Hussein’s
tyranny. The deteriorating human rights situation threatened to undermine Bush’s
Gulf War victory and with it the president’s argument the new world order had
“passed the first test”.60 Nevertheless, in March 1991 Bush argued against a US
military response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq because it risked a quagmire.
Analogising with the Vietnam War, Bush justified non-intervention on the grounds
US troops would be “sucked into the internal civil war inside Iraq”.61 More than
three-quarters of Bush’s comments about his exit strategy were thus about US
troops withdrawing from Iraq (78 percent). Maintaining the integrity of America’s
Gulf War victory as a symbol of the viability and virtue of the new world order,
however required America to respond to war crimes perpetrated under the noses
of US soldiers. Bush’s Gulf War discourse focused on the moral rightness of the
war and this constrained the options he had to implement his planned exit strategy.
Keen to avoid a Vietnam Syndrome relapse, Bush paradoxically risked triggering one:
now military victory in Iraq had been achieved without a morally clear outcome.
Bush’s unwillingness to support Hussein’s latest victims raised doubts in the wider
public discourse about America’s commitment and ability to defeat evil. In the
aftermath of the Gulf War we can see the rhetorical tension Bush experienced between
sticking to his exit strategy based on military victory and fulfilling America’s other
56. Bush, Remarks at the Community Welcome for Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina.
57. Ibid.
58. Bush, Interview With Middle Eastern Journalists.
59. George H. W. Bush, Proclamation 6257—For National Days of Thanksgiving, April 5-7, 1991,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 7, 1991.
60. Bush, Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region.
61. George H. W. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 3, 1991.
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moral responsibility expectations. While Bush talked of US “accomplishment”,62
other contributors to American domestic discourse had different ideas about what
it meant to ‘get the job done’ in Iraq. Elite media commentators echoed Bush’s
view the Vietnam Syndrome was now “buried in the Persian Gulf”.63 The New York
Times, for example, published 53 opinion pieces and editorials in March 1991 about
the Gulf War victory and what it meant for future US foreign policy, 32 after Bush
announced the US ceasefire and seven of which dealt predominantly with the Vietnam
Syndrome. For its part The Washington Post published ten opinion/editorial pieces
and The Wall Street Journal five articles on the topic over the same period. However
media commentators disagreed with Bush that the US should not “interfere in the
internal matters of Iraq”.64 The overwhelming view was moral consistency demanded
America help Iraqis rising up against Hussein.65 Even commentators such as Leslie
Gelb who, together with his Times’ editors, initially opposed US involvement in
Iraq,66 changed their views by the beginning of April 1991. Gelb argued intervention
was potentially disastrous but failure to help the Kurds was worse.67
Commentators in the Post and Journal were similarly unconvinced the attacks on
Iraqi rebels were beyond US interest or responsibility given Bush’s demands for
Hussein’s removal, as well as the fact US forces controlled a fifth of Iraq’s airspace
and had previously established a protected area for Shiites in southern Iraq.68 Journal
editors called for Bush to keep US forces in Iraq “until his work is done”, which they
62. Bush, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict .
63. Doy S. Zakheim, “The Gulf War’s Aftermath Is the Vietnam Syndrome Dead?; Happily,
It’s Buried In the Gulf,” The New York Times, March 4, 1991, See also Leslie H. Gelb, “Policy
Monotheism,” The New York Times, March 17, 1991, Editorial, “A Mean Army, Made Leaner,”
The New York Times, March 30, 1991,
64. George H. W. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of
Japan in Newport Beach, California, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 4, 1991.
65. A. M. Rosenthal, “A Second US Victory,” The New York Times, March 22, 1991, William
Safire, “Follow the Kurds to Save Iraq,” The New York Times, March 28, 1991, Flora Lewis,
“America Deserts the Rebels Cynically,” The New York Times, April 3, 1991, Tom Wicker, “A
Confused Strategy,” The New York Times, March 30, 1991,
66. Leslie H. Gelb, “A Unified, Weak Iraq,” The New York Times, March 20, 1991, Editorial,
“The Quicksand in Iraq,” The New York Times, March 20, 1991,
67. Leslie H. Gelb, “Iraq: Drawing the Line,” The New York Times, April 3, 1991,
68. Paul A. Gigot, “Bush’s ‘Stability’ not so Appealing if You’re a Kurd,” The Wall Street Journal
(New York), March 29, 1991, 10; David A. Korn, “Don’t Ignore Iraq’s Kurds; It’s Wrong, and It’s
Shortsighted Policy,” The Washington Post, March 7, 1991, a23; Mary McGrory, “Bush’s Peace
Problems,” The Washington Post, March 26, 1991, a02; Jim Hoagland, “Monumental Folly,” The
Washington Post, March 29, 1991,
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defined as securing Iraq and the stability of the Middle East.69 Although these were
more expansive obligations than Bush had initially set out for the military operation,
they were consistent with Bush’s narrative about the Gulf War as an example of
American moral authority shaping the post-Cold War order. Despite ostensibly
‘winning’ the Gulf War, Bush’s domestic audience was increasingly unwilling to
accept the operation was ‘over’, let alone just and morally uncomplicated. Bush’s
response to the Iraq crisis was a matter of political interest to his constituents. A
Pew poll published on 19 March 1991 revealed 72 percent of Americans were closely
watching the Gulf War aftermath.70 Having earlier legitimised the Gulf War using
emotions and moral evaluation, it was difficult for Bush to convincingly change
tack and legitimise his decision not to intervene in Iraq because rational, ‘strategic’
considerations like maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity to balance Iran, should
now determine US actions in Iraq.
The question here, which also arises in subsequent interventions examined in this
thesis, is why Bush was unwilling or unable to exercise the discursive power of his
office and alter the narrative in favour of these more ’strategic’ considerations. The
evidence suggests that these other justifications are not as powerful as those made
earlier on the moral grounds, especially when presidents have intensified, doubled-
down or hyperbolised those initial moral justifications. Thus in Iraq Bush became
constrained by this earlier rhetoric and the normative expectations that underpinned
it; these were the standards against which victory and success would be judged.
Mainstream media voices called for intervention as incumbent upon the US but
Congress did not similarly pressure the president to respond to the humanitarian
crisis in Iraq. Instead, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a series of
resolutions commending Bush and the US military for their Gulf War victory.71 Two
69. Editorial, “George Bush’s Elbe,” The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1991,
70. Times Mirror, “G.O.P. Collects Big War Dividend Survey, Mar, 1991,” March 14, 1991,
Interviewing conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates 14-19 March 1991 and based on
2, 028 telephone interviews. Accessed August 11, 2018.
71. William S. Bromfield, “H.Res.95 - Commending the President and United States and allied
military forces on the success of Operation Desert Storm,” Passed/agreed to in House, 102nd
Congress, February 28, 1991, Robert J. Dole, “S.Con.Res.13 - A concurrent resolution commending
the President and the Armed Forces for the success of Operation Desert Storm,” Agreed to in
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resolutions introduced in March 1991 called on the UN to try Hussein and other
members of the Iraqi government for war crimes, but these were isolated to alleged
crimes committed inside Kuwait, not against the Iraqi people.72
On 2 April, America’s NATO ally Turkey closed its border to Kurdish refugees,
exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.73 On the same day the Turkish Ambassador
wrote to the UN Security Council president requesting the Council “adopt necessary
measures to put an end to this inhuman repression being carried out on a massive
scale”,74 a direct reference to the Council’s Chapter VII powers and mass atrocity
prevention language characterising discussion of this and similar crises. Kurdish
leaders appealed to the US, Saudi Arabian, UK and French governments for support
but most of America’s Gulf War allies rejected the idea they had an ongoing moral
responsibility in Iraq.75 Like his American counterpart, UK Prime Minister John
Major devoted much of his post-Gulf War rhetoric to discussing the UK’s contribution
to victory and emphasising troops would be withdrawn immediately from the region.
Only France attempted, unsuccessfully, on 3 April 1991 to have the UNSC “say
something” about the “unjustifiable violence in both the south and the north,
Senate, 102nd Congress, February 28, 1991, Pete V. Domenici, “S.J.Res.97 - A joint resolution to
recognize and honor members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States
for their contribution to victory in the Persian Gulf,” Passed Sentate, 102nd Congress, March 20,
1991,
72. Jim Ramstad, “H.Con.Res.81 - Calling upon the United Nations to take all appropriate steps
to try Saddam Hussein and his subordinates for all war crimes,” 102nd Congress, June 6, 1991, Jim
Saxton, “H.Res.100 - To urge the establishment of an international military tribunal to prosecute
war crimes arising out of the Persian Gulf conflict,” 102nd Congress, March 18, 1991, John McCain,
“S.Res.69 - A resolution calling for the establishment of an international tribunal with jurisdiction to
judge and punish the war crimes committed by the political and military leadership of Iraq,” 102nd
Congress, February 28, 1991, Areln Specter, “S.Res.71 - A resolution to encourage the President of
the United States to confer with the sovereign state of Kuwait, countries of the Coalition or the
United Nations to establish an International Criminal Court or an International Military Tribunal
to try and punish all individuals, including President Saddam Hussein, involved in the planning or
execution of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity as defined under
international law,” 102nd Congress, Introduced 1991, George W. Gekas, “H.R.1336 - War Crimes
Act of 1991,” Introduced, 102nd Congress, July 8, 1992,
73. Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkey’s Policy in Northern Iraq,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 4
(1996): 343–66.
74. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Security Council: 16 June 1990–15 June 1991.
Official Records: Forty-Sixth Session Supplement No. 2 A/48/2 (New York: United Nations Security
Council).
75. Malanczuk, “The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf
War,” 119.
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where the inhabitants of Kurdish origin have once again been tragically attacked”.76
The French Foreign Minister Rolad Dumas went so far as to say the international
community had a “duty” to intervene.77 The US, USSR and China opposed France’s
efforts arguing it would set a precedent for UN involvement in a state’s internal
affairs.78 Instead the UNSC concentrated on codifying the Gulf War ceasefire
and demarcating the border between Iraq and Kuwait, as well as requiring Iraq
pay reparations and destroy its weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and other
military capabilities.79 Bush’s view against intervention had initially dominated
public discourse but domestic and international pressure on the president to respond
more concretely now increased.80
On 3 April 1991 The Washington Post published an opinion poll in which 55 percent
of surveyed Americans thought the US should not have ended the Gulf War with
Saddam Hussein still in power.81 Almost half of those surveyed (45 percent) thought
America should help the rebels. Of these, 78 percent favoured targeting helicopters
and 68 were in favour of giving the rebels weapons. But while 71 percent wanted to
send US military advisers to help the rebels only 42 percent favoured ground troops.
On the one hand this indicated some trade-off in the public imagination between
fulfilling America’s moral responsibility to the Kurds and protecting American
soldiers but it also indicated a willingness to reinforce the Gulf War victory.82 On
the same day that poll was published, Bush gave a press conference in which he
reminded Americans the uprisings were not America’s responsibility because US
forces “did not go there to settle all the internal affairs of Iraq” and US soldiers were
76. UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred and
Eighty-Second Meeting S/PV.2982 (New York: United Nations Security Council, April 5, 1991), 94.
77. James Cockayne and David Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort
and the No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” Security Dialogue
37 (2006): 129.
78. Malanczuk, “The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf
War,” 119.
79. UN Security Council, “Resolution 687,” April 3, 1991,
80. Cockayne and Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the
No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” 125.
81. Richard Morin, “Majority in Poll Says U.S. Ended Attack On Iraq Prematurely;No Consensus
Found on Aiding Rebel Forces,” The Washington Post (Washington DC), April 5, 1991, a14.
82. Ibid.
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“not there to intervene”,83 a point he repeated the following day.84
Domestic media commentators persisted, labelling US inaction “cynical”,85 and a
“moral failure”,86 deploring US unwillingness to protect the Kurds from “Saddam
Hussein’s vengeful butchery”.87 NATO issued a statement condemning the violence
and Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher referred to the attacks
on the Kurds as “genocide”.88 On 4 April 1991 France again called for the UNSC
to discuss the crisis.89 As domestic and international opinion shifted, Bush began
losing control of his morally righteous narrative about the Gulf War, which in turn
threatened to undermine his victory claims and accompanying troop withdrawal
strategy.
On 5 April 1991, the Bush administration with France co-sponsoredUNSC Resolution
688 about the northern Iraq crisis.90 The resolution condemned the violence in Iraq as
a “threat to international peace and security” triggering application of Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, a basis upon which the UN legitimises using armed force.91 Although
the resolution only authorised delivering humanitarian assistance to refugees and
internally displaced people, it represented a significant development in the UNSC’s
willingness to apply its Chapter VII powers to a matter within the borders of a
state.92 Apart from resolutions on South Africa’s apartheid, this was the first time
the UN made human rights an issue of international peace and security.93 Resolution
83. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
84. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan in
Newport Beach, California.
85. Lewis, “America Deserts the Rebels Cynically.”
86. William Safire, “Bush’s Bay of Pigs,” The New York Times, April 4, 1991,
87. Editorial, “The War’s Not Over Yet,” The New York Times, April 4, 1991,
88. Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 110; Marc Fisher, “NATO Condemns Iraq’s
‘Brutal Repression’;German Politician Calls U.S. Position Cynical; Kurds Stage Rallies Throughout
Europe,” The Washington Post (Washington DC), April 6, 1991, a17.
89. Jean-Marc Rochereau de la Sabliere, “Letter Dated 4 April 1991 from the Charge d’Affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France to the UN Addressed to the President of the Security
Council,” April 4, 1991,
90. Harrington, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in International Law,” 637.
91. UN Security Council, “Resolution 688,” April 5, 1991,
92. Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era,” World Policy Journal 11, no.
1 (1994): 59.
93. Cockayne and Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the
No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” 126.
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688 heralded what Alex Bellamy calls the “humanitarian exception” to the prevailing
state sovereignty and non-intervention principles institutionalised at the UN.94 The
resolution was, however, limited in scope. It stated the threat to international
security came from refugee flows, not the Iraqi government’s human rights abuses
that caused people to flee in the first place.95 Resolution 688 also authorised only aid
agencies to conduct operations to alleviate the crisis, technically excluding foreign
armed forces.96
In supporting Resolution 688, Bush helped align international opinion with what his
domestic audience required for justifiable US foreign policy action. Bush’s rhetorical
shift in favour of intervention also demonstrated the constraining effect of his moral
righteousness narrative about Gulf War victory. Exit was contingent on achieving
a successful mission but Bush had also linked victory to discharging moral duty.
US troops thus needed to remain in Iraq to defend America’s expectations for a
successful military operation as much as to stop the humanitarian crisis.
5.4 Justifying exit in Provide Comfort
Bush announced his decision to send 18,285 US military personnel to commence
Operation Provide Comfort on 5–6 April 1991. Even though he did not not use
the term, Provide Comfort was a humanitarian intervention involving US military
aircraft enforcing a NFZ and dropping aid supplies to the Kurds in a potentially
hostile operating environment. Resolution 688 did not authorise the NFZ but the
Bush administration argued it was necessary to protect its humanitarian operation
in Iraq.97 His Gulf War exit strategy was now complicated by a new humanitarian
mission. Not only did this new operation potentially undermine Bush’s earlier claims
94. Bellamy, “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions,” 218.
95. Bill Frelick, “The False Promise of Operation Provide Comfort: Protecting Refugees or
Protecting State Power?,” Middle East Report, no. 176 (1992): 26.
96. UN Security Council, “Resolution 688.”
97. Cockayne and Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the
No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” 127.
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America had fulfilled its Gulf War moral responsibilities, convincingly defeating the
Iraqi government and avoiding a quagmire,98 but Provide Comfort needed its own
exit strategy.
With an exclusively aerial operation, Bush’s exit strategy during this phase of
Provide Comfort was operational disengagement. He justified this strategy by arguing
America’s moral responsibility to the Kurds was limited to providing disaster relief,
a responsibility that could be rapidly discharged and from which US soldiers could
exit quickly. In this phase, Bush began weaving an intervention narrative framed by
normative expectations of when and how US troops would leave. As he developed
his narrative, Bush leaned into expectations of American moral responsibility in
a humanitarian crisis, expanding it from providing disaster relief to preventing
atrocities against the Kurds by removing the perpetrator, Saddam Hussein. This
expanded moral duty, however, conflicted with and undermined Bush’s justifications
for operational disengagement, making it necessary to intensify rather than reduce
America’s military commitment. In this phase of intervention Bush’s rhetoric
therefore reveals a president struggling to balance US moral responsibility with the
normative expectations to deliver victory and assured exit for American soldiers.
Bush framed Provide Comfort as an aid mission similar to those America conducted
in other parts of the world. Bush spoke of US soldiers providing “immediate aid”,
dropping supplies and “other relief-related items for refugees” to meet “emergency
needs”.99 The US was going to “step that way up”.100 Bush framed America’s disaster
relief as a deeply moral endeavour, legitimising his decision through moral evaluation
and altruism. Thus US soldiers were “helping these unfortunate people”,101 and
98. James Jones calls it “another chapter” in Operation Desert Storm Jones, “Operation Provide
Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq,” 2.
99. George H. W. Bush, Statement on Aid to Iraqi Refugees, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 5, 1991.
100. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at a Meeting With Hispanic Business Leaders and an Exchange
With Reporters in Newport Beach, California, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 5,
1991.
101. George H. W. Bush, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With
President Jacques Delors of the European Community Commission and President Jacques Santer
of the European Council of Ministers, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 11, 1991.
Finishing the job 151
Chapter 5. Northern Iraq Anna Samson
working to “assist Iraqi refugees”,102 to “alleviate the plight of the many innocent
Iraqis”,103 and “save the lives of others”.104 He cast US soldiers as aid workers and
apolitical actors, not there to “interfere in Iraq’s civil war”.105 Bush’s framing kept
Provide Comfort within the bounds of UNSC Resolution 688, protecting the military
operation’s international legitimacy and, by extension, the Gulf War’s legitimacy.106
Bush’s executive order authorising the use of Department of Defense resources
for Operation Provide Comfort explicitly stated they were for the “provision of
international disaster assistance.”107
Framing the moral objectives of Provide Comfort in terms of disaster relief preserved
the integrity of Gulf War victory and allowed Bush to frame his exclusively aerial
humanitarian operation as something other than a military intervention. Bush
could thus maintain some semblance of policy consistency and avoid antagonising
UNSC members like Russia and China that reluctantly agreed to intervention for
aid purposes but would have likely blocked measures permitting foreign military
intervention in a civil war. The Iraqi government also opposed US presence in its
sovereign territory. US soldiers were not only dropping aid but enforcing a NFZ
involving potential combat against hostile Iraqi aircraft. By assisting the Kurds
without distinguishing combatants from civilians, the US was getting involved in
the civil war, regardless of Bush’s claims he was not prepared to “go in and use this
superior military might to try to sort out this civil war”.108
Bush’s disaster relief frame not only limited the scope of America’s moral responsi-
bility for the Kurds but it created the discursive space for justifying an operational
disengagement exit strategy. The focus of Bush’s justification was his operational
approach to Provide Comfort, which, unlike the Gulf War, was restricted to an
102. Bush, Statement on Aid to Iraqi Refugees.
103. Ibid.
104. Bush, Remarks Commemorating the National Days of Thanksgiving in Houston, Texas.
105. George H. W. Bush, Exchange With Reporters on Aid to Iraqi Refugees, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, April 11, 1991.
106. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery,
Alabama, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 13, 1991.
107. George H. W. Bush, Presidential Determination No. 91 - 31 – Memorandum on Disaster
Assistance in the Persian Gulf Region, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 19, 1991.
108. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
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air campaign and did not involve US ground troops. Bush used the difference in
military commitments when talking about steps to “remove our forces”,109 “bring
them out”,110 and “take our forces out just as quickly as possible”,111 as well as
to report US soldiers “coming out”112 and “returning home”113 from the Gulf War.
Bush said America’s Gulf War mission was “completed”,114 and the “objectives,
sanctioned by international law have been achieved”.115 In separating the missions,
Bush stated that:
We’ve fulfilled our objectives [in the Gulf War] and now what we’ve got to do
is fulfil our concerns about the innocents that are suffering. . . by doing what
the United States has always done, trying to be a catalyst for healing the
wounds.116
Bush’s operational approach allowed him to maintain he had “no intention of leaving
our forces”,117 the presumption being aerial engagements are easier to conclude
than ground offensives; Bush could claim an achievable operational disengagement
exit because planes can simply return home, “to help there without being bogged
down into a ground force action”.118 Avoiding getting ‘bogged down’ was crucial
for Bush discursively distinguishing the Gulf War from a Vietnam-style quagmire
and minimising the risk to US soldiers. When explaining how committed he was to
preventing another Vietnam, Bush used verbs indicating America would not lose
control of its Iraq operation. The intervention was measured and deliberate—soldiers
109. George H. W. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Secretary of State James A.
Baker III in Houston, Texas, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 6, 1991.
110. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
111. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Secretary of State James A. Baker III in
Houston, Texas.
112. George H. W. Bush, The President’s News Conference With President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari of Mexico in Houston, Texas, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 7, 1991.
113. Bush, Remarks Commemorating the National Days of Thanksgiving in Houston, Texas.
114. Ibid.
115. Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
116. Bush, The President’s News Conference With President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico
in Houston, Texas.
117. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Secretary of State James A. Baker III in
Houston, Texas.
118. George H. W. Bush, Exchange With Reporters Aboard Air Force One, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, May 4, 1991.
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would not be “thrust into a war”,119 “sucked”,120 “shoved”121 or “pushed into this
situation”122—and thus exit implementable. Victory and therefore exit would be
easier because it was exclusively an air campaign. Juxtaposing the Gulf War and
Provide Comfort capitalised on Bush’s narrative of US soldiers quickly winning a
conventional war with minimal casualties;123 successfully completing a humanitarian
operation would arguably be less difficult and deliver results just as rapidly.
At this point Bush had apparently created an exit strategy satisfying foreign policy
normative expectations in humanitarian crises: it promised to discharge America’s
limited moral responsibility, succeed with minimal US casualties, and allow for quick
troop withdrawal. However, Bush could not resist connecting the Gulf War and
Provide Comfort to the American exceptionalism myth and the accompanying, bigger
moral leadership duties. During this phase of Provide Comfort Bush increased his
discursive emphasis on US moral responsibilities relative to other topics. Two-thirds
of all Bush’s statements (66 percent) focused on America’s moral duties, up from 54
percent prior to intervention.
It wasn’t just that Bush talked more about moral duty; the way Bush framed moral
duty also expanded from stopping an atrocity with disaster relief to fighting evil. Bush
intensified his personal reprobation of Saddam Hussein, labelling him the perpetrator
of “brutality”,124 “cruelty”,125 “savagery”126 and “repression of his own people”.127
119. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
120. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida; Bush, The
President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan in Newport Beach,
California.
121. Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
122. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan in
Newport Beach, California.
123. Bush, Remarks at the Community Welcome for Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina.
124. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida, 4 mentions; Bush,
The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan in Newport Beach,
California; George H. W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With President Jacques Delors
of the European Economic Community and President Jacques Santer of the European Council of
Ministers, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 11, 1991; Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air
Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama, 2 mentions.
125. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
126. Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
127. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With President Jacques Delors of the European Economic
Community and President Jacques Santer of the European Council of Ministers.
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According to Bush, Hussein was the “major villain”,128 “this brutal dictator”129 with
a “lack of conscience”.130 Employing these images conveyed palpable outrage and
disgust, placing the humanitarian intervention in the barbarism versus civilisation/
good versus evil frames of the Gulf War. If Hussein represented a Cold War legacy of
barbarism, the US was at the vanguard of the new world order’s enlightenment with
its commitment to the “noble goal”131 of protecting the Kurds. Bush claimed the US
was doing “the heavy lifting”;132 it “step[ped] that way up”,133 and “in keeping with
our nation’s compassion and concern, [was] massively helping,”134 with the “largest
relief effort mounted in modern military history”.135
America’s actions were also God’s work, which was why Bush led the American
people in recognising “it is time to give thanks to God, not for winning the war
but for helping us to do what was right”,136 to “thank God Almighty for men and
women who will risk their lives to save the lives of others.”137 Herein lay the difficulty:
Bush wasn’t just sending US soldiers to relieve suffering, he committed America to
saving lives and protecting the Kurds from a manifest evil. This commitment and
the challenge Bush faced in articulating its scope caused problems for Bush as the
humanitarian crisis in Iraq showed little sign of abating.
When the US launched Operation Provide Comfort only a minority of voices in
the domestic mainstream elite media and the international community raised any
concerns about the US deployment affecting the likelihood and timing of complete
troop withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Calls for the US to do more to help
128. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
129. Bush, Remarks at a Meeting With Hispanic Business Leaders and an Exchange With Reporters
in Newport Beach, California; Bush, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions
With President Jacques Delors of the European Community Commission and President Jacques
Santer of the European Council of Ministers.
130. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
131. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Secretary of State James A. Baker III in
Houston, Texas.
132. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida.
133. Bush, Remarks at a Meeting With Hispanic Business Leaders and an Exchange With Reporters
in Newport Beach, California.
134. Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
135. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With President Jacques Delors of the European Economic
Community and President Jacques Santer of the European Council of Ministers.
136. Bush, Remarks Commemorating the National Days of Thanksgiving in Houston, Texas.
137. Ibid.
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dominated the public discourse; Bush’s domestic and international audience asked
him deliver on his rhetoric about America’s moral responsibility to prevent atrocities
and defeat evil.
It began with Turkish President Turgut O¨zal suggesting the US and its allies establish
“safe havens” or “enclaves” for the Kurds on the Iraqi side of the border.138 The
Turkish government likely suggested the idea as a convenient means to abdicate
responsibility to open its border and provide protection for Kurdish refugees. The
White House’s official position initially was the US NFZ over northern Iraq was
already operating as a “de facto safe zone”.139 Nevertheless the safe haven idea was
taken up by the French, UK and German governments, securing European Economic
Community (EEC) approval for the proposal.140 US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
supported the idea as the next logical step for Provide Comfort, although he admitted
the Bush administration did not know how safe havens could work in northern Iraq.141
To comply with international law, a safe haven in northern Iraq required deliberate
US action to permanently carve out Iraqi territory expressly for that purpose, as well
as formal Iraqi government approval and ground forces to supplement those already
policing the NFZ. It also required all parties to acknowledge there was something
akin to a state of war in northern Iraq and the US was an occupying power.142 The
Iraqi government strongly opposed Turkey’s safe haven proposal. UN Secretary-
General Javier Pe´rez de Cue´llar also responded cautiously, arguing implementation
would breach Iraq’s sovereignty.
138. Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International
Law (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 173.
139. John E. Yang, “Bush: US, Allies Concur On Refugee Zones in Iraq; Accord Stressed After
Meeting With EC Leaders,” The Washington Post, April 12, 1991, John E. Yang, “Bush Defends
Non-Intervention in Iraq;President Begins Speech Campaign to Define ‘New World Order’,” The
Washington Post, April 14, 1991,
140. William Drozdiak and David B. Ottaway, “U.S., Allies Want Refugee Havens Established
in Iraq; Europeans Back Protective Zone for Kurds,” The Washington Post (Washington DC),
April 9, 1991, a01.
141. Bill McAllister, “U.N. Buffer Zones In Iraq Suggested; Cheney Offers Idea to Safeguard
Refugees,” The Washington Post (Washington DC), April 8, 1991,
142. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 1958,” 1958,
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Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Kurds remained stranded on the mountain
pass between Turkey and Iraq. Aid drops provided immediate relief but had not
stopped, let alone reversed the humanitarian crisis. It was not proving easy for Bush
to tie up this Gulf War loose end. Every day the humanitarian crisis continued the
more it threatened to undermine Bush’s narrative about America’s Gulf War victory,
the new world order, and his decision not to depose Saddam Hussein. It was also
unclear how Bush was going to implement an exit strategy for this humanitarian
intervention that met normative expectations. Restricting US soldiers to an aerial
operation meant troops were assured of quick exit. The fact the Kurds remained
in a precarious humanitarian situation, however, demonstrated how difficult it was
to succeed in a manner that made this quick exit possible. Rather than resolving
this tension between discharging America’s moral responsibility, succeeding and
exiting quickly Bush exacerbated it. He widened the scope of US moral responsibility
beyond disaster relief to include preventing atrocities and fighting evil, making it
more difficult to convincingly succeed and exit. This challenge would only deepen
when Bush agreed to introduce ground troops into northern Iraq.
5.5 Justifying exit with ground troops deployed
On 16 April 1991 President Bush announced US ground troops would establish
safe zones for the Kurds in northern Iraq. Provide Comfort was only the second
time in more than 50 years a safe area was established to protect civilians in a
conflict zone.143 Bush called the safe zones “encampments”,144 conjuring images of
refugee and other temporary disaster relief camps, rather than protected areas more
commonly associated with combat zones like field hospitals or civilian shelters. Bush
143. Harrington, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in International Law,” 637; The first
had been established in Sri Lanka by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
in 1990 with the consent of the LTTE separatist movement and the Sri Lankan government. Phil
Orchard, “Revisiting Humanitarian Safe Areas for Civilian Protection,” Global Governance 20
(2014): 3.
144. George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 16, 1991.
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thus continued framing Provide Comfort in terms of disaster relief, even as it became,
in his words, “greatly expanded and more ambitious”.145 In his speech and press
conference on 16 April 1991 Bush used the terms “relief” and “humanitarian” a
combined total of seventeen times to describe the expanded mission.146
Talking about Provide Comfort in terms of disaster relief did not insulate Bush from
the fact American soldiers were effectively occupying Iraq by mid-April 1991. The US
safe zone in northern Iraq was never formally negotiated with the Iraqi government.
Without what Phil Orchard calls “tactical consent of the belligerents”,147 US armed
forces were required to ensure the zone was indeed safe.
With Provide Comfort’s operational approach shifting from an aerial mission to one
involving ground forces, Bush could no longer rely on his operational disengagement
exit strategy. He thus developed a new, UN transition exit strategy. Bush justified this
new exit plan as consistent with his expanded scope of American moral responsibility
to protect the Kurds, not just alleviate the humanitarian crisis. He also argued the
strategy assured exit because American soldiers would not need to wait until the
Kurds were fully protected from future Iraqi government attacks; the UN would act in
America’s stead, fulfilling the moral obligations of US humanitarian intervention. The
difficulty, however, was Bush continued connecting exit with victory, and according to
him, victory could not be achieved without America fulfilling its moral obligation to
guarantee Kurdish safety. He also failed to explain when and under what conditions
the UN had agreed to take over from America, making US exit even more dependent
on meeting protection obligations itself.
During this phase of Provide Comfort Bush continued talking about American
victory in Iraq but not in the context of the humanitarian intervention. Instead,
Bush’s rhetoric reinforced his Gulf War victory narrative from which Provide Comfort
was notably excluded. Bush railed against critics who insisted Provide Comfort
145. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
146. Ibid.
147. Orchard, “Revisiting Humanitarian Safe Areas for Civilian Protection.”
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demonstrated Gulf War victory was overstated, accusing them of “revisionistic
thinking (sic)”.148 Bush reminded the American people of the limited scope of
their country’s Gulf War aims: “our objective was to repel aggression, and we did
it”,149 “the objective was to throw [Hussein] out of Kuwait, and boy did our people
perform well”,150 “the goalposts were, aggression will not stand and aggression didn’t
stand”.151
Bush’s focus on America winning went beyond discussing the “success”,152 “vic-
tory”153 and “triumph”154 of US soldiers; Bush emphasised winning as a result of
148. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at a Meeting of the American Defense Preparedness Association,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 9, 1991.
149. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at an Arbor Day Tree-Planting Ceremony and an Exchange
With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 26, 1991.
150. George H. W. Bush, Interview With Linda Douglas of KNBC, Jim Lampley of KCBS, and
Paul Moyer of KABC in Los Angeles, California, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 15,
1991.
151. Ibid.
152. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With President Hassan Gouled Aptidon
of Djibouti and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 24,
1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in
Ann Arbor, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 4, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks
to Members of the Defense Community at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, June 11, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session With
Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 29, 1991; George
H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medals of Freedom and
Presidential Citizen’s Medals, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 3, 1991; Bush, Remarks
at a Meeting of the American Defense Preparedness Association; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at
the Presentation Ceremony of the Declaration of the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander,
to General Michel Roquejeoffre in Rambouillet, France, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
July 14, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Declaration of the
Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to Sir Peter de la Billiere in London, United Kingdom,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 14, 1991; George H. W. Bush, The President’s
News Conference With Turkish President Turgut Ozal in Ankara, Turkey, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, July 20, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Toast at a State Dinner in Ankara, Turkey,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 20, 1991.
153. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Presentation of a Point of Light Award to the United
States Naval Academy/Benjamin Banneker Honors Mathematics and Science Society Partnership
in Annapolis, Maryland, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 1991; George H. W.
Bush, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 27, 1991; Bush, Interview With Linda Douglas of KNBC,
Jim Lampley of KCBS, and Paul Moyer of KABC in Los Angeles, California; Bush, Remarks at the
Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medals of Freedom and Presidential Citizen’s Medals;
George H. W. Bush, Remarks at an Independence Day Celebration in Grand Rapids, Michigan, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 4, 1991; Bush, Remarks at a Meeting of the American
Defense Preparedness Association; Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Declaration
of the Legion of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to Sir Peter de la Billiere in London, United
Kingdom; Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony of the Declaration of the Legion of Merit,
Degree of Chief Commander, to General Michel Roquejeoffre in Rambouillet, France.
154. Bush, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut ;
Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medals of Freedom and Presiden-
tial Citizen’s Medals; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at a Dinner Hosted By President Turgut Ozal
in Istanbul, Turkey, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 21, 1991.
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resisting mission creep, explicitly contrasting the Gulf War with the Vietnam War.
Bush acknowledged expanding the Provide Comfort mission would invite comparisons
to Vietnam, a parallel he explicitly resisted with Vietnam Syndrome language of
‘quagmire’ and troops ‘bogged down’:
All along I have said that the United States is not going to intervene militarily
in Iraq’s internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire.
This remains the case. Nor will we become an occupying power with US troops
patrolling the streets of Baghdad.155
I don’t want to see us get into a quagmire or get further militarily involved
with some permanent presence required.156
I did not want to get bogged down.157
Instead of laying out an exit plan or explaining why troops would not be “bogged
down” in northern Iraq, however, Bush virtually stopped talking about exit all
together. Of all the statements he made during this phase of the intervention, only
four percent were about his exit strategy. The comments Bush did make about exit
were imprecise, amounting to little more than reassuring his audience the mission
would be short, even if he sounded like he barely believed it himself as the quote at
the beginning of the chapter illustrates, as do other statements at the time:
I don’t think it has to be long-term.158
[US ground troops are an] interim measure designed to meet an immediate,
penetrating humanitarian need.159
We have always looked at this relief effort as limited in duration.160
And all of us understand this force will not stay permanently.161
When Bush finally mentioned his new exit strategy was a UN transition, he was
similarly imprecise about when the UN would take over, if at all:
155. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference, Emphasis added.
156. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the Resignation of William H. Webster as Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency and a News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
May 8, 1991.
157. Bush, Remarks Announcing the Resignation of William H. Webster as Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and a News Conference; See further references to not getting ‘bogged down’
George H. W. Bush, Remarks on the London Economic Summit and an Exchange With Foreign
Journalists, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 8, 1991, (Emphasis added).
158. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
159. Ibid.
160. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar de la Guerra of the United Nations, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 9, 1991.
161. Bush, Remarks at a Dinner Hosted By President Turgut Ozal in Istanbul, Turkey .
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JOURNALIST: How long do you think that it will be before the United
Nations forces can take over from the US and other allies?
PRESIDENT BUSH: You mean in this new operation? We don’t know that.
We don’t know that, but clearly the sooner the better. [. . . ] [W]e’ll have to
see what we do.162
Despite Bush’s imprecision we can find two main justifications for his new UN
transition exit strategy: first, avoiding a Vietnam-style quagmire; and second,
fulfilling an even wider moral responsibility to protect the Kurds rather than just
providing disaster relief. These justifications supported one another but were also in
tension, creating challenges for Bush successfully implementing his exit plan. Bush
also failed to explain exactly what the UN transition exit strategy entailed, making
the threshold of American victory that would justify exit unclear.
Avoiding another Vietnam-style quagmire meant withdrawing troops, not deploying
additional soldiers to a more risky operation. To explain this apparent contradiction
to his American audience, Bush focused with more intensity on US moral duty,
increasing the relative time he spent discussing moral responsibility from two-thirds
to almost three-quarters (74 percent) of all statements made during this phase of
the intervention. Bush also expanded the scope of America’s moral responsibility in
Iraq widened from providing disaster relief to include defeating evil and protecting
Kurds from future attacks and atrocities.
Bush continued describing US soldiers as “taking care of these people”,163 and“toil[ing]
on behalf of suffering Kurds”,164 but now he argued America had a responsibility
to “do everything in our power to save innocent life”,165 to do “what we ought
to do”.166 Bush committed America to delivering the Kurds from oppression and
162. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
163. George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Federal Energy Management Executive Order,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 17, 1991.
164. Bush, Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in Ann Arbor .
165. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference; For another mention
of “saving lives” see: George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy
Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
May 29, 1991; George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Annual Southern Baptist Convention in Atlanta,
Georgia, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 6, 1991.
166. Bush, Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado
Springs, Colorado.
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protecting them inside Iraq, arguing this was a logical part of America’s moral duty
in intervention:
Our long-term objective remains the same: for the Iraqi Kurds and, indeed,
for all Iraqi refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in peace,
free from repression, free to live their lives.167
We’ll be able to protect not only our own people but we’ll be able to protect
the people that we’re setting out to protect, which is these refugees.168
. . . these people will be protected.169
[W]e’re prepared if any force should be used against these helpless people in
the refugee camps.170
We are not going to say to them,“Come down from the mountains; you will be
protected”, and then not protect them.171
Bush framed America providing Kurdish protection as morally incumbent throughout
the rest of April-May 1991. No longer was Kurdish repression an internal Iraqi issue
of no interest to the US:
[W]e want these people’s lives to be protected against this violence that’s been
wrought on them for many, many years.172
[W]e’re responding to another challenge too: the need to protect and care for
tens of thousands of refugees who fled home and hearth to escape the brutality
of one man, Saddam Hussein.173
While it may be true Provide Comfort was still “motivated by humanitarian con-
cerns”,174 its success now hinged on US forces adequately protecting the Kurds in
safe havens from renewed attacks. Fulfilling this moral responsibility thus became
part of Bush’s exit strategy justification; it was the marker of victory that would
justify exit:
[US troops are] going to stay there as long as it takes to be sure that these
refugees are taken care of, and not a minute longer.175
167. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference; Repeated: Bush,
Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra of the
United Nations.
168. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. Bush, Exchange With Reporters Aboard Air Force One.
173. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la
Guerra of the United Nations.
174. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
175. Bush, Remarks at an Arbor Day Tree-Planting Ceremony and an Exchange With Reporters.
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However this effort to “keep our commitment to be sure that these people are
safe”176—to fulfil America’s moral responsibility—challenged Bush’s other promise
not to involve the US in in a drawn-out military engagement, a point he acknowledged:
And the only little difficulty now in terms of coming home is that we have a
responsibility to do what we can to help these refugees.177
The claim the American people had a responsibility to protect the Kurds, while
self-imposed, was not easy to shirk. Having placed the Gulf War in the pantheon
of US military victories, Bush argued America had to live up to “the responsibility
imposed by [its] successes”,178 because “never before has the world looked more to
the American example”.179 The Gulf War was part of Bush’s new world order “quest”
“to keep the dangers of disorder at bay”.180 The president foregrounded the moral
bases for foreign policy action in Iraq and elsewhere arguing:
This nation’s foreign policy has always been more than simply an expression of
American interests; it’s an extension of American ideals. This moral dimension
of American policy requires us to remain active, engaged in the world.181
Bush’s protection goal in Iraq was consistent with domestic American discourse and
the demands of US allies. Bush’s assessment appeared correct: there was indeed “a
lot of understanding” about his expanding Provide Comfort mission and shifting
exit strategies.182 So long as Bush demonstrated he was discharging America’s moral
duty to the Kurds, he received bipartisan Congressional support and relatively little
comment. To the extent Congress members criticised US ground troop deployment,
it was on the basis the US was still not doing enough to secure ‘long-term‘ protection
for the Kurds. Senator Joe Lieberman (D-Connecticut), for example, commended
Bush’s expanded operation but called for a deeper commitment, apparently willing
to sacrifice the prospect of quick American troop withdrawal for ongoing Kurdish
protection:
176. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
177. Ibid.
178. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti and
an Exchange With Reporters.
179. Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
180. Ibid.
181. Bush, Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut .
182. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
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We need to plan for the security of the Kurds over the long term. We cannot
simply set up tent cities, move the Kurds in, and then leave without in some
way safeguarding their lives against a renewed murderous rampage by Iraqi
forces.183
Here Lieberman is saying the level of victory to be achieved before troops withdraw
requires this longer-term moral obligation to be fulfilled.
The humanitarian situation undoubtedly improved in northern Iraq. With little
effective Iraqi government resistance the safe zone grew, covering almost 4200 square
kilometres.184 Encouraged by the foreign military presence Kurds began resettling in
the safe zone. Coalition forces and non-government organisations (NGOs) improved
housing, sanitation facilities, hospitals, roads, bridges and airfields. While the
Iraqi government maintained its public opposition to the foreign intervention, there
were only a handful of small-scale clashes between coalition and Iraqi soldiers.185
Nevertheless, using ground troops posed greater risk to US soldiers than the earlier
aerial operation.
Successfully fulfilling America’s moral responsibility to protect the Kurds was also
only assured with US troops present to effectively deter attacks, especially as the
Iraq government remained unchanged. Bush’s commitment to protect the Kurds
for “as long as it takes”186 and send “a strong, unmistakable signal to Saddam
Hussein”,187 challenged the wisdom of not forcibly removing Hussein, especially as
Bush maintained US humanitarian intervention was “a clear case of evil versus good
– and [Hussein’s] the evil in this one”.188 Avoiding a quagmire meant not leaving US
troops in an endless operation, but it also meant leaving after victory. As American
troops cemented their position in northern Iraq, and Hussein remained in power,
Bush talked openly about how regime change would create the level of success that
183. Joe Lieberman, “The Plight of the Kurds,” in Congressional Record 102nd Congress (1991–
1992) (April 25, 1991), S5321.
184. Jones, “Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq.”
185. Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort,
1991 , 107–28.
186. Bush, Remarks at an Arbor Day Tree-Planting Ceremony and an Exchange With Reporters.
187. Bush, Remarks at a Dinner Hosted By President Turgut Ozal in Istanbul, Turkey .
188. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Turkish President Turgut Ozal in Ankara,
Turkey .
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would justify exit because now the Kurds would be sustainably protected without
the need for US troops:
Do I think the answer is now for Saddam Hussein to be kicked out? Abso-
lutely.189
I’ll tell you what’s the most important thing, however, and that is to get
Saddam Hussein out of there.190
There will not be normalised relations with the United States—and I think this
is true for most coalition partners—until Saddam Hussein is out of there.191
We want him out of there so badly.192
I’d like to see him out of there – Saddam Hussein.193
Regime change became a bipartisan issue with soon-to-be Democratic vice-presidential
candidate, Senator Al Gore calling for US troops in Iraq to be “organised and
orchestrated toward the objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and
removing his government from power in Iraq”.194
For all the calls for Hussein to quit, however, the Bush administration was unwilling to
directly engineer Hussein’s demise. Bush’s demonising of Saddam Hussein had made
the option of negotiating with the Iraqi government to stop its attacks politically
unpalatable. Even if negotiations were an option, they would move the US further
away from being a ‘purely’ humanitarian actor to a political player. US forces had
already increased the Kurds’ standard of living relative to the rest of the Iraqi
population attempting post-war reconstruction under sanctions.
The difficulty of delivering protection such that Bush could point to a moment of
clear victory complicated his exit strategy implementation. While Bush had devoted
significant time to justify his reasons for not withdrawing troops, he had done so
at the expense of talking about how his UN transition exit would work. With a
presidential election approaching, and Bush’s popularity declining, he could not
189. Bush, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid.
193. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Turkish President Turgut Ozal in Ankara,
Turkey .
194. Al Gore, “Recent Events in Iraq,” in 102nd Congress (1991–1992) Senate Congressional
Record p S4720 (April 18, 1991).
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afford his Gulf War public relations coup potentially tainted by an unresolved or
disastrous aftermath. Bush needed a convincing justification for how he was going
to implement his UN transition exit strategy for US forces.
Following his meeting with the UNSG on 9 May 1991, Bush acknowledged an
ongoing foreign presence was required to achieve America’s protection objectives.
Withdrawing US troops from northern Iraq could only justifiably occur if they were
replaced by UN forces picking up where America left off:
[W]e are building temporary camps to encourage these people to come down
from the mountains into the camps and, ultimately, to their own villages and
towns. We are now in the process of turning these efforts over to the United
Nations, and we look forward to working with the UN to hasten the day when
all these refugees can return home, free from fear, free to live in peace.195
Apart from saying he was working to see Provide Comfort “internationalised”,196
Bush made no further attempts to publicly discuss this UN transition exit. The only
references to the strategy were in letters from the Bush administration to Congress
stating the US government intended:
to turn over the administration and security for these temporary sites as soon
as possible to the United Nations (a process that has already begun), and to
complete our total withdrawal from Iraq.197
Bush framed his transition exit in terms of UN peacekeepers taking over from the
US, analogising with the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)
“Blue Helmets on the scene”198 in southern Iraq. The comparison, however, was
inaccurate. The UNSC tasked UNIKOM on 9 April 1991 with monitoring the
demilitarised zone (DMZ) along the Iraq-Kuwait border.199 UNIKOM peacekeepers
also had no civilian protection obligations and were not even authorised to respond
195. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la
Guerra of the United Nations.
196. George H. W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Robert M. Gates To Be Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency and a News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
May 14, 1991.
197. George H. W. Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in the Persian Gulf, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 17, 1991.
198. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la
Guerra of the United Nations.
199. UN Security Council, “Resolution 687.”
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with force to border incursions or violations of the DMZ.200
Prerequisites for UN peacekeeping operations include host government invitation.
The US intervention in northern Iraq, however, was proceeding without Iraqi gov-
ernment permission.201 Handing over Provide Comfort to the UN thus required
either the Iraqi government reversing its objections to foreign intervention or a new
UNSC Resolution authorising military intervention. A UNSC resolution required
the Security Council turning peacekeepers into peace enforcers, installed and acting
against the wishes of a sovereign member state. The UN continuing what the US
started would therefore represent the first such mission in UN peacekeeping history,
potentially beyond UN peacekeepers’ capabilities and prevailing interpretation of
their mandate. Even if veto-holders Russia and China could be convinced and the
Iraqi government agreed to this type of foreign intervention, UN peacekeepers needed
an enforceable, protection mandate, a hard sell for a UNSC still suspicious about
widening exceptions to state sovereignty and the legitimacy of America’s action
in Iraq. The transition exit strategy Bush presented to the American people was
basically impossible to implement in the way he suggested.
5.6 UN transition exit strategy not an exit
US requests for UN peacekeepers to replace American troops were not met because
neither a new UNSC resolution nor permission from the Iraqi government was
forthcoming. Instead the Iraqi government agreed 500 ‘UN security police’ could
be stationed in northern Iraq to protect UNHCR and NGO personnel. These
UN police were unarmed and without authority to engage in combat to defend the
Kurdish population.202 These facts remained publicly unremarked upon by the US
200. UNIKOM’s mandate was expanded on 5 February 1993 by UNSC Resolution 806 allowing
peacekeepers to “take physical action to prevent or redress” violations of the DMZ or other border
incursions. UN Security Council, “Resolution 706,” August 15, 1991,
201. Meek, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Case Study in Humanitarian Relief and Foreign
Assistance,” 237.
202. Cockayne and Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the
No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” 128.
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president. US-led forces formally handed over primary responsibility for humanitarian
operations in the safe zone to the UNHCR on 13 May 1991.203 On 15 June 1991,
12,316 US personnel and another 11,000 coalition troops began their month long
withdrawal from northern Iraq.204 However by 24 July 1991, only 271 UN police had
arrived to support 169 UNHCR and other relief agency staff.205
Replacing US troops with UN police without the ability or mandate to provide the
same degree of protection to the Kurds as the Americans raised questions about
whether the US had fulfilled its obligations sufficiently to claim Provide Comfort
was a success. Bush initially ignored this issue but could not maintain this discursive
position for long. The lack of a clear victory, and in particular, Bush’s failure to
meet the moral responsibilities he laid out throughout the mission, contributed to
Bush choosing not to fully implement his exit strategy, instead justifying why US
troops, despite this opportunity to exit, would not be leaving and would instead
remain in and around Iraq.
During the early days of the UN transition, Bush made one of only two public
mentions of exit strategy in a letter to Congress. He argued Provide Comfort was
a success, even though its objectives were only partially achieved, but also that
this victory was by no means decisive; instead, moral responsibilities remained
outstanding:
Countless lives were saved. Through American leadership, spearheaded so
well by the military, 650,000 Iraqi refugees and displaced persons have left the
inhospitable mountains and travelled to or through relief camps we built. Most
are now returning to their homes. The last mountain camp has closed. The
task of responding to this human tragedy is not over, but we can be grateful
for what has been accomplished by the United States, the United Nations,
and the international community.206 (Emphasis added.)
203. Cockayne and Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the
No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” 132.
204. Jones, “Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq,”
105–7.
205. Gordon W. Rudd, “The 24th MEU(SOC) and Operation Provide Comfort: A Second Look,”
Marine Corps Gazette 77, no. 2 (1993): 225.
206. George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Bill Providing Humanitarian Assistance for
Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 13, 1991.
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The US had ‘accomplished’ most of its mission but this argument that partial success
was sufficient to justify exit did not convince Bush’s audience. Steven Hurst shows
there was “growing public disillusion about the outcome” of the Gulf War.207 In
June 1991 polls showed only 8 percent of Americans felt US actions in the Gulf
had been successful.208 There was a 20 percent decline in the number of people
who thought the war had been worth fighting.209 The Wall Street Journal editors
argued the US troops’ “rapid withdrawal” reflected a mistaken belief Washington’s
task had been “adequately accomplished” given the security of the Kurds “remains
precarious”.210 The Journal’s counterparts at The New York Times agreed troop
withdrawal would “remove the shield that now protects the Kurds”, leaving them
in a weak negotiating position with President Saddam Hussein.211 A problematic
aftermath and not wholly living up to normative expectations of America’s foreign
policy response to crisis reduced Bush’s Gulf War victory dividend. Withdrawing
troops became unimaginable because it would occur without victory or fulfilling
America’s moral responsibilities and therefore there was normative pressure on Bush
not to withdraw US troops.
On the same day Bush ended Operation Provide Comfort he started Operation
Provide Comfort II.212 In addition to policing the NFZ, US soldiers in Provide
Comfort II continued delivering humanitarian aid via air to the Kurdish safe zone,
their presence deterring renewed Iraqi aggression against the Kurds.213 3000 US
ground troops also remained in Turkey in Combined Task Force Poised Hammer
“to guard against a repeat of horribly brutal events in the north [of Iraq]”.214 Bush
207. Hurst, “The Rhetorical Strategy of George H. W. Bush during the Persian Gulf Crisis 1990–91:
How to Help Lose a War You Won.”
208. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), 277.
209. Ibid., 214.
210. Editorial, “Hammer or Wrench?,” The Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1991,
211. Editorial, “A Critical Juncture,” The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1991,
212. John Murray Brown, “Allies Finish N. Iraq Withdrawal; Baghdad Warned To Keep Distance,”
The Washington Post, July 16, 1991,
213. Daniel Haulman, “Crisis in Iraq: Operation Provide Comfort,” in Short of War: Major USAF
Contingency Operations 1947-1997, ed. A. Timothy Warnock (Air Force History and Museums
Program in association with Air University Press, 2000), 182.
214. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Turkish President Turgut Ozal in Ankara,
Turkey ; Rudd, “The 24th MEU(SOC) and Operation Provide Comfort: A Second Look,” 216.
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(re)committed America to guaranteeing Kurdish safety and security against the
ever-present threat posed by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Bush’s justification for keeping US troops involved in a humanitarian intervention, can
be found in a handful of statements he made assessing the humanitarian intervention
in the months following formal UN transition. In these statements Bush undermined
the victory and fulfilled moral responsibility intervention narrative by admitting he
chose to withdraw troops from northern Iraq knowing their mission was incomplete.
For example, in his letter to Congress on 16 July 1991 Bush justified the transition
exit on the grounds the mission succeeded but not sufficiently to warrant withdrawing
all US soldiers because without a US presence, a return to violence was foreseeable.
Victory was not sustainable:
Having succeeded in providing safe conditions for the return of Kurdish refugees
from the mountainous border areas, US forces have now withdrawn from
northern Iraq. However, we have informed the Iraqi Government that we will
continue to monitor carefully its treatment of its citizens, and that we remain
prepared to take appropriate steps if the situation requires. To this end, the
coalition plans to maintain an appropriate level of forces in the region for as
long as required by the situation in Iraq.215 (Emphasis added.)
Rather than predicate exit on victory, statements like this confirmed Bush had ‘ended’
Provide Comfort knowing America’s job was incomplete because America’s moral
duty was unfulfilled. The idea US troops could all withdraw was only a possibility,
therefore, if Bush was also willing to admit that victory in this intervention would
not be achieved.
Concern the US presence in Provide Comfort had only paused rather than stopped
government repression in northern Iraq was well-founded. The end of Provide Comfort
did not soften Iraqi government threats against the Kurds. Instead Saddam Hussein’s
son-in-law Hussein Kamil warned repression was only on hold until US troops left
Iraq: “How long will the US stay? One year? Two years? Five years? They’ll go
and then we’ll know how to take care of you”.216
215. George H. W. Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in the Persian Gulf, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 16, 1991.
216. Quoted in Laurie Mylroie, “Planning Saddam’s Ouster,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27,
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We can see, therefore, how even as Provide Comfort ended, Bush’s commitment to
guarantee the Kurdish safety and protection became a major inhibitor to implement-
ing an exit strategy with all foreign soldiers leaving northern Iraq. The normative
expectations of how a humanitarian intervention should proceed contributed to
Bush turning the American operation in northern Iraq into an open-ended, military
commitment.
5.7 Justifying exit in Provide Comfort II
In October 1991 Iraqi forces withdrew from Kurdish areas in northern Iraq creating
a de facto autonomous zone. The Kurds held parliamentary elections there in 1992.
US presidential elections were held on 3 November 1992. While Bush’s foreign
policy achievements boosted his popularity, in general the electorate was sanguine
about America’s place in the international community and preferred to focus on
domestic concerns. Bush was comparatively weak on issues like the economy and
was unable to translate his incumbency and foreign policy wins into electoral success,
losing to Democrat Bill Clinton. To the extent Clinton addressed foreign policy
issues in his presidential campaign, he maintained support for much of the program
Bush implemented. This was particularly true in the case of Iraq.217 Even though
Provide Comfort II lasted longer than Provide Comfort I, and therefore Clinton
was responsible for the humanitarian intervention in Iraq longer than Bush, it
was Bush’s intervention narrative that provided the rhetorical framework Clinton
maintained, including the scope of US moral responsibilities and success metrics and
the justifications for withdrawing troops. Bush’s rhetorical choices thus continued to
constrain Clinton’s imagined possibilities for exit.
For the first five months of Provide Comfort II Bush did not once publicly discuss
his exit strategy. When Clinton assumed office in January 1993 he too did not detail
1992,
217. Aubrey W. Jewett and Marc D. Turetzky, “Stability and Change in President Clinton’s
Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1993-96,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1998): 649.
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a plan for troop withdrawal. In fact, explicit presidential public statements about
exit strategy across both presidents were almost entirely absent for the four-and-
a-half years of Provide Comfort II, comprising only one percent of all statements
made about Iraq during that time. As the intervention had once again become
primarily aerial in its approach—enforcing a NFZ—Bush and then Clinton returned
to the initial operational disengagement exit strategy. Victory was achieved because
America had fulfilled its moral responsibilities and this remained the justification for
exit. However, Bush and Clinton once again re-calibrated the scope of America’s
moral responsibility in Iraq and thus the conditions to be satisfied before the mission
would be considered successful enough for US troops to leave.
Although Bush and then Clinton tasked Provide Comfort II troops with protecting
the Kurds, the extent to which protection was still the main objective of American
soldiers was unclear, as was the type of threat sufficient to trigger a US military
response. In August 1991 Bush outlined the reasons why “our task in Iraq has not
ended” arguing US forces must remain engaged, not to prevent an atrocity, as was
the earlier justification in Provide Comfort I, but because America had to disarm
and politically transform Iraq:
We must ensure that Iraq complies fully with all UN resolutions and eliminates
weapons of mass destruction. And we must work to reintegrate Iraq and its
people into the region once the Iraqi people choose new leadership.218
Clinton was especially fond of referencing normative expectations to prevent atrocities
(see Chapters 6 and 7) but this was not central to his discourse on Iraq. Clinton
used human rights violations in Iraq as part of his overall explanation for America’s
interest in the region, but he discussed human rights in the abstract not linking
them to US soldiers’ work in the Gulf.219 Instead, Clinton followed Bush’s lead and
rested America’s exit strategy not on safeguarding the Kurds, but ensuring Iraq
complied with the United Nations Special Commision on Iraq (UNSCOM) weapons
218. George H. W. Bush, The President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, August 2, 1991.
219. William J. Clinton, Teleconference Remarks With B’nai B’rith, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, August 24, 1994.
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inspections.
The UNSCOM weapons inspections were not new, having started in April 1991
under UNSC Resolution 687. The Iraqi government’s compliance was patchy, fre-
quently obstructing UN inspectors or providing incomplete information. Although
America was a major proponent of the inspections, Bush had generally separated
discussion of the inspections from his discussion of America’s humanitarian interven-
tion. As Provide Comfort II started, however, Bush incorporated US interest in Iraqi
disarmament into his justifications for the humanitarian intervention. Disarmament
became part of America’s moral responsibility in Iraq and wider American presence
in the region and thus a new measure of the humanitarian intervention’s success.220
For the remainder of his term in office, Bush talked of America’s responsibility to
get Iraq to “comply” with disarmament resolutions 45 times; Clinton used the word
a further 30 times, noting America’s duty to “enforce” the UN resolutions because it
reflected “the will of the international community”.221
Disarmament was key to fighting America’s foreign policy objectives in Iraq, but so
too was regime change. Clinton adopted Bush’s language of America not “having
normal relations” with Iraq until Saddam Hussein was removed from office.222
Clinton also followed Bush’s rhetorical move in shifting regime change away from
the objective of preventing atrocities and towards the objective of fighting against
the Iraq regime. This was a subtle but important difference because it altered
the character of America’s humanitarian intervention away from a predominantly
civilian protection mission to a more traditional military operation, albeit with a just
war focus. Although troops could theoretically be withdrawn at any time, winning
became an even more important prerequisite for exit.
220. Bush, The President’s News Conference.
221. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of
Turkey, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 15, 1993; William J. Clinton, Remarks
on the Return of the United States Delegation to Haiti, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
October 16, 1994.
222. William J. Clinton, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/218797, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, June 29, 1993.
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The shift away from civilian protection occurred in practice as well as rhetori-
cally. When Turkey conducted cross-border military operations against the Partiya
Karkereˆn Kurdistaneˆ (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) (PKK) in northern Iraq in October
1992 Bush did not use Provide Comfort II ’s mandate to protect civilians from the
actions of America’s NATO ally. Clinton behaved similarly when Turkey repeated
its action in March 1994.223 Fighting in 1994–1995 between rival Kurdish political
groups—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its breakaway faction the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—resulted in around 2300 people killed.224
Again Clinton did not authorise US soldiers to intervene to limit the violence. The
UN security police also did not respond. However, when Clinton uncovered an Iraqi
plot to assassinate George H. W. Bush on 26 June 1993, Clinton authorised unilateral
attacks on Iraqi intelligence installations, without UNSC authority.225
In August 1996, at the KDP’s request, 40,000 Iraqi troops entered northern Iraq
and captured the city of Irbil.226 This time Clinton responded with Operation Desert
Strike bombing air defence systems in Iraq’s south from 31 August to 4 September
1996 and extending the southern NFZ to just outside Baghdad.227 Clinton presented
Desert Strike as an extension of the US humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq,
justifying the choice of bombing targets on the basis:
. . . the United States cannot be in the position after years and years and years
of dealing with Saddam Hussein in which it’s obvious that he’s always pushing
the envelope of saying ‘don’t do this’ and then have him do it and we did
nothing.228
Again, US attacks were more focused on crippling Iraq’s military infrastructure than
directly stopping atrocities. The French government considered that Desert Strike
223. Frelick, “The False Promise of Operation Provide Comfort: Protecting Refugees or Protecting
State Power?,” 27.
224. Louise Fawcett, “Down but Not out? The Kurds in International Politics.,” Review of Inter-
national Studies 27, no. 1 (2001): 117; Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving
Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 14.
225. Jewett and Turetzky, “Stability and Change in President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Beliefs,
1993-96,” 649.
226. Haulman, “Crisis in Iraq: Operation Provide Comfort,” 185.
227. Alison Mitchell, “US Launches Further Strike against Iraq after Clinton Vows He Will Extract
’Price’,” The New York Times, September 4, 1996, White, “Mythic History and National Memory.”
228. William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing Pension Portability Regulations and an Exchange
With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 17, 1996.
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undermined the humanitarian nature of the US-led intervention in northern Iraq and
officially withdrew its support for Provide Comfort II in September 1996.229
Even though Clinton considered the Iraqi incursion into Kurdish areas serious enough
to warrant bombing raids, Kurdish safety was not significant enough to defend with
US ground forces because of the potential risk to American troops:
the action we took was appropriate because it would not have been appropriate
for the United States to send ground forces into northern Iraq to try to throw
Saddam out of northern Iraq. We could have done that, of course, but it would
have been at a very high price. It was inappropriate. . . 230
It is possible Clinton was especially casualty averse having lost troops in Somalia
in addition to five soldiers already killed in Iraq in a friendly fire incident in April
1994.231 This reticence was clear in the repetition of his commitment to “do whatever
we have to do in the future to protect our pilots”,232 to “take an action which would
show our resolve and would protect our planes”.233 Nevertheless, Clinton’s actions
were not consistent with America’s protection mandate and further complicated the
basis upon which US troops would exit.
The only time Clinton was asked by a journalist about his exit strategy for Provide
Comfort II occurred in the wake of the friendly fire incident. Clinton refused to
outline an exit strategy but nevertheless argued the operation had been successful,
which is why it should continue indefinitely:
I think [Provide Comfort II] has performed a very valuable function, not only
in saving the lives of the Kurds but in permitting them to continue to live in
northern Iraq and relieving Turkey of a very serious potential refugee problem.
There is no question in my mind that it has been a very successful and a very
229. Cockayne and Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the
No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” 130.
230. William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
September 14, 1996.
231. Dawn R. Eflein, “A Case Study of Rules of Engagement in Joint Operations: The Air Force
Shootdown of Army Helicopters in Operation Provide Comfort,” The Air Force Law Review 44
(1998): 33–74.
232. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Missile Strikes on Iraq and an Exchange With Reporters,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 4, 1996.
233. William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing a Missile Strike on Iraq and an Exchange With
Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 3, 1996.
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important mission. . . . our policy is sound, and I believe it should continue.234
Here Clinton argued victory was simultaneously a criteria for withdrawing troops
as well as keeping them there, if only to ensure that victory is sustained, even if
the timeframe is undefined. Despite the actions of US troops in Iraq countering the
primacy of America’s protection responsibility, the power of normative expectations
for the intervention remained, evidenced in Clinton’s strangely paradoxical exit
justifications.
Operation Provide Comfort II finally ended on 31 December 1996 at the Turkish
government’s request. The date was marked with relatively little fanfare. Clinton
immediately replaced Provide Comfort II with an even smaller Operation Northern
Watch to continue enforcing the northern NFZ.235 Operation Northern Watch was
superseded by the US-led Operation Iraqi Liberation invasion on 19 March 2003
(later renamed Operation Iraqi Freedom).236 Just as in Provide Comfort I, Provide
Comfort II ended in name only. US troops remained in Iraq until 2015.
5.8 Conclusion
Both Presidents Bush and Clinton failed to implement full exit strategies for US
troops from America’s first post-Cold War humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq.
In this case, there was indeed mission creep of the kind Adam Siegel described.237
There was task accretion and mission shift in Provide Comfort as Bush required US
forces to undertake additional activities in order to protect the Kurds from ongoing
human rights abuses perpetrated by the Iraqi government. Provide Comfort II was
an example of mission transition as US soldiers moved from defending Kurds, to
engaging in nation-building activities, to creating the conditions under which Kurds
234. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the American Helicopter Tragedy in Iraq and an Exchange
With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 15, 1994.
235. Haulman, “Crisis in Iraq: Operation Provide Comfort,” 186.
236. Northern Watch did not officially end until 1 May 2003.
237. Siegel, “Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?”
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could enjoy freedom from central government oppression. When Provide Comfort
II ended there was a mission leap as US soldiers took on the role of guaranteeing
Kurdish safety and security, but within the wider objectives of restricting the Iraqi
government’s military capabilities and promoting regime change.
Each of these mission changes formed the basis for Bush and Clinton to justify
why they were unable to completely withdraw American soldiers from Iraq and
bring an end to the intervention. But these discursive difficulties did not arise
because Bush and Clinton did not have exit strategies in place throughout the
intervention. As my analysis shows, Bush and Clinton repeatedly communicated
their personal commitments to withdrawing troops to the American people throughout
the intervention. The problem, rather, was the exit strategies themselves as well
as the efforts required to implement them, were constrained by expectations of the
moral responsibilities America had to the Kurds and the type of victory that would
make exit a justifiable proposition. Exit from the humanitarian intervention required
success but success required America’s moral responsibilities to be fulfilled. At the
same time, what it meant to succeed widened moral responsibilities, which were in
turn difficult to achieve, thus making exit almost impossible.
Within these expectation constraints, both presidents had limited room for rhetorical
manoeuvre. Bush’s strategic narrative choices also affected Clinton’s options for
crafting and implementing a viable exit strategy. Despite being from different political
parties, Clinton followed the narrative parameters Bush set. Thus Clinton did not
resile from the expectations that constrained Bush’s exit strategy justifications; if
anything, Clinton reinforced these expectations and the victory criteria they gave
rise to, protracting the intervention years after its promised exit date.
There were two main ways in which normative expectations and the two presidents
rhetorical choices in response to those expectations affected their exit strategy
decisions. First, Bush and Clinton’s intervention narrative framework centred on
American moral responsibilities and this construction was difficult to abandon without
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simultaneously undermining the moral legitimation dividend of the intervention’s
success. Bush’s discursive emphasis on moral duty reflected his domestic audience’s
and his international allies’ normative expectations of US behaviour after the Gulf
War. Bush also expanded America’s moral duty as a way to balance this normative
expectation with other expectations of ensuring when troops left, they did so as
victors. However, as Bush and then Clinton moved their definition of US moral
responsibility from disaster relief, to preventing future attacks on the Kurds, to
eroding Iraq’s military capabilities and ultimately to removing the Iraqi president,
it became harder for either president to demonstrate victory or set a timetable for
winning that would justify troops withdrawal.
The underlying difficulty here for Bush and Clinton was not simply settling on a
clear scope for America’s moral responsibility, it was deciding how any limitations
on America’s moral responsibility would influence the president’s ability to claim a
degree of victory sufficient enough to justify withdrawing troops. Because victory
was ultimately defined as ensuring the Kurds were indeed protected from Iraqi
government oppression it was not conceivable to justify withdrawing troops until
this objective had been achieved. Withdrawing troops short of victory was beyond
the realm of Bush and Clinton’s imagined possibilities, thus in each intervention
phase they can be observed explaining troops could not leave because the Kurds
were not sufficiently protected.
Bush and Clinton could have left the Kurds to their own devices (which is arguably
what happened in the latter days of Provide Comfort II ) but if the humanitarian crisis
recurred, this would have brought the justification for the humanitarian intervention
as well as the Gulf War that preceded it into question. It is thus difficult for a US
president to avoid framing their justifications for using military force in moral terms.
Once a decision to intervene is justified as consistent with America’s role conception
and foreign policy expectations, it is very difficult to abandon this narrative when
making other operational decisions including deciding when to withdraw troops.
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Provide Comfort illustrates how a president’s decision to deepen America’s moral
responsibilities over the course of an intervention is a function of expectations of what
it means to be victorious in a humanitarian intervention and the tension between
winning, fulfilling moral responsibilities and guaranteeing exit. As contemplated by
jus ex bello theorists, prolonging a military engagement may be required to address the
‘root causes’ of a humanitarian crisis or ensure a humanitarian response is sustainable.
In some instances, deepening moral responsibility, for example, with regime change,
is one way to also ensure a demonstrable victory sufficient to justify exit. At the same
time, the president may find it difficult to advocate for a ‘light touch’ intervention
to guarantee these goals are delivered. A more intensive intervention—for example
in this case removing President Hussein from power—could have fulfilled America’s
moral responsibilities but may not have resulted in ongoing Kurdish safety and
security. The Iraq case demonstrates why protection objectives are very difficult
to deliver rapidly. It is a problem all presidents in this thesis experience in their
humanitarian interventions.
Moral responsibility frames don’t just constrain exit strategy options, they can be
powerful enough to transform a humanitarian intervention into a predominantly
non-humanitarian one, which is arguably what occurred in the latter stages of Provide
Comfort II. Maintaining wide moral responsibilities can benefit other US foreign policy
objectives, in this case limiting the Iraqi government’s military capabilities. At the
same time adhering to moral responsibilities can also result in outcomes that directly
contradict other US foreign policy objectives. For example, despite presidential
commitments not to interfere in the conflict between the Iraqi government and the
Kurds, promoting the ‘Balkanisation’ of Iraq or supporting Kurdish independence,
policing the NFZ and the safe zones resulted in the creation of a de facto Kurdish
state.238
The second way normative expectations constrain exit strategy decisions and presi-
dential justifications relates to the importance of demonstrating a military operation
238. Cockayne and Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the
No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003.”
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will not become a quagmire for American soldiers. To the extent Bush succeeded
in burying the Vietnam Syndrome in the Gulf War, it was only in a shallow grave.
But while the Vietnam Syndrome remained discursively powerful, as Christopher
Gelpi, Peter Feaver and Jason Reifler argue, audiences are willing to endure long
engagements so long as they believe victory is likely and the costs are limited.239
I suggest the Gulf War’s victory dividend was so significant, it allowed greater
audience tolerance for the subsequent humanitarian intervention to be extended
as winning against an already defeated foe seemed achievable. I take Gelpi et al’s
conclusions further however, suggesting the Iraq case shows long engagements can
also be publicly tolerated so long as the moral justifications for not withdrawing
troops remain convincingly consistent with the wider expectations of humanitarian
intervention.
Framing exit strategies in terms of their likelihood to avoid a quagmire also affects
operational decisions, and operational limitations justify failures to implement an
exit strategy. This issue is observable in the northern Iraq intervention and recurs
in subsequent American humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Kosovo and Libya.
Specifically, restricting an intervention to an aerial operation can be used to justify
continuing troop presence because of the associated presumption that aerial operations
can be rapidly ended, achieving military objectives while keeping American troops
safely above the fray. It helps explain, curiously, why Clinton was able to avoid
talking about his Iraq exit strategy even after he had hastily exited from America’s
disastrous humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1994 (see Chapter 6).
But the Iraq case also shows an aerial operation, while satisfying expectations
for a rapidly implementable exit strategy, exists in tension with expectations an
intervention will meet moral obligations to protect civilians and prevent atrocities.
Bush found intensifying America’s military footprint by deploying ground forces to
northern Iraq—even if it raised the spectre of a quagmire—was necessary for the
mission to succeed, a problem he would encounter again in Somalia and Clinton
239. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War .
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would experience in Kosovo. While President Obama attempted to resist the pressure
to deploy ground forces in Libya, his decision came at the cost of his humanitarian
intervention being considered a success.
In Iraq we see Bush pioneering a UN transition exit strategy as a way of balanc-
ing the competing expectations for a humanitarian intervention of meeting moral
responsibilities, achieving victory and ensuring exit. The transition exit provides
justification for withdrawing troops before they fully discharge America’s moral
obligations and to redefine the boundaries of victory. Bush, Clinton and Obama
would all use a transition exit strategy to justify at least one of their exit strategies
in each intervention after Iraq. All three presidents struggled to effectively respond
to the problems Clinton experienced in northern Iraq in implementing this exit
strategy. To work the strategy requires replacement forces able and willing to meet
the same standards of moral responsibility the US assumed at the beginning of the
intervention, or otherwise America risks losing control of the intervention as well as
being held responsible for its shortcomings. This is quite apart from the fact that it
is questionable whether a transition exit strategy can be accurately labelled an exit
strategy if follow-on forces are mostly comprised of US soldiers, a point I will return
to in the cases of Somalia, Kosovo and Libya.
In the middle of US humanitarian intervention in Iraq, Bush commenced another
intervention in Somalia, which I turn to in the following chapter. Bush used the
supposed ‘successful’ completion of the Iraq mission to justify the Somali intervention,
despite the fact Provide Comfort would not end until well after US troops were
withdrawn from Somalia. Presenting the Iraq intervention as ‘over’ when US soldiers
remained actively engaged in intervention activities highlights just how powerful
the claimed experiences of short, successful, completed missions are to presidential
justifications for starting new interventions. It also highlights the malleability of the
notion of a US military ‘exit’ in the context of humanitarian intervention.
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CHAPTER 6
Providing Relief in Somalia (1992–1995)
It may have been na¨ıve for anyone to seriously assert in the
beginning that you could go into a situation as politically
and militarily charged as that one, give people food, turn
around and leave, and expect everything to be hunky dory.
Bill Clinton
15 October 1993
6.1 Introduction
America’s humanitarian intervention in Somalia revealed the promises and challenges
of using military force to pursue human rights outcomes. In the wake of the World
Trade Centre attacks in September 2001, another significant event affecting US
foreign policy, Hollywood released Black Hawk Down, revisiting America’s Somali
intervention. The blockbuster movie viscerally reenacts US Task Force Ranger’s
experiences in the ‘Battle of Mogadishu’ on 3–4 October 1993. The film’s narrative
frame is the bravery of American soldiers trying to ‘do their job’ in an anarchic
battlefield environment rife with tribalism and inexplicable local hostility to foreign
forces. After the infamous firefight in which 18 US soldiers died, Eversman, a Task
Force Ranger member discusses America’s imminent departure from Somalia with
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fellow soldier, Blackburn. Trying to understand why Washington bureaucrats have
suddenly decided to withdraw troops, Blackburn asks, “What changed?” to which
Eversman replies “Nothing” adding sotto voce, “That’s not true either, I think
everything’s changed; I know I’ve changed”.1
Eversman gives voice to the conventional wisdom that the brutal deaths of US
soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu was the most important event precipitating
President Clinton’s decision to withdraw troops from Somalia. Not all scholars have
been as simplistic in their interpretation of America’s exit strategy but they tend to
focus predominantly on exit plans after Mogadishu. Explanations for withdrawal
variously include: successive presidents’ failure to understand the mission or have
clear strategic goals;2 a casualty averse American public and Congress;3 ‘mission creep’
without a viable exit strategy;4 or some combination of all three, the American public
losing patience with a mission costing lives without understandable or achievable
objectives.5 The story I tell in this chapter takes a longer view of exit strategy
dynamics and acknowledges both President George H. W. Bush and his successor
Bill Clinton were eager to prevent US troops getting stuck in a Somali quagmire.
In the previous chapter on US intervention in northern Iraq I noted Bush and Clinton
centred their exit strategy justifications on normative expectations of US foreign
policy response to humanitarian crisis. Both presidents made exit contingent on
discharging an ever-expanding moral duty to the Kurds. This responsibility was
increasingly difficult to fulfil, and, when coupled with presidential commitments to
persist until the mission succeeded, contributed to repeated decisions not to withdraw
1. Ken Nolan, directed by Ridley Scott, Black Hawk Down, DVD, Sony Pictures Home Enter-
tainment, 2001.
2. John G. Fox, “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia,”
SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 147–58; John Stupart, “Just Ad Bellum and Intervention in Somalia:
Why a Military Response Can Still Work,” Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military
Studies 39, no. 2 (2011): 76–98; United States Institute of Peace, Restoring Hope: The Real Lessons
of Somalia for the Future of Intervention (Washington D.C.: USIP, 1994).
3. Glenn M. Harned, Stability Operations in Somalia 1992-1993: A Case Study, PKSOI Paper
(Carlisle Barracks, P.A.: United States Army War College Press, 2016), 77; Sebastian Kaempf, “US
Warfare in Somalia and the Trade-off between Casualty-Aversion and Civilian Protection,” Small
Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (2012): 388–413.
4. John R. Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994): 56–66.
5. Delaney, “Cutting, Running, or Otherwise?”
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troops. In Somalia we see a more complex discursive relationship developing between
exit strategy, mission success and moral responsibility. The term ‘exit strategy’
entered popular discourse during the humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Both
presidents used their exit strategies to argue mission success in Somalia was achievable.
At the same time, however, the first two exit strategies Bush and Clinton forwarded—
operational disengagement, then UN transition—were predicated on victory that
was in turn dependent on fulfilling America’s moral responsibilities in Somalia. Thus
both presidents struggled to determine when a sufficient degree of victory had been
achieved to justify exit, especially as it became increasingly difficult for a limited
troop engagement to satisfy America’s protection responsibilities to the Somali people.
As the possibility of success without significantly more investment evaporated, so
too did the intervention’s moral rightness. Bush and then Clinton expanded the
humanitarian intervention, deepening America’s moral responsibilities, which in turn
made achieving victory harder and the prospects of exit more remote. Paradoxically,
perhaps, as local hostility to the intervention increased, Clinton intensified his rhetoric
about the importance of America’s moral responsibility in Somalia, which in turn
made the idea of withdrawing troops unimaginable.
Clinton did not resolve the tensions between the competing expectations of inter-
vention. Instead, after the Battle of Mogadishu, Clinton shifted his exit strategy to
operational disengagement and local transition with a hard deadline for withdrawing
troops. To justify this new exit, rather than countenancing failure, Clinton reframed
both America’s moral responsibility and success in Somalia, crafting a narrative
that positioned US troops as ‘victors’ withdrawing with their honour intact. Ex-
ploring the interplay of normative expectations in Somalia reveals the difficulties
of defining success in a humanitarian intervention and setting temporal limits of
American moral responsibility in humanitarian interventions. Ultimately, the US
experience in Somalia directly contributed to changing US military doctrine making
exit strategy and mission success prerequisites for commencing all future American
military operations, not just humanitarian interventions.
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In unpicking the connections between success, moral responsibility and exit strategies
in this humanitarian intervention, I first outline the intervention’s rhetorical context
focusing on the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and the UNSC’s willingness to expand
the legitimacy bases for humanitarian intervention, both of which presented America
with global transformation opportunities. I organise my subsequent analysis of
presidential exit strategy justifications according to each phase of the intervention:
Operation Provide Relief, Operation Restore Hope and Operation Continue Hope
before and after the Battle of Mogadishu.
6.2 The rhetorical context
6.2.1 Humanitarian crisis in Somalia
As the US humanitarian intervention proceeded in northern Iraq, another human-
itarian disaster was brewing in the Horn of Africa. During the Cold War, the US
provided military and economic support for a number of national governments as
anti-communist bulwarks in Africa, including President Mohamed Siad Barre’s dic-
tatorship in Somalia.6 The US no longer considered this investment necessary after
the Cold War and began withdrawing its support for Barre’s government, making
him vulnerable to challenge. An armed rebellion ousted Barre in January 1991 and
the Somali National Army disbanded.7 Civil war ensued with opposition groups
competing for power and Barre eventually forced into exile. Two factions of the
United Somali Congress (USC) led by commanders General Ali Mahdi Mohamed
and General Mohamed Farah Aidid were among the most prominent armed groups
fighting for control of Somalia. Armed clashes centred on the capital Mogadishu
but also spread to other parts of the country. Most foreigners were evacuated from
6. Mary Harper, “Somalia: Whose Country Is It, Anyway?,” The Fletcher Forum of World
Affairs 37, no. 1 (2013): 161–68.
7. Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994 CMH Pub 70-81-1 (US
Army Center of Military History, 2002), 6.
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Mogadishu by the end of 1991. The US Ambassador was forced to flee the most
expensive US embassy in sub-Saharan Africa by helicopter as armed guerrillas and
civilians scaled the walls.8
The civil war caused widespread death and destruction throughout Somalia. Bandits
and militias attacked civilian populations, looted and burned villages.9 500,000
Somalis fled to neighbouring countries and a further 500,000 were internally displaced.
The war exacerbated the drought occurring simultaneously in the Horn of Africa.
More than half the Somali population—4.5 million people—faced starvation and
malnutrition-related disease. By November 1991 the UN estimated the conflict and
famine had killed approximately 300,000 people.10 The deteriorating political and
security situation also adversely affected humanitarian operations. Aid convoys were
often hijacked and relief supplies extorted. Some aid agencies feared they could not
adequately protect their workers from the violence and others hired local militiamen
as security guards.11
6.2.2 Expanding the ‘humanitarian exception’ to nonintervention
On 23 January 1992 the UNSC unanimously labelled the situation in Somalia a
“threat to international peace and security” calling for more humanitarian assistance,
an arms embargo and a ceasefire to enable humanitarian assistance to be delivered.12
On 3 March 1992, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, together with the Organisation of
8. Scott Peterson, Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, A Journalist
Reports from the Battlefields of Africa (New York: Routledge, 2000), 16; For a comprehensive
overview of the domestic and international pressures that arguably led to the civil war and attendant
humanitarian disaster, see Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the
Post-Cold War World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kenneth D. Bush, “When
Two Anarchies Meet: International Intervention in Somalia,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 17,
no. 1 (1997): 4–6; Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in
Somalia (Boulder: Lynne Pienner Publishers, 1993); Nina J. Fitzgerald, Somalia: Issues, History,
and Bibliography (New York: Nova Publishers, 2002).
9. Peterson, Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, A Journalist
Reports from the Battlefields of Africa.
10. Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?,” Foreign Policy 91 (1993): 138–39.
11. MSF, Somalia 1991–1993: Civil War, Famine Alert and UN ”Military Humanitarian” Inter-
vention, research report (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2013).
12. UN Security Council, Resolution 733, January 23, 1992.
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African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organisation of
the Islamic Conference (OIC) secured an “Agreement on the Implementation of a
Ceasefire” between civil war leaders Generals Ali Mahdi and Aidid. Two weeks later
the UNSC passed Resolution 746 calling on all parties to abide by the terms of the
ceasefire agreement and to facilitate aid delivery.13
On 24 April 1992 the UNSC unanimously established the United Nations Mission
in Somalia (UNOSOM), a small intervention force mandated to monitor Somalia’s
ceasefire agreement.14 The UNSC did so on Boutros-Ghali’s recommendation, which
was supported by African regional organisations. Although the UNSC did not
formally debate UNOSOM’s establishment, the language of the resolution echoed
previous resolutions authorising America’s humanitarian intervention in northern
Iraq.15 In Iraq the UNSC argued the Kurdish refugee crisis was a threat to interna-
tional peace and security. In Somalia, the UNSC found the humanitarian situation
within Somali state borders constituted a threat to international peace and security,
activating the UNSC’s Chapter VII powers authorising the use of force.16 Although
the UNSC authorised armed intervention only to facilitate the “unimpeded delivery
of humanitarian assistance”;17 the resolutions nevertheless widened the ‘humanitarian
exception’ to the international prohibition against foreign intervention.
Looking at the Secretary General’s recommendations leading to UNOSOM, it is
evident America’s northern Iraq intervention helped create the discursive space
for foreign military intervention in Somalia. Based on the requests of NGOs and
the US State Department18 the UNSG called for “corridors”, “zones of peace”
or “preventative zones” to facilitate aid delivery.19 Humanitarian corridors have
13. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 746, March 17, 1992.
14. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 751, April 24, 1992.
15. Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2005), 180–85, accessed September 17, 2018.
16. UN Security Council, Resolution 733 ; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 746 ;
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 751 .
17. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 746 .
18. Stefano Recchia, “Pragmatism over Principle: US Intervention and Burden Shifting in Somalia,
1992–1993,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2018, 6, accessed September 25, 2018; Walter S. Poole,
The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994 (Washington DC: Joint History Office, Office
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 10.
19. United Nations Secretary-General, The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-
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traditionally been an option in ceasefire agreements but in this instance the UNSG’s
label recalled the ‘safe zones’ America and its allies created in northern Iraq. The
UNSG requested “United Nations security personnel”, not peacekeepers, be deployed
to guarantee the safety of the Somali humanitarian corridors;20 language reflecting the
‘UN security police’ in northern Iraq. Despite their title, UN security personnel would
be part of a foreign military intervention in Somalia. The UNSG asked member states
to contribute individuals with “military skills and training” to provide a “sufficiently
strong military escort to deter attack and to fire effectively in self-defence”.21
The UN had previously used foreign military officers for ceasefire monitoring duties
but Somalia was the first time the UNSC agreed to use military personnel to help
deliver humanitarian assistance. In Somalia there was no government exercising
sovereign control across large sections of the country where the humanitarian crisis was
particularly acute. It was therefore not possible to obtain effective state authorisation
for the UN or other foreign intervention force to operate. America’s recent activities
in northern Iraq, however, demonstrated it was possible to insert foreign ground
troops for a humanitarian intervention absent government support and with no
immediately apparent significant domestic or international resistance.
6.2.3 The new world order’s transformative potential
Both UNSG Boutros-Ghali and his predecessor, Javier Pe´rez de Cue´llar, advised
the UNSC on desirable UN action in Somalia that went beyond aid delivery and
ceasefire monitoring. de Cue´llar called for international support for economic recovery
and rehabilitation programs in Somalia. He noted poor government and physical
infrastructure, as well as banditry and general lawlessness caused by weak public
institutions, exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and complicated efforts to halt the
civil war. de Cue´llar argued restoring these institutions was central to sustainably
General S/24480 (New York: United Nations Security Council, August 24, 1992).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., paras 27-28.
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solving Somalia’s humanitarian problems and should therefore be part of the UN
mandate in Somalia.22
Boutros-Ghali showed similar enthusiasm for expanding the scope of UN peacekeeping
work to include state-building. Boutros-Ghali released his Agenda for Peace in June
1992 in which he identified preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking
as necessary for global conflict prevention and resolution. Among the tasks of
peacemaking was state-buildling with member states “rebuilding institutions and
infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife” as well as “address[ing] the
deepest causes of conflict: economic and social injustice and political opporession”.23
The idea the international community should be responsible for supporting state-
building activities coincided with US President George H. W. Bush’s framing of
America’s role in the post-Cold War world. In Chapter 5 I showed how Bush argued
America’s Cold War ‘victory’ was consistent with ideas of American exceptional-
ism/manifest destiny, demonstrating the inherent superiority of liberal democratic
ideals distinguishing America from its Cold War enemies. Bush used the phrase ‘new
world order’ to characterise the changing geopolitical landscape primed for America
to shape in its own image and interests. Bush’s new world order required American
global leadership to politically and economically transform former communist and
failed states, and commit to continue fighting the new evils replacing communism.
In talking about US responsibilities, Bush analogised with the narrative of America
leading post-World War II reconstruction, using this example of America pursuing
a global transformation agenda to argue his new world order plans continued an
American tradition:
After vanquishing the dictators of Japan and Germany and Italy, America’s
war generation helped those countries rebuild and grow strong in the exercise
of democracy and free enterprise.. . . to create and nurture international organi-
sations aimed at protecting human rights, collective security, and economic
22. United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Soma-
lia S.24343 (New York: United Nations Security Council, July 22, 1992), para 56.
23. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping, Report of the Secretary-General A/47/277-S/24111 (United Nations, 1992), para 15.
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growth.24
Bush’s recounting of this historical period positioned America as a benevolent leader
acting altruistically, downplaying America’s economic and military power motivations
for supporting vanquished nations and establishing international institutions.
Bush was confident in the American model’s wide applicability calling for a “Pax
Universalis built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations”,25 where the (American)
“blessings of liberty some day might extend to all peoples”.26 In his speech to the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 23 September 1991, Bush repeatedly
asserted history was “resuming” and being “renewed”,27 bringing the world ever
closer to realising what Americans “have always dreamed of[,] the day democracy
and freedom will triumph in every corner of the world, in every captive nation and
closed society”.28 Bush’s comments conveyed a feeling of inevitability in the historical
trajectory towards a liberal democratic peak, with America spearheading Francis
Fukuyama’s portended ‘end of history’.29
In practical terms Bush called on the UN to join America in helping all nations
achieve standards “of human decency”, reinvigorating state “institutions of freedom
[that] have lain dormant”.30 Bush argued this type of state-building played “a crucial
role in our quest for a new world order”,31 co-opting the UN into America’s global
transformation mission. As I noted in earlier chapters, Bush’s claims to promote
democracy and liberal state institutions across the world were not new; such claims
featured in US foreign policy decision-making since the founding of the republic. What
was novel was Bush arguing the end of the Cold War provided new opportunities for
America, having emerged as the world’s only superpower, to deliver on these global
24. George H. W. Bush, Remarks to the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association in Honolulu, Hawaii,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, December 7, 1991.
25. George H. W. Bush, Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in
New York City, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 23, 1991.
26. Bush, Remarks to the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association in Honolulu, Hawaii .
27. Bush, Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City .
28. George H. W. Bush, Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, April 9, 1991.
29. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest, no. 16 (1989): 3–18.
30. Bush, Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City .
31. Ibid.
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transformative objectives. While the UNSC legitimised foreign military intervention
in Somalia, the humanitarian crisis also provided another opportunity for Bush to
demonstrate American leadership and transformational potential by reforming a
failed state and bringing it into the democratic community of nations.
6.3 Justifying exit in Provide Relief
It took more than two months after Resolution 751 passed for the first contingent
of 50 United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) officers to arrive in Somalia
on 23 June 1992, with an additional 500 UN officers beginning work on 15 August
1992. The Bush administration provided in-principle support but did not contribute
American military personnel to UNOSOM. Instead, Bush launched a parallel military
mission, Operation Provide Relief on 12 August 1992 to transport soldiers from other
countries who were part of UNOSOM.32 Provide Relief also delivered food and
other relief supplies from Kenya to remote parts of Somalia outside the command of
UNOSOM.33 Bush explained his decision to launch Provide Relief by focusing on
the tragedy of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, describing Americans as “grieved
by the suffering”34 in a “conflict [that] claims innocent lives”.35 Bush’s rhetoric
acknowledged the normative expectation to respond to the crisis but he also limited
America’s moral responsibility to providing disaster relief.36
Bush only mentioned Somalia in passing in press conferences more substantively about
his Iraq intervention exit plans and prospective US involvement in the developing
Bosnian conflict. Bush presented an operational disengagement exit strategy for
US troops in Provide Relief ; as an exclusively aerial mission soldiers could be
32. United Nations Secretary-General, The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General .
33. George H. W. Bush, Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Military Airlift for
Humanitarian Aid to Somalia, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, August 13, 1992.
34. George H. W. Bush, The President’s News Conference in Kennebunkport, Maine, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, August 8, 1992; George H. W. Bush, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly in New York City, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21, 1992.
35. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City .
36. Jon Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information and Advocacy in
the US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” International Security 26, no. 4 (2002): 117–18.
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easily and rapidly extracted as soon as they completed their airlift and aid delivery
responsibilities. Walter Poole notes Bush’s National Security Council (NSC) was
similarly focused on the aerial mission providing a means for rapidly declaring victory
and withdrawing troops by 25 January 1993.37 Bush used the Vietnam War trope
of soldiers “bogged down” to justify his decision not to deploy ground troops in
Somalia, arguing he was committed to only launch military operations with assured
exit strategies implemented after achieving victory, conveniently ignoring his failure
to manage this in northern Iraq.
I vowed something, because I learned something from Vietnam: I am not going
to commit US forces until I know what the mission is, until the military tell
me that it can be completed, until I know how they can come out. . . . It is
America that’s in the lead in helping with humanitarian relief for Somalia.
But when you go to put somebody else’s son or daughter into war, I think
you’ve got to be a little bit careful, and you have to be sure that there’s a
military plan that can do this.38
Despite America and the UN “helping” the humanitarian situation continued to
deteriorate in Somalia and UNOSOM troops were besieged at the airport, unable to
leave.39 Still Bush resisted deploying US soldiers, not because he was concerned about
the risk of American casualties but because he could not guarantee quick victory.
Bush argued America’s moral obligation in Somalia did not extend to sending US
ground forces into intractable “tribal wars”; an aerial disaster relief operation was
sufficient:40
[Y]ou’ve got almost anarchy over there. You have warlords controlling the
ports. They’re armed. They go—and they’re shooting up the United Nations
forces. We were very active in the United Nations to get UN forces on the
ground. But they’re having difficulty separating these warlords one from the
other. We’re sending our supplies in there. We are helping. . . . And maybe
you can say, well you never do enough. But then you’ve got to look at the
situation on the ground. There’s anarchy there. It’s a terrible thing. Once
the Siad government went out, you’ve got all these factions shooting, fighting,
killing. Seventeen-year-olds with weapons from the former Soviet empire just
shooting it up on the port, stealing the relief supplies, and taking them for
37. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994 , 9.
38. George H. W. Bush, Presidential Debate in St. Louis, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
October 11, 1992.
39. Peterson, Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, A Journalist
Reports from the Battlefields of Africa, 47.
40. Bush, Presidential Debate in St. Louis.
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their families and leaving these kids starving. It is tough.41
Although troubled by “ghastly pictures of those starving kids”42 with “the little
skinny arms”43 and wanting “to help these little starving kids in Somalia”,44 Bush
was also arguing that America’s moral responsibility was nonetheless limited because
Somalia was yet another intractable African problem, which even the US, enormous
military force notwithstanding, would be powerless to fix.
Bush could also convincingly argue for limited US moral responsibility in Somalia
because through most of 1992 there was little domestic pressure to do otherwise.
Congress did not dedicate significant time to discussing Somalia or providing Bush
with much guidance for an American response. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas)
was one of the few representatives demanding more robust US and UN action in
Somalia. She succeeded in passing a Senate resolution on 26 June 1991 calling on
the UN to make the crisis a “high priority item”,45 but Congress did not discuss
the issue again for another year. When UNOSOM started, Kassebaum convinced
both houses of Congress on 11 August 1992 to agree the president should “work
with the UNSC to deploy [UNOSOM] security guards immediately, with or without
the consent of the Somali factions to assure that humanitarian relief gets to those
most in need”.46 The resolution’s wording was strong enough to authorise military
intervention but it also left room for Bush to comply with Congress’ request without
committing US ground forces to UNOSOM.47
41. George H. W. Bush, Question-and-Answer Session in Grand Rapids, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, October 29, 1992.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. George H. W. Bush, Presidential Debate at the University of Richmond, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, October 15, 1992.
45. Nancy Landon Kassebaum, “S.Res.115 - A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate
Regarding the Emergency Humanitarian and Political Situation in Somalia,” 102nd Congress
(1991-1992) Resolution (Agreed to in Senate 1991).
46. Nancy Landon Kassebaum, “S.Con.Res.132 - A Concurrent Resolution Expressing the Sense of
the Congress Regarding the Desperate Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia and Urging the Deployment
of United Nations Security Guards to Assure That Humanitarian Relief Gets to Those Most in
Need,” 102nd Congress (1991-1992) Concurrent resolution (Agreed to in House 1992): Emphasis
added.
47. See also John Lewis, “H.Con.Res.370 - Concerning the Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia,” 102nd
Congress (1991-1992) Concurrent resolution (Agreed to in Senate 1992).
Finishing the job 194
Chapter 6. Somalia Anna Samson
Congressional sidelining of Somalia matched the views of an American constituency
inundated by presidential election campaign coverage focused more on domestic issues
than foreign policy concerns. A Pew poll conducted from 10–13 September 1992
showed almost two-thirds of respondents (65 percent) were not following news about
the civil war and famine in Somalia.48 It has almost become conventional wisdom
that US media coverage of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia from August–November
1992 drove Bush to involve the US more deeply in the conflict. Jonathan Mermin
has demonstrated, however, that elite media coverage followed rather than preceded
the Bush administration’s interest in Somalia.49 Although Mermin’s analysis was
restricted to television news media, his findings hold true across elite press coverage
of Somalia over the same time period. Between April 1992 and Bush’s announcement
in December 1992 to expand Provide Relief, The New York Times provided the most
extensive coverage of Somalia, with eleven editorials and fourteen opinion pieces.
Over the same period The Washington Post published nine editorials and six opinion
pieces on the issue, with The Wall Street Journal editors and commentators only
discussing the issue twice.
When the elite mainstream press did discuss what the US should do in Somalia,
criticism of perceived American inaction was almost universal. The Washington Post
editors and The New York Times commentators echoed Boutros-Ghali’s criticism
the US and Europe were more interested in the former Yugoslavia’s “rich man’s
war” than the humanitarian disaster in Somalia.50 Almost all articles demanded
greater US “leadership” providing humanitarian relief but did not agree America’s
obligation extended to addressing the civil war dynamics exacerbating the famine.
Wall Street Journal commentator John Prendergast was one of the few voices in
the elite press who argued “flooding the country with food is just the first step”,
48. Pew Research Poll Database, ed., News Interest Index Poll, September 1992, Survey by
Times Mirror. Methodology: Interviewing conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates,
September 10 - September 13, 1992 and based on 1,508 telephone interviews. Sample: National
adult., September 13, 1992, Based on 1508 telephone interviews.
49. Jonathan Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a
Media-Driven Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3 (1997): 385–403.
50. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga (Londres: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 55;
Editorial, “Indifference and Somalia,” The Washington Post, June 19, 1992, Editorial, “Indifference
and Somalia.”
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which should be followed by “reconstruction aid. . . to prevent a descent into the
condition of mass famine”, similar to that envisaged by the the UNSG.51 Bush’s
justification narratives regarding US intervention in Somalia paralleled wider public
discourse about preferred US foreign policy action focused on disaster relief. Bush’s
narrative also paralleled the portrayal of Somalia in the mainstream elite media
whose commentators supported US intervention on the basis that the US should be
“saving Somalia from itself.”52
Justifying limited US moral responsibility on the basis that the conflict was intractable
and using an operational disengagement exit strategy, however, conflicted with Bush’s
other statements about America’s responsibility to pursue global transformation,
using force if necessary. Somalia’s intractable humanitarian difficulties, its absence of
viable state institutions and the UN’s interest in saving and reconstructing Somalia
made it the perfect opportunity to express America’s foreign policy impetus to reform
failed states.
In his final speech before the UNGA on 21 September 1992 Bush characterised
America’s recent foreign policy actions in the following way:
As our humanitarian operations in Somalia and northern Iraq, Bosnia, and
the former Soviet Union will testify, we will continue our robust humanitarian
assistance efforts to help those suffering from man-made and natural disasters.53
Bush conflated quite different initiatives—Provide Relief aid delivery Somalia, US
soldiers defending northern Iraqi safe zones in Provide Comfort, USAID programs
in Bosnia, and supporting democratic reform and economic assistance in the former
USSR—under the heading of “humanitarian operations”. Bush’s comment about
“robust humanitarian assistance” perhaps foreshadowed a growing American interest
in ‘stability operations’ (see Chapter 2) but it also reveals different contexts had
little bearing on how Bush framed American military operations; all were consistent
51. John Prendergast, “Staving Off Hunger and Food Bandits in Somalia,” The Wall Street
Journal, September 17, 1992,
52. Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, “Save Somalia from Itself,” The New York Times,
January 2, 1992,
53. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City .
Finishing the job 196
Chapter 6. Somalia Anna Samson
with America’s global transformation approach to foreign policy.
In the same speech Bush went on to advise the UN to learn from US achievements,
claiming America’s “extensive experience in winning wars and keeping the peace”54
made it successful in humanitarian interventions. Bush’s advice not only paints an
especially rosy picture of America’s experiences in World War II, the Vietnam War
and the Gulf War, but it focuses strongly on winning without explaining exactly
what ‘winning’ entails in a humanitarian intervention context, and if it differs from
winning conventional wars. Bush’s concern with victory and the tension between
achieving victory, fulfilling America’s moral responsibilities and having a plan for
rapid troop withdrawal continued to shape subsequent justifications for shifting exit
strategies.
6.4 Justifying exit in Restore Hope
Three days after Clinton defeated Bush in the 1992 presidential election, Bush’s
National Security Council asked the CIA to determine if current UNOSOM and
Provide Relief efforts would end the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, delivering
victory and fulfilling America’s moral responsibilities.55 On 9 November 1992 the
CIA responded saying UNOSOM was dramatically under-resourced and in order
to succeed, 10,000-15,000 troops were required, more than three times the number
currently authorised. Although aware Somalia was not of immediate American
interest the NSC and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) concluded America had a significant
moral obligation to stop the humanitarian crisis and presented Bush with three
possible options for deeper intervention in Somalia.56 On 25 November 1992, with less
than two months remaining of his presidential term, Bush decided the best course
of action was for the US to lead, under its own command, a multinational military
54. Ibid.
55. Fox, “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia,” 149–50.
56. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994 , 9.
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intervention in Somalia, including ground forces.57
On 3 December 1992, the UNSC unanimously authorised America to “use all
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations in Somalia”.58 Unlike previous resolutions regarding Somalia, the
UNSC publicly debated the measure with the resulting Resolution 794 marking an
important development in the global discourse on humanitarian intervention. In
passing the resolution the UNSC acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter rather
than using its peacekeeping or ceasefire monitoring powers. As discussed in Chapter
3, Chapter VII authorises member states to conduct military operations with a UN
imprimatur. Austria and Hungary saw the resolution as a logical development in
the UN’s approach to humanitarian crises after previously authorising America’s
intervention in northern Iraq.59 China, Ecuador, Belgium, India and France expressed
regret the resolution authorised America rather than the UN to lead the intervention,
but these governments did not vote against the resolution. In China’s case, this
was because the government was convinced the intervention would ultimately be
handed over to the UN. The UNSC had, however, resisted the US Department of
Defense request to have the transition exit strategy expressly included in Resolution
794.60 UNSC members recognised the gravity of their decision but undermined
its precedent-setting value arguing the novelty of the situation justified action.
Somalia was described variously as “exceptional” by Ecuador and China, “unique”
by Zimbabwe and India, “atypical” by Belgium, “unprecedented” by France and
“extraordinary” by Venezuela, Morocco and Hungary. The preamble to Resolution
794 also identified Somalia as an “exceptional” case.61
Neither Resolution 794 nor UNSC members used the word ‘humanitarian intervention’
but Bush’s UN representative Edward Perkins was enthusiastic about America leading
57. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994 , 19–20.
58. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 794, December 3, 1992.
59. United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One
Hundred and Forty-Fifth Meeting S/PV.3145 (New York, USA: United Nations Security Council,
December 3, 1992).
60. Recchia, “Pragmatism over Principle,” 18.
61. United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One
Hundred and Forty-Fifth Meeting .
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a “great humanitarian enterprise”. Perkins commended the international community
for “taking an important step in developing a strategy for dealing with the potential
disorder and conflicts of the post-cold-war world” recognising “relief must be followed
closely by rehabilitation and by reconstruction”.62 Perkins’ statement reveals an
early disconnect between the Bush administration and the rest of the international
community’s view of American intervention in Somalia. UNSC members authorised
intervention as a last resort in exceptional circumstances; America would only use
military power to restore security to facilitate humanitarian assistance, immediately
transitioning the mission to UN command. For the Bush administration, however,
Somalia was an opportunity to demonstrate how military force could achieve wide
humanitarian objectives, delivering the deep political transformation now open to
developing nations in the post-Cold War world. Despite the disconnect, however, at
no point did the UNSC act to stop America’s intervention, allowing it to continue
along the lines Bush set.
The day after the UNSC passed Resolution 794, Bush gave a televised address
announcing 25,000 US troops would commence Operation Restore Hope in Somalia,
its contribution as coordinator and leader of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).63
Bush revised his earlier explanations for US action in Somalia, widening America’s
moral responsibility beyond providing disaster relief to include new world order
transformation.
With this wider moral responsibility and ground troops deployed, an operational
disengagement strategy was no longer viable. Bush thus changed his exit strategy to
one he was ostensibly following in northern Iraq: a UN transition exit.
First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Soma-
lia. . . Second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw
our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping
force.. . . This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer
62. Ibid., 36.
63. The total number of soldiers to be involved in UNITAF was 38,000 with the balance of
troops provided by 22 other nations including France, Italy, Belgium, Morocco, Australia, Pakistan,
Malaysia and Canada.
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than is absolutely necessary.64
This two-point exit plan sounded as uncomplicated as it was succinct. Troop
withdrawal would follow mission success and success was simply a matter of applying
sufficient military force. Bush’s framing suggested the matter of providing security
could be neatly carved out from the broader crisis in Somalia, ‘fixed’ by US soldiers
to the point it was unlikely to recur once US troops departed. Bush suggested
American soldiers could—and would—operate apolitically in Somalia, not affecting
the operational or strategic calculus of the parties to the civil war. But Bush did
not provide any details as to what he meant by ‘security’, how US forces would
establish it, or when he would know a sufficient level of security had been established
to justify their withdrawal. Just as in Iraq, Bush’s exit strategy for Somalia also left
open questions about the conditions under which the UN could effectively assume
America’s responsibilities in a transition exit. Bush chose to explicitly outline his exit
strategy in a simple manner despite his NSC and JCS advising a ground operation
in Somalia would be complicated, potentially cost American lives and, because of
the hostile operating environment, likely take more than a few months to achieve its
objective of establishing ‘security’.
Bush justified his new exit strategy by arguing that it was the deep suffering in
Somalia that rendered the situation one that compelled American intervention and
redemption Bush outlined in great detail the suffering of vulnerable Somalis. He
talked of “tragedy”65 with “suffering hard to imagine”,66 where “1.5 million people
could starve to death”;67 of a place with “no government”,68 where “law and order
have broken down [and] anarchy prevails”.69 The scale of suffering triggered America’s
moral responsibility to do “God’s work” by solving the crisis and providing global
64. George H. W. Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in Somalia, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, December 10, 1992.
65. George H. W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, December 4, 1992.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia; George H. W. Bush, Remarks
at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
December 15, 1992.
Finishing the job 200
Chapter 6. Somalia Anna Samson
leadership:
The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We’re
able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope.
America must act. Only the United States has the global reach to place a
large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently
and thus save thousands of innocents from death. [W]e also know that some
crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that
American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of
the community of nations.70
Stipulating an exit strategy provided justification for deeper military intervention in
Somalia; committing a sizeable number of ground troops to a country of marginal
security interest to the US could be made more tolerable to Americans by providing
an exit plan. The exit strategy demonstrated Bush’s rhetorical commitment to
avoiding a quagmire because the mission was not “open-ended”. Revealing a clear
exit strategy in the way Bush did on 4 December was also a way to reassure Americans
their soldiers would emerge from this operation victorious. The exit strategy was
simple and, more crucially it was putatively viable, because success was assured.
Bush did more than just imply this connection between victory and exit in Restore
Hope, he made it explicit:
The outlaw elements in Somalia must understand this is serious business. We
will accomplish our mission.. . . As Commander in Chief I assure [US soldiers
being deployed], you will have our full support to get the job done, and we
will bring you home as soon as possible.. . . We will not fail.71
Rather than completed objectives creating the conditions for exit, the exit strategy
discursively represented certainty about victory and thus justified deploying troops
in the first place. The exit strategy also helped legitimise Bush’s decision to start a
military operation after having lost his re-election bid. By emphasising what Bush
said was a limited military operation where US soldiers would definitely succeed and
withdraw according to a clear exit plan, he demonstrated how his unconventional
lame duck presidential behaviour was not as egregious as it might otherwise seem.
Western media crews aplenty documented the first contingent of US Marines landing
70. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia.
71. Ibid.
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on a Mogadishu beach on 9 December 1992. Opinion polls from NBC/The Wall
Street Journal, Time/CNN and ABC/The Washington Post showed close to 80
percent of Americans supported Bush’s decision to send US soldiers to help the
UN deliver relief supplies in Somalia.72 70 percent of Americans also agreed Restore
Hope was “worth the cost” despite “the possible loss of American lives and the
other costs involved”.73 Another opinion poll using the Vietnam War trope of failed
exit strategies, showed 62 percent of Americans agreed with Bush’s assessment that
Restore Hope would “end quickly” and US troops would not “get bogged down in a
drawn-out military involvement [sic]”.74
Domestic support was not unqualified or universal but little criticism related to the
prospects for victory or the implementability of the president’s proposed exit strategy.
Some elite press commentators contrasted the decision to send ground troops to
Somalia with Bush’s persistent refusal to similarly address the mass atrocities and
war crimes occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Others such as Anthony Lewis
suggested US military commanders opposed Restore Hope because they could not
fathom its strategic significance. Among the few Congress members who openly
opposed the deployment, Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), from Bush’s own party,
criticised him for deploying troops “without clear, precise military objectives” into a
situation akin to Vietnam or Lebanon. Others feared Bush was overconfident in US
soldiers’ ability to create security in a ‘failed state’.75
Diplomatic overtures backed by superlative military power rapidly improved aid
delivery conditions in Somalia, especially in locations where US troops were active.76
American soldiers concentrated their efforts on Somalia’s urban centres while Special
Operations Forces focused on securing regional areas. The port and airport re-opened
72. Louis J. Klarevas, “The Polls Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 64 (2000): 533–34.
73. Ibid., 534.
74. ABC/Washington Post ibid., 540.
75. Michael Wines, “Mission to Somalia: Bush Declares Goal in Somalia to ‘Save Thousands’,”
The New York Times, December 5, 1992,
76. John G. Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994 (Refugee Policy
Group, Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues, November 1994), 38; Delaney,
“Cutting, Running, or Otherwise?,” 32.
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by the end of 1992 with more than 40,000 tons of grain off-loaded.77 Bush extolled
the virtues of Restore Hope “vindicating American values”.78 When asked when
the transition exit would be implemented, however, Bush said he “just can’t help
on the question of timetabling”.79 Bush argued planning for troop withdrawal was
difficult because “I don’t think there will be any leaving of the Somali people to
suffer the fate they had been suffering”.80 Bush’s difficulty was finding an end point
for a mission to create ‘security’ without having articulated the political, geographic
and temporal dimensions of what ‘security’ in Somalia entailed.
Bush ended his presidency without resolving the security question or implementing
his transition exit strategy in Somalia. Instead, Bush dedicated his waning time in
office to setting out foreign policy principles he thought America should follow when
using military force in the new world order. As the comments of a president about
to leave office Bush’s exhortations lacked policy weight but are nevertheless germane
because in these speeches Bush used Restore Hope to illustrate American moral
foreign policy action. In a speech on 15 December 1992 at Texas A&M University,
for example, Bush outlined America’s duty to build a world in its own image, not
only because it served the ‘national interest’ but because it was fundamentally the
‘right’ thing to do:
America remains today what Lincoln said it was more than a century ago,
‘the last best hope of man on Earth’.. . . The leadership, the power, and yes,
the conscience of the United States of America, all are essential for a peaceful,
prosperous international order, just as such an order is essential for us.. . . For
the first time, turning this global vision into a new and better world is, indeed,
a realistic possibility.. . . Some will dismiss this vision as no more than a dream.
I ask them to consider the last four years when a dozen dreams were made
real. . . Today they’re concrete realities, brought about by a common cause:
the patient and judicious application of American leadership, American power,
and perhaps most of all, American moral force.. . . 81
77. United States Forces, Somalia: After Action Report and Historical Overview The United States
Army in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Center of Military History: United States Army, 2003), 10.
78. George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Lighting the National Christmas Tree, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, December 10, 1992.
79. Alison Mitchell, “President Visits Centre of Crisis in Somali Town,” The New York Times,
January 2, 1993,
80. Ibid.
81. Bush, Remarks at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas.
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Bush argued that in Somalia, as in Iraq, humanitarian intervention was morally
incumbent on the US and consistent with normative expectations and practice of US
foreign policy:
[I]n the wake of the Cold War, in a world where we are the only remaining
superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material
resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility, it is our
opportunity to lead. There is no one else.. . . The need to use force arose as
well in the wake of the Gulf War, when we came to the aid of the peoples of
both northern and southern Iraq. And more recently, as I’m sure you know,
I determined that only the use of force could stem this human tragedy of
Somalia.. . . 82
Bush included Somalia in the domestic narrative of the moral march of American
foreign policy. Restore Hope’s foreign policy purpose was about more than addressing
the material needs of Somalis; the humanitarian intervention helped fulfil America’s
larger global reform and redemption project. Consequently, while Bush claimed
Restore Hope would be limited in scope and duration, he was also laying the ground-
work for deeper American and international community involvement in Somalia’s
political reconstruction; a project necessitating a larger and longer commitment of
military force and other resources to ensure success, if success could be achieved at
all. With comments like this it is difficult not to view Bush expanding Provide Relief
to Restore Hope as a moral transformation endeavour, in turn affecting what could
be considered to be a sufficient degree of victory to justify troop withdrawal.
In addition to moral motivations, Bush argued exit strategies and military success
are central to American decisions to use military force:
And when we place our young men and women of the military in harm’s way,
we must be able to assure them and their families that their mission is defined
and that its success can be achieved.83
But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a
clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission,
and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is
complete. Only if we keep these principles in mind will the potential sacrifice
be one that can be explained and justified.84 (Emphasis added.)
82. George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New
York, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, January 5, 1993.
83. Bush, Remarks at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas.
84. Bush, Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York .
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Indeed Bush argued it is the existence of an exit strategy, contingent on victory, that
best justifies a decision to use military force. Bush did not suggest Americans are
cautious about military intervention because they are casualty averse or concerned
military objectives might not be legitimate; rather enthusiasm for sending American
soldiers to foreign operations, humanitarian or otherwise, is primarily based on
evidence troops will return home victorious. Bush claimed a well-constructed military
operation can and must fulfil moral obligations successfully within a predictable
time-frame avoiding a quagmire. As Bush was already experiencing in Somalia,
however, normative expectations shape how moral responsibilities are constructed
and therefore how and whether victory is achieved and if and when troops can leave
as victors. Meeting these normative expectations helps explain Bush committing not
to withdraw troops from Somalia if it risked returning Somalia to its pre-intervention
“fate”. It also helps explain why, just as he did in the northern Iraq intervention he also
inherited, Bill Clinton also struggled finding a balance between fulfilling America’s
moral obligation to provide Somalis with sustainable security, and achieving the
requisite level of success to justify US troops returning home.
6.5 UN transition exit not an exit
Like Bush, Clinton committed to the UN transition exit without explaining how
and when it would occur. Clinton agreed with America’s moral responsibility to
establish security but he widened Bush’s definition from physical integrity of relief
supply chains to state-building; creating long-term, political and human security
across Somalia. With UN peacekeepers unable to deliver on America’s promise, and
growing violence towards intervention forces, the conditions for US troops achieving
success were never quite established. Consequently Clinton never implemented the
transition exit strategy.
Unlike Provide Comfort in Iraq, Bush intended for Restore Hope to be concluded and
Finishing the job 205
Chapter 6. Somalia Anna Samson
troops home on or before Clinton’s inauguration day on 20 January 1993,85 although
Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State for Africa James Woods claims no-one in the
Bush administration seriously expected the mission to be over in fewer than four to
six months. In any event, when Clinton assumed the presidency it was clear that
despite its successes, what Bush commenced in Restore Hope had to continue for at
least a few months under Clinton’s leadership.86 It would be a mistake, however, to
believe Clinton did not support Bush’s decision to deploy US soldiers to Somalia.
During his election campaign Clinton called for a stronger response to the crisis and
during administration transition meetings he declared a special interest in learning
about US actions in Somalia.87 The day after Bush announced Restore Hope Clinton
agreed with the mission’s impulse to stop an atrocity and for America to lead the
effort to “create a security environment to save lives”.88
In contrast to his predecessor, President Bill Clinton was loquacious, although
this does not mean presidential rhetoric analysts consider him an especially great
communicator. Daniel Schorr describes Clinton as “the great talker”,89 a view
shared by scholars including Lee Sigelman and Cynthia Whissell who find Clinton
“longwinded” when compared with other US presidents.90 Ronald Lee and Kane Click
note the political communication aspects of Clinton’s presidency were marked by
his personal populist story, his efforts to create a more centrist Democratic party
discourse, his interest in improving race relations, and his successful weathering of
repeated political scandals from private indiscretions and abuses of power.91 Bill
85. James D. Boys, “A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism
(1991-1993),” European Journal of American Studies 7, no. 1 (2012): 4; Delaney, “Cutting, Running,
or Otherwise?,” 31.
86. James L. Woods, “US Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations
in Somalia,” in Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, ed.
Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 160.
87. Delaney, “Cutting, Running, or Otherwise?,” 30.
88. James Gerstenzang, “Bush Sending Troops to Help Somalia’s Hungry Millions Mission:
‘America Must Act,’ President Says in Dispatching Forces for Humanitarian Effort. A Dozen Other
Nations also may Participate,” Los Angeles Times, December 5, 1992,
89. Daniel Schorr, “The Great Talker,” The New Leader 76, no. 3 (February 8, 1993): 3–6.
90. Lee Sigelman and Cynthia Whissell, ““The Great Communicator” and “The Great Talker”
on the Radio: Projecting Presidential Personas,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002):
137–46.
91. Ronald Lee and Kane M. Click, “Clinton, William Jefferson (1946– ),” in Encyclopedia of
Political Communication, ed. Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (Thousand Oaks: SAGE,
2008).
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Clinton was America’s first post-Cold War president, which partly explains the
success he enjoyed with an election campaign focused on the economy and domestic
issues rather than foreign policy.
Perhaps betraying his comparative lack of interest in foreign policy issues, the first
time Clinton publicly talked about Restore Hope he claimed gang violence in some
American suburbs was worse than the violence US troops were trying to stop in
Somalia.92 Clinton was three weeks into his term when he was first asked about a
schedule for withdrawing soldiers from Somalia. Clinton responded by sticking to
Bush’s UN transition exit strategy, but in terms of a timeframe only said when
troops would not be withdrawn:
This does need to go from a US mission to a UN mission. I never thought
we could do it. Even though I think President Bush hoped we could, I never
thought we could do it by the end of January.93
In another statement about his exit strategy made a week later, Clinton said:
But I think the United States has a responsibility in Somalia. And I supported
it when we sent our troops over there to try to stop the fighting and to try to
bring some safety and food and medicine and education back to the children
there. And I think that what we will be doing in Somalia is trying to work
with other countries to always keep enough soldiers there to try to keep the
peace, but there won’t be so many Americans there. And then we can support
others and try to make sure that we restore peace on a long-term basis and
try to make sure that the people always had enough food and medicine and
shelter to do well. I think we do have a responsibility there, but as President
my first responsibility is to all of you.94
In Clinton’s remarkable inability to identify the bounds of the US mission he reveals
his central problem ending Restore Hope. Clinton bookends his comments with
references to America’s moral responsibility, but in describing this responsibility, he
rhetorically stretches Restore Hope’s mandate beyond protecting relief supplies in a
small part of Somalia to essentially ending the civil war. While Bush first raised this
wider security objective, it was Clinton who embedded it as a criterion for mission
92. William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Democratic Governors’ Association Dinner, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, February 1, 1993.
93. William J. Clinton, Exchange With Reporters Prior to a Meeting With Democratic Congres-
sional Leaders, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 13, 1993.
94. William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Children’s Town Meeting, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, February 20, 1993.
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success. In terms of his exit strategy, therefore, Clinton predicated troop withdrawal
on achieving political reform, which, as he acknowledged, is difficult to deliver within
a few months.
Changing battlefield conditions further complicated exit strategy implementation.
Breaches of the UN mandate coloured Restore Hope’s achievements and those of
the UNITAF mission of which it was a part, sometimes with good outcomes and
at other times with significant cost to the civilian population. Although UNITAF
was not required to rebuild Somali infrastructure, enforce disarmament or train local
security forces, foreign soldiers repaired roads and bridges, confiscated thousands of
small arms and automatic weapons, and recruited Somalis to perform local security
functions.95 Adekeye Adbajo notes UNITAF soldiers, who did not hesitate to use
force when confronting warlords,96 killed an estimated 227 civilians by the end of
February 1993 and committed other crimes including robbery, murder and torture.97
Such actions fermented ill-will among some Somalis and resistance towards foreign
troop activities98 but they attracted little US media attention and Clinton did not
discuss them publicly.
Meanwhile transition negotiations between the US and UN made it doubtful a
full handover to a United Nations Mission in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) mission
would occur.99 According to UNSG Boutros-Ghali, UNOSOM II fulfilling its
mandate “depended” on America maintaining a military presence in Somalia “of at
least battalion strength” as a “quick reaction force”.100 Boutros-Ghali also pushed
for a UNOSOM II mandate much wider than UNOSOM, which he considered
consistent with the peacemaking ideas in his Agenda for Peace101 and “an expression
95. Woods, “US Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in
Somalia,” 159.
96. Ibid.
97. Adekeye Adbajo, “In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia,”
International Peacekeeping 10, no. 4 (2003): 73.
98. Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?,” 139–40.
99. Robert G. Patman, Strategic Shortfall: The Somalia Syndrome and the March to 9/11 (Santa
Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010), 45–50.
100. United Nations Secretary-General, Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in
Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992) S/25354 (New York, USA: United
Nations Security Council, March 3, 1993).
101. Delaney, “Cutting, Running, or Otherwise?,” 33.
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of the international community’s determination not to remain a silent spectator
to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own”.102 UNOSOM II
would continue UNOSOM’s focus on security but instead of using US troops to
facilitate aid delivery, American soldiers would now support fundamental political
transformation.103 As far as Boutros-Ghali was concerned, Bush and Clinton’s
transition plan was not an exit strategy for US troops. Congress also approved US
participation in UNOSOM II, including the “reconstruction of Somali soceity” and
helping “people of Somalia create and maintain democratic institutions”.104
This was an important moment in how America’s humanitarian intervention in Soma-
lia unfolded. Clinton could have withdrawn troops regardless of the UNSG’s request
but it would have meant going against the normative expectations of American
foreign policy behaviour in this humanitarian crisis. By withdrawing troops at this
point Clinton would have also admitted there were limits to America’s political trans-
formation abilities and the power of American military might to deliver humanitarian
outcomes. Clinton did not push back against this new role for US troops, instead
he enthusiastically embraced it, with Congressional, State and Pentagon support,
publicly revising the victory conditions for his transition exit strategy accordingly.
In late February and early March 1993, Clinton now based his plans to end the US
mission in Somalia on America fulfilling its moral responsibility to not just make
Somalia safe for humanitarian assistance, but to create the conditions for democracy
and political transformation. This revision was consistent with the UNSG’s request
but it also aligned with Clinton’s own view of US foreign policy action. On 26
February 1993 Clinton gave his first speech as president outlining his approach
to foreign policy or, what he called “the imperative of American leadership in a
changing world”.105 Although he did not formally ascribe to Bush’s ‘new world order’
102. United Nations Secretary-General, Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in
Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992), para 101.
103. Walter Clarke, “Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia,” in Learning from Somalia:
The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 3–19.
104. George J. Mitchell, “S.J.Res.45 - Resolution Authorizing the Use of United States Armed
Forces in Somalia,” 103rd Congress (1993-1994) Bill (Passed Senate and House 1993).
105. William J. Clinton, Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration, ed. Gerhard
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project, Clinton also saw the end of the Cold War presenting a unique opportunity
for America to progress its democratic mission. Clinton continued the rhetoric of
every US president before him arguing America had a responsibility to transform the
world in its own image, but framed the responsibility as a duty to foster democracy
alongside economic globalisation in the interests of national security:
[T]he world still calls on us to promote democracy. . . All you have to do to
know that is to look at the problems in Somalia, to look at Bosnia, to look at
the other trouble spots in the world. If we could make a garden of democracy
and prosperity and free enterprise in every part of this globe, the world would
be a safer and a better and a more prosperous place for the United States and
for all of you to raise your children in.106
According to Clinton, America’s moral duty in places such as Somalia—where there
were no functioning state institutions, global economic integration or democracy
as experienced in western industrialised nations—was redemptive as much as it
was self-interested.107 He used language recalling frontier myths and American
exceptionalism to talk about a present-day reformation program “flow[ing] out of
our heritage. . . ingrained in the soul of Americans. . . For it is in our nature to reach
out”.108 Clinton of course acknowledged America needed to be selective about where
it chose to pursue this moral duty, but he was clear humanitarian intervention
in Somalia fit the bill because this was where US soldiers were “trying to create
conditions of peaceful existence”.109
Two weeks later, Clinton repeated these points in a speech before US naval officers,
this time emphasising the centrality of military force to realising reform in Somalia and
elsewhere while still using the reference to suffering of Somalis to frame intervention:110
We can be glad that your mission is not darkly framed by the Cold War’s
confrontation with a nuclear adversary. But many new duties and dangers are
taking the place of that single stark threat, some of them yet unknown.. . . And
Peters and John T. Woolley, February 26, 1993.
106. Clinton, Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration.
107. See also William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Crew of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 12, 1993.
108. Clinton, Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration.
109. Ibid.
110. William J. Clinton, Radio Address to the Armed Forces, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 12, 1993.
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at times, you who serve our nation in uniform may be called upon to answer
not only the sound of guns but also the call of distress, or a summons to
keep the peace in a troubled part of the world, or even the cry of starving
children.. . . Your work is vitally important to your fellow Americans and to
the President and to this very new and very hopeful world we are trying to
nourish and to build.111
The UNSC unanimously agreed on 26 March 1993 to establish UNOSOM II and the
accompanying American Quick Reaction Force (QRF) with the mandate requested
by the UNSG. Resolution 814 launched the largest, most expensive UN operation
in history112 authorised to use armed force to: disarm warring parties and ensure
ceasefire compliance; guarantee the safety of UN, IGO and NGO personnel delivering
relief supplies; provide security for repatriating refugees; enforce an arms embargo;
re-establish a Somali police force; promote a political settlement to the civil war and
national reconciliation; and help Somalis rehabilitate political institutions and develop
their economy.113 Resolution 814 empowered the UNOSOM II Force Commander to
“assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure
environment throughout Somalia”.114 Tacked on to these Chapter VII objectives
were even broader goals including de-mining, re-establishing national and regional
administrative institutions, as well as investigating and prosecuting violations of
international humanitarian law.
UNSC members recognised this broad mandate took the UN into uncharted, if
worthy, territory.115 Djibouti’s Ambassador lauded what he labelled the “human-
itarian intervention” in Somalia, while the Moroccan and Russian Ambassadors
noted the US had already inextricably connected the UN’s humanitarian assistance
and security work. Spain’s Ambassador argued it was “impossible” for the UN to
limit itself to distributing humanitarian assistance, needing to focus on Somalia’s
“reconciliation and national reconstruction”. Hungary’s Ambassador called the UN
111. Ibid.
112. Bush, “When Two Anarchies Meet: International Intervention in Somalia,” 6.
113. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 814, March 26, 1993.
114. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 814 , (Emphasis added.) Makinda, Seeking Peace
from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, 76.
115. United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One
Hundred and Eighty-Eigth Meeting S/PV.3188 (New York, USA: United Nations Security Council,
March 26, 1993).
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mission an effort of “grand design”. New Zealand argued the UN “must be prepared
to see through its commitment in Somalia”, which depended upon reconstructing
political institutions, establishing democratic processes and ensuring human rights
protection. But it was Clinton’s new UNSC Ambassador Madeleine Albright who
provided the most enthusiastic statement supporting using the UN’s Chapter VII
enforcement powers for a state-building mission:
By adopting this draft resolution, we will embark on an unprecedented en-
terprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a
proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations.116
Albright’s framing had clear implications for Clinton’s exit strategy: similar to
northern Iraq, Clinton’s UN transition exit was no longer a strategy for completely
withdrawing US soldiers from Somalia. A full exit would now occur only when
Somalia reformed to the point America believed Somalis could assume independent
responsibility for their country. But as with the difficulty in defining ‘security’, the
point at which Somalia had transformed sufficiently to no longer require foreign
troops was unclear.
6.6 Justifying exit in Continue Hope
The day after the UNSC created UNOSOM II, the main belligerents in Somalia
concluded the Addis Ababa peace agreement. Clinton ended Restore Hope on 4 May
1993, formally withdrawing the majority of US troops from Somalia but leaving 4000
soldiers to begin Operation Continue Hope, America’s contribution to UNOSOM
II. Of these 4000 troops, 1100 became part of a Quick Reaction Force. Although
under the operational command of US Central Command, the Deputy Commander
of UNOSOM II was a US Contingent Commander authorised to send America’s
QRF into action when he deemed necessary.
116. United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One
Hundred and Eighty-Eigth Meeting .
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In this phase of America’s humanitarian intervention, US soldiers were more combat-
oriented but also charged with the wider moral responsibility of reforming Somali
society. Although having failed to fully implement his UN transition exit strategy for
Restore Hope, Clinton kept the same exit strategy for Continue Hope and justified it
on the same basis: the US would succeed at its newly expanded mission and the UN
would take over once this occurred. Trying to pursue political reform with military
force, however—even when backed by civilian and UN efforts—did not deliver quick
results; instead foreign personnel were killed, undermining success claims and exit
strategy justifications. Just as in Restore Hope, Clinton struggled to identify clear
thresholds for American victory and for UN forces reaching a point where they were
capable of taking over from US troops. Implementing his transition exit strategy was
thus time-consuming, complicated by battlefield realities, and unable to be precisely
scheduled.
Despite significant numbers of soldiers remaining in Somalia, Clinton celebrated
those US soldiers who were withdrawing as evidence of a successfully completed
humanitarian intervention. Clinton welcomed troops home with the words “mission
accomplished”, mentioning US success in Somalia a further eleven times in his
speech on 5 May 1993. Clinton’s victory declaration was framed as a vindication of
America’s decision to save lives and transform Somalia using military force:
To understand the magnitude of what our forces in Somalia accomplished,
the world need only look back at Somalia’s condition just six months ago.
Hundreds of thousands of people were starving; armed anarchy ruled the land
and the streets of every city and town. . . . If all of you who served had not
gone, it is absolutely certain that tens of thousands would have died by now.
You saved their lives.. . . You set the stage and made it possible for [UNOSOM
II] to do its mission and for the Somalis to complete the work of rebuilding
and creating a peaceful, self-sustaining, and democratic civil society.117
Clinton connected Restore Hope’s disaster relief to Continue Hope’s mission of
transforming Somalia into a safe and prosperous nation. Contrasting Somalia with
the Vietnam War, Clinton argued this humanitarian intervention had “proved” US
military operations “need not be open-ended or ill-defined, that we can go abroad
117. William J. Clinton, Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning From Somalia, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 5, 1993.
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and accomplish distinct objectives, and then come home again when the mission is
accomplished”.118 Clinton’s summation framed Restore Hope as a textbook example
of the Wienberger-Powell doctrine, a point made by his chief negotiator to Somalia
Robert Oakely: US soldiers were committed to a winnable mission with an exit
strategy.119
Clinton argued reforming Somalia was part of America’s “job to mobilise international
action to create a better world”. Just as Bush labelled Restore Hope “God’s work”,120
Clinton assured Americans God was on their side, closing out his speech with the
Biblical beatitude, “blessed are the peacemakers”.121 US intervention in Somalia was
divinely sanctioned; victory vindicated the moral rightness of pursuing intervention
in the first place showing “the work of the just can prevail over the arms of the
warlords”.122
At the same time, however, Clinton demonstrated a rhetorical contradiction between
claiming wide success and simultaneously arguing soldiers’ achievements were insuffi-
cient to justify withdrawing all American soldiers.123 Although commending troops
for “a job very, very well done”, Clinton also said there was “still much to be done if
enduring peace is to prevail”, to reach the “day when Somalia will be reconstructed
as a functioning civil society”.124
Meanwhile in Somalia, parties to the ceasefire agreement were becoming more
belligerent. Militiamen apparently loyal to General Aidid attacked UN troops en
route to inspect an arms cantonment site at Radio Mogadishu on 5 June 1993, killing
25 Pakistani soldiers and wounding 54 with a further 10 declared missing. Three
US soldiers also suffered minor injuries. The following day the UNSC condemned
the attacks and authorised Chapter VII measures against the individuals responsible
118. Clinton, Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning From Somalia.
119. Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?,” 153.
120. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia.
121. Clinton, Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning From Somalia.
122. Ibid.
123. Boys, “A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991-
1993),” 9.
124. Clinton, Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning From Somalia.
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“including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention
for prosecution, trial and punishment”.125
US forces attacked Aidid’s strongholds the following week. Clinton suspended any
talk of exit in Somalia, or for that matter US objectives of providing security to
prevent atrocities or reform Somali society. Instead he began using language of
retribution, punishment and war-fighting calling for General Aidid’s forces to be
“crippled” in “battle” and Aidid personally brought to account.126 Clinton devoted
his weekly radio address to explaining America’s moral responsibility to confront
the “savage”127 violence in Somalia and bring the perpetrators to justice. Clinton
explained his decision to focus on hunting Aidid on the grounds his actions “cannot
go unpunished”. America and the UN “refuse[d] to tolerate this ruthless disregard
for the will of the international community”.128
Clinton could have used the attacks to justify withdrawing US soldiers given the
ceasefire was not holding and there was little peace to keep. But this would have
admitted US could not achieve victory and was thus an unimaginable option. Instead,
from June through September 1993, efforts to prepare US forces to leave Somalia
were put on hold. US soldiers now pursued a criminal justice operation which,
perhaps unsurprisingly, became a militarised manhunt complete with cash rewards
for information on Aidid, US airstrikes129 and an additional 400 US Army Rangers
and Delta Force Soldiers deployed.130 Although not abandoning the idea of Continue
Hope as a humanitarian intervention, Clinton now framed the mission not as a disaster
relief or civilian protection operation but as a just war to defeat an evil foe. Success
in this humanitarian intervention began to sound more like the decisive victory of
conventional war. Thus Clinton defended the increasingly kinetic, combat-orientated
125. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 837, June 6, 1993.
126. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
June 17, 1993.
127. William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
June 12, 1993.
128. Ibid.
129. Matthew Bryden, “Somalia: The Wages of Failure,” Current History 94, no. 591 (1995):
145–52.
130. Michael Maren, “Somalia: Whose Failure?,” Current History 95, no. 601 (1996): 203.
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actions of US troops as “appropriate”, even if they resulted in “tensions” between US
forces and Somalis.131 Violence increased, civilian casualties mounted and relations
between foreign troops and Somalis soured, highlighting the difficulties inherent in
pursuing a humanitarian intervention in a hostile environment.
US troops repeatedly attacked suspected Aidid strongholds, including a meeting of
unarmed Somali Habr Gir clan elders on 12 July 1993, mistakenly thinking it to be
one of Aidid’s military command centres. Four foreign journalists investigating the
scene were beaten to death by a mob.132 Civilians and intervention forces continued
to suffer casualties, among them four American soldiers who died in an improvised
explosive device (IED) attack on 8 August 1993.
Clinton did not see any contradiction between America’s humanitarian obligations
of disaster relief and reform on the one hand and US soldiers using force in an
increasingly partisan manner on the other.133 Clinton defended the actions saying
America was showing its commitment to “exert global leadership”,134 connoting
forceful action to drive social and political change in which any resistance to the US
project would be crushed. He argued there was a confluence of interest between US
efforts to “restore stability”135 in Somalia and fulfilling America’s political reform
responsibilities. In a series of press conferences in July and September 1993 Clinton
stated he was “still trying to fulfil our original mission”136 but urged Americans
to “have patience with nation-building” in Somalia.137 Clinton argued US troops
needed time and a significant amount of violence “to work with the Somalis toward
nation-building” because:
131. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
June 15, 1993.
132. Bronwyn Bruton, “In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More,” Foreign
Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009): 83.
133. Clarke, “Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia”; Bryden, “Somalia: The Wages
of Failure.”
134. Clinton, The President’s News Conference.
135. William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Somalia, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, July 1, 1993.
136. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Caribbean Leaders, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, August 30, 1993.
137. William J. Clinton, Interview With Foreign Journalists, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, July 2, 1993.
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you can’t have these kinds of conflicts and expect them to be brutal and illegal
on one side and then have a response [by US soldiers] and expect that there
will be nothing controversial about it.138
Clinton argued mission success required removing the evil forces standing in the
way of America achieving its plan to “build the nation” of Somalia.139 Only once
the US achieved this success—something Under Secretary for Political Affairs Peter
Tarnoff confirmed “cannot be accomplished either quickly or bloodlessly”140—could
US troops be removed.
Despite Clinton exhorting Americans to be patient, Continue Hope was losing public
support, not because of concern about mission costs, but because of scepticism the
mission could and would succeed. Even though Clinton’s Democratic Party controlled
both Houses, Congress passed a resolution in September 1993 requiring that the
president obtain Congressional approval for any US deployment to Somalia lasting
beyond 15 November 1993.141
Following Congress’ motion, Clinton resumed talking about his exit strategy for
Somalia, admitting he had given “too little thought [to] how to end the humanitarian
mission”.142 But Clinton did not come up with a new plan. Despite the manifestly
changed battle conditions, he stuck with the existing UN transition exit. Again,
Clinton could have withdrawn troops at this point but exit was not within the realm
of Clinton’s imagined possibilities at this time, because, as he put it: “we have
no intention of abandoning all those people to the fate that gripped them before
we got there”.143 Clinton argued any achievements to date were so fragile that US
withdrawal would mean a return to humanitarian crisis.
138. William J. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With President Sam Nujoma of Namibia
and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 16, 1993.
139. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio
Ciampi of Italy in Tokyo, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 7, 1993.
140. Peter Tarnoff, US Policy in Somalia, July 29, 1993.
141. Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, “Congress and the Somalia Crisis,” in Learning from Somalia:
The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 191–205.
142. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa
of Japan in New York City, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 27, 1993.
143. Ibid.
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Rather than success justifying exit, Clinton argued a longer troop commitment
was required to sustain victory. American troops should not withdraw so long as
there was a risk the humanitarian crisis might recur. Instead of withdrawing troops,
therefore, Clinton dug in deeper, talking about the UN needing to solve the political
crisis in Somalia to create the conditions required for American troops to leave.
Throughout September 1993, Clinton variously described the UN’s task in Somalia
as developing a “political initiative”,144 “a political alternative”,145 and “a political
strategy”146 for “political transformation”147 to turn over “political responsibility”148
so America could leave:
. . . it is clear that the UN must have a political strategy which permits us to
withdraw but not to withdraw on terms that revert the people to the condition
they were living in beforehand. . . 149
Clinton argued American exit without sustained victory amounted to not just
mission failure but a military operation lacking nobility, breaching the normative
expectations for a humanitarian intervention. And yet Clinton still professed his
commitment to setting an ‘end date’ for the Somali mission, unconnected to the
achievement of specific objectives stating “in the end every peacekeeping mission or
every humanitarian mission has to have a date certain when it’s over and you have to
in the end turn the affairs of the country back over to the people who live there”.150
By the end of September 1993 Clinton’s exit strategy and his justification rhetoric
were completely muddled. The imprecision reveals the rhetorical tension between
simultaneously satisfying the various normative expectations of US humanitarian
intervention. Clinton clung to the moral basis for American intervention because
144. William J. Clinton, Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Prime Minister Carlo
Azeglio Ciampi of Italy, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 17, 1993; William J.
Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Ciampi of Italy, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, September 17, 1993.
145. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan
in New York City .
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
150. William J. Clinton, Exchange With Reporters Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 28, 1993.
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fulfilling these normative expectations vindicated the decision to use force in the first
place, justified the costs already borne, was the ‘right thing to do’ and demonstrated
faith in American military force’s ability to triumph. Clinton also knew the value of
providing Americans with certainty about exit by setting an arbitrary deadline for
Continue Hope but this risked withdrawing forces without them first succeeding and
undermining the moral rightness of the mission. Making exit contingent on victory,
however, meant meeting the mandate to provide security, which Clinton, Congress
and the UN had interpreted as state-building, neutralising violent opposition and
delivering political transformation. These were long-term objectives and, just as in
northern Iraq, the UN was not in a position to take over the responsibilities Clinton
had assumed for America. Battlefield losses and violent local opposition had already
begun undermining the mission’s nobility and the American public’s confidence it
would succeed. Exit now likely meant exit without moral victory and was thus not
an option Clinton could readily contemplate.
6.7 Justifying exit after the Battle of Mogadishu
On 3–4 October 1993 US forces launched Operation Gothic Serpent, which became
best known for the Battle of Mogadishu. This botched attempt by US soldiers to
capture some of Aidid’s supporters ended with between 500 and 1500 Somalis killed.
Eighteen US and two Malaysian soldiers also died in the operation; 79 US, seven
Malaysian and two Pakistani troops were injured. Images of the bodies of dead US
soldiers dragged through the streets by Somali militiamen were broadcast widely,
angering and horrifying the US public and Congress. It was a spectacular failure.
Congress began debating resolutions to end US intervention in Somalia as soon
as possible. Numerous Senators and Representatives took the floor and airways
denouncing the Somali warlords’ actions and chastising Clinton for what they con-
sidered a failed strategy.151 Republican Senator John McCain, for example, insisted
151. Patman, Strategic Shortfall: The Somalia Syndrome and the March to 9/11 , 55.
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“it is time for American forces to come home”, arguing he did not “see the sense of
our operations in Somalia”, which were “simply not practical”. While Restore Hope
succeeded, McCain said Contine Hope had “failed”.152
The Battle of Mogadishu is the most popular explanation of Clinton’s decision to
end the humanitarian intervention in Somalia. While it was a factor, it is not the
whole explanation.153 As I pointed out earlier, public support for the intervention
steadily declined from May 1993 and continued to fall sharply after 3 October 1993.154
Clinton was not the first—or the last—American President to persist with a military
operation long after public opinion turned against it. Clinton did not decide to
withdraw troops because a handful died in a military operation; McCain’s point was
not just that US intervention was “deadly” for Americans, but it was not capable of
succeeding. Exit was necessary because American victory was no longer possible.
Clinton acknowledged the connection between exit and victory in his televised radio
address two days after the Battle of Mogadishu. He announced a deadline for troop
withdrawal of 31 March 1994, but rather than immediately or even progressively
drawing down troops, Clinton proposed to initially increase the number of US
soldiers on the ground. Clinton’s new exit strategy was now withdrawal with local
transition—an “African solution to an African problem”155—although the transition
to local responsibility was secondary to sticking to a concrete end date.
Clinton did not justify his new exit strategy as a response to American casualties.
Nor did Clinton admit his framing of American responsibility in Somalia had been
misguided or overly broad, making the tasks difficult for US soldiers to successfully
deliver. Instead, Clinton argued America had delivered on the disaster relief objectives
152. John McCain, “Somalia–It is Time to Come Home,” Congressional Record 103rd Congress
(1993–1994), Senate, October 4, 1993, 12904; Tony P. Hall, “H.Res.293 - Providing for Consideration
of the Concurrent Resolution (H. Con. Res. 170) Directing the President Pursuant to Section 5(c)
of the War Powers Resolution to Remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31,
1994,” 103rd Congress (1993-1994) Resolution (Agreed to in House 1993).
153. A finding supported by Douglas Delaney: Delaney, “Cutting, Running, or Otherwise?”
154. Baum Matthew, “How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation
Restore Hope,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2004): 187–226.
155. William J. Clinton, Exchange With Reporters at Yale University in New Haven, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, October 9, 1993.
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Bush had initially set out for Restore Hope and thus American soldiers could leave
Somalia confident in knowing they achieved their noble goals. Clinton reminded his
constituents they had “saved close to one million lives” in Somalia and “starvation
is gone”, “none of [which] would have happened without American leadership and
American troops”.156 The problem was, of course, that the disaster relief goals had
been achieved long ago, so there was little reason to have kept American troops in
Somalia unless they had bigger moral responsibilities to fulfil. Clinton squared this
circle by arguing America’s existing success was fragile, which is why soldiers were
remaining rather than withdrawing immediately:
And make no mistake about it, if we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other
nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The relief effort would stop,
and starvation soon would return. . . . let us finish leaving Somalia on our own
terms and without destroying all that two administrations have accomplished
there. For, if we were to leave today, we know what would happen. Within
months, Somali children again would be dying in the streets.157
Clinton returned to the intractability of African problems to suggest Somalia’s
descent into crisis was inevitable without the US there to prevent it from happening.
The consequences of this hypothetical future would be catastrophic for Somalia
and the whole world because it would undermine the overall moral rightness of the
intervention and the credibility of America’s reformation mission:
Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our
leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people
are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold
War world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs, and terrorists will
conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people.
It would be open season on Americans.158
Clinton was “anxious” the mission end “honourably”,159 encapsulating this idea in
the phrase ‘doing the job right’.160
156. William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Somalia, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
October 7, 1993.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 6, 1993.
160. See also William J. Clinton, Remarks at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 12, 1993.
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I am committed to doing this job in Somalia, not only quickly but effec-
tively.. . . We started this mission for the right reasons, and we’re going to
finish it in the right way.. . . So let us finish the work we set out to do. Let us
demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us,
that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right.. . . If we take
these steps—if we take the time to do the job right—I am convinced we will
have lived up to the responsibilities of American leadership in the world. And
we will have proved that we are committed to addressing the new problems of
a new era.161 (Emphasis added.)
Setting a precise withdrawal date for US troops regardless of the outcome, however,
contradicted Clinton’s idea the US would indeed be staying in Somalia to “do the job
right”. Clinton acknowledged this point—“Obviously. . . there is no guarantee that
Somalia will rid itself of violence and suffering”—but this was acceptable because
Somalia was being given “a reasonable chance”.162
Clinton’s revised framing of Continue Hope was a rhetorical manoeuvre to redefine
victory in three ways. First, he argued victory no longer required US soldiers to fulfil
reform and conflict resolution objectives; Americans had done their part required
by the initial Resetore Hope and it was now up to Somalis to achieve political
transformation themselves, finding an “African solution to an African problem”.163
At times Clinton went so far as to attempt rewriting history, for example, claiming
in a letter to Congress on 13 October 1993 “the US military mission is not now
nor was it ever one of ‘nation building’” in Somalia.164 Second, Clinton argued the
humanitarian intervention was successful because America had done its best as a
responsible international citizen, acting with the “right motives”.165 It was enough
to have supported the UN mission and attempted to reform Somalia. Any mistakes
were in mission execution rather than in the nature of the mission itself:
[W]]hat happened was, after the Pakistani soldiers were killed and the UN
161. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Somalia.
162. Ibid.
163. William J. Clinton, Exchange With Reporters on Departure for New Brunswick, New Jersey,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 8, 1993; William J. Clinton, Remarks at a
Democratic National Committee Breakfast, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 8,
1993; Clinton, Exchange With Reporters at Yale University in New Haven.
164. William J. Clinton, Message to the Congress Transmitting a Report on Somalia, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, October 13, 1993.
165. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
October 14, 1993.
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passed the resolution saying that someone ought to be held accountable, at
the moment the United States was the only country capable of serving the
police function. You can say, “Well, we should have simply refused to do that
and said that was someone else’s problem”. Then the question would have
become, “Well, what kind of a friend is the United States?”166
Here Clinton admitted he struggled with the tension between fulfilling America’s
moral responsibility and assured exit. Clinton claimed it was impressive American
forces stayed in Somalia as long as they did; what some may criticise as mission
creep was actually a commitment to achieving victory:
[T]o stay a year and three months, four months, on a mission that was originally
touted as perhaps as short as two months is quite a long time and enough in
terms of the contribution that we have made in this area.167
Redefining victory this way allowed Clinton to maintain his rhetorical position that
whenever US troops withdrew it would be as victors. There was no mission failure,
only failures of the Somali people and the UN, and America trapped by its own good
intentions.
The US ‘surge’ in Somalia occurred in late October 1993 after Congress authorised
funding for continuing Continue Hope.168 An additional 1700 Army troops and
104 armoured vehicles were deployed but their force posture changed: all offensive
operations against Aidid were halted. Congress did not pass proposed amendments
to end the mission in Somalia immediately but provisions were inserted in Title IX
of the Defense Appropriations Act making future troop deployment to operations
like Somalia contingent on Congressional approval because “the United Nations has
not yet acquired the expertise or infrastructure to enable it to effectively manage
‘peace enforcement’ operations”.169 The Defense Appropriations Act also required the
president to obtain Congressional authorisation before placing American troops under
foreign command outside NATO. Clinton strongly opposed the Act’s power-limiting
166. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey ;
Clinton, The President’s News Conference, See also.
167. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey .
168. John P. Murtha, “H.R.3116 - Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994. Public Law
103-139,” 103rd Congress (1993-1994), November 11, 1993, See Senate Amendment 1042.
169. Ibid.
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amendments but did not veto it.170
In December 1993, the US Army escorted General Aidid out of Mogadishu to Ethiopia
to attend a peace conference on the future of Somalia. The peace process became the
focus of Clinton’s narrative about Somalia but he took no responsibility for its success
instead reminding Americans their soldiers could not “stay forever” in Somalia.171
Clinton did not waver in his scheduled March 1994 exit date. He defended potentially
withdrawing before the political conflict in Somalia was resolved, saying it was the
Somali people and not the flawed American mission that led to premature exit.
Five-thousand-three-hundred Continue Hope troops withdrew from Somalia by
25 March 1994, six days earlier than scheduled. One thousand American soldiers
remained past the 31 March 1994 deadline as part of UNOSOM II. Despite Clinton’s
eagerness to end America’s humanitarian intervention on his own terms, he remained
philosophically and practically committed to the wider UN mission. All remaining
American soldiers left Somalia on 15 September 1994.
Both these exit dates passed without Clinton commenting publicly about them.
However, in foreign policy statements, Clinton continued referring to the normative
expectations that influenced the Somalia humanitarian intervention: defeating evil
forces, reforming failed states and preventing atrocities. Clinton also released Presi-
dential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) outlining America’s policy for reforming
UN-initiated peace operations. PDD-25 explicitly made commitment to victory and
an exit strategy required justifications for America participating in humanitarian
interventions and peacekeeping operations. Among “factors to be considered” in
deploying force was ensuring “the role of US forces is tied to clear objectives and
an end point for US participation” with “the clear intention of decisively achieving
these objectives”.172 PDD-25 thus turned Bush and Clinton’s exit strategy discourse
170. William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Use of United States Armed Forces
in International Operations, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 18, 1993.
171. William J. Clinton, Interview With Larry King, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
January 20, 1994.
172. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, May 3, 1994.
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in Somalia into explicit government policy for future humanitarian interventions.173
Using language of decisive victory may appear to increase the certainty of an opera-
tion but, as I argued in Section 2.3, success in humanitarian interventions is more
complicated than trouncing an enemy.
US troops leaving Somalia coincided with UNSC members similarly deciding to
wrap up UNOSOM II. Throughout 1994 the Council passed a series of resolutions
incrementally increasing the length of UNOSOM II’s mission amidst expressions
of frustration regarding its lack of progress. The Clinton Administration voted in
favour of all of these resolutions except Resolution 946 from which it abstained on
the grounds it did not set a concrete end date.174 On 4 November 1994 the UNSC
did set an end date for UNOSOM II of 31 May 1995.175 Governments, including
the Clinton Administration, expressed irritation at what they considered Somalis’
unwillingness to be helped, undermining the mission and forcing its early conclusion.
The United Kingdom’s Ambassador, for example, summarised UNOSOM II as:
a sad story of noble aims subverted and undermined by a fundamental lack of
cooperation from those the United Nations went to help. Of course mistakes
have been made. But I fear that the biggest and most tragic mistake of all
has been the failure of Somali leaders to grasp the opportunity the United
Nations offered them to get out of the appalling impasse into which they had
manoeuvred themselves.176
Part of Clinton’s justification for American troop withdrawal—the incomprehensible
level of local resistance to receiving help made it no longer worth the investment—
became the justification for ending the entire UNOSOM II mission. UNSC members
supported Clinton’s portrayal of the intervention’s ultimate failure as the failure of
the Somali people to support the nation-building project presented to them.177 The
173. Boys, “A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991-
1993),” 8; Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,”
Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 2.
174. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 946, September 30, 1994; United Nations Security
Council, 3432nd Meeting S/PV.3432 (United Nations Security Council, September 30, 1994), 4.
175. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 954, November 4, 1994.
176. United Nations Security Council, 3447th Meeting S/PV.3447 (New York, USA: United Nations
Security Council, November 4, 1994), 15.
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US and the vast majority of UNSC members publicly persisted with arguing they
had discharged their moral responsibility in Somalia even if the outcome was not as
intended. Only China admitted the UNSC overreached in applying Chapter VII
measures to a humanitarian crisis and expanding into a nation-building endeavour.
All UNOSOM II forces departed Somalia by 25 March 1995. To help withdraw the
remaining UN troops from Somalia, 1800 US troops were redeployed on 27 February
1995 as part of Operation Quick Draw. This deployment received scant comment
from Clinton who only mentioned it in a letter to Congress in which he described it as
part of America’s international responsibility and “long-standing commitment to UN
humanitarian efforts in Somalia”.178 Clinton did, however, say this latest deployment
would be short but necessary. In keeping with his narrative that American needed to
save Somalia from itself, Clinton argued America needed to stop heavy weapons and
other equipment used by foreign troops from falling into the hands of Somali militia.
Despite Somalis’ unwillingness to be helped, America would still discharge the moral
responsibility it assumed in 1992 to prevent “further harm” to the Somali people.179
6.8 Conclusion
I began this chapter with a quote providing perhaps one of the best summations of the
problems Bush and Clinton faced in creating, justifying and implementing a viable
exit strategy for Somalia. Among other things, Clinton’s comment shows mission
creep does not provide a full explanation of the failures of America’s humanitarian
intervention in Somalia. Although significant, the Battle of Mogadishu does not
provide a complete explanation for changing exit strategies throughout all phases of
the intervention, and the persistent rhetorical and practical difficulties two presidents
had implementing them.
178. William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Deployment of United States Troops
to Somalia, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 1, 1995.
179. Ibid.
Finishing the job 226
Chapter 6. Somalia Anna Samson
America started its Somalia intervention while already in the middle of another
humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq and experiences in Provide Comfort
I and II influenced Bush and Clinton’s approach to Restore Hope and Continue
Hope. First, conviction in the success of the northern Iraq intervention contributed
to Bush believing Somalia was ‘doable’; the ability to successfully impose US will
through military force was almost unquestioned domestically and internationally.
Second, the UN transition exit strategy in Somalia was almost exactly like that
attempted in Provide Comfort. Third, apparent success with the reform and political
transformation aspects of Provide Comfort, provided succour for believing similar
gains could be achieved elsewhere. Although occurring in different parts of the world
and in the context of different humanitarian crises, American interventions in Iraq
and Somalia were grounded in similar normative expectations of US foreign policy
behaviour. Bush and Clinton’s decisions in Somalia, including those about when and
how to withdraw troops, were constrained as much by internalised ideas of American
responsibility and the importance of succeeding in this mission as they were by the
battlefield conditions.
Presidential discourse in the Somalia humanitarian intervention reveals three new
insights about the challenges American presidents face in crafting and justifying exit
strategies. First, success discourse—speaking about success as much as delivering
‘concrete’ indicators of success—is integral to justifying exit, in part because victory
promises imminent exit. Indeed, America’s experiences in Somalia and the difficulties
in delivering ‘victory’ contributed to Clinton introducing victory criteria into US exit
strategy doctrine and encouraging the UN to do the same.
Second, exit strategies play an important role in the president’s overall discourse
about a humanitarian intervention. Outlining an exit strategy demonstrates an
intervention is worth pursuing because there is a plan to remove troops; it address
concerns about quagmires and a Vietnam War redux. Outlining an exit strategy
also demonstrates the president’s belief victory is possible; it acts as a promise
American troops will succeed. Making the rhetorical case for success is important
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because it vindicates the moral rightness of and therefore public support for the
intervention,180 and it makes exit justifiable under conditions of victory. This helps
explain why Clinton found it so difficult to talk about American failures in Somalia
when discussing exit strategies after the Battle of Mogadishu; he found it preferable
to re-frame what constituted success, even if it meant contradicting his previous
statements.
Countenancing exit after defeat or failure violates American collective narrative
frameworks of exceptionalism, the nobility of US soldiers, and the importance
of winning, especially in humanitarian interventions because traditional strategic
interests are not dominant professed motivations for military action. At the same
time, however, normative ideas of the ‘right thing to do’ affect whether or not
victory can be achieved, what the costs will be and how long it will take, all of
which affect the viability of an exit strategy. All these feedback loops make it
very difficult to simultaneously fulfil all normative expectations in a humanitarian
intervention. Ironically, perhaps, in their efforts to avoid the Vietnam Syndrome,
Bush and Clinton created the ‘Somalia Syndrome’, which would affect presidential
exit strategy justifications in subsequent humanitarian interventions.
Third, Somalia reinforces the experience in northern Iraq that a UN transition
exit strategy for humanitarian intervention is difficult to realise because it relies
on the UN being practically and politically ready to take over from the US.181
The UN has a different mandate and strategic objectives to the US regarding
humanitarian intervention so may not continue intervention in the way the American
president hopes. It is hard to simultaneously distance America from an intervention
by handing it over, and control how it progresses. In addition, the nature of the
moral responsibilities the president assumes in a humanitarian intervention makes it
difficult to convincingly claim a UN handover absolves America from fulfilling these
responsibilities itself; thus mission success or failure will reflect on America even
after it has putatively relinquished these responsibilities to the UN.
180. Klarevas, “The Polls Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia.”
181. Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” 66.
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Somalia had other impacts on the way Clinton and later President Barack Obama
approached exit strategies in subsequent humanitarian interventions. After Somalia,
Clinton committed to sticking for as long as possible with an operational disen-
gagement exit strategy, which meant limiting from the outset America’s operational
approach to intervention. Given the shortcomings of the UN transition exit strategy
in Somalia and Iraq, transferring responsibility for US humanitarian intervention
to a regional organisation, over which the US can exercise more influence, rather
than the UN became a standard approach for exit strategies from humanitarian
interventions.182 Thus in the next humanitarian intervention I examine in this thesis—
Kosovo—Clinton relied almost exclusively on an aerial bombing campaign and his
exit strategy combined operational disengagement with a transition to EU authorities.
Obama would similarly seek to hand over his Libyan intervention to NATO.
182. Recchia, “Pragmatism over Principle.”
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CHAPTER 7
Striking the Noble Anvil in Kosovo
(1999–)
In recent years, the military had adopted a politically
potent term for assignments they felt were too broad:
‘mission creep’. This was a powerful pejorative, conjuring up
images of quagmire. But it was never clearly defined, only
invoked, and always in a negative sense, used only to kill
someone else’s proposal.
Richard Holbrooke
Dayton Accords chief negotiator
7.1 Introduction
If America’s humanitarian intervention in Somalia is best known for its failures,
America’s intervention in Kosovo is known for its successes. Much of the scholarly
and popular preoccupation with Kosovo focuses on the reasons for participating in the
Kosovo intervention and its conduct, particularly the challenges the intervention posed
to international sovereignty norms and what it means to fight a just war.1 Scholars
1. David N. Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of
Yugoslavia (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009); Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur,
eds., “Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective
Action and International Citizenship” (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000).
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generally view Kosovo as a turning point in the historical development and practise of
humanitarian intervention, directly contributing to the introduction of responsibility
to protect (R2P) principles.2 In addition to questions of legitimacy, there is a small
but growing literature on the implications the US/NATO intervention had for the
long-term political situation in Kosovo.3 A small number of scholars have also looked
at the public discourse surrounding the intervention but most contributions examine
media coverage of intervention rather than its public justifications.4
Although generally considered a ‘successful’ intervention, there are very few studies
discussing the development and execution of America’s (or for that matter NATO’s)
exit strategy in Kosovo, none particularly detailed.5 Contributions broaching the
question of exit generally argue neither Clinton nor his NATO counterparts, hav-
ing challenged Serbian President Milosevic to call their diplomatic bluff, correctly
anticipated exactly how the Kosovo intervention would pan out. In this chapter I
look beyond the ‘muddling through’ explanation for Clinton’s approach to his exit
strategy in Kosovo. I argue normative expectations of how America should respond
to a mass atrocity—particularly one occurring in the same geographic region Clinton
had authorised US forces to intervene four years earlier—constrained Clinton’s exit
decision-making. I show Clinton’s initial promise of a simple operational disengage-
ment exit was complicated by his concerns America’s moral responsibilities in the
intervention were unfulfilled. Thus Clinton struggled to explain to the American
people when the mission had succeeded sufficiently to justify troops returning home.
America’s Kosovo intervention reveals the practical and rhetorical tension between
2. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society ; Robert C.
DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Baltimore:
JHU Press, 2002); Alex J. Bellamy, “Kosovo and the Advent of Sovereignty as Responsibility,”
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 2 (2009): 163–84.
3. Mark Webber, “The Kosovo War: A Recapitulation,” International Affairs 85, no. 3 (2009): 447–
59; Julie A. Mertus, “Operation Allied Force: Handmaiden of Independent Kosovo,” International
Affairs 85, no. 3 (2009): 461–76.
4. See, for example Danielle S. Sremac, War of Words: Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict
(Westport: Praeger, 1999); Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman, eds., Degraded Capability:
The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (Pluto Press, 2000); Chiara DeFranco, Media Power and the
Transformation of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
5. A general overview of the options for exit can be found in Michael Codner, “Bringing an End
to an Old-Fashioned War?,” RUSI Journal, 1999, 9–14; See also Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E.
O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
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achieving sustainable victory in a humanitarian intervention and assuring the Ameri-
can people troops will withdraw. Although Clinton eventually opted for a similar
transition exit strategy pursued in the preceding Iraq and Somalia interventions, in
Kosovo, Clinton initially tried a different type of transition exit to NATO rather
than the UN. In addition, unlike Somalia, Clinton expressly refused to provide a
timetable for troop withdrawal instead outlining general goals for American troops
to achieve. Although this potentially allowed more scope for the president to define
victory, the broad nature of the goals also made it difficult to demonstrate sufficient
victory to justify exit.
As in previous chapters, I begin this chapter with the rhetorical context for the
intervention and then divide my analysis into three phases of the intervention itself.
First pre-intervention, where Clinton framed Kosovo’s humanitarian crisis as a moral
concern to which America had a responsibility to respond with military action. Even
though US troops were yet to be deployed, Clinton presented an exit strategy for
any hypothetical intervention contingent on America succeeding in its moral quest
to stop the atrocity. The intensity of America’s moral obligation, however, meant
the idea America would not intervene in Kosovo was beyond the realm of imagined
possibilities. In the second phase, Clinton commenced Operation Noble Anvil, part
of NATO’s Operation Allied Force, arguing America’s intervention was contingent
on there being an implementable exit strategy for US forces. For Clinton this meant
an aerial campaign and no ground forces because this allowed for an operational
disengagement exit strategy, but also the possibility of transitioning the operation
to NATO. Implementing the exit became difficult, however, as Clinton also argued
US forces could only justifiably exit when they stopped the atrocities, protected
the Kosovo Albanians and defeated those who threatened to commit human rights
violations; wide moral responsibilities that arguably neither lent themselves to short,
aerial engagements nor could be oﬄoaded to other NATO countries to fulfil without
US assistance.
I explore how the contradictions between these exit strategy expectations ultimately
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compromised Clinton’s ability to fully implement his exit strategy and meant although
Clinton ended Allied Force, he immediately replaced it with Operation Joint Guardian.
In this third phase Clinton justified his failure to implement his initial exit strategy
on the basis American success to date was fragile and did not constitute sufficient
victory to justify exit. Instead Clinton argued for deeper involvement, deploying
ground forces to Kosovo to guarantee peace and prevent the resurgence of ethnic
violence in accordance with America’s moral duty and to ensure US victory was
sustainable.
In examining Clinton’s exit strategy dynamics in this chapter, I demonstrate the
challenges normative expectations of American military intervention poses to efforts
to adhere to an exit strategy primarily because moral responsibilities make operational
limits hard to sustain. Clinton’s attempt to implement a transition exit strategy,
although configured differently to previous efforts in Iraq and Somalia, still did not
enable US troops to withdraw easily or completely. Despite these problems with exit,
however, Clinton and later President Obama considered Kosovo a sound model for
American humanitarian interventions and military responses to mass atrocities.
7.2 The rhetorical context
The war in Kosovo began in March 1998 between the newly-established Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) fighting for an independent Kosovo Albanian territory, and
the Serbian government led by President Slobodan Milosevic, that had progressively
reduced the Albanian provinces’ autonomy since 1990.6 The conflict was the latest
in the conflagrations accompanying the disintegration of Yugoslavia following the
death of President Tito and the end of the Cold War. In 1995 America conducted
a humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, to arrest a humanitarian crisis arising from
three years of widespread human rights abuses and genocidal violence occurring
6. For more detail on the historical antecedents of the conflict see: R. J. Crampton, The Balkans
Since the Second World War (London: Routledge, 2002).
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under the direction of President Milosevic. The humanitarian intervention succeeded
in concluding the Dayton Accords peace agreement. At the time of the Kosovo
intervention American forces were stationed in Bosnia as part of the Implementation
Force (IFOR) as well as in Macedonia as part of United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR).
In the first year of fighting in Kosovo more than 2000 people were killed and 400,000
civilians were displaced with widespread reports of genocidal violence like that
witnessed in wars across Bosnia-Herzegovina. These so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’
crimes were predominantly perpetrated against the Kosovar Albanians by Serbian
armed forces.7 On 13 October 1998, NATO’s peak decision-making body, the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) authorised activation orders for US-led airstrikes, as well as
Russia’s diplomatic negotiations between Serbian authorities and Kosovo insurgents.
These combined diplomatic and deterrence efforts culminated in the Rambouillet
Peace Accord. During the negotiations for the peace agreement, Clinton proposed
contributing 4000 American personnel as peacekeepers, enforcing the autonomy
provisions of the accord. The KLA signed the agreement on 18 March 1999 but the
Serbs and Russians rejected it. Violence and war crimes continued unabated.
Back home, Clinton survived an impeachment attempt in December 1998 following
revelations he lied about his extra-marital affair with White House intern Monica
Lewinski. Now in his second and final term of office, Clinton was eager to ensure
his presidency was not defined by the Lewinski scandal, the Somalia intervention
shortcomings, inadequate responses to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, or the possibility
the Yugoslavian situation would spread and destabilise other parts of central Europe.
7. Greg Campbell, The Road to Kosovo: A Balkan Diary (Boulder: Basic Books, 1999), The
report of the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia also provides a detailed
narrative and results of the investigation of war crimes committed during the Kosovo war and the
associated conflicts. Matthew McAllester, Beyond the Mountains of the Damned: The War Inside
Kosovo (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Gilles Peress Fred Abrahams Eric Stover,
A Village Destroyed, May 14, 1999: War Crimes in Kosovo (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2002); Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and
the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Ken Booth, ed., The Kosovo Tragedy: The
Human Rights Dimensions, International Journal of Human Rights, 4 vols., 2–3 (London: Frank
Cass, 2001).
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Although he enjoyed some success with his military intervention to restore President
Aristide to office in Haiti in 1994, and with the intervention in Bosnia in 1995, Clinton
could not shake the criticism he lacked a coherent or effective foreign policy. At
the same time, the Republican Party enjoyed majorities in both houses of Congress
for the first time since the 1950s, driving impeachment proceedings and displaying
increasing hostility towards Clinton’s domestic and foreign policy agendas.8
7.3 Talking about exit before intervention
Even before a single US soldier was engaged in America’s humanitarian intervention
in Kosovo, Clinton was already talking about his exit strategy. In keeping with the
policy commitments he made after Somalia, including those contained in Presidential
Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), Clinton doubled down on making an implementable
exit strategy a prerequisite for commencing humanitarian intervention. This com-
mitment to meeting domestic expectations for an assured exit for American troops
strongly influenced the operational choices Clinton saw as available to him for the
mooted intervention in Kosovo. Clinton decided on a dual operational disengagement
and NATO transition exit strategy as his exit plan and this choice lent itself to
an exclusively aerial operation. This operational approach would enable the US to
immediately withdraw its forces as soon as the mission succeeded. Clinton argued
an operational disengagement exit would address domestic concerns about Kosovo
repeating the errors of Somalia by becoming a quagmire or unduly risking the lives
of US troops like Somalia.
While an aerial campaign was consistent with exit strategy expectations, relying
exclusively on strategic bombing risked not satisfying the moral obligations Clinton
argued were incumbent upon the US in the context of the humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo. Clinton agreed America should meet expectations to stop human rights
8. Julie Kim, Kosovo and the 106th Congress, Report for Congress (Congressional Research
Service, The Library of Congress, 2001).
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atrocities and protect Kosovo Albanians by defeating their evil Serbian oppressors.
But Clinton also argued America should spearhead wider political reform as a bulwark
against a return to violence in the future. In this section I show the problem was
fulfilling expectations regarding the level of success necessary to fully discharge
America’s moral responsibilities. These expectations conflicted with the expectation
for quick troop withdrawal, thus complicating Clinton’s exit strategy.
From the outset Clinton embraced the expectation America should intervene in this
new war in the Balkans because it had a moral responsibility to do so. Unlike the
previous interventions in Iraq and Somalia that I cover in this thesis, Clinton did
not start by framing American responsibility in narrow terms limited to providing
disaster relief or halting an ongoing atrocity. Instead, Clinton began by arguing
America had a responsibility to prevent Serbian forces committing atrocities against
the Kosovar Albanians and was clear any exit strategy was contingent on American
troops successfully preventing atrocities.
Clinton repeatedly singled out Milosevic as an evil force, “standing in the way
of peace”,9 and labelled Milosevic’s decision to engage Serbian forces in a war as
“crazy”.10 Clinton also implored the Serbian leader not to persist in “intransigence
and aggression”,11 “choose aggression over peace”12 or “continue aggression with
impunity”.13 Despite the violence occurring in the context of a civil war, Clinton
argued there was “no moral equivalence” between the Serbian forces and Kosovar
Albanians in this armed conflict.14 America, therefore, needed to be on the side of
the oppressed Kosovar Albanians and defeat the evil Serb leader.
Clinton also used the language of atrocity to highlight Milosevic’s abject evilness
9. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 19, 1999.
10. William J. Clinton, Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an
Exchange, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 11, 1999.
11. William J. Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions With NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 15, 1999.
12. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Situation in Kosovo, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 22, 1999.
13. Ibid.
14. Clinton, Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange.
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and explain why America’s moral responsibility to halt the violence was rightly
activated. Clinton talked about “terrible killings in one village in Kosovo that
were precipitated [sic] by the Serbs”;15 “bloodshed”,16 “massacres”,17 “killing”,18
Milosevic’s “repression”19 and “unquestioned record of atrocity”,20 and “innocent
men, women, and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the
dirt, sprayed with gunfire, not because of anything they had done but because of
who they were”.21 Clinton argued America was able to stop more atrocities from
occurring and therefore it had a responsibility to do so:
Our firmness is the only thing standing between [Kosovar civilians] and count-
less more villages like Racˇak, full of people without protection. . . Make no
mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more
massacres.22
At this stage, Clinton’s view was at odds with his NATO counterparts. NATO’s
President Javier Solana repeatedly framed the crisis in Kosovo as a “humanitarian
catastrophe”23 but he refused to hold Serbian leaders exclusively responsible for
the violence, saying “both the Belgrade authorities and the Kosovo armed elements
are not respecting the ceasefire”.24 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
took a similar position to NATO. At its meeting of 19 January 1999, the UNSC
issued a statement condemning Serbian government forces for the massacre of at
least 45 Kosovo Albanian civilians found in a mass grave in the village of Racˇak.The
15. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema
of Italy, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, Washington
D.C., March 5, 1999.
16. Clinton, Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange.
17. Clinton, The President’s News Conference; William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Legislative
Convention of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 23, 1999.
18. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With President Jacques Chirac of France,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 19, 1999.
19. William J. Clinton, Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, February 26, 1999; Clinton, The President’s News Conference With
Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema of Italy .
20. Clinton, The President’s News Conference.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. NATO, “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo. NATO Press Release (99)12 -
30 Jan. 1999,” January 30, 1999, accessed April 16, 2017; Javier Solana, “Statement by the NATO
Secretary-General Dr Javier Solana on behalf of the North Atlantic Council: NATO Press Release
(99)020,” February 19, 1999; Javier Solana, “NATO: Its 50th Anniversary - The Washington Summit
- The Next Century,” January 25, 1999.
24. Javier Solana, “NATO’s Agenda towards the Washington Summit,” January 11, 1999.
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Council had adopted three resolutions the previous year imposing an arms embargo
on Yugoslavia, calling for a ceasefire in the conflict, and for UN-led verification
missions in Kosovo.25 The UNSC did not consider the incident worthy of a foreign
military response because it was no threat to international peace and security. In
another meeting held 10 days later the UNSC issued a statement expressing its
“deep concern at the escalating violence in Kosovo”,26 noting the attacks on civilians.
Although acknowledging the “risk of a further deterioration in the humanitarian
situation if steps are not taken by the parties to reduce tensions”, again the Council
did not identify Milosevic’s culpability or argue the situation constituted a threat to
international peace and security sufficient to justify foreign military intervention.27
The tempered international response to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo did not
moderate Clinton’s rhetoric. As President Bush did in the Iraq and Somalia inter-
ventions, Clinton drew an analogy between the Kosovo War and WWII, activating
the political myth of WWII as a just war America was right to fight:
We have learned that if we do not contain conflict in Europe, it will spread,
and we will pay a far higher price to deal with it down the road.28
Clinton would return to this comparison to WWII throughout the Kosovo inter-
vention. It was also an image that later underpinned Clinton’s rhetoric about the
mission success parameters justifying troop withdrawal.
Clinton’s argument for fulfilling American moral responsibilities was not without
limits, however; Clinton recognised the other expectations for any military response
to Kosovo required the assurance of troop withdrawal before US troops were deployed:
NATO’s mission must be well-defined, with a clear and realistic strategy to
allow us to bring our forces home when their work is done.29
25. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1203: S/RES/1203, October 24, 1998; United
Nations Security Council, Resolution 1160: S/RES/1160, March 31, 1998; United Nations Security
Council, Resolution 1199: S/RES/1199, September 23, 1998.
26. United Nations Security Council, Minutes of the 3974th Meeting: S/PV.3974, technical report
(UN Security Countil, January 29, 1999).
27. Ibid.
28. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema of Italy .
29. William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
February 13, 1999.
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Clinton never resolved this tension between the expectations military intervention
would stop the atrocities and the expectation US troops needed a guaranteed exit,
leading to contradictory rhetoric. On the one hand, Clinton did not accept they
were competing expectations saying “the exit strategy should be defined by the
missions; You will be able to see that we have an exit strategy if we define the
missions properly”.30 At other times, Clinton admitted the contradiction between
planning a viable, rapid exit strategy on the one hand, and responding in a timely
and effective way to a mass atrocity on the other:
So I can just tell you that I think that we have tried to limit our involvement,
we have tried to limit our mission, and we will conclude it as quickly as we
can. I think that in all these cases, you have to ask yourself, what will be the
cost and the duration of involvement and the consequences if we do not move.
And I have asked myself that question as well.31
To the extent it was contradictory, it was unclear which expectations Clinton believed
should take primacy, or how he proposed to balance the two, instead allowing the
contradiction to sit, unresolved, in his rehtoric:
[W]e must have a NATO strategy that includes a clear plan for bringing our
forces home. If, and only if, these conditions are met, I strongly believe United
States forces should contribute to securing the peace in Kosovo. We have a
strong stake in bringing peace there, just as we have a strong stake in peace
in Central America. If we don’t end the conflict now, it will spread; and when
it does, we will not be able to avoid participating in stopping it; and when we
do, it will come at far greater risk and far greater cost.32
Although statements like these are confusingly imprecise, when coupled with Clinton’s
repeated statements ruling out deploying ground forces in Kosovo, I argue they show
a president trying to discursively reconcile competing expectations to ‘do something’
to stop an atrocity while avoiding a Vietnam War-style quagmire or a situation like
Somalia where American troops cannot return home victorious.
Clinton acknowledged planning for a rapid exit from a humanitarian intervention
is particularly hard when exit is contingent on mission success. Clinton argued it
30. Clinton, Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange.
31. Clinton, The President’s News Conference.
32. Clinton, Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange.
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would be “wrong” to “make an open-ended commitment” of US troops to Kosovo
but he also did not want to make a mistake about signalling when exit would occur
in case he was unable to meet his own timetable:
. . . I don’t want to get in the position in Kosovo that I was in in Bosnia, where
the Pentagon came to me with a very honest estimate of when they thought
we could finish. And we turned out to be wrong about that. We were not able
to stabilise the situation as quickly as we thought we could.33
Clinton’s concern about the desire for victory limiting exit options was based on his
experiences in Bosnia but again, his moral responsibility-victory-exit nexus message
was contradictory. Clinton maintained the Bosnian intervention successfully stopped
atrocities but also that Kosovo was essentially a repeat of the Bosnian crisis. Hence
intervention was required to:
avoid the level of atrocity and death that we saw in Bosnia. We didn’t want
to go down that road again. We wanted to dramatically shorten the timetable
from aggression and the loss of innocent life and upheaval to action.34
My intention would be to do whatever is possible, first of all, to weaken
[Milosevic’s] ability to massacre them, to have another Bosnia.35
While Clinton argued Bosnia was a success because troops had been withdrawn
rapidly after the intervention,36 he also said success in Kosovo meant reinforcing the
wins in Bosnia and ensuring there would not be yet another outbreak of violence:
“[P]art of my responsibility is to try to leave to my successors and to our country in the
21st century an environment in Europe that is stable, humane and secure.”37 These
longer-term goals had clearly not been secured by the humanitarian intervention
in Bosnia; indeed it was why US troops remained involved in Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) and then IFOR. Clinton acknowledged sustainable mission success required
willingness to sacrifice a rapid, timetabled exit strategy, or as Clinton explained:
So we decided in Kosovo the right thing to do was to say what the benchmarks
of the mission would be. . . but we wouldn’t mislead [Congress] about knowing
in advance exactly how long it would take.38
Clinton argued the hypothetical future in which the US did not militarily intervene
in Kosovo soon was nothing short of catastrophic and much more dangerous than
the risks Americans would not return home quickly:
33. Clinton, The President’s News Conference.
34. Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions With NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and an
Exchange With Reporters.
35. Clinton, The President’s News Conference.
36. Clinton, Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange.
37. Clinton, The President’s News Conference.
38. Clinton, Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange.
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Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will
be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a
license to kill.39
If we don’t act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not be able to contain
it without far greater risk and cost. . . . I’m convinced we’ll be dragged into
this thing under worse circumstances, at greater cost if we don’t act.40
This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much more. This is a conflict with
no natural boundaries. It threatens our national interests. If it continues,
it will push refugees across borders and draw in neighbouring countries. It
will undermine the credibility of NATO, on which stability in Europe and
our own credibility depend. It will likely reignite the historical animosities,
including those that can embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey.
These divisions still have the potential to make the next century a truly violent
one for that part of the world that straddles Europe, Asia, and the Middle
East.41
Clinton’s concept of ‘cost’, however, was not limited to the risk to American lives,
but also the moral cost of standing by while people were killed. Thus Clinton argued:
I would hate to think that we’d have to see a lot of other little children die
before we could do what seems to be, to me, clearly the right thing to do to
prevent it.42
I do not believe that we ought to have to have thousands more people slaugh-
tered and buried in open soccer fields before we do something. I think that
would be unfortunate if we had said we have to have a lot more victims before
we can stop what we know is about to happen.43
. . . whenever we can stop a humanitarian disaster at an acceptable price, we
ought to do it. . . we ought to do what we can to prevent further atrocities. . . I
think that would be unfortunate if we had said we have to have a lot more
victims before we can stop what we know is about to happen.44
What we see in this pre-intervention phase of the Kosovo intervention, therefore,
is a president expressing conflicting rhetoric about exit strategy expectations for
humanitarian intervention, the product of trying to resolve irreconcilable tensions
between intervention expectations. On the one hand, Clinton made exit a pre-requisite
for deploying troops; on the other hand, Clinton was also committed to intervening
militarily to halt mass atrocities because this was the right foreign policy response.
From the very early stages of the Kosovo intervention, therefore, expectations for an
39. Clinton, The President’s News Conference.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
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implementable exit strategy existed in rhetorical tension with normative expectations
of American responsibility to defeat evil and stop human rights atrocities, and the
expectation America should not exit without having succeeded in its mission.
Clinton’s domestic audience shared Clinton’s concern that any slated humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo needed the assurance of troop withdrawal but there was
also the moral responsibility to ‘do something’ to halt the atrocities. Republican
congressional members introduced a bill to both houses on 8 March 1999 to block
funding for any future humanitarian intervention that did not first receive congres-
sional approval. The concurrent resolution passed the House of Representatives but
not the Senate and required Clinton to provide Congress with details of America’s
“military exit strategy that would control the withdrawal of United States Armed
Forces personnel from Kosovo” as well as a “timeframe” for withdrawal, before the
president deployed troops.45 Congressional debate provided a platform for members
to argue publicly about what Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott (R-Miss) said
were “significant reservations”46 about the president authorising troop deployment
without a clear exit strategy for American troops. Republican House Whip Tom
DeLay used the Vietnam War quagmire trope to describe the risk American forces
faced in another Balkan mission.47
Other resolutions introduced into both the House of Representatives variously at-
tempted placing limits on Clinton’s authority to deploy troops to Kosovo. None
of these resolutions were passed by both Houses of Congress.48 Some Republican
45. Benjamin A. Gilman, “H.Con.Res.42 - Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution,” 106th
Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
46. Bradley Graham, “Serbs Warned Of NATO Strikes; Kosovo Mediators Set to End Talks,” The
Washington Post, March 19, 1999,
47. Tom DeLay, “Autonomy for Kosovo Isn’t Worth American Blood,” The Wall Street Journal,
March 9, 1999, A22.
48. Tillie Fowler, “H.Con.Res.343 - Expressing the opposition of Congress to any deployment
of United States ground forces in Kosovo, a province in southern Serbia, for peacemaking or
peacekeeping purposes,” 105th Congress (1997-1998) Resolution (Introduced 1998); Tillie Fowler,
“H.Con.Res.29 - Expressing the opposition of Congress to any deployment of United States ground
forces in Kosovo, a province in the Republic of Serbia, for peacemaking or peacekeeping purposes,”
106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999); Ron Paul, “H.R.647 - To prohibit the
use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of
United States Armed Forces in Kosovo unless that deployment is specifically authorized by Law,”
106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
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Congress members argued Serbian actions had not yet reached the “threshold” of an
atrocity worthy of US intervention, warning that after Somalia, Americans would
have a low tolerance for the “high potential of American men and women coming
home in body bags”.49 Nevertheless, Congress’ overwhelming concern was Clinton’s
ability to guarantee an implementable exit plan; during the first day of debate on
H.Con.Res.42, for example, Representatives referred to the need for a ‘exit strategy’
42 times.
Exit strategy concerns and uncertainty were amplified in the opinion pages of major
US newspapers, including the traditionally liberal The Washington Post, which
published commentary calling for “clarity of purpose” in Kosovo in the face of “very
uncertain ends”.50 Not all commentary published in the elite media focused on reasons
to be cautious about humanitarian intervention, however. There were a number of
pieces supporting intervention because American responsibility to stop atrocities
in Europe was paramount and should trump concerns about mission duration and
viable exit strategies. The Washington Post editors tended to agree, responding “so
what?” to concerns America may need to plan for a long-term military commitment
in Kosovo, which they acknowledged “could prove to be a quagmire”.51 For them,
a Kosovo intervention would be just the latest military operation in the history of
America safeguarding democracy in Europe. Activating the American exceptionalism
trope, the editors argued America “should indeed have an exit strategy for its
deployments: It should bring the troops home once democracy is secure”.52 The
editors failed, however, to indicate exactly when America would know democracy
was ‘secure’.
Nevertheless, domestic critics of the mooted intervention rarely criticised Clinton’s
49. Senate Assistant Majority Leader Dan Nickles (R-Okla) and Senator John. W. Warner
(R-Va) quoted in Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational
Assessment (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), The Congress members made these statements following
a briefing they received from the President on 19 March 1999, which the President followed with a
press conference.
50. Robert B. Zoellick and John Hillen, “. . . A Little Clarity of Purpose, Please,” The Washington
Post, March 17, 1999, A27.
51. Editorial, “The Right Exit Strategy,” The Washington Post, March 21, 1999,
52. Ibid.
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argument America had a moral interest in stopping atrocities or resolving the Kosovo
war, or that such an intervention would be inconsistent with normative expectations
of an American response. Rather they questioned whether the atrocities were
sufficient to trigger those normative expectations and the ability of the US to respond
militarily in a way that ensured sustained victory with an assured promise of troop
withdrawal.The New York Times presented the Racˇak massacre, for example, not as
an atrocity but rather as characteristic of a “surge” of violence accompanying another
Balkan war.53 When elite media began reporting increasing violence against civilians
in mid-March 1999, reports noted all parties to the conflict, not just Milosevic’s
forces bore some responsibility.54 There were thus domestic concerns from the outset
as to whether America was ’right’ to intervene in Kosovo, but this discussion was
grounded in expectations that America would have a responsibility to intervene if
the human rights abuses were indeed severe. To the extent that this debate affected
Clinton’s talk about his exit strategy, it was in in Clinton’s arguments that US troops
would be victorious against war criminals and return home soon after.
7.4 Justifying exit in Noble Anvil
On 23 March 1999, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana echoed Clinton’s framing
of the Kosovo crisis and declared NATO had a “moral duty” to “do what is necessary”
and “stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe”.55 Solana
announced NATO members would implement the organisation’s 1998 activation
order, beginning a humanitarian intervention to “stop the violence and bring an
53. Carlotta Gall, “US Official Sees ‘Collision Course’ in Kosovo Dispute,” The New York Times,
March 10, 1999, Jane Perlez, “US Hope is Slim as Talks Restart on Kosovo Crisis,” The New York
Times, March 15, 1999, The Washington Post did, however, suggest later in March that the incident
was a war crime Jeffrey Smith, “Kosovo Killings Called a Massacre; Some Victims Shot While on
Their Knees,” The Washington Post, March 17, 1999,
54. See for example The Washington Post and The New York Times’ report on bombings in
civilian areas prior to peace talks Peter Finn, “3 Bombs Shake Kosovo on Eve of New Talks,” The
Washington Post, March 14, 1999, Carlotta Gall, “Bombs Kill 6 in Kosovo Markets as Leaders
Depart for Paris Talks,” The New York Times, March 14, 1999,
55. Javier Solana, Press Statement - by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, March 23,
1999.
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end to the humanitarian catastrophe” as well as “prevent more human suffering and
more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo”.56
Despite US Senators’ earlier hand-wringing, a majority supported Senator Joe Biden’s
(D-DE) concurrent resolution on 23 March 1999 authorising Clinton to deploy Ameri-
can forces to NATO’s operation, but limited their actions to “military air operations
and missile strikes”.57 The resolution was not voted on in the House of Representatives
until April 1999, however, leaving Clinton without a clear congressional mandate to
launch an intervention in Kosovo. Regardless, the following day, Clinton announced
America would commence Operation Noble Anvil as part of NATO’s Operation
Allied Force. Although part of a coalition, US forces led the bombing campaign.
The majority of the 1000 aircraft deployed in the operation were American and
US troops flew more than 75 percent (30,018) of the approximately total 40,000
sorties in the operation,58 The Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces was
also an American, General Wesley Clark. Although some scholars have noted the
difficulties in committee-type operational decision-making because a coalition was
responsible for Allied Force,59 as the single biggest contributor to the operation,
America exercised disproportionate influence over operational decisions.
During this phase of the humanitarian intervention Clinton continued his efforts
to balance the normative expectations of intervention to fulfil America’s moral
responsibilities with assured troop withdrawal and the expectation the US mission
would end in victory for US troops. As in the Iraq and Somalia humanitarian
interventions, Clinton’s operational approach lent itself to his exit strategy: an
exclusively aerial operation theoretically allowed for operational disengagement. In
56. Solana, Press Statement - by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO , See also the
NATO statements issued on 24 March 1999, 25 March 1999 and 27 March 1999.
57. Joseph R. Biden, “S.Con.Res.21 - A concurrent resolution authorizing the President of the
United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
58. Gregory Ball, “1999–Operation Allied Force,” in The US Air Force in the Air War over
Serbia, 1999, ed. Daniel L. Haulman (1999); Steve Bowman, Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and
Allied MilitaryOperations, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, research report (Congressional Research
Service, 2003).
59. Bruce Nardulli, Walter L. Perry, and Bruce R. Pirni, Disjointed War: Military Operations in
Kosovo (RAND, 2002).
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this section I argue Clinton’s exit justifications during this time demonstrate an
inter-relationship between exit strategy options and operational choices. Clinton
persisted with aerial bombardment even when bombing was not delivering its intended
results, choosing to support widening and intensifying the bombing campaign to
the point the humanitarian nature of the intervention became questionable.60 Given
his unwillingness to modify his operational disengagement exit strategy and his
commitment not to use American ground forces because this would make operational
disengagement almost impossible, Clinton had few options but to double-down
on the bombing campaign.61 Continuing with the bombing was also the only way
Clinton could avoid withdrawing American troops before they fulfilled their moral
responsibilities to stop atrocities, protect Kosovar Albanians and defeat Milosevic.
But as Clinton struggled to coerce Milosevic to stop the human rights atrocities
with strategic bombing alone, Clinton justified choosing not to exit by expanding
America’s moral obligations in Kosovo to include state-building and political trans-
formation. He also continued arguing success was a prerequisite for troop withdrawal,
amplifying his claims of a catastrophic global future should America not succeed.
Clinton argued America should embrace a wide moral duty in Kosovo because it
was necessary to ensure the intervention’s achievements were sustainable, but an
exclusively aerial campaign was even less likely to deliver wholesale political transfor-
mation than it would neutralise Milosevic’s military capabilities. Although Clinton’s
operational approach was supposed to yield quick results and rapid exit, Clinton
became increasingly unable to guarantee the mission success that would make exit
justifiable under the conditions he set. Clinton did not resolve this rhetorical and
practical tension, ultimately failing to implement his operational disengagement exit
strategy even after NATO succeeded in defeating Milosevic and stopping Serbian
forces committing further human rights atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians.
Clinton was clear from the beginning of Allied Force his desire for an implementable
60. Susan Hannah Allen and Tiffany Vincent, “Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for Kosovo,”
Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 1–26.
61. A point acknowledged by Michael Codner, which he argues made the Kosovo similar to other
US wars: Codner, “Bringing an End to an Old-Fashioned War?”
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exit strategy affected his operational decisions. He argued an exclusively aerial
campaign was the only way to ensure a Kosovo humanitarian intervention did not
turn into a Vietnam-style quagmire or a Somalia-style disaster for American forces:
[T]he thing that bothers me about introducing ground troops into a hostile
situation—into Kosovo and into the Balkans—is the prospect of never being
able to get them out.. . . If you go in in a hostile environment in which you
do not believe in ethnic cleansing and you do not wish to see any innocent
civilians killed, you could be put in a position of, for example, creating a
Kosovar enclave that would keep you there forever.62
Here Clinton argued it was the normative expectation to protect civilians from
atrocities that made it difficult to implement an exit strategy. His mention of a
“Kosovar enclave” is arguably a reference to the northern Iraq enclaves in which
American forces remained long after their proposed exit date. As I showed in Chapter
5, Clinton and Bush justified failing to withdraw because US troops had not yet
fulfilled their moral responsibility to protect the Kurds. Clinton argued implementing
Kosovo’s humanitarian intervention exit strategy also required victory, and American
forces were more likely to succeed if their objectives were limited to those that could
be achieved without ground troops.
During the first two weeks of Noble Anvil Clinton repeatedly argued for implementing
an exit strategy only after victory, using language both he and his predecessor Bush
had employed in Iraq and Somalia about ‘staying the course’, and not leaving ‘until
the job is done’ because “we cannot predict how long these operations will need to
continue”:63
We must be determined; we must be persistent; we must be patient if we
expect to see this mission through. And I am absolutely determined to do
that.. . . We have real firm determination today in Europe that these objectives
[of Allied Force] will be achieved. And we intend to stay after them until they
are.64
We are prepared to sustain this effort for the long haul. Our plan is to persist
62. William J. Clinton, Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 31, 1999.
63. William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 26, 1999.
64. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the National Economy and Kosovar Refugees and an Exchange
With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 2, 1999.
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until we prevail.65
We are prepared to continue this effort as long as necessary to achieve our
objectives. Our timetable will be determined by our goals, not the other way
around.66
When reporters asked Clinton in the early days of the intervention what level of
success was sufficient for troop withdrawal, Clinton said Kosovo would need to
be returned to its antebellum or pre-war state with atrocities ended and Kosovar
Albanian autonomy re-established:
I believe we have quite a good chance of achieving our objectives of the return
of the Kosovars to live in security with the measure of self-government that
they enjoyed under the old Yugoslav Constitution before Mr. Milosevic took
it away from them.67
While Clinton did not talk in great detail about what victory entailed, he was
adamant about the imperative of victory because it vindicated America’s (and
NATO’s) willingness to stop human rights atrocities with force:
Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative.. . . We pledged that we, the United
States and the other 18 nations of NATO, would stick by [the Kosovo people]
if they did the right thing. We cannot let them down now. . . . Imagine what
would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way,
as these people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep. That would discredit
NATO, the cornerstone on which our security has rested for 50 years now.68
The problem, however, was a humanitarian intervention consisting almost entirely
of dropping bombs, no matter how precisely those bombs were targeted, resulted
in destruction and civilian casualties. The longer such a campaign continued, the
more difficult it was for Clinton to maintain the humanitarian character of the
humanitarian intervention or argue the intervention was succeeding in protecting
the Kosovo Albanians. At the very least, it was more difficult to attain intervention
65. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Situation in the Balkans and an Exchange With Reporters,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 5, 1999.
66. William J. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society
of Newspaper Editors in San Francisco, California, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, San
Francisco, USA, April 15, 1999.
67. Clinton, Remarks on the National Economy and Kosovar Refugees and an Exchange With
Reporters.
68. William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 24,
1999.
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success in Taylor Seybolt’s terms of lives saved/protected by intervention versus lives
lost/damaged without intervention.69
For all Clinton’s claims America and its NATO allies were stopping a humanitarian
catastrophe, he did not enjoy unwavering support from the rest of the international
community. Two days into the intervention, Belarus, Russia and India presented
a draft resolution to the UNSC calling for an immediate cessation of Allied Force
calling it a “unilateral use of force” that “flagrantly violated” the UN’s commitment
to uphold international peace and security.70 Russia sponsored the resolution having
participated in NATO’s earlier diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kosovo situation.
The resolution’s supporters criticised the intervention as an “aggressive”, “illegal”
military action launched on the “pretext of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe”,71
with the Chinese ambassador deploring the “severe casualties and damage” caused by
the “strong bullying the weak”.72 The resolution ultimately failed with only Russia,
China and Namibia voting in favour. The US, France and the UK rallied their allies
to vote against and exercised their respective veto powers.73
The UNSC did not give the Kosovo intervention an international imprimatur.
America and its allies were unwilling to present a resolution before the UNSC
expressly seeking authorisation for intervention because of the high probability the
resolution would be vetoed by Russia and/or China. Consequently the only UNSC
resolution passed during NATO’s Kosovo intervention was restricted to calling on
member states to the humanitarian relief effort for those affected by the crisis.74
Without clear international consensus on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention
in Kosovo, the public schism on display in the Security Council undermined Clinton’s
claims America was using military force in a way that protected international peace
and security. According to India’s ambassador, “the international community can
69. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure.
70. United Nations Security Council, Draft Resolution S/1999/328, March 26, 1999.
71. Russia’s Ambassador Lavrov United Nations Security Council, Minutes of the 3989th meeting
of the UN Security Council, 26 March 1999: S/PV.3989, March 26, 1999, 5.
72. China’s Ambassador Qin ibid., 9.
73. Belarus’, Cuba’s and India’s representatives spoke against the resolution but did not enjoy a
vote on the draft resolution.
74. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1239: S/RES/1239, May 14, 1999.
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hardly be said to have endorsed [NATO’s] actions when already representatives of
half of humanity have said that they do not agree with what they have done”.75
On the domestic front, Clinton received equivocal, begrudging political support for
the intervention. Not all Congress members agreed with Clinton that US forces had
a moral imperative to intervene and not leave. Nor did they agree about the exit
strategy except insofar as to say that the president had to guarantee troops would be
withdrawn.76 Clinton’s announcement of the start of the bombing campaign made
Congressional attempts to prescribe the shape of American intervention in Kosovo
redundant. Still this did not stop Congressional efforts to influence the intervention
and proscribe presidential behaviour. Once Noble Anvil began, both the House and
Senate passed resolutions overwhelmingly supporting American troops carrying out
the policy, even as members expressed disagreement with Clinton’s decision.77 The
concurrent resolution passed in the Senate authorising airstrikes was also finally
voted on in the House of Representatives on 28 April 1999. Despite airstrikes already
well underway, the resolution failed to pass the House in a tied vote. On the same
day Congress debated three other bills about the president’s authority to conduct
a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Although the Republicans controlled the
House the divisions on all Congressional votes relating to the Kosovo intervention
were not along party lines. The House passed a resolution to prohibit funding
ground forces in Kosovo without Congressional authorisation,78 but failed to pass
a resolution requiring the president to stop the current intervention.79 Congress
also failed to declare an official state of war between the US and the government
75. India’s UN Ambassador Sharma United Nations Security Council, Minutes of the 3989th
meeting of the UN Security Council, 26 March 1999 , 16.
76. Kim, Kosovo and the 106th Congress.
77. Floyd Spence, “H.Res.130 - Expressing the support of the House of Representatives for the
members of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military operations against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999); Trent
Lott, “S.Res.74 - A resolution expressing the support of the Senate for the members of the United
States Armed Forces who are engaged in military operations against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia,” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
78. Tillie Fowler, “H.R.1569 - Military Operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Limitation
Act of 1999,” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
79. Tom Campbell, “H.Con.Res.82 - Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with
the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” 106th Congress (1999-2000)
Resolution (Introduced 1999).
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of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.80 Clinton pushed back against attempted
Congressional constraints, threatening to veto any law including Congressional
budgetary restrictions. He ultimately succeeded in obtaining the full funding he
requested from Congress for the Kosovo intervention.81
During House debates on 28 April 1999, members mentioned “exit strategy” 27 times
and each time it was used by Representatives to argue against US intervention because
Clinton had no “clear” or “credible” exit strategy for US forces in Kosovo.82 But
Congress members were equally opposed to intervention either because Clinton did not
have a strategy to ‘win’ the intervention or the intervention was not ‘winnable’. Indeed,
Congress members commented on America’s likelihood of winning in Kosovo 39 times,
more often than they spoke about exit strategies. For Congress members opposed
to intervention, the question was not whether any amount of intervention would
save people but whether US troops would return home victorious. Representative
Bob Schaffer’s (R-CO) comments are particularly illustrative as acknowledging the
inherent normative expectation that US troops must win any military operation in
which they participate but not be drawn into a quagmire:
Mr. Speaker, that comment, that phrase about winning is usually something
that one side or another could understand in the case of some military conflict
or the engagement in warfare. But the definition of winning with respect to
this conflict [in Kosovo] is very nondescript.. . . It is by definition impossible to
determine when one has won and when it is time to declare victory and go
home. That is the real dilemma that the President has put us in, because it
has set off a whole cascade of problems that stem in all directions, and does
so without the clear definition of what victory means for the United States of
America. Without that definition, I am afraid this is an engagement to which
we will be committed for a long, long time.83
Congressional concern for US troops to be withdrawn only after they had succeeded
was reflected in the editorial and commentary pages of the nation’s major newspapers.
After earlier favouring intervention because it was morally incumbent, commentators
80. Tom Campbell, “H.J.Res.44 - Declaring a state of war between the United States and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution
(Introduced 1999).
81. Kim, Kosovo and the 106th Congress.
82. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress, First Session, vol. 145, 59
(April 28, 1999).
83. Bob Schaffer, Congressional Record–House (April 28, 1999), H2461.
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now focused on how America would ‘win’ the intervention. During the first three
weeks of Noble Anvil, The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Wall
Street Journal published 27 op-ed pieces between them on the necessity for America
to win the Kosovo intervention including recommendations on how this victory
should be achieved. Of these, only one piece by paleoconservative candidate for
the Republican presidency nomination, Pat Buchannan, suggested Americans would
not be able to “do whatever is necessary to win”,84 although he was careful not
to argue American troops should withdraw short of achieving victory. Regardless
of whether commentators proposed persisting with the same strategy, increasing
diplomatic efforts, intensifying America’s bombing campaign, or sending in ground
forces, mainstream media opinion took for granted that once American forces were
engaged in a military operation, they could not withdraw without winning. At the
same time, there were few concrete proposals—apart from regime change85—about
what level or type of success in Kosovo would be sufficient to permit exit.
Clinton’s arguments about American responsibility to stop atrocities in Kosovo
initially resonated with the general public86 but he struggled to maintain the public’s
enthusiasm for the intervention longer than a few weeks. Pew surveys of 2000
Americans conducted during the first week of airstrikes (24–28 March 1999) and
again three weeks later reveal these changing views. By mid-April 1999, 41 percent of
Americans paid very close attention to the Kosovo intervention (up from 11 percent
a month earlier). Sixty percent of those surveyed initially supported the NATO
airstrikes and 70 percent cited “preventing the killing of innocent civilians” as a very
important reason for military intervention. By mid-April 1999 support for airstrikes
remained steady but now two-thirds believed victory required not only American
ground forces but ground forces remaining in Kosovo for a long time. Concern
about US casualties rose from 55 to 66 percent among the American population, but
Americans remained narrowly in favour of deepening US involvement by sending
84. Patrick J. Buchanan, “The Mess They’ve Made,” The Washington Post, April 13, 1999,
85. Misha Glenny, “So Milosevic Leaves Serbia—and Goes Where?,” The New York Times,
June 23, 2000,
86. Henry E. Carey, “U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy:
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo,” World Affairs 154, no. 2 (2001): 74.
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ground forces “to try to end the conflict in Kosovo” (51 percent). The survey did not
reveal, however, what Americans thought it meant to “end” the conflict. What these
survey results do show is despite concern about risks to its troops, the American
public supported military intervention in Kosovo because it was the right thing to
do, and the public was prepared to maintain or even increase military involvement if
necessary in order to succeed.
Milosevic did not capitulate in the first weeks of bombing and NATO responded by
following America’s strategy of intensifying and widening the bombing campaign,
moving from attacks on Serbian air defence systems to military targets in Serbia
outside its capital, Belgrade, and eventually to bombing targets within Belgrade
itself. American forces led the charge, again dropping the majority of munitions and
flying the majority of sorties. Despite the intensified bombing campaign Clinton
maintained the Kosovo intervention had a humanitarian protection purpose. He
doubled-down on his justification for not withdrawing US forces immediately, explain-
ing his exit strategy would only be implemented when the mission succeeded. Clinton
argued more forcefully American victory in Kosovo was a moral imperative and
exiting without fulfilling these moral obligations was beyond his realm of imagined
possibilities. Almost as if matching the rise in the intervention’s violence, Clinton
raised the moral stakes, expanding his definition of American moral responsibility in
Kosovo beyond preventing atrocities to defending liberal democracy and spearheading
political transformation.
Clinton drew parallels between Kosovo and WWII efforts to stop the Holocaust,
using language of atrocity to argue the moral good of intervention made the price of
intervention worth paying by the Kosovar and Serbian people, if not Americans:
Sarajevo, the capital of neighbouring Bosnia, is where World War I began.
World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars, Europe
was slow to recognise the dangers, and the United States waited even longer
to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and
early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans
would not have had to die.87
87. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic
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The stories we are hearing now are truly chilling: Serb security forces herding
Albanian villagers together, gunning them down with automatic weapons, and
setting them on fire; telling villagers, “Leave or we will kill you”; separating
family members; loading up buses and trains, carrying some to the borders
and some to be slaughtered; confiscating identity papers and property records,
seeking, literally, to erase the presence of these people in their own land
forever.88
We’ve learned the hard way through two World Wars and through what we
saw in Bosnia that with these kinds of conflicts, if you don’t halt them, they
spread, to be stopped later at greater cost and greater risk.89
We cannot simply watch as hundreds of thousands of people are brutalised,
murdered, raped, forced from their homes, their family histories erased, all in
the name of ethnic pride and purity.90
But Clinton no longer limited the moral good to stopping atrocities; he argued
persisting with intervention fulfilled America’s responsibility to defend NATO’s
credibility and the future of the transatlantic security alliance, giving NATO a new
purpose in a post-Cold War era:
[T]here is a second issue here, as well, and that is whether we and our allies
in Europe are going to allow that kind of problem—hatred based on race
or ethnicity or religion—to be the defining force of the next 20 or 30 years.
. . . This is America trying to get the world to live on human terms, so we can
have peace and freedom in Europe, and our people will not be called to fight
a wider war for someone else’s madness.91
Were we to stand aside. . . NATO would be discredited, yes, because it made
promises not kept but, more important, because its values and vision of Europe
would be profoundly damaged.92
But we are fundamentally there because the Alliance will not have meaning in
the 21st century if it permits the slaughter of innocents on its doorstep. This
is not a question of territorial conquest or political domination but standing
for the values that made NATO possible in the first place.93
Clinton argued America had to succeed in Kosovo because the future of the post-
Cold War world order was at stake. Also at stake was America’s moral and military
reputation, sharpened by failures in Somalia and Rwanda and the fragility of victory
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
88. William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Community at Barksdale Air Force Base in Bossier City,
Louisiana, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Bossier City, USA, April 12, 1999.
89. Ibid.
90. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper
Editors in San Francisco, California.
91. Clinton, Remarks to the Community at Barksdale Air Force Base in Bossier City, Louisiana.
92. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper
Editors in San Francisco, California.
93. William J. Clinton, Remarks at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commemorative Cere-
mony, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 1999.
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in Iraq and Bosnia. Clinton expanded his use of the good versus evil trope beyond
the us versus them of ‘NATO versus Milosevic’ to ‘America versus regressive global
forces’, using language that also drew on American exceptionalism:
We are in Kosovo because we care about saving lives and we care about
the character of the multi-ethnic post-Cold War world. . . We cannot allow
the Milosevic vision, rooted as it is in hatred and violence and cynicism, to
prevail.94
This is our competing vision. Mr Milosevic’s vision: Greater Serbia, enforced
by paramilitary thugs and propaganda, denying the humanity of people who do
not fall within his ethnic group. But our version is democracy, messy sometimes,
yes. . . but recognising that it is better to work together for a brighter tomorrow
because, underneath, our common humanity is more important than anything
that divides us; that we are all the children of God.95
We have come to the end of the Cold war. People, by and large, have rejected
communism. And we now see the prospect of a bright new future for the world
in which we can resolve our differences in an orderly way and build a common
future—that future threatened by the oldest problem of human society, our
tendency to fear and dehumanise people who are different from ourselves.96
Mr Milosevic’s forces burn and loot homes and murder innocent people; our
forces deliver food and shelter and hope to the displaced. Mr Milosevic fans the
flames of anger between nations and peoples; we are an Alliance of 19 nations,
uniting 780 million people of many faiths and ethnic, racial, and religious
backgrounds. Mr. Milosevic knows only one way to achieve his aims, through
force; we have done everything we could to resolve this matter peacefully.97
Focusing on Milosevic’s human rights violations justified Clinton’s decision not to
exit but it was also a counter-narrative to human rights organisations criticising the
intervention’s adverse humanitarian outcomes, and growing public concern about
civilian casualties. The US Department of Defense claimed the US bombs dropped
on Serbia hit 99.6 percent of their military targets but civilian casualties nevertheless
occurred, some caused directly by US bombs and others because the intervention
spurred retaliatory violence by Serb forces.98 Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch argued NATO ‘bombing a village to save it’ resulted in unacceptable
civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure in Serbia. Estimates vary
94. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper
Editors in San Francisco, California.
95. William J. Clinton, Remarks to Humanitarian Relief Organizations in Roseville, Michigan, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 16, 1999.
96. Ibid.
97. William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Opening of the North Atlantic Council Meeting on Kosovo,
ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 1999, See also, Clinton’s speech on 1 May 1999.
98. William M. Arkin, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (Human Rights Watch, 2000).
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but approximately 500 civilians died from NATO attacks, which also destroyed
major pieces of military and civilian infrastructure including broadcasting facilities,
electricity plants and bridges.99 10,000 Kosovar civilians were killed by Serbs from
the start of the NATO intervention, representing a significant uptick in violence
during the war. A further 1000–2000 Serbs were also killed during the fighting.100
Apart from the general level of violence, a series of bombing incidents fuelled domestic
and international criticism of the intervention: a NATO airstrike on a bridge hit
a passenger train killing 14 and injuring 16 on 12 April 1999; American aircraft
repeatedly bombed a convoy of refugees fleeing Kosovo on Djakovica-Decane Road
killing 75 people on 14 April 1999; an American airstrike on the Serb Radio and
Television headquarters killed 16 and injured 16 injured on 23 April 1999; the US
bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 7–8 May 1999; and US forces deployed
cluster munitions in residential areas throughout the intervention.101 Despite these
incidents, the number of civilian casualties in the Kosovo intervention was lower
than comparable military campaigns, including the Gulf War. Clinton defended
the accidental bombing of the refugee convoy as one of the risks of intervention but
argued American forces were being as careful as they could be, “really risk[ing] a
lot to avoid destroying innocent civilians and to avoid destroying the country”.102
Clinton also acknowledged civilian casualties were one of the risks of his operational
approach:
There is no such thing as flying airplanes this fast, dropping weapons this
powerful, dealing with an enemy who is willing to use people as human shields,
and never have this sort of tragic thing happen. It cannot be done.103
The American public, while paying less attention to the Kosovo intervention than
when it began, was particularly worried about civilian casualties. According to a
99. Mary-Wynne Ashford and Ulrich Gottstein, “The Impact on Civilians of the Bombing of
Kosovo and Serbia,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 16, no. 3 (2000): 267–80.
100. Arkin, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.
101. Ibid.
102. William J. Clinton, Interview With Tom Brokaw of the National Broadcasting Corporation in
Spangdahlem, Germany, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 5, 1999.
103. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper
Editors in San Francisco, California.
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Pew survey in May 1999, only one in three Americans were closely following the
intervention but 53 percent still supported the continuing airstrikes. At the same
time, while one in two Americans expressed concern about US bombs killing civilians
the proportion supporting Clinton’s decision to intervene to stop atrocities remained
consistent (70 percent).104 Mainstream press coverage of the intervention continued
to marginalise discussion of exit strategies in favour of understanding how Clinton
could win the intervention. Commentators observed Vietnam Syndrome concerns of
the necessity for America to commit to winning and winning “absolutely”,105 “giving
war a chance”,106 and preparing for ground invasion.107 Charles Krauthammer’s
op-ed in The Washington Post was an isolated voice criticising the intervention’s
trajectory of “fighting not to win, not even to save, but to feel righteous”.108
Raising the moral stakes of the intervention not only responded to the paradox
of using force for humanitarian purposes, but it justified Clinton persisting with
a military operation that did not appear to be yielding results. Clinton argued
withdrawing American troops without defeating Milosevic was simply not an option,
a view of American moral superiority that would be vindicated by military success.
Clinton’s NATO allies shared his views. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair argued the
bombing campaign must continue because “I do believe that in the end if a course is
right it will win”.109 Likewise, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder argued “we
are under a moral obligation to help stop new atrocities [in Kosovo]. . .NATO has to
win this military conflict.”110 US forces could therefore not leave Kosovo until they
had won.
Winning was necessary for exit but Clinton also expanded what he meant by vic-
tory beyond stopping or preventing imminent atrocities and defeating Milosevic to
promoting long-term, American-led political transformation. Thus Clinton argued
104. Andrew Kohut, “A Clear Case of Clinton Fatigue,” The New York Times, August 5, 1999,
105. Elizabeth Dole, “Time to Play Our Aces,” The Washington Post, April 24, 1999, A23.
106. Thomas Friedman, “Stop the Music,” The New York Times, April 23, 1999,
107. William Safire, “Celebrating Defeat,” The New York Times, April 22, 1999,
108. Charles Krauthammer, “Fighting to Feel Righteous,” The Washington Post, April 23, 1999,
109. Jim Hoagland, “Tony Blair’s Initiation,” The Washington Post, April 18, 1999,
110. Lally Weymouth, “Q&A: Gerhard Schroeder, Firmly Convinced,” The Washington Post,
April 18, 1999, B01.
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humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was not just a military campaign but a precursor
to a new post-Cold War ‘Marshall Plan’. Clinton’s justification for exit requiring
long-term success was made before a room of American newspaper editors the day
after US forces bombed the refugee convoy. It is worth quoting in full because Clinton
also explains why US troops will not necessarily leave even if Milosevic is eventually
defeated; what was putatively a marker of victory that would make exit justifiable:
Even as we fight this conflict, we must look beyond it to what the Balkans,
south-eastern Europe, indeed, the whole continent of Europe should look like
in 10 or 20 years. We should try to do for southeastern Europe what we helped
to do for Western Europe after World War II, and for Central Europe after
the Cold War, to help its people build a region of multi-ethnic democracies, a
community that upholds common standards of human rights, a community in
which borders are open to people in trade, where nations cooperate to make
war unthinkable.. . . if we truly want a more tolerant, inclusive future for the
Balkans and all of southeast Europe, we will have to both oppose [Milosevic’s]
efforts and offer a better vision of the future, one that we are willing to help
build. . . . [W]e must follow the example of the World War II generation by
standing up to aggression and hate and then by following through with a
post-conflict strategy for reconstruction and renewal. . . . It will demand from
us a recognition that there is no easy way out of the region’s troubles, but
there is a solution that advances our interests and keeps faith with our values
if we are ready to make a long-term commitment.. . . So, however this conflict
ends, or whenever it ends—I think I know how it’s going to end—but whenever
it ends, we have some building to do.111
The President’s plans to rebuild/recreate Western Europe fit well with the image of
America as a light on the hill, a model to be promoted around the world. In keeping
with this American exceptionalism trope, Clinton painted the Kosovo intervention
as the latest in a long list of American military interventions in sovereign states to
pursue democratic values for the good of humanity. In an expression of hubris or
na¨ıvete, the President argued that even when these interventions did not turn out
well, the international community did not question America’s noble intentions:
Our steadily increasing involvement with the rest of the world [since the
beginning of the 20th century], not for territorial gain but for peace and
freedom and security, is a fact of recent history. During the Cold War, it can
be argued that on occasion we made a wrong judgement because we tended
to see the world solely through the lenses of communism or anti-communism.
But no one suggests that we ever sought territorial advantage. No one doubts
111. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper
Editors in San Francisco, California.
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that when America did get involved, we were doing what at least we thought
was right for humanity.112
Clinton’s operational disengagement exit strategy had been central to his justifica-
tion for commencing the Kosovo intervention as well as his decision to limit the
operational approach to an exclusively aerial mission. But Clinton’s ability to justifi-
ably implement his exit strategy also depended on other normative expectations of
acceptable American conduct in humanitarian intervention, especially expectations
that America maintain the morally righteous character of the intervention and deliver
long-term protection to the Kosovar Albanians. After three weeks of sustained bom-
bardment of Serbia without signs of success, Clinton’s decision to talk about a wider
moral responsibility preserved the moral defensibility of his decision to intervene
and persist with his self-imposed operational limitations despite the humanitarian
cost. The practical result of Clinton re-centring his exit strategy justifications away
from guaranteeing troop withdrawal towards fulfilling moral responsibility meant
markers of mission success and victory were now more difficult to define and, as
Clinton himself acknowledged, required a longer-term commitment of American
forces. Despite his earlier commitment to do so, Clinton struggled to stick to his exit
strategy even after the immediate humanitarian crisis was over.
7.5 Problems exiting from Noble Anvil
As America’s bombing campaign in Kosovo stretched into months, Clinton stuck with
his operational disengagement exit strategy but began explaining why implementing
this strategy would not necessarily mean America’s Kosovo intervention was over.
Clinton’s justification for not ending the humanitarian intervention as planned
was similar to the one he used previously in Iraq and Somalia, arguing America’s
military successes were fragile and required an ongoing troop presence to make them
sustainable. Thus Noble Anvil ’s objectives now included creating the battlefield
112. Clinton, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper
Editors in San Francisco, California.
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conditions for deploying foreign ground troops to “protect the people, including the
Serb minority in Kosovo, as they work toward self-determination”.113
Clinton repeated this point on nine separate occasions throughout the second half
of April and May 1999,114 however it wasn’t until his letter to Congress on 5 June
1999 that he mentioned the “anticipated contribution” of 7000 US troops “to the
international security force in Kosovo”.115 While winning was still a prerequisite
for exit, Clinton argued success should not be restricted to battlefield victory and
must be demonstrated over the long term; America’s moral responsibility extended
to political transformation that would not be delivered through airstrikes alone.
Clinton’s redefinition of America’s moral responsibility in Kosovo affected the timing,
shape and implementability of his exit strategy, but so did his changing definition of
victory. When Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces in June 1999, Clinton declared
American victory and implemented his operational disengagement exit strategy as
promised. However, Clinton immediately deployed US ground troops to participate
in a second phase of the Kosovo intervention to deliver the political transformation
Clinton argued was necessary for a truly successful intervention.
Clinton’s argument about the fragility of American victory became a key focus of
his rhetoric in May and June 1999. His public contemplation of why Noble Anvil
victory would not mean complete American troop withdrawal was grounded in the
113. Clinton, Remarks to Humanitarian Relief Organizations in Roseville, Michigan.
114. William J. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 22, 1999;
William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
April 24, 1999; William J. Clinton, Remarks Following a Meeting With a Congressional Delegation
and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 28, 1999; William
J. Clinton, Remarks on Departure for Europe and an Exchange With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, May 4, 1999; William J. Clinton, Interview With Tom Brokaw of the National
Broadcasting Corporation Aboard Air Force One, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 4,
1999; William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Community at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 5, 1999; William J. Clinton, Interview With European
Journalists at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 6,
1999; William J. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of
Germany and an Exchange With Reporters in Bonn, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
May 6, 1999; William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States at
Fort McNair, Maryland, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 13, 1999.
115. William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United
States Forces to Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 5,
1999.
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dramatically disastrous hypothetical future he painted of Europe descending into
violent chaos, and the inevitable future cost America would incur if he decided not
to commit troops today:
[Speaking to US troops deployed to Kosovo:] If we don’t want your successors
to have to come to this continent and fight another bitter war, then we must
stand in Kosovo for the elemental principle of the common humanity of every
breathing, living person in this continent.116
What we are doing today will save lives, including American lives, in the
future.117
We must be willing to pay the price of time and effort to reverse the course of
ethnic cleansing. The benefits will be far greater and last much longer than
the costs.. . . some things are worth fighting for.118
We should do this because it’s the right thing to do. And it will be—let me
say this, it will be far less expensive—far, far less expensive—for us to make
a decent contribution to the long-term development of these people than it
will be to wait around for something like this to happen again and run the
risks, all the risks we had to deal with this time that it might spread and all
of that.119
In talking about these avoided costs, Clinton again returned to the Holocaust
and WWII analogies, deepening the vision of a catastrophic outcome without
ongoing American military involvement in Kosovo, as well as comparing the Kosovo
intervention to the noble cause of WWII:
This is a lot cheaper than having another European war of the kind that we
saw in the 20th century.120
I know that many Americans believe that this [war in Kosovo] is not our fight.
But remember why many of the people are laying in these graves out here [in
Arlington Cemetary]—because of what happened in Europe and because of
what was allowed to go on too long before people intervened.121
We have a security responsibility to prevent a wider war in Europe, which
we know from our two World Wars would eventually draw America in at far
greater cost in lives, time, and treasure.122
When questioned directly about what his statements meant for how and when the
116. Clinton, Remarks to the Community at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany .
117. William J. Clinton, Remarks at a Memorial Day Ceremony in Arlington, Virginia, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, May 31, 1999.
118. William J. Clinton, Commencement Address at the United States Air Force Academy in
Colorado Springs, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 2, 1999.
119. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo and an Exchange
With Reporters, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 10, 1999.
120. Clinton, Remarks on Departure for Europe and an Exchange With Reporters.
121. Clinton, Remarks at a Memorial Day Ceremony in Arlington, Virginia.
122. Clinton, Commencement Address at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs .
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Kosovo intervention would in fact end, Clinton argued the timing of exit was less
important than supporting US and NATO troops engaged in a noble endeavour,
fighting the war to end all wars:
What the people of Europe need to know is that their governments are doing
the right thing and that it will be over, and that when it finishes, it will finish
in a way that will permit Europe to be united and democratic and free for the
first time in the history of the continent. Now, that is quite an achievement.
And it is worth waiting for. It will not drag on for years. We’re not talking
about endlessly. But we cannot expect an instantaneous result.123
NATO’s bombing campaign eventually did end on 10 June 1999, ten weeks after it
began. The airstrikes, UK-led preparations for a ground invasion, Serbia’s inability
to garner foreign military support, and Finnish and Russian diplomatic efforts to
convince Milosevic to back down, all contributed to the Serbian parliament agreeing
to NATO’s peace plan on 3 June 1999. NATO concluded an agreement with
the Serbian government on 9 June 1999 providing for complete Yugoslav military
withdrawal from Kosovo and NATO ended its airstrikes the following day.
Clinton celebrated his nation’s success in fulfilling America’s moral responsibilities
to stop human rights atrocities and defeat Milosevic, satisfying expectations for how
America should respond to humanitarian crises: the “necessary conflict” was “brought
to a just and honourable conclusion”.124 Clinton argued Noble Anvil ’s victory and
that of Allied Force more widely, transcended protecting Kosovar Albanians; it had
made the world “safer”, ensuring “the twentieth century is ending not with helpless
indignation but with a hopeful affirmation of human dignity and human rights for
the twenty-first century”.125
Clinton did not hesitate using America’s victory as vindication for his decisions to
intervene in Kosovo and conducting the operation as an exclusively aerial campaign:
This victory brings a new hope that when a people are singled out for destruc-
123. Clinton, Interview With European Journalists at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany .
124. Clinton, Remarks on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo and an Exchange With
Reporters.
125. William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 10, 1999.
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tion because of their heritage and religious faith and we can do something
about it, the world will not look the other way.126
At least I’m confident that I did the right thing in the right way.127
In his victory speeches, Clinton did not mention the more than one million Kosovar
Albanians driven from their homes over the course of the humanitarian crisis, three-
quarters of whom were forced to flee during the three months of NATO airstrikes.
The US Department of Defense’s ‘after-action’ report declared Noble Anvil an
“extraordinary success”, based in part on the number of sorties US aircraft flew while
sustaining zero American casualties.128
For all Clinton’s triumphalist rhetoric, Clinton reminded his audience battlefield
victory was only one aspect of true intervention success and thus insufficient to
warrant all American troops returning home. Clinton returned to the reconstruction
and nation-building program he argued for in April 1999, saying the best marker
of victory was America meeting its moral responsibility to change the political
calculus in the former Yugoslavia, eradicating ethnic tensions and preventing future
irredentism:
[T]he United States should feel vindicated when the people go home and when
they’re safe and when we can say that we, as a nation, have played a role in
reversing ethnic cleansing.129
Clinton’s new ‘Marshall Plan’ required more than economic stimulus; eradicating
“ancient hatreds” that caused the Kosovo crisis required ongoing American troop
presence on the ground in Kosovo. Clinton argued there was “still quite a lot to be
done” in Kosovo to fulfil America’s political transformation obligation to “guarantee
security” and ensure “lasting peace and stability” with a “plan for tomorrow, not
just today”:130
126. Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo.
127. William J. Clinton, Interview With Jim Lehrer of PBS’ ‘NewsHour’, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, June 11, 1999.
128. US Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action
Report, technical report (Washington D.C.: US Department of Defense, Pentagon, January 31,
2000).
129. Clinton, Remarks on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo and an Exchange With
Reporters.
130. Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo.
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We face the broader challenge of preventing future crises by promoting democ-
racy and prosperity in this region which has been so troubled. . . . We now have
a moment of hope . . . And we have to finish the job and build the peace.131
Thus in the very same speech Clinton declared America’s participation in Noble
Anvil over and he was implementing his operational disengagement exit strategy,
Clinton announced American ground forces would start Operation Joint Guardian—
its contribution to the Kosovo Force (KFOR)—the following day. Although he
had spent much of the previous six weeks laying the justification groundwork for
his decision not to completely withdraw American troops from Kosovo, as Joint
Guardian began Clinton argued this operation was simultaneously a completely
separate mission not to be judged by the same standards as Allied Force—“apples
and oranges”132—but also inextricably linked to Noble Anvil. Clinton argued Joint
Guardian was a mission to “win the peace”133 secured by Noble Anvil, necessary “to
make sure that this [Kosovo] mission is finally won”.134
Clinton’s attempt to semantically distinguish the two operations reflects the difficul-
ties he faced crafting a strategic narrative that balanced the normative expectations
of what America’s moral responsibilities were in the face of a mass atrocity with
achieving sufficient military success to make exit justifiable. Despite defeating Milo-
sevic, Clinton found himself acknowledging Noble Anvil had only partially fulfilled
America’s moral obligations. Partial victory made only a partial exit possible.
131. Clinton, Remarks on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo and an Exchange With
Reporters.
132. William J. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With European Union Leaders and an
Exchange With Reporters in Bonn, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 21, 1999.
133. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With European Union Leaders and an Exchange With
Reporters in Bonn; William J. Clinton, Remarks to Operation Allied Force Troops at Aviano Air
Base in Italy, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 22, 1999; William J. Clinton, The
President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 25, 1999; William J.
Clinton, Remarks to American Troops Following Thanksgiving Dinner at Camp Bondsteel, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, November 23, 1999.
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7.6 Justifying exit in Joint Guardian
On the day Clinton and his NATO allies declared victory in their Kosovo interven-
tion, the UNSC passed Resolution 1244 endorsing the Military Technical Agreement
signed by Milosevic and NATO135 and authorising “an international security pres-
ence” in Kosovo.136 The work of foreign troops included establishing a “secure
environment”, demilitarising armed groups, and “deterring renewed hostilities”.137
The resolution also authorised foreign troops in Kosovo to support nation-building,
institution creation, political transformation, human rights protection and economic
reconstruction projects, essentially all the elements of Clinton’s Marshall Plan for
the Balkans.
Clinton’s semantic distinction between Noble Anvil and Joint Guardian did not
alter the fact he now needed a new exit strategy for American forces in Kosovo.
Using ground troops meant another operational disengagement strategy was almost
impossible. Clinton avoided the exit strategy routes he had taken in Iraq and Somalia
of operational disengagement or transition to the UN and opted instead for a local
transition exit. During this phase of the Kosovo intervention Clinton refused to set a
timetable for exit, insisting once again that American troops would withdraw once
they had successfully completed Joint Guardian:
I don’t think we should put a timetable on [Joint Guardian]. We will define
our objectives and proceed to implement them.138
I hope we will stay until the objectives of the mission are completed.. . . when
we’ve achieved our objectives, we’ll get out.139
But success required discharging wide moral obligations, thus the mission objectives—
very similar to those Clinton and Bush had set in Iraq and Somalia—were broad
135. United States Institute of Peace, ed., Military Technical Agreement Between the International
Security Force (”KFOR”) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic
of Serbia, Peace Agreements Digital Collection, Washington D.C., June 9, 1999.
136. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244: S/RES/1244, June 10, 1999.
137. Ibid.
138. Clinton, Remarks on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo and an Exchange With
Reporters.
139. Clinton, Remarks Following Discussions With European Union Leaders and an Exchange With
Reporters in Bonn.
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political transformation goals, what Clinton called the “heaviest responsibility [of de-
livering] self-government, autonomy and rebuilding assistance” including establishing
sufficient security in Kosovo to ensure there was not another outbreak of violence.140
Clinton reprised the mantra US troops would stay until they “finish[ed] the job”141
but indicated American troops would not be withdrawn quickly or without winning
as this was beyond the realm of Clinton’s imagined possibilities for how the Kosovo
humanitarian intervention would end as the president rounded out his final term in
office:
We cannot say our job is finished when refugees are returning to shattered lives.
We cannot pretend our work is done when Serbia is still ruled by leaders who
maintain power by manipulating ethnic differences, living off corruption, and
threatening their neighbours. We cannot pretend our victory is complete when
the people of a vast region of Europe are still suffering from the disruption
brought about by a decade of violence.142
Once again blindsided by Clinton’s unilateral decision-making in Kosovo, Congress
attempted enacting legislation to shape Joint Guardian with mixed effects. Repre-
sentative Ike Skelton’s (D-MO) measure introduced in June 1999 to prevent defence
funding being used for combat or peacekeeping missions in Kosovo was defeated after
Clinton promised to seek Congressional approval for supplemental funding for Joint
Guardian as required.143 Clinton did make funding requests repeatedly throughout
the remainder of 1999 and into 2000. Each request was passed by Congress contingent
on Clinton outlining an exit strategy for the intervention but this element of the bills
drew almost no comment from Congress, despite Clinton’s repeatedly stating that
American troops would only withdraw once they succeeded in their political trans-
formation goals. Matching Clinton’s emphasis, Congress members did not question
this exit plan, more concerned that America’s NATO allies were not contributing
adequately to the nation-building effort. A bill to impose a withdrawal date for US
140. William J. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With President Jacques Chirac of France
in Paris, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 17, 1999.
141. Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo; Clinton, The
President’s News Conference With President Jacques Chirac of France in Paris.
142. William J. Clinton, Statement to the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, July 30, 1999.
143. Ike Skelton, “H.Amdt.161 to H.R.1401 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000,” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
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troops in Joint Guardian a year after they were first deployed was narrowly defeated
in the Senate. Although Senators equivocated on the need for a precise end date
for the intervention, Congress was keen to prevent American money being used to
support nation-building work in Serbia so long as Milosevic remained president. Each
time Clinton responded by reminding Congress supporting nation-building work in
Kosovo would create the “conditions for the eventual withdrawal of US troops”,144
taking for granted American would only exit once nation-building in Kosovo reached
the point local institutions were strong enough to survive without external military
support.
Although nation-building was a pre-condition for exit from Joint Guardian Clinton
did not talk about a timetable for achieving these objectives. Instead, for the rest
of 1999, Clinton reminded Americans their job in Kosovo was not finished because
their moral responsibility continued. Clinton again invoked the memory of WWII
to argue troops would remain engaged in Kosovo until this nation-building moral
responsibility was fully discharged:
We still have to win the peace. Those folks have to go home, and they’ve got
to have a roof over their head before it gets too cold to be outside. We’ve got
landmines to take up and businesses to rebuild and a future to make.. . . In
the final days of World War II, Harry Truman said: ”It is easier to remove
tyrants and destroy concentration camps than it is to kill the ideas which gave
them birth and strength. Victory on the battlefield was essential, but it was
not enough. For a good peace, a lasting peace, decent people of the Earth
must remain determined to strike down the evil spirit which has hung over the
world for the last decade.” Well, the decent people of the world are determined
to rebuild Kosovo and the Balkans.145
Now we have to finish the job. We have to help the Kosovars to restore
their homes and the basic conditions of living, the institutions of civil society
necessary for them to exercise autonomy. We also have to help the region.146
Mainstream American press commentators revelled in the US victory in Kosovo.
144. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, July 13, 2000.
145. William J. Clinton, Remarks at Whiteman Air Force Base in Knob Noster, Missouri, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 11, 1999.
146. Clinton, The President’s News Conference With President Jacques Chirac of France in Paris;
William J. Clinton, Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force Troops in Skopje, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, June 22, 1999, See also; William J. Clinton, Remarks at Georgetown
University, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, November 8, 1999.
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Commentators proposed various ways Clinton’s exhortation to “win the peace”147
could be effectively implemented, taking for granted that delivering this objective
was required for complete American troop withdrawal. Most commentators argued
for significant investment and commitment to creating democratic institutions in the
former Yugoslavia, with some suggesting forcible division of the territory along ethnic
lines would promote stability. Opinion polls showed an increase in public support for
the airstrikes (up to 68 percent in June 1999) once Allied Force was officially over
and well over half of those surveyed supported sending ground forces into Kosovo
to continue the intervention.148 As attention shifted to the presidential campaign,
discussion of the US troop presence in Kosovo and plans for their withdrawal fell off
the pages of the mainstream press.
For the remainder of his 18 months in office Clinton attempted to incorporate his
narrative of the Kosovo intervention within the wider collective narrative about
normative expectations for America using military force when responding to humani-
tarian crises. Clinton’s justifications for the Kosovo intervention, including his exit
strategies, became part of the so-called ‘Clinton doctrine’:
[W]here we can, at an acceptable cost—that is, without risking nuclear war
or some other terrible thing—we ought to prevent the slaughter of innocent
civilians and the wholesale uprooting of them because of their race, their ethnic
background, or the way they worship God.149
Clinton did not shy away from grounding his approach in moral responsibility
language. He used what he considered as America’s Kosovo victory to encourage
using ‘atrocity prevention’ as a platform justifying deployment of American military
force. This foreign policy approach was firmly rooted in normative expectations of
how America should respond to humanitarian crises arising from gross human rights
violations. Clinton argued these principles should not just guide American foreign
147. Clinton, Remarks at Whiteman Air Force Base in Knob Noster, Missouri ; Clinton, Remarks
Following Discussions With European Union Leaders and an Exchange With Reporters in Bonn;
Clinton, Remarks to Operation Allied Force Troops at Aviano Air Base in Italy ; Clinton, The
President’s News Conference; Clinton, Statement to the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo.
148. Andrew Kohut, Muted and Mixed Public Response to Peace in Kosovo (Pew Research Centre
for the People & the Press, June 15, 1999).
149. Clinton, Interview With Jim Lehrer of PBS’ ‘NewsHour’ .
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policy but also become an international norm:
I think there’s an important principle here that I hope will be now upheld
in the future and not just by the United States, not just by NATO but also
by the leading countries of the world, through the United Nations.. . . whether
within or beyond the borders of a country, if the world community has the
power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. . . . [W]hen
innocent civilians are subject to mass slaughter and ethnic cleansing, if we can
stop it, we should.150
The American public also expressed strong support for the Clinton doctrine in the
wake of the Kosovo intervention, with almost two-thirds supporting America using
military force to stop genocide and human rights atrocities across the globe.151
Despite the intervention being far from over, Clinton used Milosevic’s defeat to
argue humanitarian intervention was not just a moral imperative but it can and does
‘work’.
Much of the international criticism of the Kosovo intervention, including draft UNSC
resolutions condemning the intervention, were based on the idea there was no norm of
humanitarian intervention and unauthorised military action against a sovereign state
is unlawful, regardless of whether intervention is was motivated by humanitarian
intent to stop a domestic mass atrocity. Clinton argued American intervention in
Kosovo, despite the lack of UNSC imprimatur, had not undermined the UN system’s
ability to regulate the use of military force but rather enhanced UN credibility because
“by acting as we did, we helped to vindicate the principles and purposes of the UN
Charter”.152 Clinton cast a wide net for cases he believed should be classified as
humanitarian interventions to stop mass atrocities, placing Bosnia, Sierra Leone and
East Timor alongside Kosovo. Clinton notably omitted Iraq and Somalia, however,
even though he and President Bush used similar ‘atrocity prevention’ language when
talking about those interventions:
The second resolution I hope [the UNGA will] make today is to strengthen the
capacity of the international community to prevent and, whenever possible,
150. William J. Clinton, Interview With Yevgeniy Kiselev of Russia’s NTV in Cologne, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, June 20, 1999.
151. Kohut, Muted and Mixed Public Response to Peace in Kosovo.
152. William J. Clinton, Remarks to the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in
New York City, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21, 1999.
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to stop outbreaks of mass killing and displacement. This requires, as we all
know, shared responsibility, like the one West African nations accepted when
they acted to restore peace in Sierra Leone; the one 19 democracies in NATO
embraced to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo; the one Asian and
Pacific nations have now assumed in East Timor. . . 153
In the lead-up to the 2000 presidential election campaign, in which Clinton was not
able to participate, the Democrat candidate and Clinton’s Vice-President Al Gore,
defended Clinton’s Kosovo intervention policy and pledged to continue it. Republican
candidate George W. Bush—George H.W. Bush’s son—promised he would withdraw
American troops from Kosovo “at some point” once America’s “European friends
become peacekeepers”.154 Although he talked about the need for a “well-defined”
exit strategy before America committed troops to military operations, W.Bush did
not elaborate on his exit strategy (if any) for Kosovo.155
W.Bush won the election and took up office in January 2001 with almost 7000
US troops remaining in Kosovo. He never implemented his promise to bring Joint
Guardian troops home. Perhaps preoccupied with other national security and foreign
policy concerns arising from the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre,
Bush repeatedly renewed US troop participation in Joint Guardian during his two-
term presidency, never once discussing any plans for withdrawal. That said, when
arguing for UN support for a new war in Iraq, W.Bush used Kosovo as an example of
the international community failing to act to stop a “common danger” with military
force.156 Congress also repeatedly approved funding for the Kosovo intervention
granting US troops essentially the same mandate with which Clinton charged them
in 1999. President Obama also continued America’s participation in Joint Guardian
and like Presidents W.Bush and Clinton before him, used Kosovo as an example of
where military force was justifiably used to end a humanitarian crisis.
153. Ibid.
154. George W. Bush, Presidential Debate in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, October 11, 2000.
155. George W. Bush, The 2000 Campaign; Exchanges between the Candidates in the Third
Presidential Debate, October 18, 2000.
156. George W. Bush, The President’s Radio Address, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 15, 2003; George W. Bush, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Jose
Manuel Durao Barroso of Portugal, President Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, and Prime Minister
Tony Blair of the United Kingdom in the Azores, Portugal, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 16, 2003.
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7.7 Conclusion
Clinton’s intervention in Kosovo was the second humanitarian intervention he
launched and the fourth humanitarian intervention over which we exercised responsi-
bility during his eight-year presidential term. Clinton’s exit strategy justifications
in Kosovo occurred at the zenith of American’s post-Cold War humanitarian inter-
vention efforts. Although Clinton did not come to the office with a flair for foreign
policy, it is fair to say by the time of Allied Force Clinton had experience navigating
US foreign policy normative expectations, including crafting and implementing exit
strategies for more humanitarian interventions than any other president in US history.
Clinton’s exit strategy justifications were front and centre of his Kosovo intervention
rhetoric. Clinton took his own PDD-25 directive seriously and was concerned any
intervention must have a rapidly implementable exit strategy. This preoccupation
with exit strategy shaped the operational limitations Clinton placed on the inter-
vention as much as any concern about avoiding American casualties. At the same
time, however, Clinton could not escape the constraining effects of other normative
expectations for American foreign policy behaviour in humanitarian intervention. In
particular, Clinton’s strategic narrative was affected by his view an exclusively aerial
operation would not deliver sustainable peace or the political transformation required
to prevent a resurgence in war or genocidal violence. Clinton argued America’s
moral responsibility extended to delivering political transformation, making political
transformation an indispensable criterion for success.
In Kosovo, Clinton’s framing of US moral responsibility in terms of stopping atrocities
and defeating a gross evil made anything short of victory unthinkable. ‘Doing the
right thing’ by ‘finishing the job’ also helped Clinton excuse civilian casualties
and justified widening the range of targets during the bombing campaign, ignoring
opposition from the UNSC and finally introducing ground forces into Kosovo after
they had been ruled out, without committing to an exit timetable. With such high
moral stakes and victory defined as establishing peace and nation-building, a quick
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exit was not viable. At the same time, the burden of being a moral actor was also
high; the most direct route to success can be constrained by the duty to behave
morally.
What the US experience in Kosovo demonstrates, therefore, are some of the prac-
tical and rhetorical difficulties of crafting and implementing an exit strategy in
humanitarian interventions. Presidents do not necessarily struggle to implement exit
strategies because of mission creep per se, but because of domestic and international
expectations of America’s moral responsibilities in the face of humanitarian crisis
affect what victory looks like in humanitarian interventions. Victory also ‘proves’
the moral righteousness of intervention—an important consideration for a domes-
tic American audience and establishing international legitimacy. Thus deciding to
withdraw troops without first achieving victory is beyond the realm of imagined
possibilities for American presidents. And while appeals to morality can be used to
justify bearing greater costs for longer, operational approaches like air campaigns
prioritising a quick exit and low risk to American troops may only deliver a fragile
victory because they fail to address the root causes of the humanitarian crises. What
Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon call the “bomb-and-pray” strategy may not stop
the humanitarian crisis at all.157 The approach may even exacerbate the crisis, as
it did in Kosovo, especially if atrocity perpetrators have a higher-than-expected
tolerance for coercion.158 In this sense Milosevic had much in common with Saddam
Hussein in Iraq, and General Aidid in Somalia, and likely future perpetrators of
human rights abuses in other places around the world.
Jus ex bello theorists have identified instances where the most just course of action
in a military operation might require troops withdrawing before they achieve their
initial objectives, but it is difficult to see how these ideas can be readily assimilated
within American ideas about using armed force. Kosovo in particular highlights
how concerns about ‘victory’, ‘winning’ and ‘success’ remain integral to presidential
justifications for humanitarian intervention exit strategies, even if the motivations
157. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly , 160.
158. Allen and Vincent, “Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for Kosovo.”
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for intervention and its moral calculus are different from other types of military
operations.
American experience in Kosovo also shows us why Adam Siegel’s effort to decon-
struct the idea of ‘mission creep’159 is particularly important for understanding the
difficulties involved in ending humanitarian interventions but not wholly explanatory.
The changes Clinton initiated in the Kosovo intervention displayed elements of task
accretion and arguably mission leap, but simply identifying the nature of the change
does not explain how or why it occurred. By looking at Clinton’s discourse about
exit, victory and moral responsibility over the course of the intervention, I argue
we can better understand the role of normative expectations in Clinton’s public
justifications. These normative expectations constrained Clinton’s strategic narrative
and ultimately affected his ability to justifiably withdraw troops from Kosovo as
initially promised.
Although US forces have been progressively withdrawn from Kosovo, the US maintains
a military presence there today, operating under essentially the same mandate Clinton
granted them when they were first deployed. The exit strategy that was contingent
on ‘finishing the job’ of fulfilling America’s responsibility to bring self-sustaining
democratic peace and stability to the Balkans is yet to be realised. Progress has
been made but significant challenges remain. Even though the Kosovo Assembly
declared Kosovo a country independent of Serbia in 2008 it has not been universally
recognised as such by the UNGA or a number of countries that are not US allies.160
Nevertheless President Clinton’s appeal for the principle he applied in Kosovo to be
adopted more generally by the international community has gained traction.161 The
Kosovo intervention prompted a discussion in the UN about formally recognising
limitations to state sovereignty by broadening the definition of what constitutes a
159. Siegel, “Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?”
160. Jason Franks and Oliver P. Richmond, “Coopting Liberal Peace-Building: Untying the Gordian
Knot in Kosovo,” Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 81–103; Doug Bandow, “US Policy
toward Kosovo: Sowing the Wind in the Balkans, Reaping the Whirlwind in the Caucasus,”
Mediterranean Quarterly 20, no. 1 (2009): 15–30.
161. Bernard Kouchner, “The Right to Intervention: Codified in Kosovo,” New Perspectives
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1999): 4–7.
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threat to international peace and security.162 The Canadian government convened
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) whose
members proposed a new concept of R2P. Although the US was at the forefront of
advocating for this principle, the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001
shifted the focus of the new President George W. Bush and the American people
to more traditional wars of self-defence and retribution. Ten years later the Arab
Spring occurred and another President would have cause to revisit these questions in
Libya.
162. Fernando R Teso´n, “Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Inter-
vention,” Amsterdam Law Forum 1, no. 2 (2009): 42–48.
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CHAPTER 8
Dawning Odyssey in Libya (2011)
So we actually executed this plan as well as I could have
expected: We got a UN mandate, we built a coalition, it
cost us $1 billion—which, when it comes to military
operations, is very cheap. We averted large-scale civilian
casualties, we prevented what almost surely would have
been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict. And despite all
that, Libya is a mess.
Barack Obama
Interview with The Atlantic, 16 April 2016
8.1 Introduction
Unfortunately, President Clinton’s desire for his Kosovo intervention to usher in a
millennium of global peace did not come to pass. George W. Bush took office in 2001
and within the first year of his presidency launched the ‘War on Terror’, involving
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as military operations elsewhere in the
Middle East and North Africa. The War on Terror dominated foreign policy public
discourse for Bush’s eight years in office and prompted considerable domestic debate
about victory, mission creep and exit strategies. Barack Obama succeeded Bush in
2009, taking over responsibility for the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
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which by this stage were set to become the longest wars in American history, costing
trillions of dollars and thousands of American soldiers’ lives, as well as causing tens
of thousands of civilian casualties.
Two years into his presidency, and soon after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize,
Obama launched a humanitarian intervention in Libya. Obama’s Libyan operation
had much in common with the other humanitarian interventions I explore in this
thesis, despite occurring more than a decade after Kosovo. Like Kosovo, Somalia
and Iraq, Obama also justified intervention to prevent mass atrocities and protect
vulnerable populations against evil leaders. Obama, however, incorporated emerging
R2P principles in his justifications for resorting to military force allowing him to
focus squarely on atrocity prevention as the purpose of intervention.
Like America’s previous interventions, Obama began with an exclusively aerial
operation. Unlike those previous interventions, however, Obama did not follow-up
his air campaign in Libya with ground troops. Instead, Obama chose a partial
transition exit to NATO allies, followed by operational disengagement. Although in
earlier interventions US presidents had called (to varying degrees) for evil leaders
to be neutralised or removed, Obama’s intervention contributed directly to Libyan
President Muamar Qaddafi’s death, enabling rebel forces to take control of the
government. Obama argued Qaddafi’s death and installation of the new government
marked mission success, which justified him implementing his exit strategy, ending
the intervention.
In contrast to his predecessors, although information published well after the inter-
vention revealed his private scepticism of the effectiveness of the limited intervention
response, throughout the Libyan intervention Obama publicly defended his decision
to restrict America’s humanitarian intervention to policing a NFZ over Libya. This
approach was consistent with the remit of the UNSC authorisation and Obama
argued it was also consistent with America’s moral responsibility to protect the
Libyan people from impending mass atrocities. Obama argued policing a no-fly zone
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(NFZ) and removing Qaddafi was sufficient to discharge this responsibility, resisting
normative expectations to deliver wider political transformation in Libya. Obama
avoided mission creep and withdrew troops when they achieved their stated objec-
tives. As time progressed, however, domestic and international assessments shifted
to considering the intervention a failure because the US did not fulfil its wider moral
obligations to see democratic transformation in Libya. Ironically, perhaps, these later
critiques rested on claims America had not engaged in sufficient nation-building and
ended its intervention too soon. Obama later acknowledged this as a shortcoming of
his approach.
Despite Obama’s effort to shape a strategic narrative to deliver a successful in-
tervention that discharged moral responsibility and allowed for rapid withdrawal,
I argue Obama’s exit strategy justifications were ultimately undermined by his
failure to ensure the intervention adhered to American foreign policy expectations
in responding to humanitarian crises. I argue Libya shows that in humanitarian
interventions, implementing an exit strategy alone is not enough. It is important
but if other normative expectations of intervention are unmet, the intervention can
still be judged as unsuccessful or a mistake.
I begin this chapter with an overview of the rhetorical context in which the Libyan
intervention occurred. Although a number of foreign policy developments occurred
between Kosovo and Libya, I focus on four issues I believe had the greatest bearing
on Obama’s exit strategy justifications in Libya: on the domestic front, there were
debates about exit strategy and mission creep in America’s Afghanistan and Iraq
wars, as well as Obama and other key members of his administration’s long-standing
personal interest in genocide/mass atrocity prevention; in the international arena,
there were debates about applying R2P in emerging and ongoing civil conflicts, as
well as the Arab Spring promoting violence in Libya.
Next I explore how Obama talked about exit strategies prior to his Libyan intervention.
I note while Obama publicly argued America had a moral responsibility to use military
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force to stop what he feared was an impending mass atrocity, he was also concerned to
distinguish his intervention to those of his predecessors by having an implementable
exit strategy. Having recently been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and given his
election promise to end the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, justifying a new military
operation required a convincing exit strategy. Obama argued for a local transition exit
strategy. Leaving political transformation in the hands of the Libyan people rather
than reliant on continued American troop presence ostensibly made victory easier
for America because its obligation was restricted to stopping the initial, imminent
atrocity. Stopping the atrocity was not, however, a straightforward proposition.
When American troops eventually did intervene in Operation Odyssey Dawn, Obama
changed from a local transition exit to a NATO transition exit because this was faster
to implement, while still arguing America had discharged its moral responsibilities
to protect the Libyan people. Obama implemented this exit strategy but American
troops remained heavily engaged in the intervention, requiring a new operational
disengagement exit strategy from Operation Unified Protector.
Obama framed President Qaddafi’s assassination as the ultimate marker of mission
success claiming this event removed the risk of human rights atrocities and justified the
withdrawal of American troops. I conclude this chapter by showing how subsequent
political instability in Libya contributed to domestic and international criticism
of Obama’s intervention for withdrawing troops too soon, before America had
adequately discharged its moral responsibility to transform Libya into a stable
democracy. Obama’s decision to emphasise the assured exit normative expectations of
intervention compromised his ability to satisfy other normative expectations regarding
America fulfilling its moral responsibility and winning this military operation.
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8.2 The rhetorical context
8.2.1 Obama’s promise to end America’s wars and prevent
genocide
From 2001–2011 public debates about the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and the wider
War on Terror crowded out discussion of America possibly responding militarily
to other conflicts or trouble-spots around the world. Among the foreign policy
goals Obama set for his administration was ending the Iraq war and beginning
to implement an exit strategy in the Afghanistan war.1 These goals were part of
Obama’s electoral platform and reflected domestic debates about the wars’ progress,
specifically debates about victory, the wisdom of nation-building, exit strategies and
mission creep.2 Thousands of American casualties, imprecise mission objectives and
inability to deliver decisive victory revived talk of quagmires and possible defeat.3
The costs of these two engagements and their resistance to rapid resolution also
contributed to the American public’s reluctance to support deploying soldiers to
other military operations. Obama argued implementing an exit strategy in Iraq and
Afghanistan was part of America’s “responsibility” to follow “the right path, not
just the easy path”, to build a more democratic and peaceful world order.4
In addition to commitments to end the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Obama also
pledged to renew America’s focus on international diplomacy and preventing mass
atrocities. On the fifteenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide on 7 April 2009,
fewer than three months into his first term, Obama committed “to act when faced with
1. David Usborne and Jerome Sarkey, “Obama’s Exit Strategy for Afghanistan,” The Independent
(London), March 27, 2009,
2. Edelstein, “Exit Lessons”; Lucy Morgan Edwards, “How the ‘Entry’ Defines the ‘Exit’:
Contradictions between the Political and Military Strategies Adopted in 2001 and How They Have
Deleteriously Affected the Longer-Term Possibilities for Stabilisation in Afghanistan,” Conflict,
Security & Development 14, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 593–619.
3. Porter, “The Third Option in Iraq: A Responsible Exit Strategy,” See for example; Marc Jason
Gilbert, “Fatal Amnesia: American Nation-Building in Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq,” Journal of
Third World Studies 21, no. 2 (2004): 13–43; Richard Ponzio and Christopher Freeman, “Conclusion:
Rethinking Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (January 2007):
173–84, accessed February 20, 2019.
4. Barack Obama, Remarks in Cairo, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 4, 2009.
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genocide and to work with partners around the world to prevent future atrocities”.5
A fortnight later, Obama committed to “doing everything we can to prevent and end
atrocities like those that took place in Rwanda [and] those taking place in Darfur”.6 In
his speech before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 23 September
2009, President Obama used the word ‘responsibility’ more than a dozen times,
referring to the global responsibility to stop genocide and mass atrocities. Although
he recognised the failures of America’s history of promoting democracy, Obama
argued his administration would “never waver” in its efforts to support democratic
reform.7 Obama also appointed senior advisers and administration officials strongly
critical of America’s failings in Srebrenica and Rwanda, and personally committed to
a more interventionist position on atrocity prevention. Obama appointed Susan Rice
(former Clinton national security advisor on Africa during the Rwandan genocide)
his UN Ambassador, Samantha Power (author of A Problem from Hell, which was
critical of the US response to the Srebrenica massacre) his Special Assistant to the
President on the NSC, and Hillary Clinton (First Lady during and strong supporter
of America’s Bosnian and Kosovo interventions) as Secretary of State.
Despite not yet delivering on his promised withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq,
and in fact preparing for a ‘surge’ of a further 70,000 troops to Afghanistan, Obama
received the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2009. While previous recipients were
known for their commitments to non-violence, Obama used his acceptance speech to
connect the use of force with America’s responsibility to prevent atrocities. Obama
used just war language to argue “war is sometimes necessary” to resolve international
problems. He labelled American actions in WWII, the Korean War, Bosnia and
Kosovo as examples of American “just wars” fought to promote “freedom and
democracy” around the world. This ‘Obama doctrine’ did not deviate significantly
from those of his predecessors, having much in common with the justifications previous
5. Barack Obama, Statement on the 15th Anniversary of the Genocide in Rwanda, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, April 7, 2009.
6. Barack Obama, Remarks at the Holocaust Days of Remembrance Ceremony, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 2009.
7. Barack Obama, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, ed.
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 23, 2009.
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presidents had used to justify American military interventions, characterising them
as moral endeavours pursued by a benevolent superpower, consistent with American
exceptionalism tropes:
Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United States
of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades
with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. . . We have borne
this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of
enlightened self-interest. . . 8
Just as every post-Cold War president before him—Republican and Democrat—
Obama defended using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities against
civilian populations arguing “force can be justified on humanitarian grounds”.9
Although Obama did not view traditional military responses as a panacea for every
threat to America’s interests, he embraced the drone program, authorising more
drone attacks in his first year of office than President George W. Bush authorised
during his entire 8-year term.10 By the time he left office, Obama had also deployed
US special forces teams to 133 countries.11
Obama’s foreign policy approach can arguably be explained by his self-confessed
affinity for Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian who attempted to reconcile ideas of a
divinely just God with the earthly realpolitik human impulses and frailties.12 Obama
explained to David Brooks that the political lesson he drew from Niebuhr’s work
was the need to balance two “irreconcilable truths”13 about war as an evil but also
sometimes necessary:
I take away the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world and
hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can
eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism
and inaction.14
8. Barack Obama, Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, December 10, 2009.
9. Ibid.
10. Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, “Obama’s Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten Times More
Strikes than Bush,” January 17, 2017, accessed February 18, 2019.
11. Edward Delman, “Has Obama Started More Wars Than He’s Ended?,” March 30, 2016,
accessed February 18, 2019.
12. David Wellman, “Niebuhrian Realism and the Formation of US Foreign Policy,” Political
Theology 10, no. 1 (2009): 11–29.
13. Obama, Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.
14. David Brooks, “Obama, Gospel and Verse,” The New York Times, April 26, 2007, A25;
Finishing the job 283
Chapter 8. Libya Anna Samson
Following the recommendations of his Genocide Prevention Task Force, in 2010
Obama created a position within the White House administration specifically focused
on preventing and responding to war crimes and other mass atrocities. In a statement
on the anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica on 11 July 2010, Obama noted
America had a “sacred duty” to remember the atrocities and “to prevent such
atrocities from happening again. . . we have a responsibility to future generations all
over the globe to agree that we must refuse to be bystanders to evil; whenever and
wherever it occurs, we must be prepared to stand up for human dignity.”15 Obama’s
commitment to fight just wars, find exit strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan, and stop
mass atrocities were not isolated pronouncements but they did become particularly
relevant when a wave of revolutionary action began in 2010 in North Africa and the
Middle East and swept across that region the following year.
8.2.2 Emerging R2P ideas and practice
Clinton and his NATO counterparts viewed the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo
as a successful operation, a point I noted in Chapter 7. Criticism of the intervention
for bypassing traditional UNSC approval mechanisms, however, came from many
quarters, including from those governments that otherwise supported taking a strong
stance against mass atrocities and gross violations of human rights and were troubled
by the failure to respond more effectively to the Rwandan genocide.16 In 2001 the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its
report introducing the concept of R2P, charting a revised relationship between the
idea of state sovereignty as inviolable and the responsibility states have to protect
David Brooks, “Obama’s Christian Realism,” The New York Times, December 14, 2009, See also;
Raymond Haberski, God and War: American Civil Religion since 1945 (Piscataway: Rutgers
University Press, 2012), 249; For more on the theologian’s influence on Obama’s foreign policy see:
R Ward Holder and Peter B. Josephson, The Irony of Barack Obama: Barack Obama, Reinhold
Niebuhr and the Problem of Christian Statecraft (ebook: Ashgate Publishing, 2012).
15. Barack Obama, Statement on the 15th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, July 11, 2010.
16. Ramesh Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect Turns 15,” International Affairs 92, no. 2
(2016): 415–34.
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their citizens from atrocities.17 R2P gained traction in public discourse, finding a
champion in then-UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali and being endorsed by the UNGA
in 2005. The African Union (AU) also included R2P principles in its founding
charter as well as in its 2005 “Ezulwini Consensus”.18
Like all policy frameworks, those attempting to operationalise R2P have confronted
challenges, particularly with respect to how R2P principles function in the context of
natural disasters (such as Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar), insurgencies (for example in
Syria) and anti-terrorism responses (for example regarding the LTTE in Sri Lanka
or ISIS in Iraq and Syria).19 The international community also could not agree to
activate R2P to the point of authorising humanitarian intervention in Darfur despite
the then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell labelling the atrocities committed during
the civil conflict “genocide” in 2004.20 Indeed the UNSC did not even discuss the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur until 2004, 13 months after the conflict began.21 The
R2P implementation challenges at the international level were overcome to a certain
extent at the regional level. The UK government, for example, used R2P principles
to support its intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000.22 Relatively successful uses of
R2P also occurred in Kenya (2007-2008), Guinea (2009-2010), Kyrgyzstan (2010)
and Coˆte d’Ivoire (2010-2011).23
17. In his review of the early history of state sovereignty Luke Glanville argues humanitarian
intervention was one of the inherent ‘rights’ of sovereign power: Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and
the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), For
more detail see Section 2.2 in this thesis.
18. African Union, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations:
The Ezulwini Consensus (Addis Ababa: African Union Executive Council 7th Extraordinary Session,
March 7, 2005).
19. Alex J. Bellamy and Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice
(Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons, December 5, 2018).
20. Touko Piiparinen, “The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” Global
Governance 13, no. 3 (2007): 366.
21. John Borton and John Eriksson, Assessment of the Impact and Influence of Joint Evaluation
of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Aarhus: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 2004).
22. Andrew M. Dorman, Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
23. Bellamy and Luck, The Responsibility to Protect , Chapter 7.
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8.2.3 The Arab Spring reaches Libya
The Arab Spring began on 10 December 2010, comprising a series of revolutionary
movements, coups and anti-government protests—violent and non-violent—across
the Middle East and North Africa. The phenomena began in Tunisia resulting in
the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. Protests
soon spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria where governments frequently
responded with violent repression. Other countries affected by the Arab Spring
movement to varying extents included Morocco, Bahrain, Algeria, Iran, Lebanon,
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Sudan, Djibouti, Mauritania, Palestine, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia and Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.
The US government’s relationship with a number of the countries in which the
Arab Spring took place is torrid and its relationship with the Libyan government
particularly so. By 2011 Libya’s President, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi had led the
country for 41 years. In the early days of Qaddafi’s presidency, America opposed
his decision to nationalise Libya’s oil production in the 1970s. The US also bombed
Libya in response to what it considered was the Qaddafi government’s support for
terrorism, including the 1988 attack by Libyan intelligence operatives on a Pan Am
flight over Lockerbie, Scotland. The US began normalising relations with Qaddafi
in 2003 after the Libyan President agreed to dismantle his nuclear and chemical
weapons programs. In 2006 President George W. Bush removed Libya from the list
of state sponsors of terrorism and began negotiating a bilateral trade deal.
Libyans were inspired by the Arab Spring and protests against local, regional
and national governments began on 2 February 2011, although there were smaller
gatherings the previous month. Protest organisers dubbed 17 February 2011 a “Day
of Rage” as Libyans took to the streets of Benghazi and other major cities around
the world to directly challenge Qaddafi’s rule. The protests were violently repressed
with the government using helicopter gunships and snipers to attack protesters and
funeral processions for those who were killed. Human Rights Watch, the Italian
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government and the UN Human Rights Commission estimated government forces
killed between 233 and 1000 people in February 2011. Opposition protesters were
also responsible for arbitrary detentions and executing security forces as well as
other foreign nationals—mostly black African migrant workers—accused of being
government mercenaries.24 The opposition included former army leaders and members
of the Qaddafi government, and rapidly coalesced into a rebellion to overthrow the
current government. By 20 February 2011 fighting in Tripoli resulted in a significant
part of the city controlled by anti-government forces. The Libyan government also
lost control of the nation’s second-biggest city Benghazi, which was also the site of a
major port.25
8.3 Talking about exit before intervention
The tensions resulting in the outburst of Arab Spring pro-democracy activity had
simmered for decades but they nevertheless caught the Obama Administration largely
by surprise. Once the US government belatedly acknowledged the social movement’s
significance in early 2011 and the political transformation it was delivering, Obama
was philosophically and politically committed to supporting it, including the revolu-
tionary movement in Libya. The Libyan government’s efforts to halt the uprising
grew increasingly violent throughout February 2011 and Obama became convinced a
mass atrocity was imminent. Thus Obama shifted his language from condemning
the violence to talking about American military preparations for stopping it.
In late February and early March 2011, Obama reprised the language of his earlier
policy speeches regarding America’s responsibility to stop widespread human rights
abuses with military force if necessary. In arguing for humanitarian intervention,
however, Obama did not explain specifically how such an operation would end.
24. Jason Koutsoukis, “Black Men Mistaken for Mercenaries,” The Sydney Morning Herald,
March 6, 2011,
25. Paul D. Williams, “Briefing: The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya,” Global Responsibility
to Protect 3 (2011): 248–59.
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Instead he framed potential intervention as America’s moral responsibility to protect
the Libyan people. This duty could be discharged in an aerial operation, which
implied the preferred exit strategy would be operational disengagement. Obama
also used the evil leader trope to blame Qaddafi for the human rights atrocities, and
while he did not argue specifically for America precipitating regime change, he did
make it clear—as President Bush and President Clinton did in northern Iraq—that
Qaddafi’s resignation would ensure the human rights atrocities would be ended once
and for all.
On 22 February 2011, following the resignation of a number of senior military
and government officials who began forming an alternative government, Qaddafi
gave a televised address in which he referred to the Libyan protesters as “rats and
cockroaches” and vowed to “crush” the revolt. A number of major Libyan cities
had already fallen to opposition forces.26 The following day, Obama responded to
Qaddafi’s comments, denouncing the “suffering and bloodshed”, “violence” and
“suppression” of protesters as “outrageous and unacceptable”.27 Obama labelled the
Libyan government’s actions a violation of international norms and “every standard of
common decency”.28 Obama framed his criticism in terms of the Libyan government’s
“responsibility” to “refrain from violence. . . and to respect the rights of its people”.29
Obama also spoke of the international community’s “responsibility” to hold the
perpetrators of violence accountable for their actions.30 Obama committed America
to “stand up for freedom, stand up for justice and stand up for the dignity of all
people” in Libya during this “time of transition”, using R2P and atrocity prevention
rhetorical frames to lay the groundwork for justifiable humanitarian intervention
in Libya, to make Libyan leaders “face the cost of continued violations of human
rights”.31
26. For an analysis of why military forces defected so readily see: Florence Gaub, “The Libyan
Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013):
221–44.
27. Barack Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
February 23, 2011.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
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Other industrialised democracies and American allies joined Obama in condemning
Qaddafi’s comments and the Libyan government’s actions, with almost all leaders
using the language of atrocity prevention in their statements. UK Prime Minister
David Cameron called the Libyan government’s actions “appalling and unacceptable”,
saying it would face “consequences”, with “no options” ruled out if internal repression
in Libya continued.32 German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Qaddafi’s comments
were “very, very appalling” and “very, very frightening, especially because he virtually
declared war on his own people”.33 French President Nicholas Sarkozy called on the
EU to impose sanctions on Libya because “the international community cannot
remain a spectator” and those responsible for the violence “should assume the
consequences of their actions”.34
United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-Moon also condemned the “gross
violations of human rights” in Libya using atrocity and vulnerable people frames
to detail “allegations of indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests, the shooting of
peaceful demonstrators and the detention and torture of the opposition and the use of
foreign mercenaries”, singling out reports of women and children among the victims.35
The UNSG also used R2P frames to describe both the Libyan government’s and
international community’s duty to “punish” those who were “brutally shedding the
blood of innocents” and to protect the Libyan people from “genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.36 From this early stage we can see
the international community framing the Libyan crisis as a matter of international
concern not just because it posed a threat to peace and security but because it
was characterised by gross violations of human rights and systemic violence against
civilians that characterised it.
On 26 Feburary 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution
32. BBC News, ed., “Timeline: UK’s Road to Action in Libya,” April 15, 2011.
33. Davis Brown, “Introduction: The Just War Tradition and the Continuing Challenges to World
Public Order,” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 3 (2011): 125–32.
34. Al Jazeera, “France Urges EU Sanctions on Libya,” Al Jazeera News, February 23, 2011,
35. Ban Ki-Moon, “Remarks to Security Council Meeting on Peace and Security in Africa,” United
Nations Security Council, February 25, 2011,
36. Ibid.
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1970 expressly referring to the Libyan government’s “responsibility to protect its
population” and authorising military intervention to enforce this responsibility. The
Resolution imposed an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze as well as referred
individuals in the Libyan government to the International Criminal Court (ICC)
for possible prosecution.37 Notwithstanding the irony of this resolution passed by
five UNSC members who themselves refused to subject their own citizens to the
ICC jurisdiction, the brief debate on the resolution featured denouncements of
atrocities and incitement to violence in Libya. South Africa’s representative said the
resolution sent “a clear and unambiguous message to the Libyan authorities to end
the carnage against their people”38 and Russia called on the Libyan government to
“show restraint and observe the norms of international civil and human rights law”.39
All UNSC members stated both the resolution and Chapter VII action it authorised
were necessary to protect civilians and rapidly end the Libyan conflict. Only China
and India did not refer to the violence as a violation of fundamental human rights
and international humanitarian law. In her contribution to the UNSC debate on
Resolution 1970, Obama’s UN Ambassador, Susan Rice, took her criticism of Libya
further than her colleagues stating the “mass violence” meant Qaddafi had “lost the
legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now”.40
Obama’s criticism of the Libyan government amplified his Ambassador’s views.41
Obama moved away from his earlier statements that “it is up to the Libyan people
to decide their future” to spearheading calls for Qaddafi’s immediate resignation:
[W]hen a leader’s only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against
his own people, he has lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is
right for his country by leaving now.. . . Qaddafi’s government must be held
accountable.42
The UNSC resolution provided international legitimacy to buttress Obama’s moral
justifications for military intervention. Throughout March 2011 Obama’s rhetoric
37. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1970, S/Res/1970(2011), February 26, 2011.
38. United Nations Security Council, 6491st meeting transcript, S/PV.6491, February 26, 2011.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Barack Obama, Press Release - Readout of President Obama’s Call with Chancellor Angela
Merkel of Germany, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 26, 2011.
42. Ibid.
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was steeped in references to normative expectations of humanitarian intervention as
examples of America defeating evil and preventing atrocities. On 3 March 2011, for
example, in a press conference at the White House, Obama spoke about plans for
America to “lead an international effort to deter further violence” in Libya framing
objectives in R2P and regime change terms:
The violence must stop. Muammar Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead,
and he must leave. Those who perpetrate violence against the Libyan people
will be held accountable. And the aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom,
democracy, and dignity must be met.43
In this press conference, Obama called for the Libyan president’s resignation three
times but when questioned about what concrete steps, if any, America would take to
precipitate regime change, Obama refused to be drawn, only stating the US would
respond to a humanitarian emergency:
So what I want to make sure of is that the United States has full capacity to
act potentially rapidly if the situation deteriorated in such a way that you
had a humanitarian crisis on our hands or a situation in which civilians were—
defenceless civilians were finding themselves trapped and in great danger.44
Two days after Obama’s comments, the National Transitional Council–Libya (NTC)
was formally established and held its first meeting in Benghazi. The NTC issued
a statement in which it declared itself to be the “sole representative of all Libya”,
including at the international political level, where its members assumed to speak
for the Libyan state at all its foreign embassies, the UN and Arab League. In its
statement the NTC called on the international community “to fulfil its obligations to
protect the Libyan people from any further genocide and crimes against humanity”,
however, the Council asked those responsibilities be met “without any direct military
intervention on Libya soil”, although it did not specify how this could be achieved.45
Qaddafi’s government did not fall to the NTC but the violence continued in Libya.
Obama continued calling for Qaddafi’s resignation and although he did not argue for
43. Barack Obama, The President’s News Conference With President Felipe de Jesus Calderon
Hinojosa of Mexico, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 3, 2011.
44. Ibid.
45. “National Transitional Council – Libya,” November 12, 2018.
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a military presence to achieve this outcome, Obama did emphasise America’s role in
having:
mobilised the international community through the United Nations so that
across the board we are slowly tightening the noose on Qaddafi. . . . And we
are going to be in contact with the opposition, as well as in consultation with
the international community to try to achieve the goal of Mr Qaddafi being
removed from power.46
Obama also distinguished these regime change efforts from plans for humanitarian
intervention to defend the Libyan people. Obama used analogical bridging to draw
parallels between the crisis in Libya and earlier situations in Bosnia and Rwanda,
where mass atrocities were not stopped quickly. Obama reminded Americans of
their “obligation to do what it can do to prevent a repeat of something like what
occurred in the Balkans in the nineties [and] what occurred in Rwanda” and was
on alert, “maintaining 24-hour surveillance of the situation there. . . to have some
sort of alert system if you start seeing defenceless civilians who being “massacred
by Qaddafi’s forces”.47 To underscore the immediacy of the threat, Obama used the
image of Qaddafi’s forces “going door to door hunting for people”,48 which referenced
images of pograms and rapidly escalating community violence in places like Rwanda
and during the WWII Holocaust. By focusing on the immediacy and seriousness of
the atrocities Obama also made the case for a new military operation for American
soldiers despite their continued participation in two other wars in which America
was already embroiled and which Obama had not yet ended.
The American public expressed conflicting views about possible humanitarian inter-
vention in Libya. Pew polls conducted on 10–13 March 2011 showed only 27 percent
of Americans thought their government had a “responsibility to do something about
the fighting in Libya”. By contrast, a much larger proportion had felt the same way
about the Kosovo crisis (47 percent). Those surveyed preferred diplomatic action and
sanctions, with opinion split on military action such as enforcing a NFZ (44 percent
46. Barack Obama, The President’s News Conference, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 11, 2011.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
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in favour, 45 percent opposed), but decidedly against a more intensive bombing
campaign (16 percent in favour, 77 percent opposed). Americans were also very wary
of sending ground troops into Libya with only 13 percent in favour and 82 percent
opposed. And yet, when asked about the benefit of using military force in Libya,
only 26 percent of those surveyed opposed using force at all, with one-third saying
using force would demonstrate America’s commitment to democracy. One in five
supported regime change with the same proportion saying America had a “moral
obligation to stop the violence”. The dominant reason for not using force in Libya
was the belief American soldiers were “already overcommitted”.49 Such mixed views
show how the conflicting expectations of humanitarian interventions permeate public
debate as much as the president’s rhetoric. Americans wanted to use military force
to ‘do something’ about Libya but they also wanted to know this action would not
only succeed and that US troops would not be stuck in a quagmire.
In articulating what it meant to ‘do something’ Obama began constructing the moral
responsibility of humanitarian intervention as protecting civilians and facilitating
political transformation, stating he saw America’s response to Libya as part of a bigger
plan for “the entire region. . . to reform itself both politically and economically”.50
Obama acknowledged humanitarian intervention meant picking a side in the Libyan
conflict—in this case, the NTC—and creating the conditions to ensure it won:
Part of what we’re going to be wanting to do is to change the balance not just
militarily inside of Libya, but also to change the balance in terms of those who
are around Qaddafi and are thinking about what their future prospects are if
they continue down the course that they’re on. . . And we are going to be in
contact with the opposition, as well as in consultation with the international
community, to try to achieve the goal of Mr Qaddafi being removed from
power.51
The above comment encapsulates Obama’s view of how humanitarian intervention
in Libya would pan out, including his exit strategy: US action would help remove
49. The Pew Research Centre for People and the Press, ed., ‘Which of the following would be the
best argument for not using military force in Libya?’, ed. The Pew Research Centre for People and
the Press, March 13, 2011; Andrew Kohut et al., Public Wary of Military Intervention in Libya
(Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center for The People & The Press, March 14, 2011).
50. Obama, The President’s News Conference.
51. Ibid.
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Qaddafi, which would stop human rights atrocities and prevent them from recurring;
America could make a quick operational exit made possible through transitioning
to local authorities who would take responsibility for the aftermath of the crisis
and ensure US troops were not embroiled in a quagmire. Consequently, even
though humanitarian intervention involved sending troops into a “potentially hostile
situation [where] there are risks involved and there are consequences”,52 Obama
argued he would limit intervention in a way that was “helpful on the ground and
also sustainable”, ultimately ensuring victory.53
Despite not explicitly outlining an exit strategy for US troops Obama’s rhetoric
during this phase nevertheless reveals the conditions under which exit would occur
demonstrating how Obama tried to limit American moral responsibilities in a way
that made the requisite level of victory for exit clear, bounded and achievable. Troops
would only be responsible for stopping the atrocities against the Libyan people. While
Obama argued Qaddafi was the ‘root cause’ of the atrocities, this would not be
the purpose of American military intervention, rather a political outcome achieved
through parallel means that would nevertheless ensure America’s humanitarian
intervention was successful over the longer term.54 With a new government in power,
notwithstanding their dubious human rights credentials, American troops could
withdraw knowing they had successfully fulfilled their moral obligations to protect
the Libyan people.
8.4 Justifying exit in Odyssey Dawn
In the weeks during and immediately after the Pew poll asking Americans’ opinion
regarding possible humanitarian intervention in Libya, Libyan government forces
used their superior military capabilities to gradually regain control of cities fallen to
52. Obama, The President’s News Conference.
53. Ibid.
54. Stephen R. Weissman, “Presidential Deception in Foreign Policy Making: Military Intervention
in Libya 2011,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 46, no. 3 (2016): 674–75.
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the rebels. Resolution 1970 and the accompanying international diplomatic pressure
did not appear to have affected Qaddafi’s actions. The Gulf Cooperation Council,
the OIC, the EU, the G8 and the LAS passed resolutions and issued statements
calling for governments to enforce a NFZ over Libya and the Arab League agreed
on 12 March 2011 to request the UNSC consider authorising a NFZ over Libya. On
15 March 2011 the Libyan government shelled the city of Ajdabiya and thousands of
people fled their homes to Benghazi. Members of the Obama Administration feared
the Libyan armed forces would next turn their attention to Benghazi with the lives
of more than 700,000 potentially in imminent danger.55
On 15 and 17 March 2011 Obama held two meetings with his NSC to discuss
America’s options in Libya. The nature of these discussion only came to light well
after the Libyan intervention was over 18 months later in an article published by
Michael Lewis in Vanity Fair magazine. Although this thesis is centred on public
justifications regarding intervention, it is worth noting some of what transpired in
those meetings because they go to the heart of expectations and beliefs about what
humanitarian intervention could and should achieve, the bounds of American moral
responsibility and the criteria for victory and troop withdrawal.
During these meetings, the prospect of ‘doing nothing’ about Qaddafi’s threats to
the Libyan people was beyond the realm of Obama’s imagined possibilities, or as
the president put it,“it’s not who we are”.56 Although it was the option preferred
by his military advisers, a NFZ was also out of the question for Obama because it
would not deliver the requisite level of victory, thus risking US troops having trouble
withdrawing, instead being drawn into a more intensive engagement:
We knew that a no-fly zone would not save the people of Benghazi. The no-fly
zone was an expression of concern that didn’t really do anything.. . . [I]f you
announced a no-fly zone and if it appeared feckless, there would be additional
pressure for us to go further.. . . What I didn’t want is a month later a call
from our allies saying, ‘It’s not working—you need to do more’.57
55. Derek Chollet, Ben Fishman, and Alex Kuperman, “Who Lost Libya? Obama’s Intervention
in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs, May-June 2015.
56. Michael Lewis, “Obama’s Way,” Vanity Fair, September 11, 2012,
57. Ibid.
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Connor Friedersdorf has similarly pointed out that Qaddafi’s threat to Benghazi, if
indeed it was to be carried out, would have used tanks and jeeps not planes and so
targeting the Libya government’s aerial capability would not have provided adequate
civilian protection.58 In noting Obama’s private reservations it must also be said
that others in the Obama Administration saw the goals in Libya as much wider
than humanitarian protection. Former CIA Director and then Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta, stated of the time “I said what everyone in Washington knew but we
couldn’t officially acknowledge: that our goal in Libya was regime change”.59
Two days later, on 17 March 2011 the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 permitting any
state or regional organisation to “take all necessary measures. . . to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” in Libya including an NFZ and
tougher arms embargo.60 The Resolution was the first time the UNSC authorised
Chapter VII military action for civilian protection against the wishes of a sitting
government.61
When speaking in favour of the resolution government representatives used atrocity
prevention and R2P frames, noting the moral imperative to urgently save civilians in
Libya. Lebanon’s representative spoke of “violent acts and atrocious crimes”.62 The
UK’s representative asserted Qaddafi was “using weapons of war against civilians” and
“preparing for a violent assault on a city of 1 million people. . . using air, land and sea
forces”.63 France’s representative talked about Qaddafi’s “murderous repression” as
his troops pursued “violent conquest of liberated cities” amounting to “the rule of law
and international morality [being] trampled underfoot”. Colombia’s representative
argued the Libyan government had “shown that it is not up to the international
responsibility of protecting its population”.64
58. Conor Friedersdorf, “How Obama Ignored Congress, and Misled America, on War in Libya,”
The Atlantic, September 13, 2012, accessed August 1, 2017.
59. Leon Panetta with Jim Newton, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace
(New York: Penguin, 2014), 354.
60. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, S/Res/1973(2011), March 17, 2011.
61. Alex J. Bellamy, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm,”
Ethics and International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011): 263–69.
62. United Nations Security Council, 6498th meeting transcript, S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
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Although significant, Resolution 1973 did not represent a clear statement of inter-
national sentiment in favour of humanitarian intervention in Libya. Five UNSC
members—Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia—abstained from the vote
because their governments were concerned about the precedent-setting value of
the resolution and because they were unconvinced military action was the correct
response in the circumstances. Germany argued foreign armed intervention brought
unacceptably high risks, and thus “we should not enter into a military confronta-
tion on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be
achieved”.65 Brazil agreed military intervention may cause “more harm than good to
the very same civilians we are committed to protecting” as well as “change the nar-
rative” about the Arab Spring being a spontaneous, domestic movement. China had
“serious difficulty” with parts of the resolution and agreed with Russia’s contention
there was insufficient detail about how the resolution would be enforced, the rules of
engagement, and limitations on the use of force. Russia was concerned the resolu-
tion’s wording “potentially open[ed] the door to large-scale military intervention” in
Libya.66
In addition to foregrounding civilian protection responsibilities, Resolution 1973
responded to international concerns about previous humanitarian interventions as
well as the progress of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which had resulted in a
much longer-term presence of foreign soldiers than initially promised or anticipated.
The resolution expressly excluded foreign occupation from the “necessary measures”
member states could take to protect civilians and given the reservations of veto-
holding states, it is likely the resolution would not have passed without this provision.
The operational limitation could therefore be interpreted as an effort to compel
intervening states to avoid mission creep by expressly restricting operational choices.
However, the provision’s inclusion also suggests UNSC members believed civilian
protection objectives could be achieved without a ground troop presence, challenging
Obama and his fellow NATO leaders to conduct the Libyan intervention differently
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
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to every previous humanitarian intervention attempted by other US presidents who
had all eventually used ground forces to reinforce initial aerial operations.
On the basis of Resolution 1973, Obama launched Operation Odyssey Dawn on
19 March 2011. The total number of US personnel involved in the operation has
been datamasked but is estimated to be approximately 30,000. Odyssey Dawn was
conducted alongside France’s Operation Harmattan and the UK’s Operation Ellam67
but the US commanded the intervention and controlled its activities. Obama followed
in the footsteps of his predecessors in limiting Odyssey Dawn to an exclusively aerial
campaign focused on enforcing a NFZ. Like those previous humanitarian interven-
tions, Obama’s operational approach was related to his exit strategy. But unlike
those earlier interventions, Obama’s exit strategy at this time was not operational
disengagement as may have been anticipated prior to intervention. Instead, US
forces would transition the operation to NATO and withdraw later. Obama’s public
statements acknowledged it would be difficult for American soldiers to simply leave
if the humanitarian situation was not resolved through enforcing the NFZ alone. His
strategic narrative approach thus avoided problems Clinton and Bush encountered in
northern Iraq and Somalia and Clinton had experienced in Kosovo, when they were
unable to implement their operational disengagement strategy because the aerial
campaign had not delivered victory. To the extent Obama did implement his exit
strategy it had arguably negligible practical consequences given US forces remained
heavily engaged in the intervention even after NATO took over.
When announcing Odyssey Dawn to the American public the day after the UNSC
passed Resolution 1973, Obama rhetorically situated the intervention as continuing
the moral foreign policy tradition of previous American humanitarian interventions.
Obama argued America’s moral responsibility was to prevent atrocities and protect
the Libyan people from their evil leader who threatened to worsen the humanitarian
crisis to catastrophic proportions, in this case to threatening the lives of 700,000
people living in Benghazi:
67. Karl P. Mueller, Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 2015).
Finishing the job 298
Chapter 8. Libya Anna Samson
Left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Qaddafi would commit
atrocities against his people. Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis
would ensue. The entire region could be destabilised, endangering many of our
allies and partners. The calls of the Libyan people for help would go unanswered.
The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun. Moreover, the
words of the international community would be rendered hollow.68
Over the coming days, Obama argued America’s moral responsibility to use military
force arose directly because the Libyan people demanded intervention; troops were
“answering the calls of a threatened people”.69 While in the lead-up to intervention
Obama had argued regime change was necessary to prevent atrocities in Libya, now
Obama adhered closely to the text of the UNSC resolution, notably avoiding talk
of removing Qaddafi. Instead, Obama talked about sticking to “a well-defined goal,
specifically the protection of civilians”.70 According to this argument, Obama would
end the intervention and hand it over to NATO forces once civilians had been
‘protected’ with the NFZ.
The difficulty, however, was understanding this civilian protection obligation in light
of the earlier comments Obama had made about the instrumentality of regime change
to protecting civilians. The “focused”,71 “clear”,72 and “well-defined”,73 goal was not
as straightforward as Obama claimed because he did not state at what point civilians
would enjoy sufficient protection for the intervention to be considered to have been
sufficiently successful to justify US troops withdrawing. Indeed, once the intervention
began, Obama struggled in his public comments to explain how American troops
would protect civilians without targeting Qaddafi, given the intervention was to
punish a “tyrant” and demonstrate “actions have consequences and the writ of the
68. Barack Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 18, 2011.
69. Barack Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Brasilia, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, March 19, 2011.
70. Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya.
71. Ibid.
72. Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya; Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya From
Brasilia; Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting With President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil in
Brasilia, Brazil, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 19, 2011.
73. Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya; Barack Obama, Letter to Congressional Leaders
Reporting on the Commencement of Military Operations Against Libya, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, March 21, 2011; Barack Obama, The President’s News Conference With President
Carlos Mauricio Funes Cartagena of El Salvador in San Salvador, El Salvador, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, March 22, 2011.
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international community must be enforced”.74
When questioned directly about the contradiction between his stated policy position
on Qaddafi and the limitations of the UNSC authorisation, Obama argued the
intervention was about “humanitarian efforts” and he would “make sure that we
stick to that mandate”.75 At the same time, however, Obama did not resile from his
preferred regime change outcome. Instead he drew a false distinction between the
military effort to stop Qaddafi’s human rights abuses on the one hand, and America’s
non-military means to precipitate regime change on the other, as if the bombing
campaign’s effects on Qaddafi were independent of the impact of sanctions and asset
freezes, and vice versa:
Q. Sir, how do you square your position that Colonel Qadhafi has lost legitimacy
and must go against the limited objective of this campaign, which does not
demand his removal? If Colonel Qadhafi is killing his own people, is it
permissible to let him stay in power?
OBAMA. I think it’s very easy to square our military actions and our stated
policies. Our military action is in support of an international mandate from
the Security Council that specifically focuses on the humanitarian threat posed
by Colonel Qaddafi to his people.. . . Now, I have also stated that it is US policy
that Qaddafi needs to go. And we’ve got a wide range of tools in addition to
our military efforts to support that policy.76
It is difficult to see how Obama could maintain this rhetorical distinction in practice,
especially as Qaddafi was the alleged perpetrator of the very human rights abuses the
humanitarian intervention was designed to stop. Regardless of whether or not regime
change activities were consistent with the civilian protection remit of Resolution
1973, from the beginning of Odyssey Dawn removing Qaddafi was a criterion for
America’s victory in Libya and would be central to exit strategy justifications.
Victory was such an important prerequsite for troop withdrawal that Obama warned
the American people US troops may not leave even after the mission transitioned
to NATO if victory had not been achieved. Obama argued that even when US
74. Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Brasilia; Barack Obama, The President’s
Weekly Address, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 19, 2011, See also; Obama,
Remarks Following a Meeting With President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil in Brasilia, Brazil .
75. Barack Obama, The President’s News Conference With President Sebastian Pinera Echenique
of Chile in Santiago, Chile, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 21, 2011.
76. Ibid.
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troops “accomplish[ed] the very specific objectives of the mission under the UN
Charter”, American troops had to remain because the US “has to respond as a leader
in the world community”,77 which meant staying “as part of a broader international
effort”.78 Just like Clinton in Somalia and Kosovo and Bush in Iraq a handover would
not extinguish America’s moral obligations and therefore was not by itself sufficient
to justify exit. Leaving America’s moral duty unfulfilled would undermine claims
of mission success. Obama thus struggled to limit his humanitarian intervention to
simply “com[ing] in early to shape the environment”79 in Libya for others to continue
while American soldiers exited. Such an exit was beyond the realm of imaginable
possibilities in humanitarian intervention; US troops had to remain engaged until
they succeeded in achieving the civilian protection outcomes Obama set for the
intervention.
Congress did not support Obama’s actions in Libya. Some legislators such as Senator
Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) believed Obama should have acted sooner and more
forcefully, but they were a minority.80 For the most part, the Republican-controlled
Congress had adopted a belligerently oppositional attitude to Obama’s legislative
and policy agenda and the Libyan intervention was no exception. Lawmakers within
Obama’s own Democratic party such as Dennis Kucinch (D-OH) also resisted the
intervention arguing the president had violated the War Powers Resolution81 by not
seeking Congressional approval either prior to committing US forces or at any time
during the course of the operation. Despite the opposition, however, Congressional
efforts to block Obama’s efforts to commence the operation were not successful,
reinforcing the dominant rhetorical and practical role the president has to shape the
course of US humanitarian interventions, including their exit strategies.
Over the course of Odyssey Dawn US lawmakers introduced 20 bills into Congress
77. Obama, The President’s News Conference With President Carlos Mauricio Funes Cartagena
of El Salvador in San Salvador, El Salvador .
78. Ibid.
79. Barack Obama, Interview With Juan Carlos Lopez of Corriente Latina, ed. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, March 23, 2011.
80. Michael Bowman, “US Legislators Debate Libya Intervention,” ed. Voice of America News,
Voice of America News, March 21, 2011,
81. 50 U.S.C. 1541–1548
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about America’s participation in the intervention, only two of which expressed
support. While debate predominantly focused on the constitutionality of Obama’s
latest military deployments, Congress members were also concerned about exit
strategies, which they framed in the context of existing difficulties in Afghanistan
and Iraq. For instance, Representative Steve Pearce (R-NM), wondered “if we can
be out by the end of the decade”.82 Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) was also
concerned America’s responsibility to successfully deliver on its moral responsibilities
to the Libyan people, which he saw would inevitably extend beyond enforcing the
NFZ, would ultimately compromise prospects for a quick exit:
When will the U.S. combat role in the operation end? Will America’s com-
mitment end in days, not weeks, as the President promised? What will be
the duration of the noncombat operation, and what will be the cost? What
national security interests of the United States justify the risk of American
life? What is the role of our country in Libya’s ongoing civil war?83
8.5 Exit from Odyssey Dawn not an exit
On 28 March 2011 Obama announced Operation Odyssey Dawn would end in
three days as US soldiers had begun transitioning their efforts to NATO.84 In the
days leading up to NATO assuming command for the intervention under Operation
Unified Protector, Obama gave a series of speeches lauding a successfully implemented
transition exit strategy. Obama justified exit on the basis America had “accomplished”
its objectives of preventing atrocities Libya, claiming “because we acted quickly,
a humanitarian catastrophe has been avoided and the lives of countless civilians–
innocent men, women and children–have been saved”85 and “we have stopped
82. Steve Pearce, “Concerns about Libya: Proceedings and debates of the 112th Congress, First
Session,” in Congressional Record–House (March 29, 2011), S1880.
83. Mitch McConnell, “Military Action in Libya,” in Congressional Record–Senate (March 28,
2011), H4540.
84. Barack Obama, Remarks at Univision’s ”Es el Momento” Town Hall Meeting and a Question-
and-Answer Session, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 28, 2011.
85. Barack Obama, The President’s Weekly Address, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 26, 2011; Obama, Remarks at Univision’s ”Es el Momento” Town Hall Meeting and a
Question-and-Answer Session.
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Qadhafi’s deadly advance”.86 Obama argued America had acted consistently with the
normative expectations for humanitarian intervention and foreign policy behaviour
more generally, having “played a unique role as an anchor of global security and as
an advocate for human freedom.”87
Obama also argued American soldiers could withdraw because other nations were
now ready to “bear the responsibility and cost of upholding peace and security”.88
As in the lead-up to intervention, Obama repeatedly framed the intervention in
terms of “meeting responsibilities” to protect the Libyan people.89 He underscored
the success of the Libyan intervention by claiming it had only taken 31 days to
“intervene with air power to protect civilians”, whereas it had taken more than a
year in Bosnia. Consequently, as US soldiers had acted at the intervention’s “front
end”,90 the president argued America could now retreat into the background, playing
a “supporting role” that would continue to be “limited in time and scope”,91 with the
“risk and cost of this operation—to our military and to American taxpayers—reduced
significantly”.92
Although Obama physically and rhetorically downgraded the US contribution, it
soon became apparent the NATO transition exit was not really an exit at all. The
US was the largest single contributor to Unified Protector, deploying more military
assets (153 out of 295 planes) and personnel (8407 out of 12,909 soldiers) than
the other countries combined.93 Although this was a much smaller-sized military
contribution than Odyssey Dawn, if, as Obama claimed, US soldiers had been so
86. Obama, Remarks at Univision’s ”Es el Momento” Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-
Answer Session.
87. Ibid.
88. Obama, The President’s Weekly Address.
89. Obama, Remarks at Univision’s ”Es el Momento” Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-
Answer Session.
90. Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Brasilia; Barack Obama, Address to the
Nation on the Situation in Libya, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 28, 2011;
Barack Obama, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister David Cameron of the
United Kingdom in London, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 25, 2011, The President
reinforced this point in subsequent statements. See, for example, Barack Obama, The President’s
News Conference With Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, June 7, 2011.
91. Obama, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya.
92. Ibid.
93. The Guardian newspaper, ed., “NATO Libya Attacks,” The Guardian, 2011.
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successful in stopping/preventing atrocities, it was unclear why the humanitarian
intervention needed to continue or why US soldiers needed to remain in Libya at all.
Ultimately Obama was not justifying an exit but as every president conducting a
humanitarian intervention before him, he began justifying why troops were remaining
in the intervention rather than exiting. Obama’s justification for not withdrawing
troops was also similar to his predecessors in that he argued success required more
than stopping the impending atrocity.
Even before the formal handover to NATO, Obama reminded the American people
continued participation in the humanitarian intervention in Libya was necessary
because military efforts were part of his government’s wider regime change policy:
This military effort is part of our larger strategy to support the Libyan people
and hold the Qadhafi regime accountable.. . . Muammar Qadhafi has lost the
confidence of his people and the legitimacy to rule, and the aspirations of the
Libyan people must be realised.94
Although Obama had downplayed regime change at the start of the humanitarian
intervention, as US troops ostensibly prepared to handover to NATO he began
talking more about how achieving regime change would create sustainable mission
success by preventing new atrocities and supporting Libya’s political transformation:
As the bulk of our military effort ratchets down, what we can do, and will do,
is support the aspirations of the Libyan people. We have intervened to stop a
massacre, and we will work with our allies and partners to maintain the safety
of civilians. We will deny the regime arms, cut off its supplies of cash, assist
the opposition, and work with other nations to hasten the day when Qaddafi
leaves power. It may not happen overnight, as a badly weakened Qaddafi
tries desperately to hang on to power. But it should be clear to those around
Qaddafi and to every Libyan that history is not on Qaddafi’s side.95
In the very same speech on 28 March 2011, however, Obama also recognised the risk
that such a mission might result in a quagmire. Fulfilling wide moral obligations
would come at the expense of an assured troop withdrawal. Thus Obama argued
“broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake” because
94. Obama, The President’s Weekly Address.
95. Obama, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya.
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of the mission would involve ground forces, which would be costly and unpopular
because US troops could not withdraw quickly:
If we tried to overthrow Qaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter. We
would likely have to put US troops on the ground to accomplish that mission
or risk killing many civilians from the air.. . . To be blunt, we went down that
road in Iraq.. . . That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.96
The president thus delivered conflicting messages about his exit strategy for the Libya
intervention. On the one hand, Obama argued the end of Odyssey Dawn meant the
intervention was almost over because America had achieved its atrocity prevention
objectives. On the other hand, Obama argued America’s larger moral responsibilities
in Libya were still outstanding, and thus US soldiers needed to remain in Libya
until they had achieved their regime change goals. Obama was unable to justify
completely withdrawing all soldiers, constrained as he was by normative expectations
to keep troops engaged until they succeeded in their mission to stop atrocities by
defeating the evil force perpetrating them and supporting political transformation.
8.6 Justifying exit in Unified Protector
With the humanitarian intervention entering a new phase, Obama needed a new exit
strategy for completely withdrawing US soldiers, but the president never expressly
committed to one. America’s intervention was still being conducted exclusively from
the air, and so an operational disengagement exit strategy was a default option open
to the president. But it was not the exit strategy Obama chose; he selected another
transition exit, this time a transition to local Libyan authorities.
In constructing a justification for this new exit strategy, Obama refused to indicate
how long America would continue its humanitarian intervention, following the actions
his predecessors Clinton and Bush took in Kosovo, Somalia and northern Iraq, by
saying he would not “put forward any artificial timeline” for withdrawing troops from
96. Ibid.
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Libya.97 Instead, over the coming months Obama undermined his previous comments
about Odyssey Dawn having succeeded in Libya, sometimes stating America had
not ended the atrocities at all because Qaddafi remained in power and continued
committing human rights abuses. In an op-ed jointly penned with the leaders of
NATO allies France and the UK, Obama stated:
Tens of thousands of lives have been protected. But the people of Libya are
still suffering terrible horrors at Qaddafi’s hands each and every day. His
rockets and shells rained down on defenceless civilians in Ajdabiya. The
city of Misurata is enduring a medieval siege, as Qaddafi tries to strangle its
population into submission. The evidence of disappearances and abuses grows
daily.98
Statements such as these reveal Obama’s view that enforcing the UNSC’s civilian
protection mandate was not and could not be effectively discharged or sustained
by relying on air power alone to enforce a NFZ, especially if the intervention did
not effectively deter perpetrators from committing human rights abuses. It was
true that although the US was able to destroy some of the Libyan government’s
military capabilities, without the presence of foreign ground troops to stand between
perpetrators and victims, it was still possible for Libyan government forces to continue
attacking civilians.
Pursuing an exclusively aerial operation, rather than expanding the options for
implementing an exit strategy, decreased the likelihood of exit because intervention
expectations were more difficult to meet with this operational restriction. It was
perhaps not surprising, therefore, that when Unified Protector began Obama argued
America’s earlier success was fragile and incomplete. There were powerful normative
expectations America’s intervention had to materially stop the human rights abuses
and troops could not be justifiably withdrawn until this goal was achieved. The
possibility of Qaddafi perpetrating an atrocity needed to be eliminated, before exit
could be countenanced. While there was a chance this goal could be achieved with
Qaddafi still in power, Obama was hardly an enthusiastic advocate for this position,
97. Obama, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister David Cameron of the United
Kingdom in London.
98. Barack Obama, Libya’s Pathway to Peace: Joint Op-ed by Barack Obama, David Cameron
and Nicolas Sarkozy, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 14, 2011.
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preferring regime change:
And so we are strongly committed to seeing the job through, making sure that
at a minimum, Qaddafi doesn’t have the capacity to send in a bunch of thugs
to murder innocent civilians and to threaten them. I believe we have built
enough momentum that as long as we sustain the course that we’re on, that
he is ultimately going to step down.99
Indeed, this issue about how long American moral responsibilities continued once
intervention commenced would come to define the narrative of America’s Libyan
intervention long after it ended.
Although Unified Protector was supposed to create the sustainable success not
delivered by Odyssey Dawn, Obama resisted introducing ground troops to hasten
this outcome while simultaneously doubling down on his argument for regime change.
The President gave his most fervent justification of this position in a statement
released on 14 April 2011 during a meeting with NATO allies. In this statement
published in the elite US press as an op-ed, Obama blurred the line he had drawn
at the beginning of the intervention between protecting civilians within the remit
of Resolution 1973 and regime change. In so doing, Obama began framing the US
government’s policy for regime change as not just consistent with, but a necessary
component for enforcing Resolution 1973. Having started this intervention, Obama
argued it was America’s responsibility not to leave until it had ‘finished the job’, in
this case hastening Qaddafi’s denouement:
Our duty and our mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to
protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Qaddafi by force.
But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power.. . . It is
unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a
part in their future government.. . . It would be an unconscionable betrayal.100
Obama maintained his regime change policy was linked to America’s moral responsi-
bility to promote political transformation in Libya by assisting the rebel forces seeking
to overthrow the government. Obama argued the end state for this intervention was
99. Obama, The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister David Cameron of the United
Kingdom in London.
100. Obama, Libya’s Pathway to Peace: Joint Op-ed by Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas
Sarkozy .
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Qaddafi’s removal and replacement by these opposition forces:
[S]o long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its operations so that
civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds. Then a
genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can
really begin, led by a new generation of leaders. In order for that transition to
succeed, Qaddafi must go and go for good. At that point, the United Nations
and its members should help the Libyan people as they rebuild where Qaddafi
has destroyed, to repair homes and hospitals, to restore basic utilities, and to
assist Libyans as they develop the institutions to underpin a prosperous and
open society.101
Obama’s language of democratic transition and nation-building echoed similar state-
ments by earlier Presidents Bush and Clinton when they talked about American
interventions in Somalia and Kosovo, respectively. Although Obama was careful
to rule out using force to secure regime change, this was one of the practical con-
sequences of the the US and its allies continuing to place pressure on the Libyan
government in Unified Protector, as well as providing political, tactical and logistical
support for opposition groups in Libya whose express goal was also regime change.
Obama’s Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged this point in testimony he
gave before the Senate’s Armed Services Committee on 31 March 2011 in which he
stated that enforcing the NFZ and participating in the NATO intervention would
assist the rebels to achieve regime change:
So, [Qaddafi’s] military, at a certain point, is going to have to face the question
of whether they are prepared, over time, to be destroyed by these air attacks, or
whether they decide it’s time for him to go.. . . [We] continue, and the alliance
will continue, to degrade Qaddafi’s military capabilities. It wasn’t that long
ago that there were uprisings all across Libya, and Qaddafi’s forces were on
the defensive.. . . It was only because his military capabilities remained intact
that he was able to put down those uprisings. So, there’s clearly a lot of
people across Libya that are ready to rise up against this guy. If we can
sufficiently degrade his military capability, it seems to me that then gives them
the opportunity to do that.102
It is worth remembering the UNSC had attempted to constrain America’s military
options in Libya by focusing on civilian protection while prohibiting occupation.
101. Obama, Libya’s Pathway to Peace: Joint Op-ed by Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas
Sarkozy .
102. US Congress, “Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Situation in Libya,” Committee on Armed
Services Hearing, 112th Congress, 1st Session, March 31, 2011,
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Despite its restrictions, Resolution 1973 paradoxically left open a wide range of
options for the US, including supporting opposition forces in open, armed rebellion
towards regime change.103
Given America’s dominance ofNATO’s operation, it is perhaps unsurprisingNATO’s
public justifications for Unified Protector ’s exit strategy mirrored Obama’s justifica-
tions. NATO issued a statement arguing that stopping the immediate threat posed
by Qaddafi was insufficient to justify withdrawing troops. NATO members widened
their interpretations of ‘civilian protection’ to include political transformation, argu-
ing “the development of a transparent political solution [is] the only way to bring
an end to the crisis”104 promising the Libyan people NATO would “keep up the
pressure [on Qaddafi] to see it through . . . to make sure that you can shape your own
future”.105 Seeing the triumph of a credible opposition force against Qaddafi thus
appeared to be the main criterion for NATO to consider withdrawing from Libya.
Lest regime change without follow-up sound far too similar to America’s approach
to its current war in Iraq, Obama distinguished his approach first on the basis his
regime change policy was linked to his new transition exit strategy for US forces in
Libya and second, because he used the language of preventing atrocities and civilian
protection to justify it. Obama argued American forces would withdraw from Unified
Protector once Libya’s opposition replaced Qaddafi’s government. Exit was justified
because the new government would assume responsibility for sustaining America’s
success in Libya by creating the political conditions where the mass atrocities would
not occur.
103. On the related issue of the prospect of humanitarian intervention creating an incentive for
rebellion see: Alex J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessions from
the Balkans,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 49–80; Jon Western disagrees that
this concern has borne out in reality: Western and Goldstein, “Humanitarian Intervention Comes
of Age: Lessons From Somalia to Libya,” 54.
104. NATO, Statement on Libya Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign
Affairs with Non-NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector, April 14, 2011; See also
NATO, NATO to Maintain High Operational Tempo as Long as Necessary in Libya, April 14, 2011.
105. NATO, Statement by the NATO Secretary-General on the Extension of the Mission in Libya,
June 1, 2011; NATO, Statement on Libya Following the Working lunch of NATO Ministers of
Defence with non-NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector, June 8, 2011, See also.
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Having previously referred to the NTC as a “partner” in civilian protection,106 by
the middle of May 2011, Obama identified Libya’s NTC as the “legitimate and
credible” alternative to the sitting Libyan government.107 Three months later the
President’s support for the NTC solidified into recognition of this opposition group
as the “legitimate governing authority in Libya”108 and a “credible representative of
the Libyan people”.109 This support was more than just rhetorical; during Unified
Protector the US and its NATO allies coordinated their military ‘civilian protection’
activities with the de-stablisation actions of the NTC and rebel military comman-
ders.110 NATO representatives denied any explicit coordination taking place, but
journalists in Libya observed rebel forces often waited for NATO to “soften up”
targets before moving in.111
It is difficult to verify the true extent of mutual reliance between the rebel forces
and US/NATO command but government documents reveal the French, UK, Italian
and Turkish governments sent military advisers to train and organise insurgents112
and the French government also sent weapons directly to rebel forces.113 Although
Obama ruled out sending ground troops to participate in the intervention, the CIA
and special forces operatives were active in Libya and neighbouring countries.114
Regardless of whether American commanders were working directly with Libyan
rebels, there is little doubt the objectives of both operations had significant overlap.
In any event, it is clear Obama and his NATO counterparts did not limit their
humanitarian intervention to maintaining a NFZ but were rhetorically and practically
106. Barack Obama, Memorandum on Drawdown of Commodities and Services To Support Efforts
To Protect Civilians and Civilian-Populated Areas Under Threat of Attack in Libya, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, April 26, 2011.
107. Barack Obama, Joint Op-ed by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, May 24, 2011.
108. Barack Obama, Statement on the Situation in Libya, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
August 21, 2011; Barack Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Martha’s Vineyard,
Massachusetts, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, August 22, 2011.
109. Obama, Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts.
110. Weissman, “Presidential Deception in Foreign Policy Making: Military Intervention in Libya
2011,” 681–82.
111. Tim Lister, “Analysis: As Libyan Conflict Grinds On, NATO’s Mission Shifts,” CNN, August 19,
2011, Derek Flood, journalist and analyst with the Jamestown Froundation quoted in.
112. John Barry, “America’s Secret Libya War: U.S. Spent $1 Billion on Covert Ops Helping
NATO,” August 30, 2011.
113. BBC News, “Libya Conflict: France Air-Dropped Arms to Rebels,” June 29, 2011.
114. Barry, “America’s Secret Libya War: U.S. Spent $1 Billion on Covert Ops Helping NATO.”
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committed to regime change as a marker of intervention success upon which exit
depended in this second intervention phase.
Identifying a ‘credible’ alternative to Qaddafi’s government meant Obama could
not just argue democratic transition was achievable, but it would occur in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Ending America’s humanitarian intervention with a
successful local transition would position America’s difficulties achieving the same
outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq as failures of government action rather than reveal
problems with the foreign policy’s normative foundations. The Libyan intervention
thus provided an opportunity for Obama to demonstrate Afghanistan and Iraq were
aberrations in US foreign policy history; under the right conditions it was possible to
successfully use military force to promote human rights and political transformation,
and to do so quickly, without an ongoing American troop presence.
One of the risks with relying on the NTC to justify American troop withdrawal was
that a poorly-vetted, disparate group of opposition forces whose policies were not
necessarily consistent with the American government’s expectations for democratic
institution-building, may not deliver on the promise of a sustainable victory for US
soldiers in Libya. This was in fact exactly what occurred in Libya when all American
troops formally withdrew and Obama declared an end to the intervention in October
2011.
Shifting from Odyssey Dawn to Unified Protector allowed Obama to justify an exit
that wasn’t, but it also enabled Obama to avoid the legal requirement to obtain
Congressional approval for the operation under the War Powers Resolution within
60 days of engaging in hostilities overseas. The Resolution also provides a further
30 days in which the President can terminate operations before needing to bring
the matter before the US Congress.115 When the 60-day deadline for Congressional
approval mandated by the War Powers Resolution expired, a flurry of Congressional
resolutions were introduced but the votes were inconclusive. On 2 June 2011 the
115. United States Activities in Libya, The White House, June 16, 2011.
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House of Representatives criticised Obama for “failing to provide Congress with a
compelling rationale” for the intervention in Libya, giving the President a further 14
days in which to seek that authorisation. On the same day, however, the House also
blocked a resolution to withdraw US troops from Libya within 45 days.
Stalwart opponent of US foreign military interventions, Senator Dennis Kucinich
(D-OH) led a bipartisan group of his fellow representatives in filing court proceedings
on 14 June 2011 to force Obama to comply with his obligations under the War
Powers Resolution. The following day the White House responded to the growing
consternation in Congress taking the unusual step of releasing a 30-page document
arguing Obama was not breaching the War Powers Resolution because US troops
were not engaged in hostilities in Libya.116
The White House statement did not put Congressional debate to rest. On 23
June 2011, despite having the support of senior Republican Party figures such as
Senator John McCain (R-AZ), the House of Representatives rejected a bill supporting
intervention. On the same day, however, the House refused to use its budgetary
powers to cut funding for the intervention. As the Libyan intervention stretched into
its 97th day, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)
said “we have drifted into an apparently open-ended commitment [in Libya] with
goals that remain only vaguely defined.117 While she was concerned the unspecified
exit strategy would lead to mission creep, she was also not in favour of ending the
intervention immediately because US soldiers needed to stay until they succeeded,
despite the initial intervention being potentially unconstitutional. Her comments
reveal the tension apparent in Obama’s public statements between delivering a quick
exit strategy and a successful intervention that delivered human rights protections
for the Libyan people were evident more widely in American public discourse:
I must underscore that I do not support a complete withdrawal from our
commitments concerning Libya. That would be dangerous. That would be
116. United States Activities in Libya.
117. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, “Authorising Limited Use of Armed Forces in Libya: Proceedings and
debates of the 112th Congress, First Session,” in Congressional Record–House (June 24, 2011),
H2033.
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ill-advised. A complete withdrawal of all US military assets from the Libya
operations would undermine our intelligence efforts and our foreign policy
goals, and would all but assure a victory for Qaddafi.. . . While a complete
withdrawal is unacceptable, the resolution before us is also unacceptable. The
resolution effectively ratifies all that the President has done, and it would grant
him the blessings of Congress to continue on his present course. The resolution
before us would enable mission creep, rather than setting clear parameters for
US engagement.118
The initial international criticism of the Libyan intervention also intensified as the
operation continued. Scepticism about the intervention’s objectives heightened as
President Assad’s brutal oppression of the similarly Arab Spring-inspired Syrian
uprising did not attract the same robust response from the US and its allies as Libya.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, of which China and Russia are key members,
released its Astana Declaration on 15 June 2011, calling for the “cessation of military
confrontation” in Libya.119 The AU also called for a ceasefire and only two African
nations followed America’s lead in accepting the NTC as a legitimate alternative
government in Libya. The outgoing President of the LAS, the organisation that first
called for a NFZ over Libya, now demanded an immediate ceasefire because of the
civilian casualties caused by the US/NATO bombings.120 Amr Moussa also said it
was not possible for America and NATO’s military campaign to produce “a decisive
ending” to the crisis in Libya because President Qaddafi was not willing to surrender
control of the Libyan government. Here we see Moussa tying military victory to
America’s exit strategy, demonstrating how far Obama’s rhetoric influenced the
way other world leaders also internalised the normative constraints on American
intervention.121
Tripoli fell to rebel forces in August 2011 and in the following weeks American
agents and those of its allies attempted tracking down Qaddafi, who had gone
into hiding, apparently planning on seeking exile.122 In September 2011, Obama
118. Ibid.
119. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ed., Astana Declaration on the 10th Anniversary of
the SCO, June 15, 2011.
120. Ian Traynor, “Arab League Chief Admits Second Thoughts about Libya Air Strikes,” The
Guardian, June 22, 2011, Rachel Shabi, “Nato Accused of War Crimes in Libya,” The Independent,
January 19, 2012, accessed October 10, 2012.
121. Traynor, “Arab League Chief Admits Second Thoughts about Libya Air Strikes.”
122. Luke Harding, “Front: Libya: The Endgame Begins: Rebels Approach Tripoli and Trigger
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addressed the UN and met with his British, French and Turkish counterparts,
glossing over the mounting international and domestic pressure to stop the Libyan
intervention.123 Instead Obama praised the military operation as demonstrating “how
the international community is supposed to work” to “prevent a massacre”.124
President Obama also asked other countries to join in America’s project supporting
democratic transformation in Libya because
all of us have a responsibility to support the new Libya, the new Libyan
Government as they confront the challenge of turning this moment of promise
into a just and lasting peace for all Libyans.125
Obama reinforced his construction of intervention success as building democracy
and political transformation. It was America’s moral responsibility to deliver these
outcomes and there was no reason to end intervention until they were achieved.126
Obama’s political transformation criteria and the prospects for a ceasefire as bases
for justifying American troop withdrawal became moot, however, when Qaddafi
was assassinated on 20 October 2011 after fleeing a convoy bombed by American
Predator drones and French jets. Qaddafi’s car crashed and after a brief firefight with
rebels the former Libyan President was brutally mutilated, sexually assaulted and
killed. The circumstances surrounding the assassination attracted such controversy
NATO’s operational command issued a statement clarifying its role in the attack.
NATO claimed its airstrikes “likely contributed” to Qaddafi’s capture, but it had
bombed the convoy to prevent a “significant threat to the local civilian population”,
Uprising in Suburbs; Gaddafi Calls on ‘All Patriots’ to Help Defend the Capital; Leader’s Location
Uncertain as Bloody Final Battle Feared,” The Guardian, August 22, 2011, 1.
123. Barack Obama, Remarks at a United Nations Meeting on Libya in New York City, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, September 20, 2011; Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting
With Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and an Exchange With Reporters in New
York City, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 20, 2011; Barack Obama, Remarks
During a Meeting With Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom and an Exchange
With Reporters in New York City, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21, 2011;
Barack Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21, 2011.
124. Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City .
125. Ibid.
126. Barack Obama, Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony for the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff at Fort Myer, Virginia, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 30,
2011.
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unaware it included a car carrying the former president.127
Obama used this event to demonstrate America had finally achieved the victory it
sought by permanently defeating the evil force responsible for human rights atrocities
in Libya, justifying American troop withdrawal. US troops did withdraw but what
began as a successfully implemented exit strategy was soon undermined by the
deteriorating political situation in Libya.
8.7 Problems exiting from Unified Protector
In commenting on the impact of Qaddafi’s death on the future of American interven-
tion in Libya, Obama used evil leader frames to construct the event as the ultimate
symbol of American victory. Obama asserted “the dark shadow of tyranny has been
lifted” demonstrating the “strength of American leadership across the world” and
proving “the rule of an iron fist inevitably comes to an end”.128 The fact Qaddafi’s
assassination equalled victory sufficient to warrant American exit from Libya was
reinforced when Obama announced the following day the NATO mission would soon
“come to a successful end”. And while Obama left the assassination off the list of
America’s achievements in Libya, he argued Qaddafi’s death morally vindicated the
intervention, linking it directly to saving Libyans from mass atrocities. Obama said
“the death of Muammar Qaddafi showed that our role in protecting the Libyan people
and helping them break free from a tyrant was the right thing to do.”129
Countering previous statements from his advisers about America ‘leading from
behind’ in Unified Protector, after Qaddafi’s assassination Obama claimed America
had “led from the front”,130 acting with the “world community” and not “unilaterally
127. NATO, NATO and Libya: Operational Media Update for 20 October, October 21, 2011.
128. Barack Obama, Remarks on the Death of Former Leader Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi
of Libya, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 20, 2011.
129. Barack Obama, The President’s Weekly Address, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
October 22, 2011, Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s response was less circumspect, when
she joked with a CBS Reporter about the news of Qaddafi’s assassination: “We came, we saw, he
died”. Hillary Clinton, CBS News Interview, October 20, 2011.
130. Barack Obama, Interview With Jay Leno on NBC’s “The Tonight Show”, ed. Gerhard Peters
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making a decision to take out somebody”.131 At the same time however, Obama
also acknowledged America’s intervention was what enabled regime change to occur;
America’s “brave pilots and crews helped prevent a massacre, save countless lives
and give the Libyan people the chance to prevail”. Obama thus saw the intervention
as providing “a recipe for success in the future”,132 however this assessment would
be revised in the months following America’s exit from Libya.
The day after Qaddafi’s death, NATO’s North Atlantic Council decided to end
Unified Protector by 31 October 2011.133 Following NATO’s announcement, the
UNSC unanimously resolved to end its mandate for operations in Libya on 31
October 2011.134 On the day NATO forces withdrew from Libya, NATO Secretary-
General Rasmussen said his organisation had “answered the call” to “protect” Libyans
with an intervention that was “effective, flexible and precise”.135
In the months following Qaddafi’s death and US forces withdrawing from Libya
as planned Obama made very few statements about America’s exit. When he did
comment, Obama talked about American victory as “decisive”136 because it “stopped
the regime in its tracks”.137 Obama dropped his earlier arguments about troop
withdrawal being contingent on long-term institution-building and democratic trans-
formation, and turned to using Qaddafi’s death as a significant enough achievement
to justify exit. Obama argued America had “accomplished every objective” having
“saved countless Libyan men, women and children”.138 Obama contracted American
moral responsibility back to his original terms of providing civilian protection arguing
it was now over to the Libyan people to fulfil those larger nation-building tasks
and John T. Woolley, October 25, 2011.
131. Obama, Interview With Jay Leno on NBC’s “The Tonight Show”.
132. Ibid.
133. NATO, Operational Media Update: NATO and Libya, October 25, 2011.
134. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2016, S/Res/2016(2011), October 27, 2011; Rick
Gladstone, “U.N. Votes to End Libya Intervention on Monday,” The New York Times: World /
Middle East, October 27, 2011, accessed October 12, 2012.
135. NATO, “We Answered the Call” - The End of Operation Unified Protector, October 31, 2011.
136. Barack Obama, Remarks at Cannes City Hall in Cannes, France, ed. Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, November 4, 2011.
137. Ibid.
138. Barack Obama, Remarks at Cannes City Hall in Cannes, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, November 4, 2011.
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without US military support. Qaddafi’s death provided justification for Obama’s
new local transition exit strategy, where America “returned Libya to its people”,139
with Libyans “forging their own future”.140
Having suffered no US casualties, eventually implementing an exit strategy and
delivering on America’s obligations to protect civilians by precipitating Qaddafi’s
removal, Obama’s claims of intervention success were not challenged by his domestic
audience. Libya became Obama’s narrative foil to America’s other wars. The NTC
filled the leadership void that seemed so elusive in Iraq with Saddam Hussein’s demise
and the failures to create a central government in Afghanistan. Libya demonstrated
it was possible to successfully use military force to stop mass atrocities and Obama
appeared to have overcome the difficulties his predecessors faced in implementing an
exit strategy from earlier humanitarian interventions.
In reaching this outcome, Obama’s rhetoric played an important role in shaping
the contours of victory and thus the conditions for withdrawal. Obama started
with a very limited American moral responsibility to stop an imminent atrocity
but then gradually expanded this duty to include democratic transformation in
Libya. Rather than maintaining this framing, however, Obama used the occasion of
Qaddafi’s assassination to revert back to a more limited moral responsibility to deter
further atrocities. Thus Obama framed Qaddafi’s death as the ultimate deterrent,
which in turn provided the justification for the US to withdraw its forces. While
these strategic narrative shifts provided immediate political and practical benefits,
there were also risks Obama could be criticised for withdrawing too soon if the
new government committed its own human rights abuses or Libya did not proceed
towards democratic transformation.
Libya did not transition unproblematically towards democracy. The NTC resisted
repeated efforts by various international organisations to provide international aid,
139. Barack Obama, Remarks at a Veterans Day Ceremony in Arlington, Virginia, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, November 11, 2011.
140. Barack Obama, Remarks at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 2012.
Finishing the job 317
Chapter 8. Libya Anna Samson
particularly a peacekeeping force. US-UK-French attempts to build a replacement
force for the Libyan militias was ultimately abandoned due to lack of local support.141
For all its insistence to carve an independent post-Qaddafi future for Libya, the
NTC ultimately proved far too fragmented and ill-equipped to assume the full gamut
of responsibilities involved in governing Libya, let alone the capability to address
underlying political tensions, religious fundamentalism and criminality stirred by the
civil war. The rebels American troops trained were sympathetic to US adversaries
such as Al-Quaida and had a slim grasp of international humanitarian law when
dealing with pro-Qaddafi forces. There were 30 terrorist attacks in the year following
American troop withdrawal from Libya,142 including two attacks on the US Embassy
in Benghazi on 11 September 2012 that killed the American Ambassador and three
other diplomatic staff. The attacks were politically significant, not only because an
American Ambassador had not been killed on active duty since 1979, but because
the attacks occurred on the anniversary of the 9-11 attacks, reminding Americans
Al-Quaida’s reach had extended into a nation the US had ostensibly set on the path
to democratic transformation.
Congress convened a Select Committee to investigate the Benghazi attacks with
deeply politicised hearings stretching over two years and casting an unshakeable pall
over then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s reputation and subsequent Presidential
campaign. As for Libya, institutional breakdown and insecurity increased in the
years following American troop withdrawal.143 The 2014 election results prompted
renewed civil war that continues today, dividing the country and creating space for
the expansion of global terrorist networks including the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS) and Al-Quaida into Libyan territory with 1386 terrorist attacks in
141. Chollet, Fishman, and Kuperman, “Who Lost Libya? Obama’s Intervention in Retrospect”;
Commentators including James Dobbins and Frederic Wehrey were confident during the intervention
that the rebels would require minimal assistance post-intervention: James Dobbins and Frederic
Wehrey, “Libyan Nation Building After Qaddafi,” Foreign Affairs, August 23, 2011, accessed
October 12, 2012.
142. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Global
Terrorism Database,” 2016.
143. Alan J. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in
Failure,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015): 66–77.
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the four years following the Benghazi attacks.144 Libya’s instability also spilled over
into neighbouring countries. Arms from the 2011 civil war flooded into Mali and
contributed to rebellions, separatist campaigns and ultimately a civil war in which
the French government launched its own military intervention.145 Having withdrawn
US soldiers from Libya in 2011, three years later Obama redeployed troops to support
the Libyan government’s campaign to remove ISIS from its territory.
Although the US/NATO humanitarian intervention may have saved the lives of
Libyans threatened by the actions of then-President Qaddafi, many more have been
lost or irreparably damaged by the violence following Obama’s declaration of mission
success. Obama justified his decision to end the intervention by setting clear limits
on US moral duty and using his successful implementation of his transition exit to
represent the point US moral responsibility for Libya’s future ended. But despite
crafting this strategic narrative the President could not personally or politically
escape the normative expectations for America to not withdraw troops from a
military operation until they have ‘won’. In this case, it meant ensuring the successor
government behaved ‘better’ than Qaddafi’s government, violence was minimal, and
geopolitical stability was achieved. Thus Obama was trapped by the competing
expectations to, on the one hand, withdraw American soldiers quickly, and on
the other, keep them engaged until long-term, sustainable political transformation
occurred.
Before leaving office Obama stated that the “worst mistake” of his presidency was
failing to pursue a “much more aggressive effort to rebuild” Libya.146 Obama’s
assessment of his Libyan intervention failures matched those of other analysts who
argued America should have been more deeply involved and taken responsibility for
underwriting Libya’s post-Qaddafi political transformation. Ironically, this failure to
do ‘nation-building’, was at the time considered one of the main things underpinning
144. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Global
Terrorism Database.”
145. Stephen Burgess, “Military Intervention in Africa: French and US Approaches Compared,”
JEMEAA, 2019, 69.
146. BBC News, “President Obama: Libya Aftermath ‘Worst Mistake’ of Presidency,” April 11,
2016.
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the intervention’s success because it justified Obama’s decision to withdraw forces
quickly and made his transition exit implementable. The NTC also insisted at the
time that no US military support was required once the official transition occurred.
Obama left office regretting his strategic choices in Libya and his Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton’s subsequent presidential campaign was criticised for her support for
America’s exit from Libya. These criticisms were based on Clinton’s apparent failure
to adhere to the normative expectations of America using military force to ensure
military intervention delivered favourable political transformations and long-term
human rights outcomes.147
8.8 Conclusion
The problems with the aftermath of the Libyan intervention demonstrate the risks
inherent in American presidents crafting strategic narratives for humanitarian in-
terventions that focus on implementing a quick exit strategy, delivering on this
normative expectation at the expense of fulfilling wide moral responsibilities to stop
mass atrocities. Presidents have limited freedom to define victory in a way that does
not include achieving political transformation goals. Even in a case like Libya where
political transformation was not central to Obama’s justifications for commencing the
intervention, it was difficult for the president to transcend the normative expectation
America has a responsibility to secure political transformation when it uses military
force. Decisions to deploy and withdraw troops thus occur within this broader
context of America’s moral responsibility to secure political transformation around
the world.
Given the centrality of the language of mass atrocity prevention to justifications
for commencing the intervention,148 it might be expected these ideas about civilian
147. Robert Entman and Sarah Stonbely, “Blunders, Scandals, and Strategic Communication in
U.S. Foreign Policy: Benghazi vs. 9/11,” International Journal of Communication 12 (2018): 3037.
148. Kathryn Kersavage, “The “Responsibility to Protect” Our Answer to “Never Again”? Libya,
Syria and a Critical Analysis of R2P,” International Affairs Forum 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 31,
accessed April 24, 2015.
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protection would permeate other decisions about the intervention’s conduct, espe-
cially for a president who was personally committed to atrocity prevention. What we
see in Libya, however, is rather than R2P guiding decision-making,149 its rhetorical
protection frames were subsumed into the pre-existing normative frameworks circum-
scribing American decisions to use military force. Consequently, Obama’s decision
to end the intervention had more in common with exit strategy decisions in earlier
humanitarian interventions where concerns about protecting civilians had to be bal-
anced against moral obligations to defeat evil and promote political transformation,
and only exiting after these objectives are achieved.
Obama followed the existing guidance on the best ways to conduct an intervention,
including that outlined by the MARO authors,150 and yet, as he pointed out at
the end of his presidential term, Libya was still “a mess”.151 The limitations of
these prescriptions for conducting intervention is they do not take into account the
normative context within which presidents conduct interventions. Existing guidance
does not acknowledge presenting a clear exit strategy for American soldiers is limited
by the normative expectations of what an American humanitarian intervention is
supposed to achieve. Once military intervention has begun R2P also does not provide
a framework for how that intervention can address the underlying issues that gave
rise to the atrocities.
Criticism of Obama’s intervention in Libya demonstrates that even after America’s
failed contemporary experiments with nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
pressure to turn inwards after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the normative expectations
about the power of American military force to save people from evil rulers and
bring about political transformation remains. Even when a president recognises
the limitations of American military power, attempts to move US forces into the
149. Liliana L. Jubilut, “Has the ’Responsibility to Protect’ Been a Real Change in Humanitarian
Intervention? An Analysis from the Crisis in Libya,” International Community Law Review 14
(2012): 309–35.
150. Sewall, Raymond, and Chin, MARO - Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning
Handbook .
151. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. President Talks through His Hardest
Decisions about America’s Role in the World,” The Atlantic, April 16, 2016.
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background of coalition operations and deliver on his promise not to deploy ground
forces as part of a humanitarian intervention, the success of the intervention will
ultimately be judged by the extent to which the intervention meets those wider
normative expectations. More than a decade after Kosovo and twenty years after the
first post-Cold War humanitarian intervention, an American president still struggled
with balancing competing normative expectations of fulfilling moral obligations,
achieving victory and assuring troops would not be stuck in a quagmire but be
guaranteed to withdraw.
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Three months into President Donald Trump’s term, on the morning of 4 April 2017,
a 14-year-old girl in the town of Khan Sheikhoun in western Syria told The New
York Times she saw a plane drop a bomb on a single-storey building causing a yellow
mushroom cloud. Later, other community members, activists, local journalists and
emergency service workers reported cases of people lying on the ground, unable
to move or choking on the street. The victims’ symptoms were consistent with
experiencing a chemical weapons attack. After examining samples taken from three
victims, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN
Joint Investigation Mechanism reported on 19 April 2019 the victims had been
exposed to Sarin or a Sarin-like substance.1 Reports issued by Turkish and French
authorities confirmed the OPCW’s findings.2 Total numbers of individuals killed or
injured in the attack have not been confirmed but the UK-based Syrian Observatory
for Human Rights put the initial number of people killed at 72. Subsequent reports
from CNN, the French government and organisations run by Syrian opposition groups
placed the number killed as high as 100 with up to 600 injured.3
1. Office for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “OPCW Director-General Shares Incontro-
vertible Laboratory Results Concluding Exposure to Sarin,” April 19, 2017.
2. BBC News, ed., “Syria Chemical ‘Attack’: What we Know,” April 26, 2017.
3. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ed., “Syria chemical weapons attack toll rises to 70 as
Russian narrative is dismissed,” April 6, 2017.
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At the start of the Syrian civil war in 2012, the Syrian government acknowledged it
possessed chemical weapons but denied ever using or intending to use them against
Syrians. Shortly after the Syrian government confirmed the existence of chemical
weapons, US President Barack Obama drew a proverbial “red line” on chemical
weapons use in Syria, saying if the US saw “a whole bunch of chemical weapons
moving around or being utilised” this would influence his view on whether America
should intervene militarily in Syria.4 The incident in Khan Sheikhoun was not the
first use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war. Such actions are arguably
war crimes under the Rome Statute, especially if the chemical weapons are deployed
indiscriminately or otherwise deliberately target civilian populations. Regardless of
whether the attack was a war crime, its effects placed it within the realm of a mass
atrocity, similar to those that prompted the humanitarian interventions I examined
in northern Iraq, Kosovo and Libya.
The US, UK, French and Turkish governments held the Syrian government responsible
for the attack on Khan Sheikhoun.5 The Syrian government denied involvement
and was backed by the Russian government. Not waiting for confirmation from
independent organisations or his own intelligence authorities, less than 72 hours after
the attack, US President Donald Trump authorised 59 cruise missiles launched from
warships USS Ross and USS Porter targeted at the Shayrat Airbase, the military
installation from which Trump believed the chemical weapons attack originated.6
Trump announced his decision to the American people in a short televised address in
which he classified the military strike as part of his plan “to end the slaughter and
bloodshed in Syria”, calling on “all civilised nations to join us”, arguing “as long
as America stands for justice, then peace and harmony will, in the end, prevail”.7
4. Barack Obama, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Following a Press Briefing by
White House Press Secretary James F. ‘Jay’ Carney, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
August 20, 2012.
5. Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladstone, “Nikki Haley Says U.S. May ‘Take Our Own Action’
on Syrian Chemical Attack,” The New York Times, April 5, 2017,
6. Rex Tillerson and H.R. McMaster, Press Briefing by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and
National Security Advisor General H.R. McMaster, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
April 6, 2017.
7. Donald J. Trump, Remarks on United States Military Operations in Syria from Palm Beach,
Florida, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 6, 2017.
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Trump used the language of atrocity to talk about the “horrible chemical weapons
attack”, which was all the more “barbaric” because “even beautiful babies were
cruelly murdered”.8
Trump expanded on his position in his characteristic disjointed stream-of-consciousness
justification in an interview on 11 April 2017 on the Fox Business Network that is
worth quoting verbatim:
I will tell you that when I looked at the pictures on any show or any newspaper
but especially when you see them on television and you see these beautiful
kids that are dead in their father’s arms or you see kids gasping for life, you
know, it’s over it’s over for them. They’re hosing them down. Hundreds of
them. When you see that, I immediately called [Secretary of Defense] General
Mattis. I said “what can we do” and they came back with a number of different
alternatives and we hit them very hard. Now, are we going to get involved
with Syria? No. But if I see them using gas and using things that I mean even
some of the worst tyrants in the world didn’t use the kind of gases that they
use and some of the gases are unbelievably potent. So, when I saw that, I said
we have to do something. You should have peace in Syria. It’s enough and
frankly you know we talked the chemicals because you know people just don’t
see this the level of brutality. The level of viciousness. But when they drop
barrel bombs and bombs of any kind, right on top of a civilian population,
that’s the worst thing. I’ve never seen anything like it. And frankly Putin
is backing a person that’s truly an evil person and I think it’s very bad for
Russia. I think it’s very bad for mankind. It’s very bad for this world, but
when you drop gas or bombs or barrel bombs. They have these massive barrels
with dynamite and they drop it right in the middle of a group of people. And
in all fairness, you see the same kids no arms, no legs, no face. This is an
animal and I really think that there’s going to be a lot of pressure on Russia
to make sure that peace happens. Because, frankly, if Russia didn’t go in and
back this animal you wouldn’t have a problem right now.9
The following day, Trump would again justify his attack on the basis that “the
vicious slaughter of innocent civilians with chemical weapons, including the barbaric
killing of small and helpless children and babies, must be forcefully rejected by any
nation that values human life.”10
Trump’s public discussion of the response to the chemical weapons attack continued
well after it was over. Trump had reduced America’s humanitarian intervention to
stop this particular human rights atrocity to a single missile strike launched from
8. Ibid.
9. Donald J. Trump, Interview with Maria Bartiromo on Fox Business Network, ed. Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, April 11, 2017.
10. Donald J. Trump, The President’s News Conference With Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 12, 2017.
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warships in the Mediterranean Sea. This humanitarian intervention was as short
and as sharp as could be possibly imagined, completed while Trump ate dessert with
China’s President Xi Jinping. It had an immediate effect and while it did not stop
human rights atrocities from continuing in the civil war, it did stop that specific Syrian
base being used to launch future strikes, chemical or otherwise, for a limited time.
The intervention was not authorised by the UNSC and Syrian authorities stated
the intervention killed at least seven people, including four children, but the death
toll was not independently verified. America’s allies including the UK, Australia,
Italy and Japan supported the intervention, with the UK Defence Secretary Michael
Fallon calling it “wholly appropriate”.11 US forces were not drawn into formally
participating in the wider Syrian conflict (although American soldiers continued to
act in an ‘advisory’ capacity to some rebel forces and subsequent bombing raids
continued on a sporadic basis into 2018). Restricting the intervention to airstrikes
meant US troop withdrawal was assured; the operational exit strategy was not only
promised, it was implemented.
Despite having been elected to office in part on the strength of his outsider status and
his commitment to reduce America’s involvement in military operations in the Middle
East, Trump proved as willing as his predecessors to use military force to respond to
mass atrocities overseas. Although Trump is known for his iconoclastic approach,
delivering unpolished policy pronouncements over Twitter, and his unwillingness to
adopt rhetorical positions similar to presidents before him, the language he used
to talk about his humanitarian intervention was remarkably similar to the kind I
identified other presidents—Democrat and Republican—used for the previous quarter
century when talking about humanitarian interventions. Trump used the language of
atrocity to justify his framing of a military response in Syria as morally incumbent,
consistent with the normative expectations America could and should use force to
stop atrocities and defeat evil.
Trump did, however, laud the mission for achieving its very limited objective, noting
11. Anushka Asthana, “Syria airstrikes: UK offers verbal but not military support to US,” The
Guardian, April 8, 2017,
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all of the missiles hit their target, which was “unbelievable...Amazing. Really
it’s so incredible, it’s brilliant, its genius”.12 Although he saw the intervention
as acting on behalf of all “civilised” countries, Trump, like Obama in his Libyan
humanitarian intervention, did not embrace the normative expectation for the US
intervention to politically transform Syria, an objective requiring a much longer-term
troop commitment. But like Obama, Trump’s failure to fulfil these wider moral
responsibilities to stop the atrocities altogether drew criticism because it did not
neutralise Syria’s President Bashir al-Assad.13 Syria rebuilt its destroyed air base
and resumed combat missions, Assad cemented his control on power and continued
to use chemical weapons for strategic ends.14
Trump’s rhetoric also included references to how this military operation came with
the promise of troop withdrawal. His exit strategy was built into his operational
approach. Like Bush, Clinton and Obama before him, Trump justified his exit
strategy on the basis he was restricting his humanitarian intervention to an airstrike,
repeatedly saying America was “not going into Syria”, by which he meant he would
not deploy US ground forces into Syrian territory.15 For all the promise Trump had
shown in breaking the foreign policy mould of presidents before him, when it came
to humanitarian intervention, the Syrian case demonstrated that even Trump was as
likely to frame his justification rhetoric by referring to normative expectations of
using force to address mass atrocities.
The issue prompting my investigation is exactly the issue Trump and every US
president since the end of the Cold War has faced when attempting to use military
force to respond to mass atrocities or gross violations of human rights: how can a
president both respond effectively to stop these mass atrocities while also ensuring
12. Trump, Interview with Maria Bartiromo on Fox Business Network ; Following a subsequent
attack on Syria Trump also declared “Mission Accomplished!” on Twitter, apparently unfazed by
the association of the phrase with George W. Bush’s announcement I noted at the beginning of
this thesis. Donald J. Trump, Tweet at 5:21am on 14 April 2018, April 14, 2018.
13. Jonathan Marcus, “Syria Air Strikes: Will West’s Attack Sway Syria’s Assad?,” BBC News,
April 14, 2018,
14. Tobias Schneider and Theresa Luˆtkefend, Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical Weapons
Use in Syria, research report (Global Public Policy Institute, 2019).
15. Trump, Interview with Maria Bartiromo on Fox Business Network .
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there is a clear, implementable exit strategy that convincingly assures the American
people soldiers will be brought home?
In Chapter 2 I demonstrated that current foreign policy and strategic studies literature
does not adequately address the issue of exit strategies in humanitarian interventions.
There are three main reasons for this. First, although humanitarian interventions
are military operations, conventional war termination theories cannot be effectively
applied in these cases because they do not sufficiently account for humanitarian
intervention’s peculiar normative foundations as a constraint on decision-making.
I argued the moral responsibility motivation for humanitarian intervention affects
operational choices and strategic calculations, including justifiable grounds for troop
withdrawal. Maintaining the character of humanitarian interventions as ‘humani-
tarian’ requires troops remain only so long as the moral benefit of their presence
outweighs the moral cost of their withdrawal. This assessment, however, is affected
by discursive constructions of moral benefit that can and do change over time, as
well as trade-offs between competing moral obligations, for example force protection
versus minimising civilian casualties.
The second reason is that inherent in most analyses of exit strategies is a presumption
that exit requires victory. The idea of victory itself is not particularly problematic,
especially as scholars have recognised victory is multi-dimensional and is broader than
crude metrics of battlefield success. Nevertheless, most scholars studying military
operations continue to position victory as the ultimate goal of military engagements
and argue decision-makers can achieve this goal by clearly defining victory parameters
from the outset. It is not especially helpful to apply these ideas about victory to
humanitarian interventions however, because what constitutes intervention success
is linked to nebulous ideas about moral responsibility that frequently defy concrete
measurement and evolve throughout the course of an intervention.
Third, to the extent that scholars have tried to explain why humanitarian interventions
have proved notoriously difficult to end, they frequently rely on the concept of ‘mission
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creep’. Indeed scholars have identified instances of mission creep in each of the four
case studies I investigated in this thesis. However, despite efforts to more clearly
define the term, mission creep remains a thin description of an observable phenomenon
rather than an explanation of the dynamics that give rise to it. Existing mission
creep analyses do little to identify how mission creep occurs, whether or not making
different strategic strategic choices could have avoided mission creep, the extent those
choices were even available, or whether mission creep was the determinative factor
for explaining why decision-makers did not withdraw troops from humanitarian
interventions.
My thesis goes some way towards filling the gap in the international relations
and strategic studies literature on understanding exit strategies in humanitarian
interventions. I did this by bringing together the insights of three groups of scholars:
foreign policy analysts who seek to understand the dynamics of foreign policy decision-
making; scholars of the rhetorical presidency who explore how American presidential
rhetoric reflects and shapes the landscape for political action; and public justification
theorists and those who see the importance of public speech acts as enabling and
constraining possibilities for political action. In this research project I synthesised
the three theoretical strands through the lens of normative concepts analysis and
discourse tracing.
By centring discourse and public justification I could better account for the way in
which humanitarian intervention considerations are unlike those in other military
operations and thus why the exit strategy dynamics differed for a chief strategic
decision-maker in these circumstances. Normative concepts provided a reference
point against which I could judge the decision-making dynamics within and between
interventions, accommodating context but still allowing for comparisons between
cases and public justifications. In addition, centring speech acts in my analysis
helped demonstrate their consequential relationship with strategic decision-making,
showing that to the extent that speech acts are constrained, so too are the foreign
policy decisions those speech acts are about. Ultimately, my research lends weight to
Finishing the job 329
Chapter 9. Conclusion Anna Samson
the intuitive understanding that public justifications matter, especially in decisions
about how to use military force.
In this thesis I examined transcripts of more than 700 verbal texts by three US
presidents since the end of the Cold War in which they discussed their exit strategy
plans for four humanitarian interventions: northern Iraq (George H.W. Bush and Bill
Clinton), Somalia (George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton), Kosovo (Bill Clinton, and
to a lesser degree George W. Bush and Barack Obama) and Libya (Barack Obama).
Through a line-by-line analysis of this material, I explored how presidents justified
to the American people why they were withdrawing US soldiers from humanitarian
interventions, or, as was more often the case, why they were unable to implement the
exit strategies they promised. My thesis is the only current comparative investigation
of exit strategies in these four interventions, revealing significant continuity between
the exit strategy justifications of presidents across time.
My methodological approach followed the work of Uriel Abulof and Markus Korn-
probst, using normative concepts to centre my analysis and as the point from which
to explore public justifications. Despite its grounding in the well-established field
of discourse analysis, normative concepts analysis is an emerging methodological
approach but I found it particularly useful for studying the large corpus of verbal
texts. It allowed me to conduct a thick, comparative analysis of the texts that
captured nuances but also allowed me to identify themes, patterns and changes in a
way that would not have been as effective had I restricted my inquiry to focusing on
either a smaller number of texts or semantic word analysis. Working with normative
concepts helped me reveal connections between public justifications and strategic
decision-making as well as the wider context within which exit strategies are crafted,
justified and implemented.
In my investigation I found that the problem of ensuring an implementable exit
strategy in a humanitarian intervention is not primarily a function of presidents
needing to plan more effectively or possess a more nuanced understanding of the
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challenges an intervention may experience, although these are definitely important
considerations and without them there would be little chance of an exit strategy
being implemented in the manner and at the time promised or desired. Instead I
discovered that among the roots of this problem is a normative issue, peculiar and yet
fundamental to humanitarian interventions. A major problem in crafting, sticking
to and effectively implementing an exit strategy is the conflict between collective
normative expectations about how America should respond militarily to humanitarian
crises. These normative expectations make the humanitarian intervention justifiable
in the first instance but they also shape the imagined possibilities for the conditions
under which deciding to end an intervention would be considered similarly justifiable.
My research provides evidence for why international relations theory needs to account
for the real world consequences that normative constrains place on presidential action,
even in instances where more ’rational’ considerations may be expected to take
precedence in decision-making.
American historical experience is collectively understood and made sense of through
political myths that include normative expectations for how America should respond
to gross human rights violations or mass atrocities abroad. As I noted in Chapter 3
these three myths are US exceptionalism and manifest destiny, World War II and
the Vietnam War as archetypes of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ wars respectively, and winning
as moral vindication. In this thesis I show how these three myths reinforce each
other, feature in all presidents’ justifications for decision-making in humanitarian
interventions, and frame the grounds upon which the interventions can be justifiably
ended. It is tempting to caricature these three myths or dismiss their use by US
presidents—or even the myths themselves—as cynical, however they consistently
frame domestic public discourse about how military force is used. More importantly,
these myths give rise to normative expectations about using force for humanitarian
purposes and therefore constrain the possibilities for action, including when troops
can be justifiably withdrawn. Those observing US foreign policy behaviour, including
US allies and intergovernmental institutions, also accept these political myths and
normative expectations are critical to American foreign policy behaviour and the
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dominant liberal international order that America is expected to champion. This
order is something of which US allies and international institutions have also invested.
These actors can be observed judging US actions in part by the extent to which they
adhere to these moral ideas. International relations scholars must therefore take
these myths and expectations seriously.
US exceptionalism and manifest destiny tropes are observable in the way presidents
construct the moral responsibility they argue America must discharge through
military intervention. The nature of this moral responsibility is to stand up for
human rights, to defend vulnerable people from oppression and to assist communities
in the process of democratic transformation. This moral responsibility positions
American military action itself as benevolent, emancipatory and a public good. The
myth of WWII as a ‘good’ war demonstrates how military force can and should be
successfully used to pursue American values defeating an evil foe and the world it
represented. The Vietnam War as the ‘bad’ war archetype on the other hand, does
not undo the myth of American exceptionalism or question the wisdom of resorting to
armed force, but is interpreted as proof military force must be overwhelming enough
to ensure unmitigated success, and must be in service of a ‘righteous’ cause. Vietnam
demonstrated that the American public needs any military success to be grounded
in a morally righteous cause if ‘winning’ is to be truly constructed as victory. A
quagmire is not so much a concern about embroiling soldiers in interminable military
operations as it is about fears US forces will not emerge victorious. At the same
time, however, winning military engagements provides moral vindication for deciding
to use force, particularly important in humanitarian interventions, which expressly
foreground moral considerations in choosing an armed response. Winning is also
integral to American culture and identity beyond military operations.
Having decided to initiate a humanitarian intervention, the grounds upon which a
president can justifiably withdraw troops are threefold and should ideally be satisfied
simultaneously: first, a president must demonstrate that US troops have fulfilled the
moral responsibilities that made their intervention incumbent in the first instance;
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second, as with all other military engagements, US forces will be victorious; and third,
US troops will not be an occupying force, withdrawing quickly so as to avoid being
mired in a quagmire. The first group of expectations regarding moral responsibilities
requires US forces to, at the very least, prevent an impending mass atrocity or stop
human rights violations currently underway. What it means to ‘stop’ or ‘prevent’
an atrocity, however, is a matter presidents construct through their discursive
action. Presidents understand that such incidents of mass violence are not isolated
occurrences but embedded within a wider social and political context of grievances
that gave rise to that violence. Hence we can observe every president noting that
fulfilling America’s moral responsibility to halt an atrocity quickly takes US policy
into areas of removing the root causes of the violence, be that individual perpetrators
(President Hussein in northern Iraq, General Aidid in Somalia, President Milosevic
in Kosovo and President Qaddafi in Libya), or promoting the kind of political
transformation that will address the structural problems, inequalities and oppression
in which those grievances have been allowed to marinate (Kurdish oppression in
northern Iraq, state collapse and famine in Somalia, post-communist transition in
Kosovo, grassroots pressure for political reform in Libya).
A president’s decision to widen the scope of American responsibility is deliberate
but it is also difficult for a president to avoid making it. When a president attempts
to ‘read down’ or limit the scope of American moral responsibility to stop an
immediate atrocity, they do so at the risk their military operations will not be
considered successful. Thus in each intervention I examined presidents began with a
relatively restricted operational approach for their mission that would address the
humanitarian crisis. The problem was, however, that they struggled to convincingly
keep America’s moral obligation in each case limited, largely because these duties
were connected both practically and normatively to wider moral responsibilities, the
successful fulfilment of which necessarily meant their initial exit strategies could not
be implemented as planned. To have any rheotircal room to manoeuvre, presidents
are driven to intensify their rhetoric about the moral consequences of inaction and
the concomitant costs of failure.
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Achieving mission success is the second expectation of a humanitarian intervention
and frames the grounds for a justifiable exit. The prospect US troops would be
withdrawn from an operation before they have ‘won’ is beyond the realm of presidents’
imagined possibilities because anything short of victory brings the decision to have
resorted to force in the first place into question. Exiting without victory challenges
deep notions within the American collective narrative about the righteousness of
American military action and the nobility of its soldiers. Winning is important in
and of itself and for what it represents, but what constitutes victory, winning and
success in the context of humanitarian interventions is very difficult for presidents to
articulate. In large part this is because the moral responsibilities of intervention are
broadly construed and thus it is very difficult to explain the appropriate threshold
for success that would justify an exit and identify when sufficient success is achieved.
As moral responsibilities become increasingly nebulous, the president’s ability to
clearly articulate how the American people will know their moral responsibilities
have been fulfilled and the mission has succeeded also become increasingly imprecise.
Consequently, knowing when to claim the requisite degree of victory in a humanitarian
intervention to justify withdrawing American soldiers also becomes more challenging.
It is possible for presidents to simply exercise their rhetorical power and define the
bounds of success themselves but they do so at the risk of challenging the dominant
narrative about what American armed forces should be seen to achieve in military
operations. This is exactly what happened with President Obama in Libya with he
and others ultimately criticising the intervention as a failure. In Somalia, Clinton
attempted to walk back his definition of victory by reading down America’s moral
obligations to the Somali people, but this decision had limited public cachet because
the wider moral obligations were already entrenched in the intervention narrative.
Clinton withdrew troops under conditions of defeat, despite his efforts to frame it
otherwise; but even if the public questioned Clinton’s declaration of victory, they
did not question the moral impetus behind the intervention. More often than not,
presidents hedge against the risk that they will withdraw troops too early before the
intervention has succeeded leading to repeated failures to implement exit strategies,
Finishing the job 334
Chapter 9. Conclusion Anna Samson
as was the situation for Presidents Bush and Clinton in Iraq and Somalia, and
President Clinton in Kosovo.
Although presidents are constrained in their moulding of definitions of victory, there is
some historical ’learning’ that arguably takes place, resulting in changes over time in
how presidents claim victory ought to be demonstrated. Humanitarian interventions
have thus been central to contemporary interpretations of what constitutes victory
and success in US military operations. H.W. Bush constructed victory in Iraq, at
least initially, as not necessarily requiring regime change, in part because America’s
moral responsibility to the Kurds could be discharged without actively removing
Saddam Hussein. In Somalia and then Kosovo, Clinton began with a view of
victory that did not require regime change but later argued that conditions of
victory required neutralising capacity of individual protagonists. By the time Obama
intervened in Libya, regime change as a condition of victory was unquestioned as a
practical representation of stopping an atrocity in its tracks and a morally symbolic
achievement of bringing justice to a perpetrator. Thus exit strategy discourse in
humanitarian interventions have, over time, become one in which the concept of
‘victory’ has been distilled into a single objective of removing an ‘enemy’. Today,
regime change has become synonymous with military and wider American foreign
policy success, be it in Syria, Iran or Venezuela.
In addition to the challenges posed by expectations that US troops will succeed in
fulfilling wide moral responsibilities, there is the expectation that US troop exit will
be assured. This concern about providing a demonstrable exit date is in part linked
to the myth that the United States is not an imperial power and its military forces
are only used for defensive or benevolent purposes. But the expectation of an assured
date for troop withdrawal is also strongly influenced by experiences in Vietnam and
the fear of US troops being stuck in a quagmire. This fear manifests in the way in
which the quagmire trope permeates presidential rhetoric, regardless of an individual’s
political hue, as well as the public commentary about every humanitarian intervention.
It is the reason for presidents committing to exit timetables and emphasising at
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the outset, as well as throughout an intervention, that American soldiers will not
remain engaged indefinitely. However, this commitment to a quick withdrawal, or
even providing a timetable for withdrawal, conflicts with the two other groups of
normative expectations with respect to how America should respond in the face of
a humanitarian crisis. It is very difficult to provide a clear exit date or commit to
troops withdrawing within a relatively short period of time when there are wide
moral obligations to fulfil and the criteria for knowing when those obligations have
been discharged and the mission has succeeded is hard to establish or shifts over
time.
Indeed so pervasive are these myths and expectations that all US presidents I
examined in this thesis, be they Democrat or Republican, reference them. George
H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, for example, persisted with referencing the expectation
that US troops could not withdraw being victorious in Somalia, despite the fact
this expectation had previously complicated their planned exit strategies in earlier
intervention in northern Iraq. Even Barack Obama, governing in a post-9/11 climate
that affected every other conceivable aspect of American foreign policy, can be
observed referencing these three groups of expectations when justifying his exit
strategy for his intervention in Libya almost to the exclusion of any more contemporary
foreign policy considerations. I suggest the pervasiveness of these myths in presidential
discourse arises because of the power these myths have to locate foreign policy actions—
particularly the use of armed force—within a predictable, cognitively consistent
narrative, which contains within it justifications for decisions to use military force.
As humanitarian interventions are decisions to use military force that do not arise
from existential threats or other clear self-interest motivations, the idea of using
military force and risking the lives of American soldiers to defend the lives of others or
humanitarian ideals can only really be justified to the extent that it is consistent with
larger value propositions about American foreign policy action. While this narrative
and its constituent myths and expectations facilitate humanitarian intervention, they
also constrain a president’s possibilities for action.
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The tension between all three groups of normative expectations is evident in the
presidential rhetoric of each of the four humanitarian interventions I investigated
for this thesis. In each intervention presidents Bush, Clinton and Obama struggled
to satisfy all three groups of normative expectations but the balance was almost
impossible to strike. To the extent these men were able to craft a strategic narrative
through an intervention and justify their exit strategy decisions, there were five
main consequences: first, in all four cases, every president was, more often than not,
unable to justify withdrawing troops within a specified period of time or stick to
their initial exit strategy plans because it was manifestly clear withdrawing would be
under conditions that were short of victory and left moral responsibilities unfulfilled.
Second, in Somalia and Libya, Clinton and Obama withdrew troops as planned but at
the cost of meeting America’s moral obligations, leaving questions about whether the
missions could be classified as successful. Third, in Iraq, Somalia and Libya presidents
attempted to redefine victory as the intervention progressed but were ultimately
challenged by the intervention’s failure to fulfil wider moral responsibilities. Fourth,
in northern Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo, presidents attempted to limit the scope of
America’s moral obligations to providing immediate humanitarian assistance, but
humanitarian assistance did not address the cause of the crisis or promise atrocities
would not recur once the US withdrew. And finally presidents chose an operational
approach in every intervention—specifically an exclusively aerial mission—that would
enable rapid exit, but these tactics alone could not deliver sustained human rights
protections, let alone widespread political transformation. Thus any initial exit
strategy proved to offer only a temporary pause in American military intervention in
these countries.
The difficulty in balancing the three groups of normative expectations did not
mean presidents stopped trying to achieve this balance. In part this was because
although achieving the balance is difficult, the payoff in terms of the president’s
personal reputation, political capital, and positive reinforcement of the national
collective narrative is enticing. In examining the discourse I identified a shifting
relationship between battlefield conditions, the domestic and international debate
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and public justification as each president tried different ways to satisfy all three
groups of normative expectations. Ultimately, however, all presidents needed to
make a choice to focus on delivering one group of expectations and this necessarily
came at the expense of satisfying the other requirements. This means the scope
for presidents to construct a strategic narrative that subverts these expectations is
limited. The normative expectations constrain the imagined possibilities available
to presidents when crafting their exit strategies. Actions have to be explained as
consistent with these normative expectations and that includes decisions about when
to withdraw troops. Although decision-makers matter, I found these continuities
persisted regardless of whether presidents were Democrat or Republican, whether
they oversaw one or more interventions during their presidency, or whether there was
a significant external shock affecting the American foreign policy landscape, such as
the Rwandan genocide or the terror attacks of 9-11.
This point I make about the conflicting groups of normative expectations and the
limited agency presidents can exercise within these normative constraints is connected
to a wider observation about the nature of mission creep. My findings build on the
work of Adam Siegel and Michael Robinson16 but instead of identifying and classifying
instances where mission creep occurred I uncovered the discursive dynamics in each
case that gave rise to mission creep. While I agree with Siegel and Robinson that it
takes deliberate decision-making on the part of American presidents to change the
missions over time, these changes occur in the context of the imagined possibilities
for exit. Those imagined possibilities arise from normative expectations but also from
the ways in which presidents have observed those normative expectations featuring
in previous humanitarian interventions. Thus we see ideas about operational exit
strategies and transition exits modified with each successive intervention as presidents
build on prior experience, even when those interventions occur in vastly different
contexts. Obama’s strategic narrative drew on the successes he observed in Kosovo;
Clinton’s narrative in Kosovo was grounded in his experience in Somalia; and Bush’s
16. Siegel, “Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?”; Robinson, “Military Operations in Kosovo
and the Danger of ‘Mission Creep’.”
Finishing the job 338
Chapter 9. Conclusion Anna Samson
narrative in Somalia was based on the challenges he experienced in northern Iraq.
This analogical bridging17 allows for some learning but it also amplifies and reinforces
the salience of normative expectations as these are never abandoned.
There are some important limitations in my investigation that affect the generalisabil-
ity of my results and suggest opportunities for future research. In the first instance
my research focused specifically on the American experience. As I noted throughout
the thesis, the normative foundations of American foreign policy are unique and
while I consider it fair to say that normative expectations affect all governments’
decision-making in humanitarian interventions, exactly how those expectations affect
decision-making dynamics requires more targeted, country-specific investigation.
Wider cross-national comparative research between the US and other nations also
undertaking humanitarian interventions—for example France or the UK—would also
likely yield interesting findings regarding the extent to which normative expectations
differ and how these affect decision-making. My research focused on presidential
discourse and while I have looked at the way in which this discourse reflected and
responded to wider domestic and international discourse on humanitarian interven-
tion I did not isolate or quantify audience effects, an avenue of investigation that
would round out my findings and create a fuller picture of humanitarian intervention
exit strategy discourse. In addition, I selected four case studies over a twenty-year
period for this thesis primarily because I argued they provided a sound basis for
making comparisons and identifying instances of continuity and change. In making
this selection, however, I omitted other cases like Bosnia, which was very similar
to Kosovo, East Timor, where America did not play a leading role, and Iraq (2015)
where humanitarian intervention was essentially a military evacuation. Future re-
search on exit strategies could include or substitute these cases for comparisons and
perhaps contrast them with instances where humanitarian intervention did not occur,
such as Rwanda, Darfur, Myanmar or North Korea.
The findings in this thesis and their basis in strong methodological and empiri-
17. David Patrick Houghton, “Historical Analogies and the Cognitive Dimension of Domestic
Policymaking,” Political Psychology 19, no. 2 (1998): 279–303.
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cal foundations do, however, suggest refinements to theoretical frameworks used
to understand military exit strategies and humanitarian interventions. My work
builds on the contribution of scholars like Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney18
in demonstrating that ideas of victory are not just discursively and normatively
constructed but victory itself comes with its own normative cachet. What constitutes
victory in a humanitarian intervention may not be possible to settle at the outset
because it is contingent on fulfilling moral responsibilities that are themselves fluid
and difficult to limit justifiably. While tempting because of its concreteness, it is also
not always desirable to reduce victory to a calculation between lives saved versus
lives lost like that in Thomas Seybolt’s pioneering study evaluating the effectiveness
of humanitarian interventions.19 This equation does not account for all the other
variables contributing to making a humanitarian intervention a success or, more
importantly, creating the requisite level of success to justify troop withdrawal.
Despite jus ex bello scholars urging recognition of of opportunities for wars to end
short of victory, for this approach to percolate into the way countries like the US
make decisions in humanitarian interventions requires disconnecting victory and exit.
In this thesis I demonstrated this connection is embedded in the collective narrative
about why and how military force is used overseas and is thus very difficult to undo.
My thesis confirms Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver and Jason Reifler’s observations
that the promise of victory is what underpins American public support for the kinds
of long-term military deployments required to fulfil the moral responsibilities of
humanitarian interventions.20 Exiting without winning is not a simple matter of
adhering to just war principles or refusing to hinge exit on success. It requires
re-imagining the purpose of using military force, disconnecting the idea of soldiers’
nobility from military triumph, and removing sentimentality from collective narratives
about military operations.21 Normative expectations frame foreign policy decision-
18. Johnson and Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International
Politics.
19. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure.
20. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War .
21. Elizabeth Samet, “Can an American Soldier Ever Die in Vain? What Shakespeare, Lincoln
and ‘Lone Survivor’ Teach us About the Danger of Refusing to Confront Futility in War,” Foreign
Policy, 2014, 74–78.
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making including during military operations and especially during humanitarian
interventions. Consequently, exit strategies in humanitarian interventions are not
just practical matters but political questions constructed, mediated and answered
through discourse. How leaders talk publicly about exit strategies and intervention
more generally matters because they have the potential to foreclose some exit options
and make yet others seem unavoidable.
For American policy-makers and military strategists, therefore, exit is not just a
matter of needing to plan better or ‘finish the job’. A decision to embark on a
humanitarian intervention must be made with the knowledge it will be very difficult
to satisfy all the normative expectations for how America uses military force to
respond to mass atrocities. Decision-makers should be prepared to identify which
set of normative expectations they are prepared to leave unfulfilled, knowing that
efforts to read down or limit the scope of those expectations may not deliver the
successful mission outcomes they seek.
I began this thesis with a reference to President George W. Bush declaring ‘mission
accomplished’ long before the 2003 Iraq War was anywhere near completed. I noted
one of the reasons Bush’s statement was so memorable as a political faux pas is that
it laid bare the normative expectations Americans have that US soldiers will always
triumph in their endeavours and their victory will be a pre-requisite for exit. Two
years before his mission accomplished speech, Bush gave another speech launching
the War on Terror, explaining to the American people that, although they would
win this war, victory would not look like it had in previous wars, nor would there
be a definite end point to which Americans could look forward where US troops
would be guaranteed to return home. According to Bush, “Americans should not
expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen”,
with no “decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion”.22 Bush justified this
‘war without end’, deliberately sacrificing the assurance of troop withdrawal and a
22. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 20,
2001.
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predictable exit strategy in favour of America successfully meeting its responsibility
to “fight for our principles” because “the advance of human freedom, the great
achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us”.23
According to an ABC poll, 80 percent of Americans overwhelmingly supported
Bush’s call to war with 57 percent accepting such a war would last for several years
and 37 percent believing it would result in significant US casualties.24 In January
2015, almost the same proportion of Americans—72 percent—continued to support
the War on Terror.25 It is true that unlike humanitarian interventions, the War on
Terror was framed as a response to a direct threat to America not the protection
of others from mass atrocities, but the threat was far from existential. Whatever
criticisms one may have of the War on Terror, it shows that even when exit strategies
may be difficult or impossible to implement in any military operation—including
humanitarian interventions—this does not present as significant a foreign policy
dilemma as a military operation in which American soldiers are not victorious in
delivering on their moral responsibilities.
23. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11 .
24. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2016).
25. Pew Centre for People and the Press, ed., “Terrorism Worries Little Changed; Most Give
Government Good Marks for Reducing Threat,” January 12, 2015.
Finishing the job 342
Bibliography
Abbott, Kirby. “A Brief Overview of Legal Interoperability Challenges for NATO
Arising from the Interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in Light of the
European Convention on Human Rights.” International Review of the Red Cross
96, no. 893 (March 2014): 107–37.
Abulof, Uriel. “Normative Concepts Analysis: Unpacking the Language of Legitima-
tion.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 18, no. 1 (January 2,
2015): 73–89.
Abulof, Uriel, and Markus Kornprobst. “Introduction: The Politics of Public Justifi-
cation.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1 (2017): 1–18.
. “Unpacking Public Justification.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1 (2017):
126–33.
Adams, Gordon, and Shoon Kathleen Murray, eds. Mission Creep: The Militarization
of US Foreign Policy? Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014.
Adbajo, Adekeye. “In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and
Somalia.” International Peacekeeping 10, no. 4 (2003): 62–81.
Adelman, Howard. “Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds.” Interna-
tional Journal of Refugee Law 4, no. 1 (1992): 4–38.
African Union. The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United
Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus. Addis Ababa: African Union Executive Coun-
cil 7th Extraordinary Session, March 7, 2005. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.
org/AU Ezulwini%5C%20Consensus.pdf.
Al Jazeera. “France Urges EU Sanctions on Libya.” Al Jazeera News, February 23,
2011. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/02/2011223102122200199.
html.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. “On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The ‘Holo-
caust’ from War Crime to Trauma Drama.” European Journal of Social Theory
5, no. 1 (February 1, 2002): 5–85.
343
Bibliography Anna Samson
Allen, Susan Hannah, and Tiffany Vincent. “Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for
Kosovo.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 1–26.
Allen, William B. “The Moral Foundations of Political Choices: George Washington,
Foreign Policy and National Character.” The Review of Faith and International
Affairs 9, no. 4 (2011): 3–12.
Arkin, William M. Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign. Human Rights
Watch, 2000. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm#TopOfPage.
Ashford, Mary-Wynne, and Ulrich Gottstein. “The Impact on Civilians of the
Bombing of Kosovo and Serbia.” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 16, no. 3
(2000): 267–80.
Asthana, Anushka. “Syria airstrikes: UK offers verbal but not military support to
US.” The Guardian, April 8, 2017.
Axelrod, Robert. “Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception
and Cognition.” American Political Science Review 67, no. 4 (1973): 1248–66.
Aykan, Mahmut Bali. “Turkey’s Policy in Northern Iraq.” Middle Eastern Studies
32, no. 4 (1996): 343–66.
Baker, James Addison, and Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revo-
lution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992. New York: Putnam, 1995.
Balfour, Michael. “Unconditional Surrender.” International Affairs 46, no. 4 (1970):
719–36.
Ball, Gregory. “1999–Operation Allied Force.” In The US Air Force in the Air War
over Serbia, 1999, edited by Daniel L. Haulman. 1999. https://www.afhistory.af.
mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/.
Balz, Dan. “Bush Criticizes Iraq’s Use of Helicopters on Rebels; President, Mitterrand
Confer in Martinique.” The Washington Post (Washington DC), March 15, 1991,
a37.
Balz, Dan, and John M. Goshko. “Situation in Iraq ’Murky’; Rebels Claim Progress
in North; Army Seen Gaining South.” The Washington Post (Washington DC),
March 20, 1991, a01.
Bandow, Doug. “US Policy toward Kosovo: Sowing the Wind in the Balkans, Reaping
the Whirlwind in the Caucasus.” Mediterranean Quarterly 20, no. 1 (2009):
15–30.
Banks, William C., and Jeffrey D. Straussman. “A New Imperial Presidency? Insights
from US Involvement in Bosnia.” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 2 (1999):
195–218.
Banta, Benjamin. “Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism.” European Journal
of International Relations 19, no. 2 (2013): 379–402.
Finishing the job 344
Bibliography Anna Samson
Barnett, Michael N., and Thomas G. Weiss. Humanitarianism Contested: Where
Angels Fear to Tread. Milton Park: Routledge, 2011.
Barry, John. “America’s Secret Libya War: U.S. Spent $1 Billion on Covert Ops
Helping NATO.” August 30, 2011. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2011/08/30/america-s-secret- libya-war-u-s-spent-1-billion-on-covert-ops-
helping-nato.
Baum, David. “The Exit Strategy Myth and the End State Reality.” (Washington
DC), 2001.
Baum, Matthew A. Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign
Policy in the New Media Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
BBC News. “Libya Conflict: France Air-Dropped Arms to Rebels.” June 29, 2011.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13955751.
. “President Obama: Libya Aftermath ‘Worst Mistake’ of Presidency.” April 11,
2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703.
, ed. “Syria Chemical ‘Attack’: What we Know.” April 26, 2017. https :
//www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500947.
, ed. “Timeline: UK’s Road to Action in Libya.” April 15, 2011. https :
//www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12821505.
Beasley, Vanessa B. “Identity, Democracy and Presidential Rhetoric.” In Politics,
Discourse, and American Society: New Agendas, edited by Roderick P. Hart and
Bartholomew H. Sparrow, 19–34. Rowman / Littlefield Publishers, 2001.
Beer, Francis A., and Robert Hariman. “Post-Realism, Just War and the Gulf War
Debate.” In Politically Speaking: A Worldwide Examination of Language Used in
the Public Sphere, edited by Ofer Feldman and Christ’l De Landtsheer, 184–93.
Connecticut: Praeger, 1998.
Bellah, Robert N. “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 96, no. 1 (1967): 1–21.
Bellamy, Alex J. “Kosovo and the Advent of Sovereignty as Responsibility.” Journal
of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 2 (2009): 163–84.
. “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm.”
Ethics and International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011): 263–69.
. “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interven-
tions.” Journal of Military Ethics 3, no. 3 (2004): 216–32.
. “The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten.” Ethics and International Affairs
29, no. 2 (2015): 161–85.
Bellamy, Alex J., and Edward C. Luck. The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise
to Practice. Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons, December 5, 2018.
Finishing the job 345
Bibliography Anna Samson
Bennett, D. Scott. “Democracy, Regime Change and Rivalry Termination.” Interna-
tional Interactions 22, no. 4 (1997): 369–97.
Ben-Porath, Eran. “Rhetoric of Atrocities: The Place of Horrific Human Rights
Abuses in Presidential Persuasion Efforts.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37,
no. 2 (2007): 181–202.
Berman, Nathanial. “Intervention in a ’Divided World’: Axes of Legitimacy.” In
Human Rights, Intervention and the Use of Force, edited by Philip Alston and
Euan MacDonald, 215–42. London: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Bhatia, Michael V. War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations.
Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc, 2003.
Bicchieri, Cristina. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social
Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Biddle, Stephen. “Military Power: A Reply.” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 3
(2005): 453–69.
. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
Biden, Joseph R. “S.Con.Res.21 - A concurrent resolution authorizing the President
of the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” 106th Congress
(1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Bimes, Terri. “Understanding the Rhetorical Presidency.” In The Oxford Handbook of
the American Presidency, edited by George C. Edwards and William G. Howell.
The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009.
Binder, Sarah A., and Thomas E. Mann. Constraints on Leadership in Washington,
Issues in Governance Studies 41. Washington DC: Brookings, July 2011.
Blaikie, Norman. Approaches to Social Enquiry. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.
Blight, James G., and Janet M. Lang. The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life of
Robert S. McNamara. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
Bloom, Alexander. “”The Mainspring in This Country Has Been Broken”: America’s
Battered Sense of Self and the Emergence of the Vietnam Syndrome.” In Four
Decades on: Vietnam, the United States, and the Legacies of the Second Indochina
War, edited by Scott Laderman and Edwin A. Martini, 58–83. Durham: Duke
University Press, 2013.
Bloor, Meriel, and Thomas Bloor. The Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis: An
Introduction. London: Hodder Arnold, 2007.
Blum, Gabriella, and David Luban. “Unsatisfying Wars: Degrees of Risk and the
Jus Ex Bello.” Ethics 125 (2015): 751–80.
Finishing the job 346
Bibliography Anna Samson
Blum, William. America’s Deadliest Export: Democracy: The Truth about US Foreign
Policy and Everything Else. Halifax: Fernwood Publications; Zed Books, 2013.
Bobrow, Davis B. “Stories Remembered and Forgotten.” Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion 33, no. 2 (1989): 187–205.
Bolton, John R. “Wrong Turn in Somalia.” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994): 56–66.
Boone Bartholomees, J. “Theory of Victory.” Parameters, 2008, 25–36.
Booth Fowler, Robert, Allen D. Hertzke, Laura R. Olson, and Kevin R. denDulk.
Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture and Strategic Choices. 5th.
Boulder: Westview Press, 2013.
Booth, Ken, ed. The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions. International
Journal of Human Rights. 4 vols. 2–3. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
Borton, John, and John Eriksson. Assessment of the Impact and Influence of Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Aarhus: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Denmark, 2004. http://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/35084497.pdf.
Bostdorff, Denise M. The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis. Studies in
Rhetoric/Communication. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
Bottici, Chiara. “Philosophies of Political Myth, a Comparative Look Backwards:
Cassirer, Sorel and Spinoza.” European Journal of Political Theory 8, no. 3
(2009): 365–82.
. “Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth.” Iris 3, no. 5 (2011): 31–52.
Bottici, Chiara, and Benoˆıt Challand. “Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of
Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.” European Journal of Social Theory
9, no. 3 (2006): 315–36.
Boucher, David. “The Just War Tradition and Its Modern Legacy: Jus Ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello.” European Journal of Political Theory, 2011, 1–20.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and symbolic power. Reprint. Edited by John B. Thomp-
son. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2009.
. “Social Space and Symbolic Power.” Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989):
14–25.
Boustany, Nora. “A Trail of Death in Iraq; Shiite Refugees Tell of Atrocities by
Republican Guard.” The Washington Post (Washington DC), March 26, 1991,
a01.
. “Refugees Tell of Turmoil in Iraq; Troops Recount Allied Onslaught.” The
Washington Post (Washington DC), March 4, 1991, a01.
Finishing the job 347
Bibliography Anna Samson
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General A/47/277-S/24111. United
Nations, 1992.
. Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga. Londres: I.B. Tauris, 1999.
Bowman, Michael. “US Legislators Debate Libya Intervention.” Edited by Voice of
America News. Voice of America News, March 21, 2011. https://www.voanews.
com/a/us-legislators-debate-libya-intervention-118446709/157723.html.
Bowman, Steve. Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied MilitaryOperations. CRS
Issue Brief for Congress. Research report. Congressional Research Service, 2003.
Boys, James D. “A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive
Multilateralism (1991-1993).” European Journal of American Studies 7, no. 1
(2012): online.
Bradley, Tahman. “Press Missed ‘Mission Accomplished’ Meaning, Says Bush Staffer.”
ABC News, September 19, 2001. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/
09/press-missed-mission-accomplished-meaning-says-bush-staffer/.
Brands, H. W. “George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2004): 113–32.
Brennan Jr, Rick, Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben Connable, Terrence Kelly,
Michael McNerney, Stephanie Young, Jason H. Campbell, and K. Scott McMa-
hon. Ending the US War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver,
and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq. Santa Monica: RAND Corpo-
ration, 2013.
Brigham, Robert K. “The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq.” In Understanding
the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, edited by Beth L Bailey and Richard H
Immerman. New York, 2015.
Bromfield, William S. “H.Res.95 - Commending the President and United States
and allied military forces on the success of Operation Desert Storm.” 102nd
Congress, February 28, 1991.
Brooks, David. “Obama, Gospel and Verse.” The New York Times, April 26, 2007,
A25.
. “Obama’s Christian Realism.” The New York Times, December 14, 2009.
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/opinion/15brooks.html.
Brooks, Rosa. “Humanitarian Intervention: Evolving Norms, Fragmenting Consensus
(Remarks).” Maryland Journal of International Law, 2014.
Brown, Andrew J. “The Righteous Use of Violence: Rhetoric and Mythmaking before
the First Gulf War (1990–91).” PoLAR 27, no. 2 (2004): 20–44.
Brown, Chris. “Do Great Powers Have Great Responsibilities? Great Powers and
Moral Agency.” Global Society 18, no. 1 (2004): 5–19.
Finishing the job 348
Bibliography Anna Samson
Brown, Davis. “Introduction: The Just War Tradition and the Continuing Challenges
to World Public Order.” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 3 (2011): 125–32.
Brown, John Murray. “Allies Finish N. Iraq Withdrawal; Baghdad Warned To Keep
Distance.” The Washington Post, July 16, 1991.
Bruton, Bronwyn. “In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More.”
Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009): 79–94.
Bryden, Matthew. “Somalia: The Wages of Failure.” Current History 94, no. 591
(1995): 145–52.
Buchanan, Patrick J. “The Mess They’ve Made.” The Washington Post, April 13,
1999.
Buckaloo, Derek Neal. “Fighting the Last War: The ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ as a
Constraint on United States Foreign Policy, 1975–1991.” PhD thesis, Emory
University, 2002.
Bukovansky, Mlada, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard M. Price, Christian Reus-
Smit, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and
American Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Burgess, Stephen. “Military Intervention in Africa: French and US Approaches
Compared.” JEMEAA, 2019, 69–80.
Bush, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, September 20, 2001. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/213749.
. Address to the Nation on Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 1, 2003. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/213755.
. “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.” 2005. Accessed October 25, 2017.
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/National Strategy for Victory in Iraq/Part 1,
%20https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/National Strategy for Victory in Iraq/
Part 2.
Bush, Kenneth D. “When Two Anarchies Meet: International Intervention in Somalia.”
The Journal of Conflict Studies 17, no. 1 (1997).
Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London: Verso, 2009.
Campbell, David. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity. Rev. ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
Campbell, Greg. The Road to Kosovo: A Balkan Diary. Boulder: Basic Books, 1999.
Campbell, Kenneth J. “Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine.” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3 (1998): 357–74.
Finishing the job 349
Bibliography Anna Samson
Campbell, Luke B. “The ’Importance of Winning’: Affect, Just War and the ’Famil-
iarization’ of Success.” PhD thesis, University of Kansas, 2015.
Campbell, Tom. “H.Con.Res.82 - Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of
the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their
positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
. “H.J.Res.44 - Declaring a state of war between the United States and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” 106th Congress (1999-2000)
Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Cap, Piotr. “Towards the Proximization Model of the Analysis of Legitimization in
Political Discourse.” Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008): 17–41.
Caplan, Richard. “After Exit: Successor Missions and Peace Consolidation.” Civil
Wars 8, nos. 3-4 (2006): 253–67.
, ed. Exit Strategies and State Building. New York: Oxford University Press,
2012.
. “Policy Implications.” In Exit Strategies and States Building, edited by
Richard Caplan, 311–19. ebook: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Caraccilo, Dominic J. Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy. Santa
Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2011.
Carey, Henry E. “U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention
Policy: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.” World Affairs 154, no. 2 (2001): 72–82.
Carney, Zoe¨ Hess, and Mary E. Stuckey. “The World as the American Frontier:
Racialized Presidential War Rhetoric.” Southern Communication Journal 80,
no. 3 (2015): 163–88.
Cassidy, John. “ISIS and the Curse of the Iraq War.” The New Yorker, August 28,
2015. https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/isis-and-the-curse-of-the-
iraq-war.
Ceaser, J. W., G. E. Thurow, Jeffrey K. Tulis, and J. M. Bessette. “The Rise of
the Rhetorical Presidency.” In Rethinking the Presidency, edited by Thomas E.
Cronin, 233–52. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982.
Chatterjee, Soumitra. “Presidential Beliefs, Advisors’ Capacities and the Forumula-
tion of Intervention Policy.” PhD thesis, University of California, 2019.
Chaulia, Sreeram. International Organizations and Civilian Protection: Power, Ideas
and Humanitarian Aid in Conflict Zones. The Library of International Rela-
tions 54. London: I. B.Tauris, 2011.
Chenail, R. J. “Conducting Qualitative Data Analysis: Reading Line-by-Line, but
Analyzing by Meaningful Qualitative Units.” The Qualitative Report 17, no. 1
(2012): 266–69.
Finishing the job 350
Bibliography Anna Samson
Chesterman, Simon. Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and
International Law. London: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Chilton, Paul A. Analysing Political Discourse Theory and Practice. London: Rout-
ledge, 2004.
Chilton, Paul A. Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to
Common House. Conflict and Consciousness, vol. 2. New York: P. Lang, 1996.
Chilton, Paul, and Christina Scha¨ffner. “Introduction: Themes and Principles in
the Analysis of Political Discourse.” In Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic
Approaches to Political Discourse, edited by Paul A. Chilton and Christina
Scha¨affner, 1–44. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2002.
Chollet, Derek, Ben Fishman, and Alex Kuperman. “Who Lost Libya? Obama’s
Intervention in Retrospect.” Foreign Affairs, May-June 2015.
Chollet, Derek, and Tod Lindberg. “A Moral Core for US Foreign Policy.” Policy
Review, no. 146 (2007): 3–23.
Christie, Lars. “Distributing Death in Humantiarian Interventions.” In Who Should
Die? Liability, Rights, and the Moral Context of Killing in War, edited by
Ryan C. Jenkins, Michael Robillard, and Bradley Jay Strawser, 186–201. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Cienki, Alan, and Dvora Yanow. “Why Metaphor and Other Tropes? Linguistic
Approaches to Analysing Policies and the Political.” Journal of International
Relations and Development 16, no. 2 (2013): 167–76.
Clarke, Walter. “Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia.” In Learning
from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, edited by
Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst, 3–19. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.
Clarke, Walter, and Jeffrey Herbst. “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention.” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 70.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008.
Clinton, Hillary. CBS News Interview, October 20, 2011. https://youtu.be/mlz3-
OzcExI.
Coady, C. A. J. “The Dilemmas of Militant Humanitarianism.” Global Change, Peace
and Security 20, no. 3 (2008): 255–62.
. The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, Peaceworks 45. Washington D.C.:
United States Institute for Peace, 2002.
Cockayne, James, and David Malone. “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation
Provide Comfort and the No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the
Iraq Crisis of 2003.” Security Dialogue 37 (2006): 123–42.
Finishing the job 351
Bibliography Anna Samson
Codner, Michael. “Bringing an End to an Old-Fashioned War?” RUSI Journal, 1999,
9–14.
Coker, Christopher. Waging War without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Mili-
tary Conflict. IISS Studies in International Security. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2002.
Coles, Roberta L. “Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and
Destiny Intertwined.” Sociology of Religion 63, no. 4 (2002): 403–26.
Conforti, Benedetto. The Law and Practice of the United Nations. Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10271095.
Copeland, Dale C. Economic Interdependence and War. online: Princeton University
Press, 2015.
Cox, Dan G. “The Age of Liberal Imperialism: Twenty-Five Years of a Flawed U.S.
Foreign Policy.” Orbis 57, no. 4 (2013): 643–52.
Crampton, R. J. The Balkans Since the Second World War. London: Routledge,
2002.
Crothers, Lane. “The Cultural Roots of Isolationism and Internationalism in American
Foreign Policy.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, no. 1 (2011): 21–34.
Cruz, Consuelo. “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and
Make Their Futures.” World Politics 52, no. 3 (2000): 275–312.
Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly. Washington, D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution Press, 2001.
Davenport, John J. “Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention and the Need for
a Democratic Federation.” Journal of Religious Ethics 39, no. 3 (2011): 493–555.
DeFranco, Chiara. Media Power and the Transformation of War. Basingstoke: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2012.
Delaney, Douglas. “Cutting, Running, or Otherwise? The US Decision to Withdraw
from Somalia.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 15, no. 3 (2004): 28–46.
DeLay, Tom. “Autonomy for Kosovo Isn’t Worth American Blood.” The Wall Street
Journal, March 9, 1999, A22.
Delman, Edward. “Has Obama Started More Wars Than He’s Ended?” March 30,
2016. Accessed February 18, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2016/03/obama-doctrine-wars-numbers/474531/.
Dill, Janina. “Ending Wars: The Jus Ad Bellum Principles Suspended, Repeated, or
Adjusted?” Ethics 125 (2015): 627–30.
Dimitriu, George, and Beatrice De Graaf. “Fighting the War at Home: Strategic Nar-
ratives, Elite Responsiveness, and the Dutch Mission in Afghanistan, 2006–2010.”
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014, 1–22.
Finishing the job 352
Bibliography Anna Samson
Dimitriu, George, Beatrice De Graaf, and Jens Ringsmose. Strategic Narratives, Public
Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War. London:
Routledge, 2015.
DiPrizio, Robert C. Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq
to Kosovo. Baltimore: JHU Press, 2002.
Dobbins, James, Coalition Provisional Authority, and International Security and
Defense Policy Center. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority. Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2009.
Dobbins, James, and Frederic Wehrey. “Libyan Nation Building After Qaddafi.”
Foreign Affairs, August 23, 2011. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68227/
james-dobbins-and-frederic-wehrey/libyan-nation-building-after-qaddafi.
Dobos, Ned. “Idealism, Realism, and Success in Armed Humanitarian Intervention.”
Philosophia 44, no. 2 (2016): 497–507.
Dodge, Toby. “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application
of Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Review of International
Studies 39, no. 5 (2013): 1189–212.
. Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. Adelphi, 434-435. London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012.
Dole, Elizabeth. “Time to Play Our Aces.” The Washington Post, April 24, 1999,
A23.
Dole, Robert J. “S.Con.Res.13 - A concurrent resolution commending the President
and the Armed Forces for the success of Operation Desert Storm.” 102nd
Congress, February 28, 1991.
Domenici, Pete V. “S.J.Res.97 - A joint resolution to recognize and honor members
of the reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States for their
contribution to victory in the Persian Gulf.” 102nd Congress, March 20, 1991.
Donald Trump Campaign Rally. C-Span (User Uploaded). Hilton Head, South Car-
olina, December 30, 2015. https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4673842/winning-
trump-campaign-rally-hilton-head-sc-dec-30-2015.
Dorman, Andrew M. Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra
Leone. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.
Douven, Igor. “Abduction.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. online: Stanford University, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/.
Drozdiak, William, and David B. Ottaway. “U.S., Allies Want Refugee Havens Es-
tablished in Iraq; Europeans Back Protective Zone for Kurds.” The Washington
Post (Washington DC), April 9, 1991, a01.
Duina, Francesco G. Winning: Reflections on an American Obsession. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011.
Finishing the job 353
Bibliography Anna Samson
Dumbrell, John, and David Ryan, eds. Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, Lessons, Legacies and
Ghosts. Contemporary Security Studies. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis
Group, 2007.
Edelstein, David M. “Exit Lessons.” Wilson Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2009): 34–39.
Editorial. “A Critical Juncture.” The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1991.
. “A Mean Army, Made Leaner.” The New York Times, March 30, 1991.
. “George Bush’s Elbe.” The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1991.
. “Hammer or Wrench?” The Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1991.
. “Indifference and Somalia.” The Washington Post, June 19, 1992.
. “The Quicksand in Iraq.” The New York Times, March 20, 1991.
. “The Right Exit Strategy.” The Washington Post, March 21, 1999.
. “The War’s Not Over Yet.” The New York Times, April 4, 1991.
Eflein, Dawn R. “A Case Study of Rules of Engagement in Joint Operations: The
Air Force Shootdown of Army Helicopters in Operation Provide Comfort.” The
Air Force Law Review 44 (1998): 33–74.
Engel, Jeffrey A. “When George Bush Believed the Cold War Ended and Why That
Mattered.” In Inside the Presidency of George H. W. Bush, edited by Michael
Nelson and Barbara A. Perry, 100–122. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.
Entman, Robert M. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S.
Foreign Policy. Studies in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004.
Entman, Robert, and Sarah Stonbely. “Blunders, Scandals, and Strategic Commu-
nication in U.S. Foreign Policy: Benghazi vs. 9/11.” International Journal of
Communication 12 (2018): 3024–47.
Esch, Joanne. “Legitimizing the ”War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level
Rhetoric.” Political Psychology 31, no. 3 (2010): 257–391.
Evans, Gareth, and Mohamed Sahnoun. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa,
Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001.
Fabre, Cecile. “War Exit.” Ethics 125 (2015): 631–52.
Factiva database search. November 5, 2018.
Fairclough, Isabela, and Norman Fairclough. Political Discourse Analysis. a Method
for Advanced Students. Oxon: Routledge, 2012.
Finishing the job 354
Bibliography Anna Samson
Fairclough, Norman. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language.
Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013.
Fawcett, Louise. “Down but Not out? The Kurds in International Politics.” Review
of International Studies 27, no. 1 (2001): 109–18.
Finn, Peter. “3 Bombs Shake Kosovo on Eve of New Talks.” The Washington Post,
March 14, 1999.
Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Soceity. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996.
. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2003.
Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. 3rd. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2013.
. “Presidents Who Initiate Wars.” In The Domestic Sources of American For-
eign Policy: Insights and Evidence, Sixth edition, edited by James M. McCormick,
189–208. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2012.
Fisher, Marc. “NATO Condemns Iraq’s ‘Brutal Repression’;German Politician Calls
U.S. Position Cynical; Kurds Stage Rallies Throughout Europe.” The Washing-
ton Post (Washington DC), April 6, 1991, a17.
Fisher, Walter R. “Clarifying the Narrative Paradigm.” Communication Monographs
56, no. 1 (1989): 55–58.
Fitzgerald, Nina J. Somalia: Issues, History, and Bibliography. New York: Nova
Publishers, 2002.
Flowerdew, John. “The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal: A Case Study in the
Creation of Mythic Discourse.” Discourse and Society 8, no. 4 (1997): 453–77.
Forsythe, David P., and Patrice C. McMahon. American Exceptionalism Reconsidered:
US Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and World Order. Internatioinal Studies
Intensives. New York: Routledge, 2017.
Foster, James L., and Garry D. Brewer. “And the Clocks Were Striking Thirteen:
The Termination of War.” Policy Sciences 7 (1976): 225–43.
Foucault, Michel. Archaeology of Knowledge. Routledge Classics. London: Routledge,
2002.
. Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy. Edited by Meaghan Morris and
Paul Patton. Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979.
Fowler, Tillie. “H.Con.Res.29 - Expressing the opposition of Congress to any deploy-
ment of United States ground forces in Kosovo, a province in the Republic of
Serbia, for peacemaking or peacekeeping purposes.” 106th Congress (1999-2000)
Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Finishing the job 355
Bibliography Anna Samson
Fowler, Tillie. “H.Con.Res.343 - Expressing the opposition of Congress to any
deployment of United States ground forces in Kosovo, a province in southern
Serbia, for peacemaking or peacekeeping purposes.” 105th Congress (1997-1998)
Resolution (Introduced 1998).
. “H.R.1569 - Military Operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Limitation Act of 1999.” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced
1999).
Fox, John G. “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of
Somalia.” SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (2001): 147–58.
Francis, Angus, Vesselin Popovski, and C. J. G. Sampford, eds. Norms of Protection:
Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction. Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 2012.
Franks, Jason, and Oliver P. Richmond. “Coopting Liberal Peace-Building: Untying
the Gordian Knot in Kosovo.” Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 81–103.
Fraser, Trudy. Maintaining Peace and Security? The United Nations in a Changing
World. Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan Education, 2015.
Fred Abrahams, Gilles Peress, Eric Stover. A Village Destroyed, May 14, 1999: War
Crimes in Kosovo. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Freedman, Lawrence. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. Adelphi Papers 379.
London: Routledge, 2006.
Frelick, Bill. “The False Promise of Operation Provide Comfort: Protecting Refugees
or Protecting State Power?” Middle East Report, no. 176 (1992): 22–27.
Friedersdorf, Conor. “How Obama Ignored Congress, and Misled America, on War
in Libya.” The Atlantic, September 13, 2012. https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2012/09/how-obama-ignored-congress-and-misled-america-
on-war-in-libya/262299/.
Friedman, Thomas. “Stop the Music.” The New York Times, April 23, 1999.
Fritz, A. I. “The American Presidency Project.” Choice 52, no. 12 (2015): 2000.
Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (1989):
3–18.
Fusman, Alfred. “U.S. Presidential Discourse, September 11-20, 2001: The Birth of
the War on Terror.” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 12, no. 34
(2013): 126–51.
Gabrielson, Teena. “Obstacles and Opportunities: Factors That Constrain Elected
Officials’ Ability to Frame Political Issues.” In Framing American Politics,
edited by Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell, 76–102. Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 2005.
Finishing the job 356
Bibliography Anna Samson
Galbraith, Peter W. Refugees from War in Iraq: What Happened in 1991 and What
May Happen in 2003, MPI Policy Brief 2. Migration Policy Institute, February
2003.
Gall, Carlotta. “Bombs Kill 6 in Kosovo Markets as Leaders Depart for Paris Talks.”
The New York Times, March 14, 1999.
. “US Official Sees ‘Collision Course’ in Kosovo Dispute.” The New York
Times, March 10, 1999.
Gallup News Poll. “Presidential Job Approval Rating Interactive Chart.” August 9,
2018. https://news.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-
center.aspx.
Gaub, Florence. “The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression.”
Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 221–44.
Gekas, George W. “H.R.1336 - War Crimes Act of 1991.” 102nd Congress, July 8,
1992.
Gelb, Leslie H. “A Unified, Weak Iraq.” The New York Times, March 20, 1991.
. “Iraq: Drawing the Line.” The New York Times, April 3, 1991.
. “Policy Monotheism.” The New York Times, March 17, 1991.
Gelpi, Christopher, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler. Paying the Human Costs of
War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009.
. “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq.” International
Security 30, no. 3 (2006): 7–46.
George, Alexander L. “The ”Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the
Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making.” In American Foreign Policy:
Theoretical Essays, edited by G. John Ikenberry, 483–506. Glenview: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1989.
Gerges, Fawaz A. ISIS: A History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
Gerstenzang, James. “Bush Sending Troops to Help Somalia’s Hungry Millions
Mission: ‘America Must Act,’ President Says in Dispatching Forces for Humani-
tarian Effort. A Dozen Other Nations also may Participate.” Los Angeles Times,
December 5, 1992.
Gibbs, David N. First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction
of Yugoslavia. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009.
Gigot, Paul A. “Bush’s ‘Stability’ not so Appealing if You’re a Kurd.” The Wall
Street Journal (New York), March 29, 1991, 10.
Gilbert, Marc Jason. “Fatal Amnesia: American Nation-Building in Viet Nam,
Afghanistan and Iraq.” Journal of Third World Studies 21, no. 2 (2004): 13–43.
Finishing the job 357
Bibliography Anna Samson
Gilboa, Eytan. “Global Television News and Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN
Effect.” International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 325–41.
Gilman, Benjamin A. “H.Con.Res.42 - Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolu-
tion.” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene, and Kristin E. Kosek. “Why Humanitarian Interventions
Succeed or Fail: The Role of Local Participation.” Cooperation and Conflict:
Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 40, no. 4 (2005): 363–83.
Gladstone, Rick. “U.N. Votes to End Libya Intervention on Monday.” The New
York Times: World / Middle East, October 27, 2011. http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/10/28/world/middleeast/security-council-ends-libya-intervention-
mandate.html.
Glanville, Luke. Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014.
Glenny, Misha. “So Milosevic Leaves Serbia—and Goes Where?” The New York
Times, June 23, 2000.
Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. President Talks through His
Hardest Decisions about America’s Role in the World.” The Atlantic, April 16,
2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-
doctrine/471525/.
Goodnight, G. Thomas. “The Metapolitics of the 2002 Iraq Debate: Public Policy
and the Network Imaginary.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 13, no. 1 (2010): 65–94.
Gore, Al. “Recent Events in Iraq.” In 102nd Congress (1991–1992) Senate Congres-
sional Record p S4720. April 18, 1991.
Gozzi, Gustavo. “The “Discourse” of International Law and Humanitarian Inter-
vention: The “Discourse” of International Law.” Ratio Juris 30, no. 2 (2017):
186–204.
Graber, Doris A., ed. Media Power in Politics. 4th ed. Washington, D.C: CQ Press,
2000.
Graham, Bradley. “Serbs Warned Of NATO Strikes; Kosovo Mediators Set to End
Talks.” The Washington Post, March 19, 1999.
Grauer, Ryan, and Michael C Horowitz. “What Determines Military Victory? Testing
the Modern System.” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (2012): 83–112.
Gray, Colin S. Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory. Carlisle Barracks.: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002.
. “National Style in Strategy: The American Example.” International Security
6, no. 2 (1981): 21–47.
. “Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory.” International Security
4, no. 9 (1979): 54–87.
Finishing the job 358
Bibliography Anna Samson
Greenfeld, Liah. “Caveat: Addressing Public Justification as an Empirical Phe-
nomenon.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1 (2017): 120–25.
Greiner, Bernd. “Heroism and Self-Sacrifice: The Vietnam War as a Case in Point.”
In Heroism and the Changing Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?,
edited by Sibylle Scheipers, 108–19. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Griffith, Michael C. “War Termination: Theory, Doctrine and Practice,” US Army
Command and General Staff College, 1992.
Gunter, Michael M. The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish
Problem in Iraq. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Haas, Peter. “Does It Even Work? A Theoretical and Practical Evaluation of the
War Powers Resolution.” Congress & the Presidency 44, no. 2 (May 4, 2017):
235–58.
Haberski, Raymond. “‘A Theology of American Exceptionalism’? Iraq, Civil Religion
and American Public Morality.” In Moral Values, Cultural Change, and Post-
Materialism in Europe and North America. Lisbon, April 14, 2009.
. God and War: American Civil Religion since 1945. Piscataway: Rutgers
University Press, 2012.
Halberstam, David. The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the
Kennedy Era. Revised. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
Hall, Tony P. “H.Res.293 - Providing for Consideration of the Concurrent Resolution
(H. Con. Res. 170) Directing the President Pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution to Remove United States Armed Forces from Somalia by
January 31, 1994.” 103rd Congress (1993-1994) Resolution (Agreed to in House
1993).
Hall, Wynton C. ““Reflections of Yesterday”: George H. W. Bush’s Instrumental
Use of Research in Presidential Discourse.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32,
no. 3 (2002): 531–58.
Hammond, Philip, and Edward S. Herman, eds. Degraded Capability: The Media and
the Kosovo Crisis. Pluto Press, 2000.
Hansen, Lene. “Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the
Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It.” Review of International
Studies 38, no. 3 (2012): 525–46.
Harbour, Francis V. “Reasonable Probability of Success as a Moral Criterion in
the Western Just War Tradition.” Journal of Military Ethics 10, no. 3 (2011):
230–41.
Harding, Luke. “Front: Libya: The Endgame Begins: Rebels Approach Tripoli and
Trigger Uprising in Suburbs; Gaddafi Calls on ‘All Patriots’ to Help Defend
the Capital; Leader’s Location Uncertain as Bloody Final Battle Feared.” The
Guardian, August 22, 2011, 1.
Finishing the job 359
Bibliography Anna Samson
Harned, Glenn M. Stability Operations in Somalia 1992-1993: A Case Study. PKSOI
Paper. Carlisle Barracks, P.A.: United States Army War College Press, 2016.
Harper, Mary. “Somalia: Whose Country Is It, Anyway?” The Fletcher Forum of
World Affairs 37, no. 1 (2013): 161–68.
Harrington, Michael E. “Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in International
Law.” Connecticut Journal of International Law 8 (1992–1993): 635–58.
Harris, Brice F. “United States Strategic Culture and Asia-Pacific Security.” Con-
temporary Security Policy 35, no. 2 (2014): 290–309.
Hart, Roderick P., ed. Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005.
Hashemi, Nader, and Danny Postel, eds. The Syria Dilemma. Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 2013.
Hastedt, Glenn P. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future. Tenth edition.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.
Haulman, Daniel. “Crisis in Iraq: Operation Provide Comfort.” In Short of War: Ma-
jor USAF Contingency Operations 1947-1997, edited by A. Timothy Warnock,
179–89. Air Force History and Museums Program in association with Air Uni-
versity Press, 2000. http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
101027-044.pdf.
Healey, Jason. “Winning and Losing in Cyberspace.” In Cyber Power. Estonia: NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2016.
Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776.
The Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press,
2008.
. “The Vietnam Syndrome.” In The Columbia History of the Vietnam War,
edited by David L. Anderson, 409–30. New York: Columbia University Press,
2011.
Herrmann, Richard K., James F. Voss, Tonya Y. E. Schooler, and Joseph Ciarrochi.
“Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata.”
International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 403–33.
Hickey, James E. Precision-Guided Munitions and Human Suffering in War. Military
and Defence Ethics. Burlington: Ashgate Pub. Co, 2012.
Hixson, Walter L. “Viet Nam and ‘Vietnam’ in American History and Memory.” In
Four Decades on: Vietnam, the United States, and the Legacies of the Second
Indochina War, edited by Scott Laderman and Edwin A. Martini. Durham:
Duke University Press, 2013.
Hoagland, Jim. “Monumental Folly.” The Washington Post, March 29, 1991.
. “Tony Blair’s Initiation.” The Washington Post, April 18, 1999.
Finishing the job 360
Bibliography Anna Samson
Hogan, Michael J., and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. Explaining the History of American
Foreign Relations. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Holder, R Ward, and Peter B. Josephson. The Irony of Barack Obama: Barack Obama,
Reinhold Niebuhr and the Problem of Christian Statecraft. ebook: Ashgate
Publishing, 2012. https://www.ebook.de/de/product/19362563/r ward holder
professor peter b josephson irony of barack obama.html.
Holsti, K. J. “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International
Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 233.
Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical,
Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Houghton, David Patrick. “Historical Analogies and the Cognitive Dimension of
Domestic Policymaking.” Political Psychology 19, no. 2 (1998): 279–303.
Hudson, Valerie M., ed. Culture & Foreign Policy. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers,
1997.
. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Lanham: Row-
man & Littlefield, 2013.
Human Rights Watch. Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties during
the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War. Human Rights Watch,
June 1, 1991. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/.
Hurst, Steven. “The Rhetorical Strategy of George H. W. Bush during the Persian
Gulf Crisis 1990–91: How to Help Lose a War You Won.” Political Studies 52
(2004): 376–92.
Ikenberry, G. John. “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American
Unipolar Age.” Review of International Studies 30, no. 4 (2004).
Ikle´, Fred. Every War Must End. Revised. New York: Columbia University Press,
2005.
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Convention (IV) relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Com-
mentary of 1958,” 1958. https : / / ihl - databases . icrc . org / ihl / COM / 380 -
600056?OpenDocument.
Jackson, Richard. “Culture, Identity and Hegemony: Continuity and (the Lack of)
Change in US Counterterrorism Policy from Bush to Obama.” International
Politics 48, nos. 2-3 (2011): 390–411.
Jacob, Cecilia, Alistair D. B. Cook, and University of Queensland, eds. Civilian
Protection in the Twenty-First Century: Governance and Responsibility in a
Fragmented World. First edition. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press,
2016.
Jaffe, Greg. “Obama’s New Patriotism: How Obama has used his Presidency to
Redfine ‘American Exceptionalism’.” The Washington Post, June 3, 2015.
Finishing the job 361
Bibliography Anna Samson
Jahn, Beate. “The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention,
Statebuilding (Part II).” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 2
(2007): 211–29.
Jervis, Robert. “Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?” Security Studies
22, no. 2 (2013): 153–79.
Jewett, Aubrey W., and Marc D. Turetzky. “Stability and Change in President
Clinton’s Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1993-96.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 28, no.
3 (1998): 638–65.
Jim Newton, Leon Panetta with. Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War
and Peace. New York: Penguin, 2014.
Johnson, Dominic D P, and Dominic Tierney. Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory
and Defeat in International Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Johnson, Dominic, and Dominic Tierney. “Essence of Victory.” Security Studies 13,
no. 2 (2003): 350–81.
Johnston, Harry, and Ted Dagne. “Congress and the Somalia Crisis.” In Learning
from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, edited by
Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst, 191–205. Boulder: Westview Press,
1997.
Jones, James L. “Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance
in Northern Iraq.” Marine Corps Gazette 75, no. 11 (1991): 98–107.
Jørgensen, Marianne, and Louise Phillips. “Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory.”
In Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London: SAGE, 2002.
Jubilut, Liliana L. “Has the ’Responsibility to Protect’ Been a Real Change in
Humanitarian Intervention? An Analysis from the Crisis in Libya.” International
Community Law Review 14 (2012): 309–35.
Kaempf, Sebastian. “US Warfare in Somalia and the Trade-off between Casualty-
Aversion and Civilian Protection.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (2012):
388–413.
Karlberg, Michael. “Discourse Theory and Peace.” In The Encyclopedia of Peace
Psychology, edited by Daniel J. Christie. Malden: Wiley Blackwell Publishing,
2012.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon. “S.Con.Res.132 - A Concurrent Resolution Expressing
the Sense of the Congress Regarding the Desperate Humanitarian Crisis in
Somalia and Urging the Deployment of United Nations Security Guards to
Assure That Humanitarian Relief Gets to Those Most in Need.” 102nd Congress
(1991-1992) Concurrent resolution (Agreed to in House 1992).
. “S.Res.115 - A Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the
Emergency Humanitarian and Political Situation in Somalia.” 102nd Congress
(1991-1992) Resolution (Agreed to in Senate 1991).
Finishing the job 362
Bibliography Anna Samson
Kassebaum, Nancy, and Paul Simon. “Save Somalia from Itself.” The New York
Times, January 2, 1992.
Ken Nolan, directed by Ridley Scott. Black Hawk Down. DVD. Sony Pictures Home
Entertainment, 2001.
Kersavage, Kathryn. “The “Responsibility to Protect” Our Answer to “Never Again”?
Libya, Syria and a Critical Analysis of R2P.” International Affairs Forum 5, no.
1 (January 2, 2014): 23–41.
Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Viet-
nam Decisions of 1965. Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992.
Kieman, Ben. Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from
Sparta to Darfur. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
Kim, Julie. Kosovo and the 106th Congress. Report for Congress. Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2001.
Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in
and Extrication from the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.
Klare, Michael T. Beyond the ”Vietnam Syndrome”: U.S. Interventionism in the
1980s. Washington, D.C: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981.
Klarevas, Louis J. “The Polls Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia.”
Public Opinion Quarterly 64 (2000): 523–40.
Klose, Fabian, ed. The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Prac-
tice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present. Human Rights in History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Knight, W. Andy, and Frazer Egerton, eds. The Routledge Handbook of the Respon-
sibility to Protect. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Knott, Stephen F. Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American
Presidency. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Koh, Harold Hongju. “The Obama Administration and International Law.” In Speech.
Washington D.C.: US Department of State, March 25, 2010.
Kohut, Andrew. “A Clear Case of Clinton Fatigue.” The New York Times, August 5,
1999.
. Muted and Mixed Public Response to Peace in Kosovo. Pew Research Centre
for the People & the Press, June 15, 1999.
Kohut, Andrew, Carroll Doherty, Michael Dimock, and Scott Keeter. Public Wary
of Military Intervention in Libya. Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center for
The People & The Press, March 14, 2011.
Finishing the job 363
Bibliography Anna Samson
Agenda-Setting. In International Encyclopedia of Political Science, 49–53. Thousand
Oaks: SAGE, 2014, by Thomas Konig and Dirk Junge.
Koplow, David A. Death by Moderation: The U.S. Military’s Quest for Useable
Weapons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Korn, David A. “Don’t Ignore Iraq’s Kurds; It’s Wrong, and It’s Shortsighted Policy.”
The Washington Post, March 7, 1991, a23.
Kornprobst, Markus. “From Political Judgements to Public Justifications (and Vice
Versa): How Communities Generate Reasons upon Which to Act.” European
Journal of International Relations 20, no. 1 (2014): 192–216.
Kouchner, Bernard. “The Right to Intervention: Codified in Kosovo.” New Perspec-
tives Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1999): 4–7.
Koutsoukis, Jason. “Black Men Mistaken for Mercenaries.” The Sydney Morning
Herald, March 6, 2011.
Krauthammer, Charles. “Fighting to Feel Righteous.” The Washington Post, April 23,
1999.
Krebs, Ronald R., and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. “Twisting Tongues and Twisting
Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric.” European Journal of International
Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 35–68.
Kreps, Sarah, and John Kaag. “The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contem-
porary Conflict: A Legal and Ethical Analysis.” Polity 44, no. 2 (2012): 260–
85.
Kuperman, Alan J. “Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention
Ended in Failure.” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015): 66–77.
Kuperman, Alex J. “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessions from
the Balkans.” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 49–80.
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso, 1985.
LaFeber, Walter. “The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine.”
Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 1 (2009): 71–93.
Lambeth, Benjamin S. NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational
Assessment. Santa Monica: Rand, 2001.
Lango, John W. “Preventative Wars, Just War Principles, and the United Nations.”
The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 247–68.
Laster, Shari. “The American Presidency Project.” Reference Reviews 27, no. 7
(September 16, 2013): 23–24.
Finishing the job 364
Bibliography Anna Samson
Lee, Ronald, and Kane M. Click. “Clinton, William Jefferson (1946– ).” In Ency-
clopedia of Political Communication, edited by Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina
Holtz-Bacha. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2008.
LeGreco, Marianne, and Sarah J. Tracy. “Discourse Tracing as Qualitative Practice.”
Qualitative Inquiry 15, no. 9 (2009): 1516–43.
Leib, Robert S. “Political Myth: An Archeology of Magical Language.” PhD thesis,
2016.
Leites, Nathan. The Operational Code of the Politburo. 1st edition. New York: RAND
Corporation, 1951.
Lejon, Kjell. George H.W. Bush : Faith, Presidency, and Public Theology. Frankfurt:
Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2014.
Levinger, Matthew. “A Core National Security Interest: Framing Atrocities Preven-
tion.” Politics and Governance 3, no. 4 (2015): 26.
Lewis, Adrian R. The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force
from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Lewis, Flora. “America Deserts the Rebels Cynically.” The New York Times, April 3,
1991.
Lewis, John. “H.Con.Res.370 - Concerning the Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia.”
102nd Congress (1991-1992) Concurrent resolution (Agreed to in Senate 1992).
. Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
Lewis, Michael. “Obama’s Way.” Vanity Fair, September 11, 2012. https://www.
vanityfair.com/news/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama.
Licklider, Roy. “Early Returns: Results of the First Wave of Statistical Studies of
Civil War Termination.” Civil Wars 1, no. 3 (1998): 121–32.
Lieberman, Joe. “The Plight of the Kurds.” In Congressional Record 102nd Congress
(1991–1992), S5321. April 25, 1991.
Lieven, Anatol. America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism.
2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Lincoln, Bruce. Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of
Myth, Ritual, and Classification. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014.
Lind, Michael. The American Way of Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006.
Lister, Tim. “Analysis: As Libyan Conflict Grinds On, NATO’s Mission Shifts.” CNN,
August 19, 2011. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/08/19/libya.
nato.analysis/index.html.
Finishing the job 365
Bibliography Anna Samson
Locke, Karen. “Abduction.” In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, edited by
Albert Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe. Thousand Oaks: SAGE,
2010.
Loo, Bernard Fook Weng. “Decisive Battle, Victory and the Revolution in Military
Affairs.” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (2009): 189–211.
Lord, Carnes. “American Strategic Culture.” Comparative Strategy 5, no. 3 (1985):
269–93.
Lordan, Edward J. Case for Combat: How Presidents Persuade Americans to Go to
War. ebook: EBSCO Publishing, 2010.
Lott, Trent. “S.Res.74 - A resolution expressing the support of the Senate for
the members of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” 106th Congress (1999-
2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Luttwak, Edward N. On the Meaning of Victory: Essays on Strategy. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1986.
Mabee, Bryan. Understanding American Power: The Changing World of US Foreign
Policy. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Mahnken, Thomas G. Technology and the American Way of War since 1945. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
Makinda, Samuel M. Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in
Somalia. Boulder: Lynne Pienner Publishers, 1993.
Malanczuk, Peter. “The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of
the Second Gulf War.” European Journal of International Law 2 (1991): 114–35.
Mandel, Robert. The Meaning of Military Victory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2006.
Marcus, Jonathan. “Syria Air Strikes: Will West’s Attack Sway Syria’s Assad?” BBC
News, April 14, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43764344.
Maren, Michael. “Somalia: Whose Failure?” Current History 95, no. 601 (1996):
201–6.
Martel, William. Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Martin-Brule´, Sarah-Myriam. Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions : A Typology of
Success and Failure in International Interventions. New York: Routledge, 2017.
Matthew, Baum. “How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of
Operation Restore Hope.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2004): 187–
226.
Finishing the job 366
Bibliography Anna Samson
Maull, Hanns W. “Hegemony Reconstructed? America’s Role Conception and Its
“Leadership” within Its Core Alliances.” In Role Theory in International Relations:
Approaches and Analyses, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and
Hanns Maull, 168–93. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global
Politics. New York: Routledge, 2011.
Maxey, Sarah. “The Power of Humanitarian Narratives: A Domestic Coalition Theory
of Justifications for Military Action.” Political Research Quarterly, 2019, 1–16.
Maxwell, Dayton L. “Facing the Choice among Bad Options in Complex Humani-
tarian Emergencies.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 9, no. 1 (March 1998): 179–
91.
May, Larry. After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012.
McAllester, Matthew. Beyond the Mountains of the Damned: The War Inside Kosovo.
New York: New York University Press, 2001.
McAllister, Bill. “U.N. Buffer Zones In Iraq Suggested; Cheney Offers Idea to
Safeguard Refugees.” The Washington Post (Washington DC), April 8, 1991.
McCain, John. “Somalia–It is Time to Come Home.” Congressional Record 103rd
Congress (1993–1994), Senate, October 4, 1993, 12904.
. “S.Res.69 - A resolution calling for the establishment of an international
tribunal with jurisdiction to judge and punish the war crimes committed by the
political and military leadership of Iraq.” 102nd Congress, February 28, 1991.
McConnell, Mitch. “Military Action in Libya.” In Congressional Record–Senate,
H4540. March 28, 2011.
McCready, Doug. “Ending the War Right: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War
Tradition.” Journal of Military Ethics 8, no. 1 (2009): 66–78.
McCrisken, Trevor David. “The Vietnam Syndrome, American Exceptionalism, and
the Use of United States Military Force.” PhD thesis, American University,
1994.
McDougall, Walter A. Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter
with the World Since 1776. Boston: Houghton Miﬄin, 1997.
McGrory, Mary. “Bush’s Peace Problems.” The Washington Post, March 26, 1991,
a02.
Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It
Changed the World. Reprinted. A Century Foundation Book. New York: Rout-
ledge, 2009.
Medhurst, Martin J., ed. Before the Rhetorical Presidency. 1st edition. Presidential
Rhetoric Series 19. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008.
Finishing the job 367
Bibliography Anna Samson
Medzihorsky, Juraj, Milos Popovic, and Erin K. Jenne. “Rhetoric of Civil Conflict
Management: United Nations Security Council Debates over the Syrian Civil
War.” Research & Politics 4, no. 2 (2017): 1–10.
Meek, Philip A. “Operation Provide Comfort: A Case Study in Humanitarian Relief
and Foreign Assistance.” Air Force Law Review 37 (1994): 225–39.
Me´rand, Fre´de´ric. “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense.” Security
Studies 19, no. 2 (2010): 342–74.
Mermin, Jonathan. “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The
Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3
(1997): 385–403.
Mertus, Julie A. “Operation Allied Force: Handmaiden of Independent Kosovo.”
International Affairs 85, no. 3 (2009): 461–76.
Milliken, Jennifer. “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of
Research and Methods.” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2
(1999): 225–54.
Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, eds. Forging the World:
Strategic Narratives and International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2017.
Mitchell, Alison. “President Visits Centre of Crisis in Somali Town.” The New York
Times, January 2, 1993.
. “US Launches Further Strike against Iraq after Clinton Vows He Will Extract
’Price’.” The New York Times, September 4, 1996.
Mitchell, George J. “S.J.Res.45 - Resolution Authorizing the Use of United States
Armed Forces in Somalia.” 103rd Congress (1993-1994) Bill (Passed Senate and
House 1993).
Mollendorf, Darrel. “Jus Ex Bello.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 16, no. 2
(2008): 123–36.
. “Two Doctrines of Jus Ex Bello.” Ethics 125 (2015): 653–753.
Ki-Moon, Ban. “Remarks to Security Council Meeting on Peace and Security in
Africa.” United Nations Security Council, February 25, 2011. https://www.un.
org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2011-02-25/remarks-security-council-meeting-
peace-and-security-africa.
Morgan Edwards, Lucy. “How the ‘Entry’ Defines the ‘Exit’: Contradictions between
the Political and Military Strategies Adopted in 2001 and How They Have Dele-
teriously Affected the Longer-Term Possibilities for Stabilisation in Afghanistan.”
Conflict, Security & Development 14, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 593–619.
Finishing the job 368
Bibliography Anna Samson
Morgan, Gregory M. “History of Iraq, 1990–Present.” In The Encyclopedia of Middle
East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq
Conflicts, edited by Spencer Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts, 590–97. Santa
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010.
Morin, Richard. “Majority in Poll Says U.S. Ended Attack On Iraq Prematurely;No
Consensus Found on Aiding Rebel Forces.” The Washington Post (Washington
DC), April 5, 1991, a14.
MSF. Somalia 1991–1993: Civil War, Famine Alert and UN ”Military Humanitarian”
Intervention. Research report. Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2013. https://www.
msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/2019-04/MSF%5C%20Speaking%5C%20Out%5C%
20Somalia%5C%201991-1993.pdf.
Mueller, John. Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994.
Mueller, John, and Mark G. Stewart. Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Mueller, Karl P. Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War. Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015.
Mumford, Andrew. “Parallels, Prescience and the Past: Analogical Reasoning and
Contemporary International Politics.” International Politics 52, no. 1 (2015):
1–19.
Murphy, Sean D. Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving
World Order. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996.
Murtha, John P. “H.R.3116 - Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994.
Public Law 103-139.” 103rd Congress (1993-1994), November 11, 1993.
Mylroie, Laurie. “Planning Saddam’s Ouster.” The Wall Street Journal, July 27,
1992.
Naimark, Norman M. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Nardulli, Bruce, Walter L. Perry, and Bruce R. Pirni. Disjointed War: Military
Operations in Kosovo. RAND, 2002.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
“Global Terrorism Database.” 2016. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
“National Transitional Council – Libya.” November 12, 2018. http://ntclibya.org/.
NATO. NATO and Libya: Operational Media Update for 20 October, October 21, 2011.
http://www.nato.int/nato static/assets/pdf/pdf 2011 10/20111021 111021-
oup-update.pdf.
Finishing the job 369
Bibliography Anna Samson
NATO. NATO to Maintain High Operational Tempo as Long as Necessary in Libya,
April 14, 2011. http ://www.nato . int/cps/en/natolive/news 72549 .htm?
selectedLocale=en.
. Operational Media Update: NATO and Libya, October 25, 2011. http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news 71994.htm.
. Statement by the NATO Secretary-General on the Extension of the Mission
in Libya, June 1, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news 74977.htm?
selectedLocale=en.
. “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo. NATO Press Release
(99)12 - 30 Jan. 1999.” January 30, 1999. Accessed April 16, 2017. http://www.
nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm.
. Statement on Libya Following the Working lunch of NATO Ministers of
Defence with non-NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector, June 8,
2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news 75177.htm.
. Statement on Libya Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of
Foreign Affairs with Non-NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector,
April 14, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official texts 72544.htm.
. “We Answered the Call” - The End of Operation Unified Protector, Octo-
ber 31, 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news 80435.htm.
“Across Platforms, 7 in 10 Adults Access Content from Newspaper Media Each Week.”
March 25, 2013. Accessed September 22, 2014. http://www.naa.org/trends-and-
numbers/readership.aspx.
Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. “Narrative Led Operations.” Militaert Tidsskrift 141, no. 4
(2013): 67–77.
Noesselt, Nele. “China’s Contradictory Role(s) in World Politics: Decrypting China’s
North Korea Strategy.” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 7 (2014): 1307–25.
Office for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. “OPCW Director-General Shares
Incontrovertible Laboratory Results Concluding Exposure to Sarin.” April 19,
2017. https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2017/04/opcw-director-
general-shares-incontrovertible-laboratory-results.
Office of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. “Genocide Prevention
Analysis Framework,” 2013. http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/
pdf/osapg analysis framework.pdf.
Olesen, Thomas. “Global Injustice Memories: The 1994 Rwanda Genocide.” Interna-
tional Political Sociology 6 (2012): 373–89.
O’Loughlin, Ben. “Strategic Narratives: Methods and Ethics.” In Forging the World:
Strategic Narratives and International Relations, edited by Alister Miskimmon,
Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, 23–54. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2017.
Finishing the job 370
Bibliography Anna Samson
Olson, Robert. “Five stages of Kurdish nationalism:1880–1980.” Institute of Muslim
Minority Affairs. Journal 12, no. 2 (1991): 391–409.
Onea, Tudor A. US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Restraint versus
Assertiveness from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013.
Onuf, Nicholas. International Legal Theory, Essays and Engagements, 1966-2006.
New York: Routledge, 2008.
Orchard, Phil. “Revisiting Humanitarian Safe Areas for Civilian Protection.” Global
Governance 20 (2014): 55–75.
O’Reilly, K. P. “A Rogue Doctrine?: The Role of Strategic Culture on US Foreign
Policy Behavior: A Rogue Doctrine?” Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 1 (2013):
57–77.
Orend, Brian. “Justice after War.” Ethics and International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002):
43–56.
Osborne Daponte, Beth. “A Case Study in Estimating Casualties from War and Its
Aftermath: The 1991 Persian Gulf War.” The PSR Quarterly Review 3, no. 2
(1993): 57–66.
Palmer, R. R. “Frederick the Great, Guilbert, Bu¨low: From Dynastic to National
War.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,
edited by Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 91–122.
Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Pamment, James. “Strategic Narratives in US Public Diplomacy: A Critical Geopoli-
tics.” Popular Communication 12, no. 1 (2014): 48–64.
Pape, Robert A. “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard for Humanitarian
Intervention.” International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 41–80.
Passerin d’Entre´ves, Maurizio. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. London:
Routledge, 1994.
Patman, Robert G. Strategic Shortfall: The Somalia Syndrome and the March to
9/11. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2010.
Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory:
Lessons from Modern Insurgencies. Report for the Office of the US Secretary of
Defense. Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2013.
Paul, Ron. “H.R.647 - To prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department
of Defense from being used for the deployment of United States Armed Forces
in Kosovo unless that deployment is specifically authorized by Law.” 106th
Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Pearce, Steve. “Concerns about Libya: Proceedings and debates of the 112th Congress,
First Session.” In Congressional Record–House, S1880. March 29, 2011.
Finishing the job 371
Bibliography Anna Samson
Pedersen, Ove K. Discourse Analysis. Working Paper 65. Frederiksberg: Copenhagen
Business School, 2009.
Perlez, Jane. “US Hope is Slim as Talks Restart on Kosovo Crisis.” The New York
Times, March 15, 1999.
Peters, Gerhard, and John T. Woolley. “The American Presidency Project.” 1999–
2017. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
Peterson, Scott. Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, A
Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Pew Centre for People and the Press, ed. “Terrorism Worries Little Changed; Most
Give Government Good Marks for Reducing Threat.” January 12, 2015. https:
//www.people-press.org/2015/01/12/terrorism-worries-little-changed-most-
give-government-good-marks-for-reducing-threat/.
Pew Research Centre. Newspapers Fact Sheet: Analysis based on Alliance for Au-
dited Media data. Research report. Pew Research Centre, 2018. https://www.
journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/.
Pew Research Poll Database, ed. News Interest Index Poll, September 1992. Survey
by Times Mirror. Methodology: Interviewing conducted by Princeton Survey
Research Associates, September 10 - September 13, 1992 and based on 1,508
telephone interviews. Sample: National adult., September 13, 1992.
Piiparinen, Touko. “The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Interven-
tion.” Global Governance 13, no. 3 (2007): 365–90.
Ponzio, Richard, and Christopher Freeman. “Conclusion: Rethinking Statebuilding
in Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (January 2007): 173–84.
Poole, Walter S. The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994. Washington
DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2005.
Porter, Gareth. “The Third Option in Iraq: A Responsible Exit Strategy.” Middle
East Policy 12, no. 3 (2005): 29–45.
Pouliot, Vincent. “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security
Communities.” International Organization 62, no. 2 (2008): 257–88.
Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New
York: Basic Books, 2002.
Prendergast, John. “Staving Off Hunger and Food Bandits in Somalia.” The Wall
Street Journal, September 17, 1992.
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, May 3, 1994. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/
pdd/pdd-25.pdf.
Finishing the job 372
Bibliography Anna Samson
Priest, Andrew. “From Saigon to Baghdad: The Vietnam Syndrome, the Iraq War
and American Foreign Policy.” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 1
(2009): 139–71.
Purkiss, Jessica, and Jack Serle. “Obama’s Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten
Times More Strikes than Bush.” January 17, 2017. Accessed February 18, 2019.
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-
drone-war-in-numbers-ten-times-more-strikes-than-bush.
Quester, George H. “Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals.” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 392 (How Wars End 1970):
30–39.
Rambaree, Komalsingh, and Elisabeth Faxelid. “Considering Abductive Thematic
Network Analysis with ATLAS-Ti 6.2.” In Advancing Research Methods with New
Technologies, edited by Natalie Sappleton. Premier Reference Source. Hershey:
Information Science Reference, 2013.
Ramstad, Jim. “H.Con.Res.81 - Calling upon the United Nations to take all appro-
priate steps to try Saddam Hussein and his subordinates for all war crimes.”
102nd Congress, June 6, 1991.
Randal, Jonathan C. “Iraq Says Rebellion Toll High; Papers Print Photos of Bodies,
Damage in Southern Cities.” The Washington Post, March 18, 1991.
. “Kurds Report Uprising in Northern Iraq; Arab Leaders Meet in Damascus.”
The Washington Post, March 6, 1991.
Reagan, Ronald. “Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety.” August 18, 1980. https:
//reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/reference/8.18.80.html.
Recchia, Stefano. “Pragmatism over Principle: US Intervention and Burden Shifting
in Somalia, 1992–1993.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2018, 1–25.
Reichertz, Jo. “Abduction: The Logic of Discovery of Grounded Theory.” In The
SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory, edited by Antony Bryant and Kathy
Charmaz, 214–29. London: SAGE, 2007.
Reisigl, Martin. “Argumentation Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach: A
Methodological Framework.” In Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies, edited
by Christopher Hart and Piotr Cap, 67–96. London: Bloomsbury Academic,
2014.
Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak. “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).” In
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd, 87–121. London: SAGE, 2009.
Reyes, Antonio. “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to
Actions.” Discourse and Society 22, no. 6 (2011): 781–807.
Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York:
Penguin Press, 2006.
Finishing the job 373
Bibliography Anna Samson
Roberts, Timothy, and Lindsay DiCuirci, eds. American Exceptionalism. Vol. 4.
London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013.
Robinson, Michael A. “Military Operations in Kosovo and the Danger of ‘Mission
Creep’.” Military Review, May 28, 2014, 1–5. https://www.armyupress.army.
mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Online-Exclusive/Robinson-
May-2014.pdf.
Robinson, Piers. The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention.
London: Psychology Press, 2002.
Rochereau de la Sabliere, Jean-Marc. “Letter Dated 4 April 1991 from the Charge
d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France to the UN Addressed to the
President of the Security Council,” April 4, 1991. https://documents-dds-ny.un.
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N91/109/03/IMG/N9110903.pdf?OpenElement.
Rodin, David. “Ending War: A Response to Richard Miller.” Ethics and International
Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011): 259–367.
. “The War Trap: Dilemmas of Jus Terminatio.” Ethics 125 (2015): 674–95.
Rojecki, Andrew. “Rhetorical Alchemy: American Exceptionalism and the War on
Terror.” Political Communication 25, no. 1 (2008): 67–88.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Fireside Chat.” American Presidency Project, December 29,
1940. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fireside-chat-9.
Rose, Gideon. “The Exit Strategy Delusion.” Foreign Affairs, 1998, no. 1, 56–67.
Rosenthal, A. M. “A Second US Victory.” The New York Times, March 22, 1991.
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana. “Authorising Limited Use of Armed Forces in Libya: Pro-
ceedings and debates of the 112th Congress, First Session.” In Congressional
Record–House, H2033. June 24, 2011.
Rossi, Christopher R., and Elihu Root, eds. “The Monroe Doctrine and International
Law in the Americas.” In Whiggish International Law, 123–53. Online: Brill
Nijhoff, 2019.
Rothkopf, David. “Barack Obama and the Powell Doctrine, Reconsidered.” Foreign
Policy: Voice, October 15, 2015. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/15/barack-
obama-and-the-powell-doctrine-reconsidered-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal-
iraq/.
Rothstein, Robert. “Domestic Politics and Peacemaking: Reconciling Incompatible
Imperatives.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 392 (How Wars End 1970): 62–75.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
Rudd, Gordon W. Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation
Provide Comfort, 1991. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2004.
Finishing the job 374
Bibliography Anna Samson
. “The 24th MEU(SOC) and Operation Provide Comfort: A Second Look.”
Marine Corps Gazette 77, no. 2 (1993): 20–22.
Ryan, Cheyney. “The Dilemma of Cosmopolitan Soldiering.” In Heroism and the
Changing Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, edited by Sibylle
Scheipers, 120–41. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Safire, William. “Bush’s Bay of Pigs.” The New York Times, April 4, 1991.
. “Celebrating Defeat.” The New York Times, April 22, 1999.
. “Follow the Kurds to Save Iraq.” The New York Times, March 28, 1991.
Samet, Elizabeth. “Can an American Soldier Ever Die in Vain? What Shakespeare,
Lincoln and ‘Lone Survivor’ Teach us About the Danger of Refusing to Confront
Futility in War.” Foreign Policy, 2014, 74–78.
Sanger, David. “President Says Military Phase in Iraq Has Ended.” The New York
Times, May 2, 2003.
Saunders, Elizabeth N. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.
Saxton, Jim. “H.Res.100 - To urge the establishment of an international military
tribunal to prosecute war crimes arising out of the Persian Gulf conflict.” 102nd
Congress, March 18, 1991.
Schaffer, Bob. Congressional Record–House. April 28, 1999.
Scheipers, Sibylle. “Introduction: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?” In Heroism and the
Changing Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, edited by Sibylle
Scheipers, 1–18. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action,
and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.” International Organiza-
tion 55, no. 1 (2001): 47–80.
Schmidt, Vivien A. “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and
Discourse.” Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (June 2008): 303–26.
Schmitt, Eric. “The Powell Doctrine Is Looking Pretty Good Again.” The New York
Times, April 4, 1999.
Schnabel, Albrecht, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. “Kosovo and the Challenge of Human-
itarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International
Citizenship.” Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000.
Schneider, Tobias, and Theresa Luˆtkefend. Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical
Weapons Use in Syria. Research report. Global Public Policy Institute, 2019.
https://www.gppi.net/media/GPPi Schneider Luetkefend 2019 Nowhere to
Hide Web.pdf.
Finishing the job 375
Bibliography Anna Samson
Schorr, Daniel. “The Great Talker.” The New Leader 76, no. 3 (February 8, 1993):
3–6.
Schrijvers, Peter. “War against Evil: The Second World War.” In Heroism and the
Changing Character of War: Toward Post-Heroic Warfare?, edited by Sibylle
Scheipers, 76–92. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Seabury, Paul, and Angelo Codevilla. War: Ends and Means. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1989.
Secunda, Eugene, and Terence P. Moran. Selling War to America: From the Span-
ish American War to the Global War on Terror. Westport: Praeger Security
International, 2007.
Sengupta, Somini, and Rick Gladstone. “Nikki Haley Says U.S. May ‘Take Our Own
Action’ on Syrian Chemical Attack.” The New York Times, April 5, 2017.
Sewall, Sarah, Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin. MARO - Mass Atrocity Response
Operations: A Military Planning Handbook. Carr Center for Human Rights
Policy, Harvard Kennedy School and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute, 2007. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/maro/pdf/
MARO Handbook v9.pdf.
Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success
and Failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Shabi, Rachel. “Nato Accused of War Crimes in Libya.” The Independent, January 19,
2012. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nato-accused-of-war-
crimes-in-libya-6291566.html.
Shillinger, Kurt. “The ‘Victory’ Code: Bush’s Exit Strategy and Prospects for Iraq.”
South African Journal of International Affairs 12, no. 2 (2005): 105–12.
Siegel, Adam B. “Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?” Joint Forces Quarterly,
2000, 112–15.
Sigelman, Lee, and Cynthia Whissell. ““The Great Communicator” and “The Great
Talker” on the Radio: Projecting Presidential Personas.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002): 137–46.
Sikkink, Kathryn. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Chang-
ing World Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011.
Silliman, Stephen W. “The “Old West” in the Middle East: U.S. Military Metaphors
in Real and Imagined Indian Country.” American Anthropologist 110, no. 2
(2008): 237–47.
Simmons, A. John. Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Simms, Brendan, and D. J. B. Trim, eds. Humanitarian Intervention: A History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Finishing the job 376
Bibliography Anna Samson
Simons, G. L. Vietnam Syndrome: Impact on US Foreign Policy. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1998.
Simons, Herbert W. “From Post-9/11 Melodrama to Quagmire in Iraq: A Rhetorical
History.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10, no. 2 (2007): 183–94.
Skelton, Ike. “H.Amdt.161 to H.R.1401 – National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000.” 106th Congress (1999-2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Slim, Hugo. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008.
Smith, Adam I. P. “‘On the Altar of the Nation’: Narratives of Heroic Sacrifice in the
American Civil War.” In Heroism and the Changing Character of War: Toward
Post-Heroic Warfare?, edited by Sibylle Scheipers, 33–45. London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014.
Smith, Jeffrey. “Kosovo Killings Called a Massacre; Some Victims Shot While on
Their Knees.” The Washington Post, March 17, 1999.
Smith, Michael G. “Military Intervention and Humanitarian Assistance.” Global
Change, Peace & Security 20, no. 3 (October 2008): 243–54.
Smith, Tony. “From Woodrow Wilson in 1902 to the Bush Doctrine in 2002: Democ-
racy Promotion as Imperialism.” International Politics 48, nos. 2-3 (2011):
229–50.
Sneberg, Catherine. “The Purpose of American Strategic Culture: A Study of
American Exceptionalism and Its Implications for U.S. Grand Strategy and
America’s Global Role.” Masters thesis, University of Oslo, 2015.
Snyder, Jack L. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear
Operations R-2154-AF. Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, September 1977.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf.
Solana, Javier. “NATO: Its 50th Anniversary - The Washington Summit - The
Next Century.” January 25, 1999. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions 27641.htm?selectedLocale=en.
. “NATO’s Agenda towards the Washington Summit.” January 11, 1999.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions 27643.htm?selectedLocale=en.
. Press Statement - by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO,
March 23, 1999. https : / / www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / opinions 27615 .
htm?selectedLocale=en.
. “Statement by the NATO Secretary-General Dr Javier Solana on behalf of
the North Atlantic Council: NATO Press Release (99)020.” February 19, 1999.
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-020e.htm.
Sommer, John G. Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994. Refugee
Policy Group, Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues,
November 1994.
Finishing the job 377
Bibliography Anna Samson
Specter, Areln. “S.Res.71 - A resolution to encourage the President of the United
States to confer with the sovereign state of Kuwait, countries of the Coalition
or the United Nations to establish an International Criminal Court or an
International Military Tribunal to try and punish all individuals, including
President Saddam Hussein, involved in the planning or execution of Crimes
against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity as defined under
international law.” 102nd Congress, Introduced 1991.
Spence, Floyd. “H.Res.130 - Expressing the support of the House of Representatives
for the members of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” 106th Congress (1999-
2000) Resolution (Introduced 1999).
Spencer, Tucker. US Leadership in Wartime: Clashes, Controversy and Compromise.
New York: ABC-CLIO, 2009.
Sprout, Margaret, and Harold Sprout. An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of
International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Centre of International
Studies, 1968.
Sremac, Danielle S. War of Words: Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict.
Westport: Praeger, 1999.
Statman, Daniel. “Ending War Short of Victory? A Contractarian View of Jus Ex
Bello.” Ethics 125 (2015): 720–50.
Stephanson, Anders. Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of
Right. 1st. A Critical Issue. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995.
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. “The Emperor Wore Cowboy Boots.” International Studies
Perspectives 9, no. 3 (August 2008): 319–30.
Stevenson, Jonathan. “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (1993): 138–54.
Stewart, Richard W. The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994 CMH Pub
70-81-1. US Army Center of Military History, 2002. http://www.history.army.
mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm.
Stolberg, Cheryl Gay. “Mistakes, I’ve Made a Few, Bush Tells Reporters.” The New
York Times, January 12, 2009.
Stuckey, Mary E. “Rethinking the Rhetorical Presidency and Presidential Rhetoric.”
Review of Communication 10, no. 1 (2010): 38–52.
Stupart, John. “Just Ad Bellum and Intervention in Somalia: Why a Military
Response Can Still Work.” Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military
Studies 39, no. 2 (2011): 76–98.
Sutherland, Claire. “Nation-Building through Discourse Theory.” ASEAN 11, no. 2
(2005): 185–202.
Finishing the job 378
Bibliography Anna Samson
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ed. “Syria chemical weapons attack toll rises
to 70 as Russian narrative is dismissed.” April 6, 2017. http://www.syriahr.
com/en/?p=64269.
Tarnoff, Peter. US Policy in Somalia, July 29, 1993.
Taylor, A J P. How Wars End. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985.
Teles Fazendeiro, Bernardo. “Rethinking Roles: Reflexive Role Ascription and Per-
formativity in International Relations.” International Studies Review 18, no. 3
(2016): 487–507.
Tellis, Ashley, J. “Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S.
Involvement in Intrastate Conflicts.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no.
2 (1996): 117–51.
Teso´n, Fernando R. “Humanitarian Intervention: Loose Ends.” Journal of Military
Ethics 10, no. 3 (2011): 192–212.
Teso´n, Fernando R. “Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention.” Amsterdam Law Forum 1, no. 2 (2009): 42–48.
Teso´n, Fernando R., and Bas Van der Vossen. Debating Humanitarian Intervention:
Should We Try to Save Strangers? New York, 2017.
Thakur, Ramesh. “The Responsibility to Protect Turns 15.” International Affairs
92, no. 2 (2016): 415–34.
The Guardian newspaper, ed. “NATO Libya Attacks.” The Guardian. 2011. https://
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17o1NI6zYSPb B-cN5NnWWMjVG1k3GFLKNPB-
4qDEoW8/edit?authkey=CPeKjPMB&hl=en US&hl=en US&authkey=
CPeKjPMB#gid=0.
The Pew Research Centre for People and the Press, ed. ‘Which of the following would
be the best argument for not using military force in Libya?’ Edited by The Pew
Research Centre for People and the Press, March 13, 2011. https://www.people-
press.org/question-search/?qid=1781920&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ed. Astana Declaration on the 10th An-
niversary of the SCO, June 15, 2011. http://eng.sectsco.org/load/199300/.
The United States Army. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-16, The Army in Multina-
tional Operations. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010.
United States Activities in Libya. The White House, June 16, 2011.
Thies, Cameron G. “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America.”
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014, 662–81.
Tierney, Dominic. The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable
Conflicts. New York: Little, Brown & Co, 2015.
Finishing the job 379
Bibliography Anna Samson
Tillerson, Rex, and H.R. McMaster. Press Briefing by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
and National Security Advisor General H.R. McMaster. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, April 6, 2017. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
326721.
Times Mirror. “G.O.P. Collects Big War Dividend Survey, Mar, 1991,” March 14,
1991. http://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=504097&pid=51&
ccid=51#top.
Toulmin, Stephen Edelston. The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
Traynor, Ian. “Arab League Chief Admits Second Thoughts about Libya Air Strikes.”
The Guardian, June 22, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/
21/arab-league-chief-libya-air-strikes.
Trump, Donald J. Interview with Maria Bartiromo on Fox Business Network. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 11, 2017. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/326791.
. Remarks on United States Military Operations in Syria from Palm Beach,
Florida. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 6, 2017. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/326564.
. The President’s News Conference With Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 12, 2017. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/326597.
. Tweet at 5:21am on 14 April 2018, April 14, 2018. https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/985130802668294144?lang=en.
Tulis, Jeffrey K. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr, 1987.
Turner, Robert F. “The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional,
Unnecessary and Fraud That Contributed Directly to the 9/11 Attacks.” Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 45, no. 1 (2012): 109–43.
Tyler, Patrick E. “After the War: US Juggling Iraq Policy.” The New York Times,
April 13, 1991.
UN Security Council. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine
Hundred and Eighty-Second Meeting S/PV.2982. New York: United Nations
Security Council, April 5, 1991.
. “Resolution 687,” April 3, 1991.
. “Resolution 688,” April 5, 1991.
. “Resolution 706,” August 15, 1991.
. Resolution 733, January 23, 1992.
Finishing the job 380
Bibliography Anna Samson
United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.
“Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention,” 2014. http:
//www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/publications-and-resources/
Framework%5C%20of%5C%20Analysis%5C%20for%5C%20Atrocity%5C%
20Crimes EN.pdf.
United Nations Secretary-General. Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted
in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992) S/25354. New
York, USA: United Nations Security Council, March 3, 1993.
. No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure
or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Report of the Secretary-
General S/2001/394. New York: United Nations Security Council, April 20, 2001.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf%5C%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%5C%7D/PKO%5C%20S%5C%202001%5C%20394.
pdf.
. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia S.24343. New
York: United Nations Security Council, July 22, 1992.
. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia Submitted
in Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Resolution 954 (1994) S/1995/231.
United Nations Security Council, March 28, 1995.
. The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General S/24480. New
York: United Nations Security Council, August 24, 1992.
United Nations Security Council. 3432nd Meeting S/PV.3432. United Nations Secu-
rity Council, September 30, 1994.
. 3447th Meeting S/PV.3447. New York, USA: United Nations Security Council,
November 4, 1994.
. 6491st meeting transcript. S/PV.6491, February 26, 2011.
. 6498th meeting transcript. S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011.
. Draft Resolution S/1999/328, March 26, 1999.
. Minutes of the 3974th Meeting: S/PV.3974. Technical report. UN Security
Countil, January 29, 1999.
. Minutes of the 3989th meeting of the UN Security Council, 26 March 1999:
S/PV.3989, March 26, 1999.
. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Eighty-
Eigth Meeting S/PV.3188. New York, USA: United Nations Security Council,
March 26, 1993.
. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Forty-
Fifth Meeting S/PV.3145. New York, USA: United Nations Security Council,
December 3, 1992.
Finishing the job 381
Bibliography Anna Samson
United Nations Security Council. Report of the Security Council: 16 June 1990–15
June 1991. Official Records: Forty-Sixth Session Supplement No. 2 A/48/2. New
York: United Nations Security Council.
. Resolution 1160: S/RES/1160, March 31, 1998.
. Resolution 1199: S/RES/1199, September 23, 1998.
. Resolution 1203: S/RES/1203, October 24, 1998.
. Resolution 1239: S/RES/1239, May 14, 1999.
. Resolution 1244: S/RES/1244, June 10, 1999.
. Resolution 1970. S/Res/1970(2011), February 26, 2011.
. Resolution 1973. S/Res/1973(2011), March 17, 2011.
. Resolution 2016. S/Res/2016(2011), October 27, 2011.
. Resolution 746, March 17, 1992.
. Resolution 751, April 24, 1992.
. Resolution 794, December 3, 1992.
. Resolution 814, March 26, 1993.
. Resolution 837, June 6, 1993.
. Resolution 946, September 30, 1994.
. Resolution 954, November 4, 1994.
United States Forces, Somalia: After Action Report and Historical Overview The
United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994. Center of Military History: United
States Army, 2003.
United States Institute of Peace, ed. Military Technical Agreement Between the
International Security Force (”KFOR”) and the Governments of Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Peace Agreements Digital Collection.
Washington D.C., June 9, 1999. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/
resources/collections/peace agreements/kosovo mta06091999.pdf.
. Restoring Hope: The Real Lessons of Somalia for the Future of Intervention.
Washington D.C.: USIP, 1994.
Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress, First Session.
Vol. 145. 59. April 28, 1999. https://www.congress.gov/crec/1999/04/28/CREC-
1999-04-28.pdf.
US Congress. “Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Situation in Libya.” Committee on
Armed Services Hearing, 112th Congress, 1st Session, March 31, 2011.
Finishing the job 382
Bibliography Anna Samson
US Department of Defense. Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force
After-Action Report. Technical report. Washington D.C.: US Department of
Defense, Pentagon, January 31, 2000.
Usborne, David, and Jerome Sarkey. “Obama’s Exit Strategy for Afghanistan.” The
Independent (London), March 27, 2009.
Valentino, Benjamin. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Van Dijk, Teun A. “What Is Political Discourse Analysis?” In Political Linguistics,
edited by Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen, 11–52. Amsterdam: Benjamins,
1995.
Van Leeuwen, Theo. “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication.” Discourse &
Communication 1, no. 1 (2007): 91–112.
. “Three Models of Interdisciplinarity.” In New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse
Analysis : Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity, edited by Ruth Wodak
and Paul A. Chilton, 3–19. Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture
; v. 13. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2005.
Von Hippel, Karin. Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold
War World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Walker, James C. “War Termination: Why, When, Who What, Where and How.”
Naval War College, Newport R.I., 1996.
Walker, Stephen G., and Mark Schafer. “Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy.” Political Psychology 28, no. 6 (2007):
747–76.
Walling, Carrie Booth. All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitar-
ian Intervention. Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
Walt, Stephen M. “Applying the 8 Questions of the Powell Doctrine to Syria.” Foreign
Policy, September 3, 2013. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/03/applying-the-
8-questions-of-the-powell-doctrine-to-syria/.
. “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 35,
no. 2 (1991): 211–39.
Walzer, Michael. “Just and Unjust Occupations.” Dissent, 2004, no. 1, 61–63.
. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 2006.
. “Regime Change and Just War.” Dissent 53, no. 3 (2006): 103–8.
. “The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success).” Social
Research 69, no. 4 (2002): 925–44.
Finishing the job 383
Bibliography Anna Samson
Warren, James E. “Taming the Warrant in Toulmin’s Model of Argument.” The
English Journal 99, no. 6 (2010): 41–46.
Webber, Mark. “The Kosovo War: A Recapitulation.” International Affairs 85, no.
3 (2009): 447–59.
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by Talcott
Parsons. New York: Free Press, 1964.
Weigley, Russell Frank. The American Way of War: A History of United States
Military Strategy and Policy. Indiana University Press paperback ed. The Wars
of the United States. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.
Weinberger, Caspar. “The Uses of Military Power.” November 28, 1984. http://
insidethecoldwar.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statement%5C%20by%
5C%20Secretary%5C%20of%5C%20Defense%5C%20Weinberger%5C%20at%
5C%20National%5C%20Press%5C%20Club,%5C%20November%5C%2028,
%5C%201984.pdf.
Weiss, David. “Agenda-Setting Theory.” In The Encyclopedia of Communication
Theory, 32–34. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2009.
Weiss, Gilbert, and Ruth Wodak, eds. Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Palgrave
Macmillan UK, 2003.
Weiss, Thomas G. Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action. Third edition. Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2016.
. “Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era.” World Policy Journal 11, no. 1
(1994): 59–68.
. “RtoP Alive and Well after Libya.” Ethics and International Affairs 25, no.
3 (2011): 287–92.
Weissman, Stephen R. “Presidential Deception in Foreign Policy Making: Military
Intervention in Libya 2011.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 46, no. 3 (2016):
669–90.
Wellman, David. “Niebuhrian Realism and the Formation of US Foreign Policy.”
Political Theology 10, no. 1 (2009): 11–29.
Western, Jon. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information and
Advocacy in the US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” International Security
26, no. 4 (2002): 112–42.
Western, Jon, and Joshua S. Goldstein. “Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age:
Lessons From Somalia to Libya.” Foreign Affairs, 2011, no. 6, 48–59.
Weymouth, Lally. “Q&A: Gerhard Schroeder, Firmly Convinced.” The Washington
Post, April 18, 1999, B01.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Finishing the job 384
Bibliography Anna Samson
White, Geoffrey M. “Mythic History and National Memory: The Pearl Harbor
Anniversary.” Culture & Psychology 3, no. 1 (1997): 63–88.
Wicker, Tom. “A Confused Strategy.” The New York Times, March 30, 1991.
Wilde, Ralph. “Competing Normative Visions of Exit.” In Exit Strategies and States
Building, edited by Richard Caplan, 261–75. ebook: Oxford University Press,
2012.
Wilkening, Kenneth E. “Culture and Japanese Citizen Influence on the Transbound-
ary Air Pollution Issue in Northeast Asia.” Political Psychology 20, no. 4 (1999):
701–23.
Williams, Brian Glyn. Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on Al Qaeda. ebook: Potomac
Books, July 1, 2013.
Williams, Paul D. “Briefing: The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya.” Global
Responsibility to Protect 3 (2011): 248–59.
. “Protection, Resilience and Empowerment: United Nations Peacekeeping
and Violence against Civilians in Contemporary War Zones.” Politics 33, no. 4
(2013): 287–98.
Wilson, Woodrow. “Address to the Senate of the United States: ”A World League
for Peace”.” American Presidency Project, January 22, 1917. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-senate-the-united-states-world-
league-for-peace.
Wines, Michael. “Mission to Somalia: Bush Declares Goal in Somalia to ‘Save
Thousands’.” The New York Times, December 5, 1992.
Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer. “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda,
Theory and Methodology.” In Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd, 1–33.
London: SAGE, 2009.
Wodak, Ruth, Michael Meyer, Stefan Titscher, and Eva Vetter. Methods of Text and
Discourse Analysis: In Search of Meaning. London: SAGE, 2000.
Wolfe, Alan. “Back to Crackpot Moralism.” World Policy Journal 25, no. 3 (2008):
218–20.
Wood, Edward W. Worshipping the Myths of World War II: Reflections on America’s
Dedication to War. 1st ed. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2006.
Woods, James L. “US Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian
Operations in Somalia.” In Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed
Humanitarian Intervention, edited by Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst,
151–72. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.
Woods, Megan, Rob Macklin, and Gemma K. Lewis. “Researcher Reflexivity: Ex-
ploring the Impacts of CAQDAS Use.” International Journal of Social Research
Methodology 19, no. 4 (2016): 385–403.
Finishing the job 385
Bibliography Anna Samson
Wright, James. “10 Years After ‘Mission Accomplished,’ the Risks of Another
Intervention.” The Atlantic, May 1, 2013. https : / / www . theatlantic . com /
international/archive/2013/05/10-years-after-mission-accomplished-the-risks-
of-another-intervention/275446/.
Yamashita, Hikaru. “Reading “Threats to International Peace and Security,” 1946–2005.”
Diplomacy & Statecraft 18, no. 3 (2007): 551–72.
Yang, John E. “Bush Defends Non-Intervention in Iraq;President Begins Speech
Campaign to Define ‘New World Order’.” The Washington Post, April 14, 1991.
. “Bush: US, Allies Concur On Refugee Zones in Iraq; Accord Stressed After
Meeting With EC Leaders.” The Washington Post, April 12, 1991.
Zˇagar, Igor. “Topoi in Critical Discourse Analysis.” Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6,
no. 1 (2010). https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/lpp.2010.6.issue-1/v10016-
010-0002-1/v10016-010-0002-1.xml.
Zakheim, Doy S. “The Gulf War’s Aftermath Is the Vietnam Syndrome Dead?;
Happily, It’s Buried In the Gulf.” The New York Times, March 4, 1991.
Zarefsky, David. “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition.” Presidential
Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2004): 607–20.
Zaum, Dominik. “The Norms and Politics of Exit: Ending Postconflict Transitional
Administrations.” Ethics and International Affairs 23, no. 2 (2009): 189–208.
Zoellick, Robert B., and John Hillen. “. . . A Little Clarity of Purpose, Please.” The
Washington Post, March 17, 1999, A27.
Finishing the job 386
Chapter 5 Presidential Texts
Bush, George H. W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation
of the Persian Gulf Conflict. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 6, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265314.
. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis
and the Federal Budget Deficit. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
September 11, 1990. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/264415.
. Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian
Gulf. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, January 16, 1991. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265756.
. Exchange With Reporters Aboard Air Force One. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, May 4, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
265023.
. Exchange With Reporters on Aid to Iraqi Refugees. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, April 11, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
265924.
. Interview With Linda Douglas of KNBC, Jim Lampley of KCBS, and Paul
Moyer of KABC in Los Angeles, California. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John
T. Woolley, June 15, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266028.
. Interview With Middle Eastern Journalists. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, March 8, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265348.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in the Persian Gulf. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 17, 1991. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/265357.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in the Persian Gulf. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 16, 1991. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/265220.
. Presidential Determination No. 91 - 31 – Memorandum on Disaster As-
sistance in the Persian Gulf Region. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 19, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266155.
387
Chapter 5 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Bush, George H. W. Proclamation 6243—For a National Day of Prayer, February
3, 1991. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 1, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/268427.
. Proclamation 6257—For National Days of Thanksgiving, April 5-7, 1991.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 7, 1991. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/268442.
. Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Bethesda, Maryland. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 27, 1991. https : / / www .
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265692.
. Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Hobe Sound, Florida. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 3, 1991. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/265758.
. Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 29, 1991. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266416.
. Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian
Gulf Region. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 2, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265239.
. Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Pres-
ident Jacques Delors of the European Community Commission and President
Jacques Santer of the European Council of Ministers. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, April 11, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
265905.
. Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Robert M. Gates To Be Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency and a News Conference. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, May 14, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/265258.
. Remarks Announcing the Resignation of William H. Webster as Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency and a News Conference. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, May 8, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/265148.
. Remarks at a Dinner Hosted By President Turgut Ozal in Istanbul, Turkey.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 21, 1991. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265351.
. Remarks at a Meeting of the American Defense Preparedness Association.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 9, 1991. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266470.
. Remarks at a Meeting With Hispanic Business Leaders and an Exchange
With Reporters in Newport Beach, California. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, April 5, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265787.
Finishing the job 388
Chapter 5 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
. Remarks at an Arbor Day Tree-Planting Ceremony and an Exchange With
Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 26, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266311.
. Remarks at an Independence Day Celebration in Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 4, 1991. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/267034.
. Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 13, 1991. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265992.
. Remarks at the Annual Southern Baptist Convention in Atlanta, Georgia.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 6, 1991. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265746.
. Remarks at the Community Welcome for Returning Troops in Sumter, South
Carolina. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 17, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265476.
. Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Declaration of the Legion
of Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to Sir Peter de la Billiere in London,
United Kingdom. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 14, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266605.
. Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medals of Freedom
and Presidential Citizen’s Medals. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
July 3, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/268252.
. Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony of the Declaration of the Legion of
Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, to General Michel Roquejeoffre in Ram-
bouillet, France. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 14, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266598.
. Remarks at the Presentation of a Point of Light Award to the United States
Naval Academy/Benjamin Banneker Honors Mathematics and Science Society
Partnership in Annapolis, Maryland. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 23, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266222.
. Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony
in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
May 29, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265553.
. Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in Ann
Arbor. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 4, 1991. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265030.
. Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven,
Connecticut. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 27, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265542.
Finishing the job 389
Chapter 5 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Bush, George H. W. Remarks Commemorating the National Days of Thanksgiving in
Houston, Texas. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 7, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265796.
. Remarks Following Discussions With President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of
Djibouti and an Exchange With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 24, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266233.
. Remarks Following Discussions With President Jacques Delors of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community and President Jacques Santer of the European
Council of Ministers. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 11,
1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265916.
. Remarks Following Discussions With Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar de la Guerra of the United Nations. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, May 9, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265185.
. Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 16, 1991. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/266047.
. Remarks on Signing the Federal Energy Management Executive Order. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 17, 1991. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/266076.
. Remarks on the London Economic Summit and an Exchange With Foreign
Journalists. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 8, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266458.
. Remarks to Members of the Defense Community at Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 11, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265908.
. Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 1, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/265226.
. Remarks to Veterans Service Organizations. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, March 4, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265240.
. Statement on Aid to Iraqi Refugees. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 5, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265785.
. Statement on Signing the Bill Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi
Refugees and Displaced Persons. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
June 13, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266011.
. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, August 2, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265696.
Finishing the job 390
Chapter 5 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
. The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 1, 1991. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/265236.
. The President’s News Conference With President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
of Mexico in Houston, Texas. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
April 7, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265819.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of
Japan in Newport Beach, California. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 4, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265783.
. The President’s News Conference With Secretary of State James A. Baker
III in Houston, Texas. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 6,
1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265794.
. The President’s News Conference With Turkish President Turgut Ozal in
Ankara, Turkey. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 20, 1991.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265326.
. Toast at a State Dinner in Ankara, Turkey. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, July 20, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265327.
Carter, Jimmy. Visit of Lieutenant General Obasanjo of Nigeria Toasts of the
President and Lieutenant General Obasanjo at a Dinner Honoring the Nigerian
Head of State. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 11, 1977.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/242820.
. Visit of President Perez of Venezuela Toasts of the President and President
Perez at a Dinner Honoring the Venezuelan President. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, June 28, 1977. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
244101.
Clinton, William J. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/218797. Edited by Ger-
hard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 29, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/node/220768.
. Remarks Announcing a Missile Strike on Iraq and an Exchange With Re-
porters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 3, 1996.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/223042.
. Remarks Announcing Pension Portability Regulations and an Exchange With
Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 17, 1996.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/221162.
. Remarks on the American Helicopter Tragedy in Iraq and an Exchange
With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 15, 1994.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/219038.
. Remarks on the Missile Strikes on Iraq and an Exchange With Reporters.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 4, 1996. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/223067.
Finishing the job 391
Chapter 5 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Clinton, William J. Remarks on the Return of the United States Delegation to
Haiti. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 16, 1994. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/218797.
. Teleconference Remarks With B’nai B’rith. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, August 24, 1994. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
218314.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of
Turkey. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 15, 1993.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/218612.
. The President’s Radio Address. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, September 14, 1996. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/222257.
Nixon, Richard. Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign
Policy. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 3, 1973. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/255404.
. Toasts of the President and Premier Chou En-lai of China at a Banquet
Honoring the Premier in Peking. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
February 25, 1972. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/255121.
Reagan, Ronald. Toasts of President Reagan and President Soeharto of Indonesia at
the State Dinner. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 12,
1982. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246273.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. Address for Navy and Total Defense Day. Edited by Address
for Navy and Total Defense Day, October 27, 1941. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/210207.
Finishing the job 392
Chapter 6 Presidential Texts
Bush, George H. W. Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly in New York City. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
September 23, 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266506.
. Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, December 4, 1992. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/267749.
. Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21, 1992. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/267788.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in Somalia. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, December 10, 1992. https : / / www .
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/267810.
. Presidential Debate at the University of Richmond. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, October 15, 1992. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/217084.
. Presidential Debate in St. Louis. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, October 11, 1992. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217078.
. Question-and-Answer Session in Grand Rapids. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, October 29, 1992. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/267475.
. Remarks at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, December 15, 1992. https : / / www .
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/267885.
. Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, January 5, 1993. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266384.
. Remarks on Lighting the National Christmas Tree. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, December 10, 1992. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/267828.
393
Chapter 6 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Bush, George H. W. Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 9, 1991. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/266587.
. Remarks to the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, December 7, 1991. https :
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/265871.
. Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Military Airlift for Humanitar-
ian Aid to Somalia. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, August 13,
1992. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266783.
. The President’s News Conference in Kennebunkport, Maine. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, August 8, 1992. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/268592.
Clinton, William J. Address to the Nation on Somalia. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, October 7, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
218391.
. Exchange With Reporters at Yale University in New Haven. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 9, 1993. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/218487.
. Exchange With Reporters on Departure for New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 8, 1993. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/218435.
. Exchange With Reporters Prior to a Meeting With Congressional Leaders.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 28, 1993. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217975.
. Exchange With Reporters Prior to a Meeting With Democratic Congressional
Leaders. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 13, 1993.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217871.
. Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Prime Minister Carlo
Azeglio Ciampi of Italy. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Septem-
ber 17, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217711.
. Interview With Foreign Journalists. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, July 2, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/219494.
. Interview With Larry King. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
January 20, 1994. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/220375.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders on Deployment of United States Troops
to Somalia. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 1, 1995.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/221028.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders on Somalia. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, July 1, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/219444.
Finishing the job 394
Chapter 6 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Use of United States Armed Forces
in International Operations. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
October 18, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/218704.
. Message to the Congress Transmitting a Report on Somalia. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 13, 1993. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/218531.
. Radio Address to the Armed Forces. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 12, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/220441.
. Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Breakfast. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, October 8, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/node/218429.
. Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 26, 1993. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/220231.
. Remarks at the Children’s Town Meeting. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John
T. Woolley, February 20, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217776.
. Remarks at the Democratic Governors’ Association Dinner. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 1, 1993. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/219718.
. Remarks at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 12, 1993. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/218511.
. Remarks Following Discussions With President Sam Nujoma of Namibia and
an Exchange With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
June 16, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/220423.
. Remarks on Signing the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 6, 1993. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/218281.
. Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning From Somalia. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 5, 1993. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/220335.
. Remarks to the Crew of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 12, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/220427.
. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, June 17, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/220478.
. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, June 15, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/220361.
Finishing the job 395
Chapter 6 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Clinton, William J. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, October 14, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
218575.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi
of Italy in Tokyo. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 7, 1993.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/219598.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Ciampi of Italy.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 17, 1993. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217717.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa
of Japan in New York City. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
September 27, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217965.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of
Turkey. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 15, 1993.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/218612.
. The President’s Radio Address. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, June 12, 1993. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/220323.
Finishing the job 396
Chapter 7 Presidential Texts
Bush, George W. Presidential Debate in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 11, 2000. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/217166.
. The 2000 Campaign; Exchanges between the Candidates in the Third Presiden-
tial Debate, October 18, 2000. https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/18/us/2000-
campaign-exchanges-between-candidates-third-presidential-debate.html.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao
Barroso of Portugal, President Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, and Prime Minister
Tony Blair of the United Kingdom in the Azores, Portugal. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 16, 2003. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/211583.
. The President’s Radio Address. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 15, 2003. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/216002.
Clinton, William J. Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 24, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/229752.
. Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 10, 1999. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226640.
. Closing Remarks at the Central America Summit in Antigua and an Exchange.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 11, 1999. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229277.
. Commencement Address at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado
Springs. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 2, 1999. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226484.
. Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John
T. Woolley, March 31, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229915.
397
Chapter 7 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Clinton, William J. Interview With European Journalists at Rhein Main Air Base,
Germany. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 6, 1999. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229778.
. Interview With Jim Lehrer of PBS’ ‘NewsHour’. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, June 11, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
226668.
. Interview With Tom Brokaw of the National Broadcasting Corporation Aboard
Air Force One. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 4, 1999.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229763.
. Interview With Tom Brokaw of the National Broadcasting Corporation in
Spangdahlem, Germany. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 5,
1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229777.
. Interview With Yevgeniy Kiselev of Russia’s NTV in Cologne. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 20, 1999. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/226809.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 26, 1999. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229803.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United
States Forces to Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, June 5, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226586.
. Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of
Newspaper Editors in San Francisco, California. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley. San Francisco, USA, April 15, 1999. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/229054.
. Remarks at a Memorial Day Ceremony in Arlington, Virginia. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 31, 1999. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/226457.
. Remarks at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commemorative Ceremony.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 1999. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229352.
. Remarks at Georgetown University. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, November 8, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/228744.
. Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 23, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229688.
. Remarks at the Opening of the North Atlantic Council Meeting on Kosovo.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 1999. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229343.
Finishing the job 398
Chapter 7 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
. Remarks at Whiteman Air Force Base in Knob Noster, Missouri. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 11, 1999. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/226661.
. Remarks Following a Meeting With a Congressional Delegation and an
Exchange With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
April 28, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229554.
. Remarks Following Discussions With Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Ger-
many and an Exchange With Reporters in Bonn. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, May 6, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226817.
. Remarks Following Discussions With European Union Leaders and an Ex-
change With Reporters in Bonn. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
June 21, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226817.
. Remarks Following Discussions With NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
and an Exchange With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
April 22, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229313.
. Remarks on Departure for Europe and an Exchange With Reporters. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 4, 1999. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/229733.
. Remarks on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo and an Exchange
With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 10, 1999.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226627.
. Remarks on the National Economy and Kosovar Refugees and an Exchange
With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 2, 1999.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229962.
. Remarks on the Situation in Kosovo. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 22, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229674.
. Remarks on the Situation in the Balkans and an Exchange With Reporters.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 5, 1999. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230036.
. Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, February 26, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/node/228940.
. Remarks Prior to Discussions With NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
and an Exchange With Reporters. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 15, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229434.
. Remarks to American Troops Following Thanksgiving Dinner at Camp
Bondsteel. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, November 23, 1999.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229280.
Finishing the job 399
Chapter 7 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Clinton, William J. Remarks to Humanitarian Relief Organizations in Roseville,
Michigan. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 16, 1999.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229073.
. Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force Troops in Skopje. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 22, 1999. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/226865.
. Remarks to Operation Allied Force Troops at Aviano Air Base in Italy.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 22, 1999. https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226875.
. Remarks to the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in
New York City. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21,
1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226270.
. Remarks to the Community at Barksdale Air Force Base in Bossier City,
Louisiana. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. Bossier City, USA,
April 12, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/228982.
. Remarks to the Community at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 5, 1999. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/229904.
. Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States at Fort
McNair, Maryland. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 13,
1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230110.
. Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 13, 2000. https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/node/229529.
. Statement to the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, July 30, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
node/227329.
. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 19, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229659.
. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, April 24, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229380.
. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, June 25, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226985.
. The President’s News Conference With President Jacques Chirac of France.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 19, 1999. https :
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229939.
. The President’s News Conference With President Jacques Chirac of France
in Paris. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 17, 1999. https:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/226734.
Finishing the job 400
Chapter 7 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema of
Italy. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency
Project. Washington D.C., March 5, 1999. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=57203.
. The President’s Radio Address. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, February 13, 1999. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229229.
Finishing the job 401
Chapter 7 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Finishing the job 402
Chapter 8 Presidential Texts
Obama, Barack. Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 28, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=90195.
. Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21, 2011. http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=96787.
. Interview With Jay Leno on NBC’s “The Tonight Show”. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, October 25, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/?pid=97085.
. Interview With Juan Carlos Lopez of Corriente Latina. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 23, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=97092.
. Joint Op-ed by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, May 24, 2011. http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90613.
. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Commencement of Military
Operations Against Libya. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 21, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90174.
. Libya’s Pathway to Peace: Joint Op-ed by Barack Obama, David Cameron
and Nicolas Sarkozy. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 14,
2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90276.
. Memorandum on Drawdown of Commodities and Services To Support Efforts
To Protect Civilians and Civilian-Populated Areas Under Threat of Attack in
Libya. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 26, 2011. http:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90340.
. Press Release - Readout of President Obama’s Call with Chancellor Angela
Merkel of Germany. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, February 26,
2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=89583.
403
Chapter 8 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Obama, Barack. Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Following a Press Briefing
by White House Press Secretary James F. ‘Jay’ Carney. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, August 20, 2012. https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/node/302263.
. Remarks at a United Nations Meeting on Libya in New York City. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 20, 2011. http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=96771.
. Remarks at a Veterans Day Ceremony in Arlington, Virginia. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, November 11, 2011. http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=97030.
. Remarks at Cannes City Hall in Cannes. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John
T. Woolley, November 4, 2011. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/297470.
. Remarks at Cannes City Hall in Cannes, France. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, November 4, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=96998.
. Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony for the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at Fort Myer, Virginia. Edited by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, September 30, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=96820.
. Remarks at the Holocaust Days of Remembrance Ceremony. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 2009. http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86043.
. Remarks at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 23, 2012. http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=100689.
. Remarks at Univision’s ”Es el Momento” Town Hall Meeting and a Question-
and-Answer Session. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 28,
2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90242.
. Remarks During a Meeting With Prime Minister David Cameron of the
United Kingdom and an Exchange With Reporters in New York City. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 21, 2011. http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=96783.
. Remarks Following a Meeting With President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil in
Brasilia, Brazil. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 19, 2011.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90172.
. Remarks in Cairo. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 4,
2009. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86221.
. Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, December 10, 2009. http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/?pid=86978.
Finishing the job 404
Chapter 8 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
. Remarks on the Death of Former Leader Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi
of Libya. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, October 20, 2011.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=96923.
. Remarks on the Situation in Libya. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, February 23, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=89480.
. Remarks on the Situation in Libya. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 18, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
90162.
. Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Brasilia. Edited by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, March 19, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=90164.
. Remarks on the Situation in Libya From Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts.
Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, August 22, 2011. http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=94603.
. Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of
Turkey and an Exchange With Reporters in New York City. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, September 20, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=96782.
. Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 23, 2009. http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86659.
. Statement on the 15th Anniversary of the Genocide in Rwanda. Edited by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 7, 2009. http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85968.
. Statement on the 15th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide. Edited
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, July 11, 2010. The%20American%
20Presidency%20Project.%20http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=
88174.
. Statement on the Situation in Libya. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, August 21, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
94163.
. The President’s News Conference. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 11, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90137.
. The President’s News Conference With Chancellor Angela Merkel of Ger-
many. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, June 7, 2011. http:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90492.
Finishing the job 405
Chapter 8 Presidential Texts Anna Samson
Obama, Barack. The President’s News Conference With President Carlos Mauricio
Funes Cartagena of El Salvador in San Salvador, El Salvador. Edited by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, March 22, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=90188.
. The President’s News Conference With President Felipe de Jesus Calderon
Hinojosa of Mexico. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 3,
2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=89712.
. The President’s News Conference With President Sebastian Pinera Echenique
of Chile in Santiago, Chile. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
March 21, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9019.
. The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister David Cameron of
the United Kingdom in London. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
May 25, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90445.
. The President’s Weekly Address. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 19, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=90166.
. The President’s Weekly Address. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, March 26, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
90184.
. The President’s Weekly Address. Edited by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, October 22, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=96938.
Finishing the job 406
